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Summary
This thesis focuses on a novel form of UK public sector pay restraint 
strategy: the indirect control of pay through the limitation of the 
budgets and expenditure of authorities by means of cash limits and other 
devices. The 1979-83 period is covered.
Four issues are investigated on the basis of archival work, interviews 
and quantitative data. Since the cash limits pay restraint policy is a 
relatively new phenomenon, it has received little academic attention.
Hence, this investigation makes a contribution to knowledge in respect of 
all four issues.
First, the reasons for Government intervention in pay determination 
are analysed. The role of the Government's price inflation and public 
expenditure objectives is highlighted, as are the sources of wage inflation 
in the economic and political context where finance is determined; in the 
institutional environment; and in strategic influences.
Second, the style of the policy design and policy support is analysed 
and distinguished from past forms of strategy. Attention is drawn to the 
greater flexibility of the cash limits policy, and its imposition rather 
than agreement.
Third, the counter-inflationary performance of the strategy is 
investigated. A statistical and econometric assessment shows the policy 
had as great an effect as the most successful incomes policies. The 
explanation is found to lie in the economic and political markets which 
determined the policy constraints and other financial exigencies; a less 
inflationary institutional setting; and the acquiescence of negotiators.
Fourth, the theoretical and practical implications are drawn out. A 
theoretical model of pay determination under cash limits is derived from 
the findings. On a practical note, the contrasting long run experience of 
incomes policies and cash limits is explained in terms of policy design and 
support. The likely counter-inflationary effects of variants of the cash 
limits policy approach and of alternative strategies are assessed.
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The election of the Conservative Party to power in May 1979 heralded
far-reaching changes of State policy in many spheres of economic and social
1
life in the United Kingdom (UK). The field of public sector pay was no 
exception. After direct regulation of pay increases by the outgoing, 
Labour, Government, a fresh strategy was announced by the incoming 
Conservative administration:
We intend to avoid detailed interference with the pay bargaining 
process. Our task--and it is vital--will be to create the right 
climate, particularly the disciplined financial conditions, 
within which the bargaining process must take place. Of course, 
the Government will necessarily be more closely concerned with 
pay bargaining in the public sector where they are directly 
involved, either as employer or as the provider of a large part 
of any settlement. For it is essential here--as it is for 
similar reasons in the private sectoi— to reconcile the 
consequences of pay bargaining with the resources that are 
available, which are necessarily not unlimited.2
Thus the new strategy was to impose financial constraints on public
sector authorities in order to induce pay increases that were satisfactory
to the Government. To this end, a welter of controls were applied to the
availability of finance for authorities' expenditure, and to the level and
composition of expenditure itself. The most notable instrument was cash
limits. They represented planned ceilings on the amount of money that the
Government proposed to spend on blocks of services during the financial 
3
year.
In sum, there operated what can be termed a 'financial pay restraint 
policy', characterised by the regulation of the incomes and expenditures of 
authorities in an attempt to curb pay rises. It is not to be confused 
with a financial policy in the conventional sense, which relates purely to 
measures directed at financial variables rather than at pay increases. The 
policy might also be called a 'cash limits pay restraint strategy', after 
the major policy instrument used.
2
Tnis new financial pay restraint strategy in tne puDlic sector, as 
pursued by the Conservative Government during their 1979-1983 period of 
office, provides the focus for this thesis.
The present chapter introduces the four issues that are analysed.
Each is outlined and its significance is explained. The structure of the 
thesis is then mapped out.
1. Four Issues
In investigating the new mode of pay control in the public sector, 
four issues receive attention. They concern the reasons for intervention 
in public sector pay determination in this period; the characteristics of 
the State's approach; the performance of the policies adopted; and, 
finally, the implications of the operation of the strategy for State 
strategies towards public sector pay.
While similar questions can be asked regarding any period of pay 
restraint, the issues take on particular significance in the context of the 
novel and distinctive approach of the financial pay restraint strategy.
1.1 Issue 1: The stimuli to intervention in public sector pay determination 
IQ 1979.
Financial pay restraint policies have a long genealogy. Since the 
Second World War the UK has seen a succession of pay control strategies 
of varying kinds in both the public and private sectors. They have become 
so much a part of the economic policy landscape that one of the 
foremost industrial relations academics has contended:
The relevant question therefore is not whether Britain will soon 
see the last of incomes policy, but whether the future will bring 
another series of short-lived policies or one lasting policy.4.
While incomes policy may seem inevitable for one reason or another, it
3
is still pertinent to inquire into the precise rationale for a particular
pay restraint strategy, for history demonstrates that the reasons for 
intervention tend to vary from period to period. In tne first place, while 
wage rises have been deemed 'excessive' in each policy period, the causes 
of the 'excess' pressure have varied over time. On occasions wage­
inflationary forces appeared to emanate from the labour market itself, from
structural and institutional conditions, as well as from real wage 
5
expectations. At other times, given intensities of pay pressures had
greater inflationary implications owing to other economic events, such as
6
the 1967 devaluation, and supply shocks like the 1973-74 oil price rise.
Furthermore, the rationale for intervention has varied with the
assumptions of policymakers regarding the effects of wage increases on
price inflation. For instance, up to the early 1960s, pay rises were
primarily argued to warrant control because they were thought to reflect
7
a high pressure of demand. During the remainder of the 1960s, and much of
the 1970s, pay increases were believed to require control because they were
8
said to be a major contributor to cost-induced inflation.
Finally, although price inflation has naturally tended to be a
dominant primary consideration throughout the postwar period, ultimate
9
concerns have changed. The indirect concern prompting pay control until 
1971 was with the balance of payments under a fixed exchange rate regime.
In the early 1960s this was supplemented with a concern for economic 
growth. After 1971, in contrast, the emphasis turned to the avoidance of 
unemployment caused by uncompetitive prices.
In view of the shifting grounds for the State's forays into public 
sector pay determination, this thesis first focuses on the factors 
encouraging the Conservative Government to embark on pay control in mid- 
1979. Apart from the intrinsic merit of this issue, the inquiry is also of
4
is still pertinent to inquire into the precise rationale for a particular
pay restraint strategy, for history demonstrates that the reasons for 
intervention tend to vary from period to period. In tne first place, while 
wage rises have been deemed 'excessive1 in each policy period, the causes 
of the 'excess' pressure have varied over time. On occasions wage­
inflationary forces appeared to emanate from the labour market itself, from
structural and institutional conditions, as well as from real wage 
5
expectations. At other times, given intensities of pay pressures had
greater inflationary implications owing to other economic events, such as
6
the 1967 devaluation, and supply shocks like the 1973-74 oil price rise.
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concerns have changed. The indirect concern prompting pay control until 
1971 was with the balance of payments under a fixed exchange rate regime.
In the early 1960s this was supplemented with a concern for economic 
growth. After 1971, in contrast, the emphasis turned to the avoidance of 
unemployment caused by uncompetitive prices.
In view of the shifting grounds for the State's forays into public 
sector pay determination, this thesis first focuses on the factors 
encouraging the Conservative Government to embark on pay control in mid- 
1979. Apart from the intrinsic merit of this issue, the inquiry is also of
4
benefit to the study of other issues regarding financial pay restraint 
policies. It informs the second issue, the understanding of the State's 
approach to pay control, since, obviously, the rationale for restraint can 
influence the design of the strategy. For example, whether the model of 
inflation emphasises demand or cost factors can affect whether the policy 
is of a demand-management character or is more direct in orientation. In 
addition, in relation to the third issue, an awareness of tne State's 
reasons for adopting a pay restraint strategy aids the explanation of 
the counter-inflationary performance of the policy: attention can be drawn 
to the ways in which the policy succeeded in restraining the forces that 
were identified as inflationary in mid-1979.
1.2 Issue 2: The form of the financial pay restraint strategy
The appropriate approach to pay control is a lively issue. The early
1970s, for example, saw much debate over technical details. The incomes
policy discussions between the Heath Administration, the Trades Union
Congress (TUC), and, to a lesser extent, the Confederation of British
Industry (CBI), at Chequers and in Downing Street in 1972 revealed major
differences of opinion. The Government was anxious to formulate a policy
that would control pay, by taking account of the wage structure, union
objectives and power centres. The TUC, on the other hand, was concerned to
10
improve the position of the low-paid, and wanted tough price controls.
The Government had the final say, but the style of Stages 2 and 3 in 1973-
74 showed a degree of compromise. Joint flat-rate and percentage limits on
bargaining unit pay bill increases were set, namely £1 per week plus 4 per
cent in Stage 2, and 7 percent or £2.25 per head per week in Stage 3,
subject to carefully specified exceptions. Both policies were statutorily 
11
enforced. Thus the Government ensured compliance but encouraged the
5
redistribution of income to appease the TUC.
The issue of strategy style continues to be extremely topical. As
indicated in the introduction, the post-1979 strategy was sharply different
from previous policies. Whereas ceilings had been put on the pay rises of
12
individuals or bargaining groups throughout Phases 1 to 4 (1975-79),
the financial pay restraint strategy sought to control the availability and
disbursement of authorities' finance.
The second task of the thesis is, therefore, to identify and explain 
the characteristics and distinctiveness of the State's strategy of 
financial pay restraint. Not only is the analysis of merit in itself, but 
also it facilitates the assessment of other issues. In connection with the 
impact of financial pay restraint policies, the morphology clarifies the 
policy components that, in conjunction with other factors, might have 
affected the outcome of pay determination. It also provides a framework 
for discussing some of the implications of the financial pay restraint 
experience for other variants of the strategy and alternative strategies.
1.3 Issue 3: The performance of the financial pay restraint policy
Pay restraint strategies may have a multiplicity of immediate 
13
objectives. As their name implies, and as the discussion of the issue of
the causes of intervention makes plain, the countering of inflation is
always a major aim. In addition, on occasions, policies have aimed to
redistribute income and increase labour market efficiency. Two
considerations have prompted special help for the lower-paid. First,
egalitarian desires for a narrower distribution of income have sometimes
influenced policy design, as was the case in Stages 2 and 3 of the Heath
14
Administration's strategy (1973-74). A second motive has been that, in 
times of restricted real income growth, the higher paid can afford to take
6
a bigger percentage share of tne burden, due to the greater flexibility
that their larger incomes give them. Phase 1 (1975-76) of the Labour
15
Government's strategy was fashioned by this belief, for example.
Meantime, labour market objectives have generally been to raise
productivity as in Stage 3 (1973-74) and Phases 3 and 4 (1977-79), or to
stimulate the movement of labour to undermanned industries as in the late 
16
1960s.
In view of the economic and social importance of the objectives of pay
restraint policies, an apposite question to ask is whether and why
strategies achieved their objectives. Accordingly, this study assesses the
extent and causes of the counter-inf1ationary effects of financial pay
restraint policies. This is not to say that the financial pay restraint
policies had no distributional and labour efficiency objectives. The
differences in increases between groups facilitated by the State's policy
17
were not wholly unconsciously determined. It is also clear that an aim
of the financial constraints imposed by the State on pay was to increase 
18
labour efficiency. However, there is no doubt that the counter-
19
inflationary objective, of the three, was the most important. Although 
the performance is studied with reference to the effect on wage inflation, 
the equity and efficiency effects are introduced as explanations where they 
are germane.
The discussion of the performance of the financial pay restraint 
strategy is also of importance because it is fundamental to the 
conclusions. The implications for pay restraint policies in general and 
in particular are based on the analysis of the performance of the cash 
limits pay strategy.
7
1.4 Issue 4: Tne tneoretical and policy imp!ications of the operation of 
the financial pay restraint strategy
Investigations of specific pay restraint strategies from the point of 
view of their success in achieving their objectives reveal factors 
promoting and hindering desired outcomes. On the assumption of 
regularities in the relationship between negotiation outcomes and the 
independent explanatory variables— and tnere is no reason to suppose there 
are not--conclusions of a general nature can be drawn. This is a valuable 
undertaking, for, in this way, both academic and practical industrial 
relations can be advanced.
If the discipline of industrial relations is to progress, its
paradigms, as applied to the subject area of industrial relations as a
20
whole and to its constituent parts, have to be continually refined. This
may entail redefinition of the key variables and their interrelationships,
or it may involve a different methodology or method. The mere accumulation
of knowledge does not advance industrial relations as a discipline. It
follows that the analysis of pay restraint strategies can contribute to
industrial relations theory by yielding generalisations which can form a
theoretical structure for subsequent investigations, until superseded by
more up-to-date and accurate models.
For industrial relations to be advanced as a practical art, it is
necessary that continual improvement be made in the notions of how the
21
industrial relations world currently operates. This applies whatever the 
identity and interests of the practitioner: all form strategies at least 
in part with regard to the form of empirical dynamics. For example, 
governments, in designing pay policies, have in mind a model of pay 
inflation, based, at least in part, on experience. Unions' pay negotiation 
strategies recognise the factors which can be employed to raise
8
settlements, and they acknowledge constraining factors. The opposite
applies to managements. This is not to claim that the State, employers and
unions in practice acknowledge and use all research conclusions
immediately. Nevertheless, the process of research and education no doubt
influences ideas of practitioners, even if in a sporadic and diffuse 
22
manner. It is worth recalling the words of Keynes:
... the ideas of economists and political philosophers... are 
more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is 
ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to 
be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the 
slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear 
voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic 
scribbler of a few years back.23
Therefore, it seems legitimate to believe that the analysis of the
cash limits pay restraint policy can contribute to the practice of
industrial relations through using the generalisations to shed light on the
potential of different strategies. Attention is concentrated on government
strategies, given the driving interest behind the investigation is the
counter-inflationary effect of the financial restraint strategy.
The focus on implications for strategies which have the reduction of
wage inflation as the central objective is not supposed to imply that it is
universally agreed that pay restraint is desirable. The debate is still
open. There are differing views as to whether pay rises are a primary and
24
root cause of inflation. Further, attitudes towards pay restraint vary 
according to the distributional implications of the policy--for example,
for the distribution of income between profits and wages, and between
25
bargaining units.
To fail to acknowledge this, unwittingly or otherwise, would be to
implicitly give the study an ideological bias, owing to the non-neutrality
26
of pay restraint. This would be ethically reprehensible because citizens
9
are not in possession of tne full facts and cannot maks informed judgements 
of the merits of pay restraint; in other words, they would be misled. Fox, 
in criticising the failure of pluralism to divulge details about power 
relations in the existing social order, makes a remark which is equally 
applicable here:
If... there is any reason to believe that the participants are 
not cognisant of the facts, and that their aspirations and 
claims, and their responses to the aspirations and claims of 
others, are affected by this ignorance, then are there any 
legitimate grounds on which social scientists could consider it 
'socially responsible' not to labour at emphasising these 
facts.27
Nevertheless, it is valid to study the implications for counter-
inflationary policies because State pay restraint strategies are likely to
persist, given continuing economic dislocation and the major role of wages
in dominant models of the economy. Other models do exist, but they are
28
unlikely to be taken up by the State.
2. Thesis Structure
The thesis is divided into five parts: an introductory part followed 
by analyses of the four issues. The chapters forming each part vary in 
number and length, according to the necessary extent of discussion and the 
incidence of natural thematic breaks.
In addition to this chapter, Part I contains a second introductory 
chapter. After describing the general methodology adopted in the thesis 
the remainder of the chapter considers the design of the research. The 
bargaining units which were targets of the pay strategy, and which are 
therefore the focus of the investigation, are determined. The broad 
disciplinary approach is outlined and defended and the theory of pay 
determination that underlies the analysis of each issue is spelt out. 
Finally, the empirical research strategy and methods are adumbrated.
10
Part II of the thesis is devoted to tne suggestion and amplification 
of the reasons for the State's intervention in public sector pay 
determination from 1979 to 1983. Chapter 3 first considers the influence 
of the Government's price inflation and public expenditure objectives. It 
then points to the inflationary conditions tnat existed in mid-1979 in the 
economic-political environment, the institutional context and negotiators' 
strategies.
Part III is concerned with the form of the financial pay restraint 
strategy. It examines the distinctiveness of the approach and ascertains 
why it was chosen. In Chapter 4 the key facets of pay control strategies 
in general are initially categorised. The style of the financial pay 
restraint policies of 1979-83 is then spelled out, using the categorisation 
as a descriptive framework. The central features of the strategy are 
compared with those of previous strategies, and the causes of the change in 
strategy orientation are explained.
The assessment and explanation of the performance of the financial pay 
restraint strategy appears in Part IV, covering Chapters 5 to 9 inclusive.
Chapter 5 is devoted to the statistical assessment of the strategy's 
performance. The pay increases gained by the subsectors of the public 
sector in the pay rounds between 1979 and 1983 are analysed, distinguishing 
the role of settlement increases and work-related rises, such as due to 
changes in overtime and output. The performance of the strategy is 
compared with that of previous efforts to control public sector pay. 
Finally, the changes in pay under cash limits are compared with estimates 
of pay rises that would have occurred in the absence of pay restraint 
policies.
The remainder of Part IV sets out to explain the counter-inflationary 
impact of the cash limits pay restraint strategy. Chapter 6 analyses the
11
stringency of the financial constraints on authorities caused by the 
financial pay restraint policy and local financial circumstances in order 
to indicate the extent to which the freedom of pay negotiators was 
restricted. Central government, local authorities and public corporations 
are considered in turn. In each case, the constraints on the size and 
allocation of budgets of authorities are analysed. They are then explained 
in terms of the economic and political environment in which tne authorities 
operate.
In Chapter 7, the role of institutional processes and structures in 
influencing pay determination is analysed. The impact of the internal 
organisation of management and unions is investigated, as are bargaining 
structure and pay determination procedures. Both stable characteristics 
and changing features are studied, in recognition of management and union 
strategies to change the institutional context.
The explanatory relevance of collective bargaining strategies, given 
financial and institutional constraints, is examined in Chapter 8.
Reference is made to the pay criteria used by negotiators, the relative 
strategic, economic and political power of management and unions, and the 
politics of wage decisions.
Chapter 9 contains an econometric cross-section analysis of the causes 
of the impact of financial restrictions on pay determination during the 
period. Being quantitative, it complements the qualitative conclusions of 
Chapters 6 to 8. First of all, the equations are specified and the 
variables are operationalised given the data. The results are then 
presented and compared with those derived by other methods.
The fourth and final issue, the academic and practical implications 
for pay restraint strategies, is investigated in Part V. The tenth chapter
12
draws up d tentative theory of the impact of financial pay restraint 
strategies from the research findings. The practical implications are also 
considered. The relative effectiveness of financial pay restraint policies 
vis-a-vis other past forms of strategy is examined on the basis of actual 
experience. In addition, the probable effects of different styles of 
financial pay restraint strategy are considered in the light of the 
theoretical model. The prospects for alternative strategies are also 
analysed in the light of the experience of pay determination under 
strategies of the financial variety. The thesis ends with a final 
conclusion concerning the outlook for financial pay restraint strategies.
13
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The results of the inquiry depend on the principles and procedures by 
which the research is conducted. The logic or methodology of the 
investigation affects the validity of the knowledge produced. The 
definition of the field of study, the theoretical basis of the analysis, 
and the empirical research techniques, all also flavour the conclusions.
Consequently, it is worthwhile to adumbrate and justify the 
methodology and research design before moving to the analysis. Thus 
Section 1 details the methodology guiding the investigation, while Section 
2 explains the coverage of the public sector for the purposes of the study; 
the basic theoretical framework underlying the four analyses is to be found 
in Section 3, and the combination of research methods used is described in 
the fourth section.
1. Methodology
In considering the issues, a procedural logic has to be followed which 
is capable of producing findings that are valid in the sense that they are 
accurate, complete, and reliable. A theoretical or empirical approach may
be adopted, or theory and empiricism may be combined in one of a variety of
1
ways. This study proceeds on the assumption that both theory and 
empiricism play a necessary role.
For a satisfactory analysis, empirical data must be unearthed. Theory 
cannot of itself sufficiently analyse the issues, particularly in view of 
their focus on a new form of pay restraint policy. Two reasons are 
apparent. In the first place, owing to the novelty of the policies, some 
aspects of the theory would be speculative and vague. Secondly, even if 
pre-existing evidence supported the theoretical propositions, they would be 
no more than plausible. They would not have been confirmed as currently
true by a validation process. Historical evidence drawn from studies of 
related issues might in fact be inapplicable to financial pay restraint 
policies owing to the new approach and also the passage of time: thus the 
factual base might be inadequate or incorrect, emphases might be misplaced 
and interrelationships might be misspelt.
Equally, unbridled empiricism would be problematic. At a
methodological level, it would tend to yield data which were most easily
identified by the chosen empirical method, rather than those required by 
2
intelligible theory. To take an example from tne determinants of pay 
rises, uninformed empirical fieldwork might tend to emphasise behavioural 
factors such as pay demands and the use of bargaining power, to the neglect 
of the role of structural factors. Similarly, quantitative methods might 
simply emphasise variables that could be measured or proxied, although 
unquantifiable factors such as institutional processes might also be 
relevant. Further, the necessity inherent in empirical work to limit the 
investigation, owing to the size of the population of data that could be 
tapped, might mean that in unguided studies the data would not produce 
valid results and conclusions. Irrelevant information would no doubt be 
accumulated. Important factors might be omitted. False emphases and 
relationships might be derived. Even if, as is likely, a theory was being 
followed noncognisantly, a high degree of sophistication would be 
unlikely, and, as a result, the same problems would arise.
Given the data, the process of explanation from empirical data, too, 
is questionable on methodological grounds. If the explanation is produced 
simply by uninformed inferences from the data, it is of dubious validity.
It is merely plausible: it is consistent with the evidence but it is not 
confirmed because theoretical alternatives have not been posed and tested
20
against the preferred hypothesis.
In addition, at an epistemological level, it is uncertain that
empirical data on their own would constitute knowledge of a significant 
3
scientific nature. The processes studied in this thesis, as with most
studied by social scientists generally, are complicated. An unguided
empirical approach would not be sensitive enough to provide adequate
explanations. The data merely form the basis of explanations.
Together, however, theory and empiricism overcome some of these
problems. Broadly speaking, there are two ways of integrating theory and
empiricism: first, through induction, where studies are carried out in
order to formulate general propositions based on particular empirical
instances and, secondly, through deduction, whereby universal statements
and the specifics of the situation are used to make deductions about the
issue, which are then tested empirically, characteristically by tests of
4
association, to confirm or modify the theory.
The emphasis in this study is on induction. A prior theoretical
framework reduces the methodological disadvantages of unaugmented
empiricism by directing the empirical exercises in four respects. First,
the framework indicates the categories of data which are relevant to the 
5
analyses. For example, in the context of the impact of pay policies, pay
bargaining criteria such as the rate of price inflation are cited as
pertinent variables. Second, the theoretical preliminaries state the
viewpoint from which the facts should be interpreted. For instance, they
make clear whether pay comparability should be interpreted from the
6
viewpoint of management or labour. Third, the theories suggest
interrelationships between the variables, such as the manner in which
7
financial constraints affect economic bargaining power. Finally, the 
framework specifies, at various levels of precision, the links between the
21
facts and the issues under study. A case in point is the way in which the 
criteria and procedures impinge on pay increases.
At the same time, the empirical content and style of the inductive
approach overcomes the deficiencies of a purely theoretical analysis. The
validity of speculative and plausible theoretical propositions is examined
in the light of the evidence. Unsupported propositions are eliminated.
The explanation is broadened to incorporate additional pertinent facts
which were neglected on grounds of perceived irrelevance, or which were
unknown, at the theoretical stage: elsewhere, these have been termed the
9
'recasting' and 'serendipity' functions of empirical research. Further, 
where there are not so much theoretical propositions as broad categories of 
explanatory factors, empirical work not only verifies the importance of the 
categories, but also specifies in greater detail the causal processes at 
work.
The inductive approach is preferred over the deductive approach for 
two related reasons. First, basing the study on deductions is unreliable 
in the field of industrial relations where universal propositions (from 
which deductions can be made) are rare, owing to the nature of human 
behavior. Further, theories, where they exist, are not generally well- 
developed or widely accepted. The danger is that deductions would be 
inaccurate or inappropriate.
This problem is reinforced by the second consideration: empirical 
deductive work is seen as verifying and modifying at the margin, rather 
than enriching and recasting. Indeed, the characteristic style of 
deductive empiricism is simply to carry out tests of association. Hence 
the theoretical shortcomings are not remedied at the empirical stage.
It is argued, therefore, that it is much more appropriate to guide the
8
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research by indicating (intentionally) broad categories of potential 
explanatory factors which can be crystallised and supplemented as necessary 
by empirical results which are produced by methods allowing full analysis 
of the processes at work. Nevertheless, where inductive research produces 
findings that can be cross-checked by deductive principles, the deductive 
approach is used.
2. The Field of Study
The focus of the investigation is confined to the public sector
although, with private sector workers accounting for two-thirds of total UK
employment, and with many public sector employees having formal or informal
links with the pay of private sector workers, settlement levels in private
industry and services can be potent forces in the determination of the
10
overall rate of wage inflation in the economy. The restriction of the
investigation to the public sector can be justified on three main grounds.
First, and most significant, although the strategy in both sectors from
1979 was financial in orientation, the mobilisation of the strategy
differed qualitatively between sectors. Stemming from the financial
relationship of private sector authorities to the government, the policy
instruments used to combat wage inflation in that sector were those
employed in the implementation of monetary policy, rather than cash limits
11
and associated devices which applied to public expenditure. Secondly,
pay increases in the public sector were especially vital to the State, for
reasons which will become evident in Chapter 3. Thirdly, past experience
has shown that the operation and outturn of State pay restraint policies
are frequently different between the public and private sectors, even when
12
a common strategy is in effect. Hence, an exclusively public sector 
focus is unlikely to impose undue restrictions on the wider applicability
23
of the findings.
In order to assess public sector pay restraint policies accurately, it 
is important to be cognisant of the authorities and bargaining units which 
are the targets of the controls. In the context of financial pay policies 
this is particularly advisable owing to the variety of financial 
restrictions imposed and the wide range of circumstances of authorities and 
negotiating units: a limited focus would not necessarily be representative.
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no single, definitive, published 
conception of the UK public sector. Presumably this reflects the 
uncertainties caused by the lack of a formalised and rational machinery of 
government. This section therefore produces a definition of the public 
sector appropriate to the analysis of public sector pay control. The 
shortcomings of existing views are first explained. Following this, 
criteria for defining public sector organisations are proposed. The 
authorities with these characteristies, together with the associated 
bargaining units, are subsequently derived.
2.1 Deficiencies of existing conceptions of the pub!ic sector
Few analyses of the public sector in terms of its employment, finance
or other characteristics, take the trouble to explain the distinguishing
13
features of public sector authorities. Instead, most simply tend to make
casual references to, or draw up lists of, what are believed to be 
14
constituent bodies. Criticisms can be levelled at both the (rare) 
definitions of the public sector and the notions of the authority- 
composition of the sector.
Where attempts have been made to construct a definition they have 
sometimes suffered from imprecision to the extent that greatly differing 
catalogues of authorities could be drawn up according to interpretation.
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For example, one study refers to the criterion of 'government or a
15
government-owned corporation or enterprise', while another defines the
public sector as 'those [undertakings] forming part of the machinery of
central government, those forming part of the machinery of local
government, and those other public undertakings which are largely 
16
autonomous'. Indeed, it might be argued that these definitions are so
vague that they do not in fact constitute definitions.
A second problem with certain definitions is that they rest on varying
ad hoc criteria which have no explicit thread running through them which
applies universally to all public sector authorities. For instance, the
Central Statistical Office defines the public sector as 'the sum of general
government and the public corporations' where the subsectors are defined by 
17
differing criteria. Through failing to define the public sector as a
composite whole, there is a danger that inconsistencies and ambiguities
arise in the assignment of organisations to the public and private sectors.
Available lists of, and references to, public sector authorities are
of limited value, regardless of whether they are based on explicit or
implicit criteria. Clearly, unsubstantiated lists are unsatisfactory
conceptions of the public sector because the basis is unknown, and there is
the worry that if no criterion was used to draw up the list, the potential 
18
error is high. In cases where definitions have been explicitly stated,
their intrinsic shortcomings have caused corresponding deficiencies in the
lists or references. The problems are sometimes compounded in the
application of the criteria: for example, one study fails to identify tax-
funded authorities in central government apart from the civil service, and
19
public corporations other than nationalised industries.
Further inadequacies tend to appear in all types of conception.
First, references are generally made, and lists are often framed, at a high
25
level of aggregation, identifying broad categories of authorities without
20
distinguishing each constituent organisation. Second, where efforts are
made to isolate individual authorities, the references and lists are,
without exception, incomplete. Normal practice is merely to cite only
21
major bodies as illustrations of broader categories of authority. Third,
many lists are out of date owing to government action to widen and narrow
22
the scope of the sector.
Conceptions of bargaining units in the public sector are even more 
23
rare and problematic. Selection criteria are unstated and lists are very 
incomplete.
In view of the severe limitations of currently published conceptions 
of public sector authorities and bargaining groups, it is necessary to 
establish explicit, universal, criteria defining the public sector which 
are plausible and precise, and to rigorously apply them to form an up-to- 
date, comprehensive and disaggregated list of bodies forming the public 
sector. Constituent bargaining units can then be exposed.
2.2 The establishment and application of satisfactory criteria
The essential feature of the public sector is that authorities are 
under public ownership and control. It is in such bodies that the 
government is directly or indirectly the employer with responsibility for 
the determination of pay, and can implement a distinctive pay restraint 
policy.
In this context, public ownership and control are being taken to imply 
three characteristics. First, it is presumed that the interests of the 
public rather than those of industry or persons are served. Second, a 
dependence on finance from sources other than private funds, (such as 
private capital which might yield ownership or control rights), is
26
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envisaged. Third, there must be some form of public accountability. All 
three criteria must be met for an authority to be classified as part of the 
public sector; a failure to meet any of the criteria may indicate the 
possibility of a response to private interests and a corresponding 
diminution of the role of the government as ultimate employer with 
responsibility for wage decisions.
The notion that public ownership and control is of central importance 
gives this conception of the public sector an explicit, plausible, and 
universal base. The three-pronged operationalisation of the notion ensures 
a high degree of precision.
In applying the criteria it is evident that authorities of widely 
varying detailed characteristics qualify for public sector status. Three 
subsectors, each with its own configuration of distinguishing 
characteristics, can be isolated: central government, local authorities and 
public corporations.
2.2.1 Central government
Central government is taken to comprise bodies which advise the 
government, and formulate and administer government policy. The 
authorities are distinctive in terms of all three criteria. They serve the 
interests of the public performing functions associated with government at 
national level. Secondly, there is an effective total--or near-total-- 
dependence on the government for finance for expenditure. This does not 
imply that all finance is necessarily funded by national taxation. Some 
may come from other sources, but either it is closely regulated by the 
government; or explicit compensating adjustments are made to Exchequer 
finance; or it is relatively insignificant. Thirdly, a Minister of the 
Crown or other responsible person is accountable to Parliament for the
27
activities of the authority. This involves a greater or lesser degree of
Ministerial and departmental control over the operation of the body.
Authorities which are government-financed generally submit detailed
statements of expenditure and revenue to Parliament, and are usually
subject to official audit and possible investigation through the work of
the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Public Accounts Committee and the
various House of Commons committees.
Other than the Armed Forces and Parliament, two main categories of
central government organisations can be isolated on the basis of the
criteria: government departments and non-departmental bodies. The key
difference between departments and non-departmental bodies lies in the form
24
of public accountability and control to which they are subject.
Departments are under day-to-day direction by Ministers and Permanent
Secretaries. In contrast, non-departmental authorities are controlled in
less detail. Stringent control is confined to major matters such as the
expenditure programme of the body and the allocation of grant finance for
expenditure. Although both types of body are financially dependent on the
Exchequer, it tends to be (but is not always) the case that departments
receive government money direct from the Exchequer while non-departmental
bodies receive it through departments.
Many conceptions of the composition of the category of government
25
departments exist, largely varying according to the purpose in hand. For
example, government financial publications such as the Supply Estimates and
the Appropriation Accounts list departments which account for public 
26
expenditure Votes. Different lists of departments can be found in 
government staffing publications; in Hansard, for answering Parliamentary 
questions; in the reports of the Par 1 iamentary Commissioner for
28
Administration; and various other official and non-official 
28
publications. However, no source adopts the criteria preferred here. As 
a result, an independent list has been constructed. It appears in 
Appendix 1.1. All the bodies fulfil national government functions, are 
cited in the Supply Votes as directly in receipt of Exchequer funds for 
expenditure, and are subject to detailed control as distinct authorities.
Problems also beset the use of available compilations of central 
government non-departmental bodies. Few have been based on appropriate 
criteria. Indeed, most lists have not been prepared with the purpose of 
isolating central government authorities. They have encompassed 
authorities serving industrial or personal interests; some bodies have not 
been dependent on government for finance, and others have either not been 
accountable or not tightly controlled. Thus, variously, their focus has
included all non-departmental bodies with a role in the processes of
29
government; permanent agencies of government, whose chairman or board was
appointed by government, and whose staff was separate from that of the
30 31 
department; and bodies to which Ministers appoint members.
In view of this situation, the central government non-department
criteria have been applied to bodies mentioned in these publications and to
other bodies that have been omitted. Those authorities meeting the
criteria and employing more than 2000 full-time equivalent individuals are
listed in Appendix 1.2.
In total, this view of the composition of central government may
approximate other conceptions, but this version has a more apposite
foundation, and, given the criteria, is more accurate and comprehensive
than most. In mid-1979 the sector consisted of 2,424,000 jobs (no
32
distinction being drawn between full-time and part-time jobs). The 
employment levels in major authorities are shown in Appendix 1.2. The
27
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dominant employers are clearly the civil service, the armed forces, the 
National Health Service (NHS), and the universities.
The bargaining units to which central government employees belong (at 
the principal level of pay determination in cases where they are subject to 
more than one agreement), together with the approximate numbers of 
employees covered, are also indicated in Appendix 1.2. It can be seen that 
the targets of policy in central government are mainly large bargaining 
units which negotiate at national level.
2.2.2 Local authorities
Local authorities are authorities of limited geographical scope with
powers and duties to provide public services. Their characteristics assign
them to the public sector but distinguish them from central government and
public corporations. They serve the public interest as defined by local
governments within parameters set by national government. Although
publicly funded, there is less effective dependence on the government for
finance than in central government, for a significant proportion of finance
is raised through the power of authorities to levy certain forms of local
taxes. Public accountability takes the form of the making of returns of
income and expenditure under the Local Government Act 1972 and the Local
Government (Scotland) Act 1973. Financial accounts are audited in England
by the district auditor (appointed by the Secretary of State for the
Environment) or an approved private auditor. Audit is carried out by
33
different bodies elsewhere in the UK.
The authorities meeting these criteria are relatively easy to
identify, as compared with central government bodies. A summary appears in
Appendix 2. The main bodies covered are authorities with general
34
administrative functions. In England and Wales, for example, in 1979
f
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there were 53 large county authorities (6 of them being metropolitan 
counties), within which there were 369 smaller district authorities.
English county councils usually have responsibility for police, the fire 
service, transportation planning, strategic planning, highways, traffic 
regulation, consumer protection and refuse disposal. District councils are 
charged with functions such as environmental health, housing, and refuse 
collection. In non-metropolitan areas county councils are responsible for 
education, libraries and personal social services, while in metropolitan 
areas district councils have responsibility. Special arrangements apply in 
London, functions being divided between the Greater London Council and the 
London boroughs (including the Corporation of the City of London).
Additional to general administrative authorities under the local authority 
umbrella are a myriad of local bodies with special functions such as 
markets and licensing authorities.
In aggregate, UK local authorities employed 3,070,000 individuals (on
a job-count basis) in mid-1979. The whole-time equivalent total was
approximately 80 per cent of this figure. Of the job-count total, 52 per
cent were engaged in education, 11 per cent in social services, 5 per cent
35
in construction, and 6 per cent in the police service.
The principal local authority bargaining units, and their size, are 
listed in Appendix 2. As in central government, the principal level of pay 
determination is at national level. These units form part of the focus of 
pay restraint policy and hence the field of study of this investigation.
2.2.3 Public corporations
Public corporations are public trading bodies with a substantial 
degree of independence from central government and local authorities. They 
pursue the public interest according to the wishes of their boards within
31
the bounds set by government. The assets are publicly owned. No finance
is obtained from shareholders or proprietors. However, in contrast to
central and local authorities, there is generally less dependence on
government-sanctioned finance. The government makes grants to some
corporations and facilitates external finance from public dividend capital
and borrowing, but usually a significant proportion of finance is raised
internally from trading operations. Public accountability is exercised
through the whole or majority of the board of each corporation being
appointed directly or indirectly by the Sovereign, Parliament or Ministers.
Freedom from detailed intervention through an arm's-length relationship
between corporations and government is rooted in the Morrisonian concept of 
36
a public corporation.
The authorities fitting these criteria in mid-1979 appear in Appendix
3. At this time, eighteen were designated nationalised industries,
differentiated from other public corporations by the degree to which they
were engaged in the sale of goods and services and by the extent to which
37
they gained revenue directly from customers. Subsidiaries of public
corporations are allocated to the public corporation sector when their
accounts are consolidated with those of the parent corporation. The
subsidiaries of the National Enterprise Board (NEB) are excluded on the
grounds that their accounts are not consolidated with the parent company
and some private shareholders remain. In spite of government involvement,
they are more appropriately seen as part of the private company sector.
Since the effective date of the list of public corporations the
government has passed legislation allowing the sale of the whole, or parts
38
of, a number of nationalised industries to private interests. The first 
public corporation to be denationalised was British Aerospace in February
32
1981 when a minority holding was sold. Consequently, tnis industry is now 
part of the private company sector. Also, since mid-1979 Crown Agents 
(January 1980) and HMSO (April 1980) have been switched from central 
government to public corporation status.
The public corporations employed 2,061,000 full-time equivalents in
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mid-1979, of which 1,774,000 were in nationalised industries. The 
disaggregated picture appears in Appendix 3. Since this time, several 
authorities have contracted, notably steel which has halved in size.
The bargaining units appear in the same appendix. The main level of 
bargaining is the national level once again, but in a few cases there is 
some decentralisation. Correspondingly, pay restraint strategies are 
directed primarily at national-level negotiations.
2.2.4 Summary
In sum, the public sector covers a wide range of authorities, all 
publicly owned and controlled, but differentiated by the particular type of 
public interests served, source of public finance, and procedures for 
accountability. The financial pay restraint strategy was targetted 
directly at these authorities, and indirectly at the associated bargaining 
units, which are primarily national-level entities. In consequence, the 
theoretical framework and the empirical research in this study are designed 
to take account of differing financial contexts and the salience of 
national-level bargaining. It is to the theoretical basis of the 
investigation that attention is now directed.
3. Theoretical Framework
The purpose of the theoretical framework is to provide a theory of pay 
determination that can be used to help direct the empirical research into 
all the issues under scrutiny. The reasons for government involvement in
33
pay control in the period of interest, the first issue, clearly might
include forces in pay determination that foster inflationary tendencies.
The form of the financial pay restraint policy, too, may reflect the manner
in which pay is settled. Similarly, the causes of the impact of the
financial pay restraint strategy on pay increases can be more easily
identified with reference to the factors determining pay. Finally, the
consideration of the theoretical and practical implications of the strategy
is enlightened and structured by analysing the relationship of types of
policy to the determinants of wage inflation. Of course, in each case, the
basic, and necessarily very general, model of pay fixing has to be suitably
modified and supplemented to suit the particular question in hand: these
theoretical amendments are introduced in the relevant parts of the thesis.
Many kinds of theories of pay are feasible, distinguished in part by
their disciplinary paradigms which define the essentials of pay
determination and the pattern and content of the interrelationships between 
40
the key variables. Thus, to the extent that there exists an industrial
41
relations paradigm (and there is much debate about this), it is
associated with pay theories which focus on institutional and strategic
factors such as structures, relations, processes, policies, power, and
42
legal and policy constraints. Particular paradigmatical differences,
such as between pluralists and radicals over power relations, account for
43
some internal differentiation of approach.
Alternatively, pay determination might be analysed less from the
standpoint of institutions and strategies as from the human actions which
44
produce, and work within, those impersonal variables. A market-oriented 
economic approach, predicated on the asserted importance of commodities, 
individuals and exchange, would explain pay in terms of individual labour
34
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Market choices on the supply side, and product market and technological
45
forces on the demand side. Institutional economists would temper tnis
with a recognition of the mediating role of collectivities and other
institutional features of the real world of industrial relations. They
would therefore acknowledge that group decisions, negotiations, and
bargaining power require explicit modelling within a framework that is
46
still at root economic.
Other disciplines centre on different facets of human action and
interaction. A political science view would draw attention to the roles of
basic value systems, demands and expectations of industrial relations
groupings; the interests of groups within larger collectivities; and the
47
organisation, procedures and internal operation of the parties.
Psychologists would concentrate on motivation and personality; and
48
perceptual and thought processes. Sociological perspectives would 
emphasise the part played by the social structure at micro- and macro­
levels, such as the class divide and workgroup constituencies, and that
played by social processes within those structures, such as the
49
preoccupation with drawing limited social comparisons. Historical
approaches would seek to expose the rationale of settlements with reference
50
to the circumstances of the time. Legal analyses would acknowledge the
51
influence of the attitudes of legislative bodies and the courts.
The value of each paradigm is undeniable. All approaches are capable,
through their individual angles and styles, of contributing to the
understanding of pay determination. None is intellectually feeble.
A multi-disciplinary analysis has obvious attractions. In the first
place, disciplines can be of 'additive' explanatory merit in the sense that,
in combination, they are able to account more accurately for the outcome of
52
pay determination than can one discipline in isolation. For example, an
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economic perspective might indicate similar pay negotiation outcomes, given 
the same economic circumstances, in two authorities, but a political 
perspective used in conjunction would recognise the possibility that the 
outcomes might vary according to internal organisational politics which 
affect the intensity with which claims and offers are pursued.
Secondly, disciplines complement each other in the sense that they 
provide 'correlative1 explanations, that is, alternative perspectives on 
the same causal process, one discipline exposing correlates of explanations 
in others. For instance, in the above example, economic and political 
explanations would correlate each other to the degree that the result of 
intra-party manoeuvring merely mirrored the financial position of the 
authorities.
Although a multi-disciplinary approach would facilitate a full 
explanation in both these senses, anything but a superficial treatment is a 
monumental undertaking. Since there is no interdisciplinary intellectual 
framework as such, the paradigms of each discipline would have to be used 
to describe and explain the relevant issues. In order to make the present 
analysis of the public sector financial pay restraint policy manageable, 
the perspective is restricted. The inquiry is fundamentally an industrial 
relations study. Thus a strong institutional flavour is maintained: the 
investigation proceeds in full recognition of the importance to 
explanations of the role of industrial relations institutions and 
strategies, such as management, union, and government structures and 
policies. However, the approach is not imperialistic.
The industrial relations structures and processes are recognised to be 
affected by other forces. Importantly, the roles of economics and politics 
are considered. It is held that these disciplines provide the most
36
appropriate paradigms to analyse pay determination outcomes because the
economic and political climate is necessarily, directly and significantly
related to the financial environment and the shape of institutions and
strategies. Of course, this is not to argue that other forces are
redundant. The part played by historical, legal, social and psychological
factors is not precluded where of significant additive importance.
However, this approach is not without its critics. Since the public
sector is inevitably more susceptible to political market forces than is
the private sector which responds more readily to economic market forces,
given the freedom afforded by competition, law and economic management
policies, it has been argued by some that for all intents and purposes the
environment of public sector industrial relations can be considered as
simply political. For example, Batstone et. al. have argued strongly that
the political contingency rather than the pursuit of 
profitability determines the logic of management action in the 
state firm.53
Thus labour relations strategies are seen as responding to political 
signals: for instance,
the contingency may lead to political decisions to increase the 
degree of exposure of state enterprises to market forces, and 
this in turn may induce management to seek greater control of 
labour.54
It is certainly worthy to underline the importance of political
forces, but it is a mistake to abstract from economic markets. One is
reminded of Boulding's lament in 1949:
There is a strong tendency among... labor specialists, not merely 
to let economics go by default out of ignorance, ... but to cast 
it out of the window bodily, with shrill cries of jubilation.
One can hardly pick up a new book on labor nowadays without 
finding the author jumping gleefully on what he thinks is the 
corpse of demand and supply, or proclaiming with trumpets 'The 
labor market is dead...55
Public sector managements' objectives are indeed politically-determined,
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but strategies nave to react to changing economic circumstances, independe­
ntly of the political exigencies. For instance, a contraction in demand 
caused by a recession might cause a reappraisal of public corporation wage 
policy in order to meet the given financial targets. A rise in demand, 
conversely, mignt facilitate a more flexible response to union demands.
To be sure, Batstone et. al. acknowledge, in passing, that
the way the strategy formation process works itself out in a 
particular organisation depends on the nature of the activity - 
the service provided, the sort of market, the technology, the 
labour force.56
However, this is not developed and (in the same sentence) pride of place is
attributed to the political contingency. The root of the problem appears
to be a methodological focus on the political process of strategy
generation, which leads to non-political factors being treated as exogenous
constraints and being robbed of independent explanatory power.
At the other extreme, some might argue that political factors largely
mirror economic factors. According to this view, the economist:
is somewhat in the position of the astronomer who can neglect the 
problem of whether angels move the planets, because whether they 
do or not their behaviour toward the planets is perfectly 
regular, and therefore predictable, and hence any other quirks of 
motive or character which they possess can be neglected. I say 
'somewhat' because the men who move commodities are much less 
regular in their behaviour toward them than are the angels, if 
any, toward the planets, and hence the economist cannot regard 
the universe of commodities quite without regard to the men who 
move them and are moved by them. Nevertheless, the behaviour of 
men toward commodities is regular and simple enough to justify as 
a first approximation the concept of a universe of commodities 
following its own laws.57
This position, too, is rejected in this context. The danger would be 
analogous to that implicit in the approach of Batstone et. al.: that 
disciplinary polarisation would lead to key explanatory factors being 
ignored. The joint economic-political approach would seem to be more 
fruitful.
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Reflecting the disciplinary orientation, the fundamental proposition 
of the theoretical framework is that pay increases are the product of 
negotiators' pay determination strategies within the economic-political 
environment and the institutional and procedural context. Micro- and 
macro-economic forces and politically-determined rules of conduct for 
authorities, through their implications for financial parameters, influence 
the arguments of the parties to pay determination and their bargaining 
power. The internal organisation of the parties, as well as the 
negotiating context of bargaining structure and the procedures according to 
which negotiations take place, can also affect pay strategies. Within 
these constraints the bargaining strategies themselves are partly of 
independent relevance to pay determination, influenced by internal 
politics, power and social concerns. These categories of explanation are 
applicable to pay determination at any level, be it where principal 
increases are negotiated or where rewards for work input, productivity and 
output are administered on a day-to-day basis.
For pedagogical purposes the theoretical framework is divided into 
three parts. The potential consequences for pay increases of the economic- 
political market environment; the organisational and procedural context: 
and bargaining strategy, are specified. At the same time, the factors 
moulding the contexts and strategy are indicated.
Parenthetically, it should be said that as a result of the use of a 
multidisciplinary framework, albeit with a restricted selection of 
paradigms, the theoretical basis of the thesis is to some extent 
disjointed. The causal factors, noted in different disciplines, 
and to some extent being independent of each other, cannot be readily 
interrelated in any regular fashion. Nevertheless, this does not detract
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from the potential explanatory power of the framework.
More generally, it should be noted that the theoretical framework is 
drawn up at a relatively high level of generality and comprehensiveness. 
This is intentional and in accordance with the methodological stance taken 
in the thesis, whereby categories of explanation are indicated in order to 
give the empirical work direction, but are not so specific that the 
research suffers from tunnel-vision.
3.1 The economic-political market environment
The economic-political environment is important in pay determination
primarily because it imposes financial constraints on negotiators. The
elements of the economic-political market which define the financial
constraints faced in bargaining in the public sector are deducible from a
bilateral monopoly model of wage determination. Such a theory is
appropriate because public sector authorities in the UK are generally
relatively large employers of the categories of labour hired and unions are
prevalent throughout the public sector, with very high membership density,
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especially amongst manual workers.
In the model, depicted in diagram 3.1, the authority's labour demand 
curve shows that the wage the employer is willing to pay varies with the 
marginal revenue productivity of labour. The marginal demand curve shows 
the increase in the wage bill upon an increase in the demand for labour.
The monopolistic position of the employer implies that wages must be raised 
to increase employment in the authority - the labour supply curve facing 
the firm slopes upwards because the authority's demand for labour has a 
significant effect on the market demand curve, and hence on the market 
wage. As the higher wage has to be paid to all employees, the cost of an 
extra unit of labour - the marginal cost of labour - is above, and
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increases faster than, the wage.
Within this framework, there are conflicting pressures on wages. The
strategy of the employer is assumed by the theory to be to minimise costs.
The equation of the marginal cost of labour with the marginal revenue
product at employment level e yields a preferred wage level w . The
e e
objective of the union is usually held to be to maximise the economic rent 
to labour. At the point e , where the supply price of labour equals the
marginal return to labour, the wage is w . This aim may be realistic where
unions are concerned with relative pay advantages between alternative
employment opportunities. Even if not, it can be safely assumed that the
union aims for a wage above the competitive wage where demand and supply
intersect. Since, in bilateral monopoly, the desired pay levels of unions
and management do not coincide, there is a 'range of indeterminacy' within
which other economic and non-economic forces interact to precisely fix
remuneration between w and w , somewhere on the labour demand or supply
u e
curves, assuming the employer hires all the labour he can, given the wage.
Financial pressures on authorities are implicit in the labour demand 
function. Ceteris paribus, authorities find it easier to finance pay 
increases when the demand for labour increases or becomes more inelastic. 
While there are several factors that can cause this to happen, three are of 
particular importance.
First, higher product or service demand increases labour demand, given 
other factor prices and the technically-determined factor productivities. 
Essentially, higher sales raise prices and revenues in economic markets, 
while in "political markets," where non-trading authorities obtain their 
finance, greater financial provisions for public services and investment 
directly increase budgets.
u
u
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Diagram 2.1: Bilateral Monopoly
Second, monopolistic market structures cause product demand and hence 
labour demand to be inelastic, given the proportion of labour costs in 
total costs, and the feasibility of factor substitution. In economic 
markets, a lack of competition allows product prices to be put up to 
finance pay increases, without a significant fear of a loss of output and 
therefore employment. In political markets, where the authority is in a 
powerful position, it is able to raise finance from the government or 
taxpayer without undue difficulty.
Third, a low labour cost-total cost ratio contributes to inelastic 
labour demand, given the elasticity of product demand and the technical 
possibilities of factor substitution. In both economic and political 
markets, a low ratio facilities higher pay increases within a given budget 
because there is more scope for substituting pay for non-pay expenditure.
Therefore, the financial constraints on central government 
authorities' budgets are determined by the political market structure - the 
power of the authority vis-a-vis the government and other interested 
parties, such as Parliament and the unions, in the planning and control of 
expenditure; by the attitudes of the dominant party in the political market 
towards expenditure; and by the possibilities for expenditure substitution.
Local authorities' budgets are also determined in the political 
market, but in two segments of it. First, in the centre-periphery market, 
the relative market power of the authorities, their associations, the 
government, and other relevant parties together with the dominant political 
market attitudes, is influential in fixing government grants. Second, 
the structure of, and attitudes in, the local submarket involving the 
authorities and ratepayers determine rate income. Within overall 
budgets, the labour cost-total cost ratio is once again important.
The public corporations are involved in both political and
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economic markets. Tne structure of, and attitudes in, the government- 
industry political submarket settle the limits to external financing and 
the other controls on corporation finance and expenditure. The industry 
political submarket, primarily involving the corporations and their 
consumer councils is also relevant, particularly to price determination and 
hence internal revenue. Finally, the economic market structure and product 
demand trends, as indicated earlier, carry implications for revenue.
While these dimensions of the economic-political market environment 
are important to the tneory of pay determination, as the bilateral monopoly 
model indicates, the financial constraints merely form upper constraints on 
pay increases. Other, institutional and strategic, factors may be 
pertinent. They are considered in the next two subsections.
3.2 The institutional environment
One set of forces acting on pay bargaining and mediating economic and 
political exigencies is the configuration of formal and informal structures 
and processes which channels the strategies of the parties. The 
formulation and development of bargaining stances depend in part on the 
organisation of the management and union sides: it helps to determine the 
influential actors in each party, and thus policy. In addition, it affects 
the strength of the party as a whole. The content of strategies and the 
vigour with which they are pursued are also constrained by the framework of 
rules governing the structure of bargaining and the conduct of the pay 
determination process.
3.2.1 Internal party organisation
In more detail, pay offers and claims are affected by the composition, 
arrangement and interrelationships of roles in the organisation, as
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actually operative and not necessarily as formally defined by the 
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authority. These features are reflected in three main structural
characteristics and two central processes: the role composition of the
organisation; the horizontal and vertical distributions of decision-making
responsibility; communications; and control mechanisms.
The role composition of the organisation defines the balance of
functional roles in the organisation and the degree of role specialisation.
Within management, it is probable that more, and specialised, labour
relations and finance roles are more conducive to management strength in 
60
pay determination. For example, in relation to industrial relations
roles, greater and undivided attention could be paid to negotiations, and
skills and knowledge would be possessed or developed, both of which would
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make the management side more adept at the handling of negotiations.
Similarly, specialisation in negotiating by certain union officials, and
the concentration of attention on ’client' bargaining units can be expected
to strengthen unions. More broadly, the occupational
composition of the union membership tends to affect union power. For
instance, manual units may be more militant than white-collar units, as
were postmen vis-a-vis switchboard operators in the 1971 Post Office 
62
strike. A heterogeneous workforce may be less easy to mobilise than a 
homogeneous group.
The horizontal distribution of pay decision-making power between 
management functions, such as finance and labour relations, or between 
separately-constituted ’professional’ negotiation bodies, elected officials 
and management; and between unions on joint union committees, or between 
union officials in different functional roles, can have implications for 
the pay strategy adopted. This arises from the emphasis of different 
considerations.
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Management departments have varying interests, and given autonomy, are
63
likely to pursue them, even to the detriment of other departments.
Further, independently of departmental interests, departments have
different outlooks, tending to perceive the interests of senior management
64
in different ways: departmental specialties tend to be emphasised. The
frames of reference emanate from the members' predispositions, experience,
training, roles and position in the organisation, and departmental 
65
ideology. Consequently, the industrial relations functions may try to
satisfy union demands to a greater extent, ceteris paribus, because it may
believe it to be in its own, and what it perceives to be top management's
interests to have an adequate and quiescent workforce. This may be at odds
with the desire of the finance function to control the organisational
budget, however. All other things being equal, in these circumstances pay
control is more likely to be effective when structures assure that the
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labour relations function is weaker than the finance function. In a
similar vein, professional negotiations, elected officials and executive
management, frequently have different interests and outlooks, so their
67
relative influence in negotiations affects outcomes.
On the union side, functional differences of opinion may occur such as 
between research, organisation and negotiating personnel. But probably 
greater differences are likely between unions on joint committees, rooted 
in differences in membership occupational composition, different pay
68
problems, competitive attempts to increase membership, and ideology.
In both the management and union cases, the organisational features
that affect the horizontal power distribution include the allocation of
seats on pay decision-making bodies, the voting procedures, and the way in
69
which meetings are conducted.
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multilateral allocation of power between, for example, organisational
levels such as the Board and the industrial relations department in a
nationalised industry, and between organisations and external controlling
bodies such as responsible departments and the government. On the union
side, the vertical dispersion of power relates to the authority of the rank
and file vis-a-vis full-time officials and confederate union officials.
Once again, differing views make for potential variation in bargaining 
70
stances according to the distribution of power determined by, for
instance, formal representation and voting rights, and informal access to
those notionally responsible for taking decisions.
Within management, the centralisation of decision-making probably
makes for tougher stances in bargaining for three reasons. First, it
facilitates the achievement of top management's goals through the
71
maintenance of a comprehensive perspective in decision-making. Factors
can be taken into account which are formally beyond the concerns of
devolved layers of authority owing to role specialisation. Importantly,
centralisation of bargaining decisions allows,ceteris paribus, the
acknowledgement of financial constraints to a greater degree. Second,
centralisation may avoid any tendency of labour management to neglect their
responsibilities of pay control. It is firmly established that managerial
72
objectives at different levels are not necessarily congruent, although
for reasons of organisational ethos, career dependency and stringent
73
environmental pressures, this should not be exaggerated. Personal goals 
may vary. Perceptions of the situation and appropriate courses of action 
may differ with the proximity to the situation and the role fulfilled in 
the organisation. Thus, while directors, owing to their position and role, 
tend to show a lack of concern with the position of employees, treating
The vertical distribution of decision-making authority refers to the
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them as a cost that should be controlled, personnel management tend to be
more pragmatic, emphasising 'fair* pay rises maintaining industrial peace
74
and adequate labour input. Tnirdly, concentration of decision-making at
the centre of the organisation may lead to more appropriate pay settlements
where the decisions are non-routine. In such instances, the matters cannot
be handled according to set criteria or procedures by decentralised
personnel, and there may be reluctance to allow lower management to make
75
the decisions especially where they are critical.
Decentralisation, on the other hand, may increase pay control too.
First, it has the advantage that the decision-makers are likely to have
75
detailed knowledge and skills which can be applied in bargaining. They 
may have the professional attributes to deal with non-routine as well as 
routine negotiations. Second, decentralisation aids speedy decision-
77
making, since, ceteris paribus, there is a reduced communications lag.
This may conceivably oil the negotiation process and prevent worker
restlessness and militancy, and thereby lead to lower pay rises than with
constant referral to higher authority.
In unions, too, actors at different levels face different pressures
and have different perceptions. In contrast to management, however, the
consequences of the degree of centralisation of decision-making authority
for bargaining strategy appear more ambiguous. For instance, it has been
argued that in the early 1960s NUS union leaders were able to use their
position to pursue more conservative policies than the membership would 
78
have preferred. Meantime, historically, in the TGWU, Deakin often used
his decision-making power to moderate the demands of militant groups in the 
79
union.
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and control mechanisms. Whatever the locus of decision-making, these
features help determine the extent to which others in the organisation can
exercise influence, bringing their potentially differing perspectives to
bear. That modifications to strategies can result is clear, although
whether stances become more or less militant is sometimes uncertain.
Communication allows decisions to be better informed, and, in
particular, decision makers can be made more aware of the consequences of
80
their planned actions. Further, through wider knowledge and more skill
being addressed to the problem, unintentional errors of judgment may be 
81
reduced. It is difficult to predict the impact on pay. The decision­
making group may come under greater pressure from other groups in the 
organisations, and thus see its power reduced, or, conversely, it may be 
able to strengthen its position through persuasive argument. In 
management, horizontally, the finance function might emphasise the 
financial situation to the industrial relations department, and, 
vertically, the Board might impress on the department the need to take 
account of wider considerations. Alternatively, communications from the 
industrial relations function might secure a more flexible approach in 
bargaining. In unions, vertical communications may be used to attempt to 
persuade the leadership to acknowledge rank-and-file sentiments, or
officials may use them to exhort and explain in order to gain support for 
82
their position.
Control mechanisms within management tend to add to the toughness of 
bargaining strategies. Ceteris paribus, they increase the likelihood that 
organisational members responsible for pay negotiations act so as to 
achieve the goals set for the organisation, rather than different 
perceptions of those aims, or other aims. Programmes for action may be
Mediating the distribution of authority are communications networks
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carefully stated by higher authority, perhaps in financial terms.
Monitoring may occur to check that the plans are adhered to. Procedures
83
for investigation of deviation from the plans may be established.
Union control mechanisms on tne leadership, in tne form of
conferences, branch and workplace meetings, and ballotting provisions, may
modify bargaining strategies although the efficacy of such mechanisms has
sometimes been questioned. For example, the power of the moderates in the
AUEW is reputed to have increased following the switch to postal ballots in
84
elections from branch voting. In advocating strike ballots, the 
Conservative Government of 1979-83 also explicitly assumed that many
85
leaders were more ready to take industrial action than were the members. 
However, in practice, the way in which strategies are affected by control 
mechanisms is more ambiguous, depending on the differences of view of 
leaders and members.
3.2.2 Bargaining structure
Bargaining structure, the framework of procedural rules delimiting
86
bargaining levels, units, formality and scope, is capable of fashioning 
the types of negotiating arguments put forward and the extent to which they 
are enforced by the parties.
The level of bargaining relates to the level of management with direct 
responsibility for negotiation: that is, whether there is multiemployer 
bargaining, authority-level bargaining, divisional or establishment 
negotiations, or workshop pay determination. The implications of the 
bargaining level for the magnitude of pay increases are equivocal.
Centralised bargaining may enhance management's bargaining position 
relative to that of the union in four ways. First, central isation through 
its ramifications for the number of bargaining units, acts to reduce the
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potential for leapfrogging, and thus for costly and inflationary wage 
87
increases. For example, competitive rises may occur where
88
decentralisation gives bargaining groups with similar power, or where
institutional or legal devices (such as the now-defunct Schedule 11 of the
Employment Protection Act) or informal comparisons can be used to transmit
89
pay increases across groups.
Second, centralised negotiations may conceivably reduce union power.
Militant and powerful sections of the workforce may be neutralised in a
more conservative and less powerful mass, such as happened in British 
90
Leyland. Further, the power yielded by developed workforce organisation
and coordination between plants may be made less relevant by central
91
bargaining.
Third, bargaining at authority level facilitates greater management 
control of pay negotiations. Senior management may become involved, there 
being fewer negotiations to deal with, and those now at a higher level. 
Correspondingly, a greater congruence between negotiator goals and top 
management aims may be expected. Indeed, analogously with the evidence on 
the loci of decision-making in management, decentralised bargaining has
been discovered to tend to lead to deviations from 'official' management
92
objectives. For example, in one study, centralised negotiations were
retained because plant management was thought likely to adapt the wage
93
structure to meet production targets.
Fourth, centralisation of bargaining within the authority may heighten 
the awareness of the ability-to-pay. In comparison, there may be a greater 
tendency at a decentralised level to ignore the implications of pay deals 
for the organisation as a whole and for employment security.
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However, the opposite may be true in some instances: decentralisation
of negotiations may further management control. First, bargaining can be
related to economic circumstances. The ability of the authority to pay may
94
be evident from organisational and departmental budgets. Wage levels may
also be curbed by relating them to local rather than national labour market 
95
conditions. Also unit labour costs may be restrained more easily at a
96
local level by negotiating concomitant increases in productivity. For
example, the Commission on Industrial Relations (C.I.R.) found some
companies decentralised bargaining to raise productivity and eliminate
97
demarcation inefficiencies. The National Board for Prices and Incomes
(N.B.P.I.), too, advised such strategies in some cases in the late 
98
1960s. Secondly, decentralised negotiations can minimise union power in
certain circumstances. In particular, when unions are fragmented, weak and
uncoordinated, they are not likely to impose an inflationary threat through 
99
leapfrogging.
Bargaining units, the groups of workers covered by collective
agreements, are partly a function of the level of bargaining (in that more
decentralised arrangements tend to imply more fragmentation), but they are
also independently determined, and are therefore worthy of separate
consideration. The control of pay depends on, once again, the probability
of leapfrogging, and the implications of unit coverage for union power. A
more fragmented structure facilitates leapfrogging, either through
uncoordinated claims or through engineered pattern-setting. As indicated
above, case studies have shown that this is a prevalent worry of
100
managements where comparisons are rife in bargaining. The consequences 
of the composition of units for union power are less clear. Much depends, 
again, on organisation, the distribution of militancy, and inter-union 
coordination. On the one hand, a broad coverage can give the union unity
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and thus power. This was the belief of tne National Union of Mineworkers
(NUM) when it opposed the introduction of area incentive schemes in the
mid-1970s: it felt the NCB would be able to use differential
productivity earnings to weaken the union in central negotiations over
101
annual general increases. On the other hand, a broad coverage can
neutralise powerful elements, which under fragmented arrangements might
stimulate wage advance through competitive bargaining or wage 
102
leadership.
Bargaining form relates to the degree of formality of agreements, that
is the extent to which they are jointly authored and written down. High
degrees of formality are widely believed to increase management control
over pay. Areas of uncertainty can be reduced so that payments are made as
intended rather than according to the pressures operating at the point of 
103
pay determination. For example, formal agreements may prevent the use
of incentive schemes and overtime payments for purposes different from
those intended. On the other hand, formality may not necessarily have the
desired effects if the formal agreements do not carry the same authority
that the previously existing informal understandings had. Informality may
also actually benefit management by providing the leeway for the exercise
104
of tighter unilateral management control.
Finally, bargaining scope, which refers to the subject matter 
encompassed by negotiations, may produce greater or lesser inflationary 
outcomes, depending on the bargaining issues involved. Extensions to the 
number of remuneration items that can be jointly determined are likely, if 
anything, to increase union demands. There are potentially more areas 
where greater benefits are wanted. A wider scope of bargaining in other 
ways might strengthen management's position, in contrast. First, by
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increasing the range of negotiable matters to incorporate former
unilaterally-determined working practices, management and worker
105
inefficiencies may be reduced. This was advised, for example, by the
106
N.B.P.I. in the 1960s. Second, new bargaining issues unrelated to pay,
such as control over decisions, may afford the possibility of concessions
to workers of a non-inflationary kind. This idea lay behind some of the
Social Contract clauses agreed between the Government and the Trades Union
107
Congress (T.U.C.) in 1974.
3.2.3 Pay determination procedures
Given bargaining structures, the practice of negotiation is influenced
by pay determination procedures including formal pay criteria, settlement
dates, settlement intervals, arbitration arrangements, and payment systems.
The potential importance of such procedures for wage inflation is indicated
108
by the plethora of suggestions made for their reform over recent years.
Where there are formal procedures laying down the criteria to be used
in pay determination, in times of financial adversity such as the one under
study, wage increases are likely to be greater where the criteria are
comparability or changes in the cost-of-living, and lower where there is
recognition of the ability to pay (including the rate of productivity
growth). In the first place, there is no reason why the warranted
increases would be within the economic constraints, especially during
conditions of increasing stringency brought about by high price and wage
inflation. Secondly, over the longer term, wage control is endangered
because the cost-of-living argument is likely to accentuate the price-wage 
109 110
spiral, and comparability the wage-wage spiral.
The timing of pay settlements relative to each other can impact on the
magnitude of pay increases in four ways. If anniversary dates are
54
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dispersed widely throughout the year, settlements tend to be reached
against differing backgrounds; different increases may then stimulate
111
relativities claims which are difficult for authorities to finance, as
112
British Leyland reportedly found before centralised bargaining. Second,
the order of settlements in the August to July pay round nay induce pay
rises that are greater than would be payable on the grounds of
international price competitiveness alone, should some sheltered industries
and services settle first and oblige the competitive sector to follow on
113
grounds of comparability or labour supply and demand. Third, the order 
of settlements affects the potential for wage leadership. Fourth, where 
product demand is seasonal, the timing of settlements is crucial to union 
power.
Regarding the effect of the length of agreements, ceteris paribus, 
longer agreements tend to contain pay growth when wages are primarily 
raised in response to past trends in prices and other wages, as is usual in 
the UK. Essentially, there is a longer lag before retrospective 
recompense is made, so the time-path of the authority's wage levels is 
lower than it otherwise would have been. Of course, if negotiators look at 
expected inflation, the longer the agreement, the higher the interim wage 
levels, all other things being equal. The potential importance of 
settlement intervals is amply illustrated by the exhortations by the Labour 
Government in the Social Contract Mark I period of 1974-75 to negotiators 
to refrain from reopening agreements until they had been in force twelve 
months, for fear of a rapid escalation of wage inflation.
Pay increases may also be significantly affected by third-party 
arrangements. Where access to a third-party is possible, especially 
without the agreement of the employer, management's position in pay 
determination is likely to be weakened. Given different interests between
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the third-party and the employer, perhaps because the third party is
charged with the operationalisation of criteria other than the ability to
pay, or because it recognises union arguments in order to provide a
solution to a dispute, pay increases are likely to be higher than through
114
collective bargaining with a tough management strategy.
The last pay determination process of concern is the payment system.
The manner in which pay is related to labour input or output is critical to
the magnitude of wage increases. Apart from procedurally-legitimate
sources of pay increase, there are other familiar sources of rises. For
instance, under PBR schemes, wage drift may arise because of lax output
or wage controls yielding looser negotiated times and comparability
115
adjustments, such as to payments in lieu. Productivity agreements and
productivity incentive schemes, similarly, may be overgenerous or induce 
116
leapfrogging. To illustrate, many productivity agreements in the late
117
1960s were loosely implemented and controlled. It has also been argued
that the 1977-78 coal industry area incentive schemes were implemented with
118
insufficient regard to the cost implications. Other payment systems
have potential defects too. Overtime pay is often unrelated to output
because it is manipulated for non-productivity reasons, such as the need to
offset low PBR earnings or to provide a steady additional source of 
119
income. Increments may make control difficult as they are frequently
120
automatic, and are often large relative to principal increases.
Generally speaking, control over payments is more easily secured under 
systems where pay and productivity levels are determined centrally and are 
not subject to the output-oriented pressures of the work milieu.
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3.3 Bargaining strategy
Within the configuration of factors that comprise the economic and 
institutional environments, the strategies of pay negotiators impact on 
principal settlements and the day-to-day administration of pay. Tne 
influences affecting the strategies can be deduced from a simple bargaining 
model, which can be visualised as describing the forces determining the 
wage within the range of indeterminacy in the bilateral monopoly model.
The bargaining strategies are not simple reflections of the two 
environments isolated in this framework: while strategies are affected by 
them, the strategies are of independent explanatory relevance too, being 
influenced also by social and political considerations.
In the model, for each negotiating team, each wage is associated with 
certain expected costs and benefits. The benefits depend on the extent to 
which the wage meets the objectives of the party, and on how important 
those objectives are. The costs depend on the costs of negotiating and 
enforcing claims and offers. Under assumptions of diminishing marginal 
utility of benefits, and of increasing negotiation and enforcement costs, 
the expected costs and benefits take on the shapes depicted in Diagram 2.2. 
Consequently, the expected net benefit functions are as in Diagram 2.3. If 
the sides attempt to achieve their objectives as best they can, they will 
demand or offer, and argue for, the wage which maximises expected net 
benefits.
As negotiations proceed, interactions change the valuations of the 
benefits and the costs of each wage. Primarily, reassessments are made of
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the costs of enforcing claims and offers. Objectives and their priority 
for the side may also change. New net benefit curves result. Adjustments 
to offers and claims are dictated, although in practice this will tend to 
happen at discrete intervals with lags, according to bargaining convention 
and tactics. For example, a speedy, or a double, concession might be 
interpreted as a sign of weakness by the other side, increasing its 
resolution and raising the costs to the conceding side of attaining any 
given wage. Clearly, a union (employer) negotiator would seek to avoid 
lowering (raising) the range of wages with positive net benefits in this 
way.
Eventually, agreement is reached. Both sides maximise the expected 
value of net benefits, as perceived at that time. Possible offer and claim 
functions appear in Diagram 2.4, showing sequential concessions and the 
final agreement.
Although simple, this model indicates three categories of factors 
underlying bargaining strategy. First, the pay criteria valued, and 
employed, by negotiators are fundamental to bargaining outcomes, working 
through the benefit functions in the model. Second, the bargaining power 
of each party affects the cost of achieving each wage. Third, what can be 
termed the politics of wage decisions influence the relative weight 
attached to each criterion by the party, the overall concern of the unit 
with pursuing those objectives, and hence, in the model, the value of 
benefits; through the willingness to take industrial action, the cost 
function is also affected. Political factors also characterise
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negotiations between the parties, causing them to re-evaluate the 
importance of their arguments, and their bargaining power.
3.3.1 Pay determination criteria
Negotiators attest to the power of argument in negotiations: for 
example Clive Jenkins and Barrie Sherman of ASTMS have said
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A management is sensitive to charges of exploitation or 
parsimony, and if a well-argued and researched case is publicly 
aired it can prove a great source of embarrassment. Some 
employers are actually convinced by such a case and take the 
appropriate actions.121
The justifications for offers and claims at each stage of bargaining
tend to rest on a limited number of economic and social principles, in
conjunction with the setting in which the criteria are applied.
Economic arguments marshalled by negotiators reflect aspects of the
economic environment. They may encompass the ability of the authority to
pay, labour supply and demand, and productivity growth.
The ability-to-pay criterion is always potentially germane because the
public purse is not bottomless. As Kahn has put it, in the public services
tax- and rate-payers may at times seem like willing enough milch- 
cows, but there is a point beyond which it is injudicious to milk 
them.122
In public corporations, monopoly is not usually complete, there being
substitutes for most goods and services, and there exist legislative and
administrative requirements regarding financial performance, with the
result that it is not possible to raise prices and increase deficits ad
infinitum. In other words, the demand for labour is not perfectly
inelastic, with the result that a pay-employment trade-off exists to some
degree. It is certainly an exaggeration to assert, as do Wellington and
Winter in the context of the US public sector, that 'no such restraint
123
limits the demands of public employee unions.'
Labour supply and demand can be a pertinent consideration whenever 
there is a need to change the quantity of labour employed, and thus to
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alter the level of services or output. In terms of the economic model, an
upward shift in the demand for labour, or a reduction in the supply of
labour, would serve to move the range of wage indeterminacy upwards,
facilitating higher pay and actually creating pressure for negotiators to
revise wages, which may or may not be recognised. Although it has been
argued that varying job opportunities can allocate labour within SIC codes
independently of wage changes, as indicated by low correlation coefficients
between wage and employment changes, it remains the case that wage and
employment changes do occur, and are significantly and positively related
in the short run. Moreover, between SIC industries, the role of wages is 
124
much more powerful.
Productivity may affect pay directly through payment systems, such as 
payment by results schemes and overtime payments, or more indirectly 
through annual pay settlements when pay increases may be awarded to reward 
past or promised rises in output. This is a likely influence on pay 
particularly when it is desired to improve manpower utilisation, cut costs, 
and thus reduce the price or tax burden on the public. However, owing to 
difficulties of measurement, the productivity criterion is liable to be 
confined to manual bargaining units.
While economic criteria may be actively important, there is strong 
reason to believe that social criteria may be heeded, being especially 
significant when financial constraints are less severe, that is, when 
groups are within the range of indeterminacy of wages but the elasticity of 
demand for labour is not very elastic. There exist in the UK economy
pervasive notions of fairness. One is the maintenance of customary pay
relationships. This idea may be promoted by the status hierarchy which
125
tends to legitimise the pay structure. Alternatively, equal percentage
126
increases may be regarded as (rough) social justice. Second, fairness
is sometimes defined to mean fair differences according to work input, such
as skill, responsibility, productivity and effort. This is based on a
127
belief that it is morally right for pay to differ. Third, fairness may
128
imply equality of treatment, especially between similar situations, but
129
possibly in the overall income distribution. Fourth, fairness may be
couched in terms of real income growth, particularly keeping up with the 
130
cost of living.
Fair pay comparisons may prompt changes in pay levels whenever notions
of fairness are offended. Thus pay rises may reflect changes in the pay or
work content of groups outside the bargaining unit; attitudes towards the
distribution of income; or real wage aims. Further, rises may be caused by
modifications to the notions of fairness adopted. However, there may be a
social range of indeterminacy within which relative pay can vary without
131
pressures for rectification.
The first type of comparison, comparability, is always likely to be an
argument in the public sector, for organisational and procedural reasons.
The ultimate common 'ownership' of authorities, together with centralised
132
bargaining by unions which cover several authorities, breed comparisons. 
Politically, too, there is good reason to believe that comparability 
pressures are strong. Employers want to avoid embarrassment and so avoid
'getting out of line' with other, similar, employers. Union leaders wish
to demonstrate that they have done a satisfactory job of negotiating in
order to maintain union membership levels and bolster leadership 
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support. Further, government involvement in public sector pay
bargaining may stimulate comparability. As Ross argues
When the government participates actively in the determination of 
wages, the pressure for uniform treatment is almost irresistable.
It is a cardinal tenet of democracy that the government must 
exercise its powers evenhandedly and dispense justice 
impartially.134
Comparisons between individual groups and the distribution of income
are characteristically rooted in low pay arguments. However, their
incidence is prone to be restricted since only low-paid groups can employ
the argument seriously. Furthermore, it may not be of great weight since
the orbits of comparisons tend to be limited. To illustrate from the
manufacturing sector, it has been found that plant-level union officers
tend to compare the position of their members to groups fulfilling similar
135
tasks, rather than to higher-paid jobs.
The third form of comparison, the 'real wage restraint' hypothesis,
may well be a powerful element in pay strategies in view of the significant
increase in real wage expectations that occurred, according to many
observers, in the late 1960s. It has been argued that this was caused at
bottom by unprecedented real wage rises in the postwar period, and frequent
136
changes in money wages which deprived them of any customary importance.
3.3.2 Bargaining power
While not denying the role of economic and social arguments, their
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potency in negotiations also depends on the force with which they can be
supported. As Jenkins and Sherman have said:
A persuasive presentation of a claim cannot always be said to be 
a total criterion of success. We would all like to think that we 
live in a world where reasoned argument wins the day. . . . 
Sophistication may not always be the most efficacious therapy in 
industrial relations: power matters too.137
Bargaining power here is taken to refer to the relative ability of
management and unions to influence each other in the enforcement of claims 
138
and offers. Thus, for example, while one side may be able to levy 
sanctions, its bargaining power also depends on the ability of the other 
side to respond. In addition, it should be noted that the definition 
refers to the power base and excludes the willingness of a side to use its 
strength, which, although pertinent to the use of power, is treated 
analytically as part of the politics of wage decisions in the following 
subsection.
The power base of a party has economic, strategic and political 
facets. Each aspect facilitates the enforcement of claims and offers 
through its implications for the costs of attaining each wage level.
Economic power relates to the economic factors which affect the costs 
of negotiating a wage, and the costs of the wage outcome itself. The 
negotiation costs tend to revolve around the costs of the bargaining 
process and the costs of industrial action. Bargaining process costs 
relate to the time and intensity involved, and the value of any delay 
in payment. The costs of action to individual workers depend in part on 
the availability of strike pay and State contributions such as social
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security benefits for strikers' families, and tax rebates. Probably
more important, according to previous studies, however, is other family 
140
income and savings. For the employer, the economic sources of power
during action are the profit and demand situations. High profits reduce
the capital market constraint. When demand is low, employers may welcome a 
141
stoppage. Assessments of long-term consequences of action for profits
142
and demand may alter these short-term leanings, however.
The economic-based cost of a wage settlement, apart from the extent to 
which it falls short of the desired criteria, which is reflected in the 
benefit function in the model, is the impact on employment. Smaller 
reductions in employment imply greater union power, and vice versa. The 
magnitude of the trade-off is fashioned by the economic environment. At a 
micro-level, the risk of being displaced from the authority upon a rise in 
wages is influenced by the Marshallian conditions which determine the 
elasticity of the demand for labour, namely the elasticity of product 
demand, the share of labour costs in total costs, the elasticity of supply 
of alternative factors, and the possibilities of factor substitution. But 
the effective cost of displacement depends on the macro-employment position 
too, for this affects the prospects of re-engagement by another employer.
Strategic power - that is, power stemming from the occupation of an 
advantageous position in the authority or in bargaining - is primarily 
determined by organisational and procedural factors. The organisation of 
production affects the degree of control unions have over essential parts 
of the production process, and thus their ability to pursue cost-effective
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action through limited sanctions which have widespread disruptive
consequences. Union control is reduced when the production stage can be
circumvented, perhaps by ‘outsourcing1; and when multiple sources of supply
exist, including plentiful stocks.
As the discussion of the organisational context indicated,
the internal organisation of the parties also impinges on bargaining power.
For instance, a lack of specialised industrial relations staff may reduce
bargaining effectiveness. Further, the potency of sanctions, or the threat
thereof, may be reduced if the real decision-makers are not represented at
the bargaining table, for management negotiators may be less able to
accede, thus increasing the costs to the union of pursuing any given 
143
wage.
Bargaining structures and pay determination procedures play a part
too. The levels and units of bargaining, as described earlier, affect the
militancy of worker groups. The timing of negotiations in the year
influences the disruptive potential of industrial action, where demand is
seasonal. Pay systems dictate the scope for the exercise of power
possessed by the parties at each level in the organisation. The use of
third parties may neutralise power, and thereby strengthen or weaken the
144
position of each side. Meantime, legal procedures, both laws and codes 
of action, set out the official limits to industrial action.
Political power relates to the use of methods such as lobbying, 
demonstrations, the use of the media, and meetings with politicians, in 
order to use public or political pressure to induce the other side to
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concede more amenable terms. The greater the political power, tne lower
the cost of obtaining a given wage increase. Political pressure may simply
yield additional support, or alternatively it may encourage tne government
to override management's stance, or else provide more finance to pay for
higher rises. For example, in 1974 the nursing unions marched in London,
and met with the Health Secretary and the Prime Minister about their pay
claim; they ware rewarded shortly afterwards with 'special case' status
which produced larger rises than management had offered, and the necessary
145
finance was provided by the government. The use of political power is
likely to be of general application in the public sector, for the
government is the ultimate employer and the public the ultimate 
146
financier.
3.3.3 Politics of wage decisions
Mediating the impact of the criteria and bargaining power are the 
politics of the intra- and inter-party bargaining processes. In each case, 
the variety of attitudes among participants and the process of compromise 
affect the individual and overall weight attached to the criteria by the 
party, and the willingness to use the party's bargaining power.
In intra-organisational decision-making over pay, as noted in the 
discussion of the organisational context, differences in attitudes may 
result from the functional roles represented. But the same role may be 
filled by very different individuals, distinguished by personal and 
political characteristics. That the types of incumbents influence the
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nature of decisions is readi ly evident in the fact that organisations (more
and more) devote considerable resources to the recruitment and selection
process, screening candidates for desirable characteristics which will
147
increase organisational cohesion.
Individual sources of attitudinal variation may emanate from different 
personal interests. Workers may be differently affected by wage increases. 
A relatively senior worker might prefer a large rise in order to boost his 
pre-retirement savings and possibly his pension entitlement; at the same 
time, seniority rights in lay-offs and terminations would make him worry 
little about the pay-employment trade-off. A more junior worker, 
conversely, would probably care about the employment effect and the
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implications of higher pay for the long-run viability of the authority.
Second, individuals may have different psychological dispositions.
Some are more ready than others to adopt militant stances. People also
have varying attitudes to risk, viewing potential future net gains from a
149
bargaining strategy with differing degrees of risk-aversion. Some may
be motivated by 'ludic' (seemingly absurd) objectives, such as a personal
commitment to a particular wage or a desire to inflict punishment on the 
150
opposition.
Third, political leanings may differ, either because of individual
convictions or in response to the individual's constituency of support.
For example, it has been argued that left-wing union leaders despise the
attitude of responsibility in collective bargaining, in contrast to 
151
moderate leaders. On the side of management, the political balance of
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government representatives in local authority units and some central
government groups influences the stances taken.
Fourth, factional conflict within unions may prompt tougher bargaining
of stances by the incumbent faction in order to demonstrate to the
152
membership that it is serving its members well. In a similar vein, on
joint union negotiation committees, where unions compete for members, more
aggressive demands are likely. For instance, NUPE spearheaded the 1970
local government manual workers' strike, with the GMWU and TGWU playing
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subordinate roles, in part to boost NUPE membership.
Given the assortment of attitudes, the dynamics by which compromise is
reached within the party fashion the side's position in negotiations.
Apart from the organisational exigencies cited earlier, personal
characteristics and tactics may be germane. Some participants may use
their technical knowledge and expertise to advantage. Others may dominate
through their powers of oratory, perhaps by persuasion or by strategic 
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obfuscation. Tactics may include the appropriate chairing of meetings,
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the ordering of agendas, and the judicious use of the rules of the body.
For example, in the NUM, pit incentive schemes were rejected by a
Conference and a referendum in 1977, yet the schemes went ahead because the
National Executive Committee circumvented the decisions by allowing
156
individual areas to decide for themselves. Finally, tactics may embrace 
lobbying and horse-trading.
In negotiations between management and unions, political factors can 
exert a separate influence on the stances the sides choose to take. Given
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the criteria, bargaining power, and internal organisational politics, 
different outcomes can result, first, from the general disposition of the 
two sides toward each other, and, second, from how their strategic 
differences are resolved.
Management and union styles, reflecting attitudes toward the
opposition, affect the negotiation atmosphere. If there is a high level of
trust, perhaps because the two sides share a pluralist perspective of
industrial relations, there is likely to be less deception and exploitation
of blunders; there may also be more understanding of the position of the
other side. With low-trust relations, for instance rooted in a conflict
between a management's unitary view and a union's pluralist prospective,
157
more aggressive positions are likely.
The resolution of offers and claims may be independently affected by
the manner in which the parties negotiate within the procedures. As in the
case of intra-organisational bargaining, personal qualities and tactics may
be significant. For example, bluffing and strategically-timed referrals to
the rank-and-file membership may toughen the apparent position of a 
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party. The importance of tactics, especially in bargaining involving
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professional and experienced negotiators, has been questioned, however.
4. Empirical Research Strategy
To reach valid conclusions, the theoretical framework of categories of 
relevant variables must be complemented with an empirical research strategy 
which ensures the facts selected are pertinent to the categories and are 
accurate. A strategy consists of a research design and a set of research
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techniques. The research design specifies the logic of the empirical work, 
given the general methodology of the investigation. In order for the 
inquiry to meet the required standards, decisions have to be made 
regarding, in particular, the appropriate time-space sample selection, and 
the best combination of research methods. The techniques themselves refer 
to the specific factfinding operations.
4.1 Research design
The broad logic of the research strategy of this investigation is to 
accurately expose the causal relationships between the dependent and 
relevant independent variables, with reference to a wide-based 
intertemporal sample, and using a triangulation of research methods whenever 
suitable and possible.
The question of the sample is only an issue in the analyses of the
impact of financial pay restraint policies. It is necessary to employ a
sample design which minimises sampling error and selection bias within the 
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available resources. The sampling error should be small in order to
produce more precise estimates. Selection bias should be avoided so that
the results are representative of the population and the inter-temporal 
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picture.
To facilitate precision, large samples are required. Sample subgroups 
that are analysed should contain enough observations to allow satisfactory 
analysis of the relative importance of the independent variables. Of 
course, the factors may still be of variable importance across the
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population due to the intrinsic characteristics of the population members, 
but this is not the result of sampling. To obviate selection bias, the 
population can be stratified by pertinent variables and proportional 
samples taken, or else disproportional samples appropriately weighted in 
aggregate analyses.
The sample was extensive. Contact was made with most employers and 
unions (as well as with employer associations, such as the local authority 
associations, and professional negotiating bodies, such as the Local 
Authorities' Conditions of Service Advisory Board). This high sampling 
fraction was necessitated by the relatively small number of authorities 
comprising the public sector; by an interest in how different public sector 
subgroups, such as energy industries, were affected by the financial pay 
strategy; and by the large number of independent variables of interest. To 
take anything but a large sample, in percentage terms, would have led to 
very imprecise results. The practice adopted means that in fact the 
results are close to being as precise as possible.
To the extent it occurred, the sampling was disproportional. Many 
small public corporations were excluded on the conceptual grounds that they 
did not figure significantly in public sector wage inflation in either an 
accounting or an industrial relations sense. In addition, time and budget 
constraints led to the exclusion of a few authorities that were outside the 
South of England and the Midlands. It should also be noted that 
approximately ten percent of contacts failed to cooperate, and that these 
were disproportionately nationalised industry managements. However, it was
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generally possible to successfully contact the other sides in these 
organisations and so gain one perspective on events. Overall, these 
sources of disproportional sampling should not be a matter for concern 
since they are either justifiaDle, insignificant, or counteracted, 
respectively. The people contacted are listed in the appendices. It was 
attempted to contact people associated with the largest or most significant 
units in the authorities. Details of negotiations in other units were 
gleaned from these respondents: usually they were in touch with other 
bargainers, and in management's case were often physically present in other 
negotiations.
Over time, the sampling was more disproportional: the bulk of the 
empirical research was carried out during 1980 and 1981. However, 
supplementary inquiries were carried out in the summers of 1982 and 1983, 
albeit on a narrower scale, in order to update the analysis. Thus there is 
no apparent reason to worry about the representativeness of the thrust of 
the thesis argument to actual developments between 1979 and 1983.
In the samples analysed, a combination of research techniques was 
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employed. This was done because every technique, however well it is 
used, has shortcomings, causing the accuracy of the conclusions to suffer. 
The methods may be imprecise; biased; unreliable, in the sense of yielding 
inconsistent results over time and between researchers; or narrow in scope, 
being unable to detect the relevance of all the variables of interest. The 
use of multiple methods, first, allowed cross-checks to be carried out to 
attempt to counter bias and unreliability. Second, this approach allowed
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each method to be supplemented by others, thereby, it is hoped, improving 
the precision and the comprehensiveness of the analysis.
As has been observed:
So if the restraints on validity sometimes seem demoralising, 
they remain so only as long as one set of data, one type of 
method, is considered separately. Viewed in consort with other 
methods, matched against the available outcroppings for theory 
testing, there can be strength in converging weakness.163
4.2 Research techniques
This study triangulated three techniques: archival work; 
interviewing; and quantitative data analyses. In line with the preferred 
inductive approach, the emphasis was on the first two methods. In the 
investigation of the first two issues, unobtrusive measures were the main 
research tool, but, in researching the third issue, both interview and 
archival data were heavily relied upon in combination. The quantitative 
techniques were also used in the policy impact discussion, first to 
describe the pattern of wage settlements, and later to provide a deductive 
explanation as a cross-check and supplement to the inductive qualitative 
explanation.
In more detail, the archival work involved the analysis of both 
published and unpublished data. The published material included the 
literature on related subjects, union, employer and government documents 
and economic statistics. Unpublished matter mainly took the form of 
negotiation records. In addition, intra-organisational documents were 
obtained in some cases, usually from unions.
The archival work was a very productive part of the research effort.
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Two potential problems might be raised. One is the question of bias. This 
is not significant here, however. The unpublished documents were obtained 
from a wide range of authorities. Negotiation records were jointly agreed 
by management and unions. The published material came from both sides and 
the government.
A second problem might be the selectiveness of the material in the
sense of misplaced emphases (without necessarily any bias toward one
party). As Ross has remarked regarding negotiation records:
In specific cases, all the conventional standards are invoked; 
but some have a real weight in the resulting determination, 
whereas others have no weight at all. The most elaborate logical 
and statistical demonstrations are presented in support of 
arguments which are wholly devoid of effect; but often the 
crucial factor has its place in the oral arguments and written 
documents of the proceeding--including the arbitrator's award.
In fact there is probably no field of social inquiry in which the 
written word is more misleading than the negotiation and 
adjudication of wage rates.164
This point is well taken. It is hoped that the use of interviews make up 
for any deficiencies in written records.
The interviews were conducted primarily with management and union 
negotiators (separately). Also interviewed in some cases were managers 
from financial departments, and managers from decentralised levels of 
authorities who were responsible for advice and implementation of 
agreements. In total, over 80 interviews were conducted, averaging over 
two-and-a-half hours each. A questionnaire was used as the basis of the 
discussion, but it was administered in a flexible order, with additional 
questions where appropriate. There were no suggested answers. With
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experience, especially over the first dozen interviews, the questions were 
redefined and restyled.
First-hand experience was an extremely valuable data source to tap.
But, of course, interview techniques are open to familiar challenge.
First, there may have been respondent error. One source was problems of
recall. Attempts were made to circumvent this in the present study by
reminding the interviewee of the government policy or the settlement in the
year of interest. Inevitably, though, some details were still not
recalled. Respondents also tended to gloss over certain aspects,
especially the internal politics of decision-making, in spite of guarantees
of anonymity, on the apparent grounds that it was unprofessional to deviate
from the principle of collective responsibility. This part of the analysis
may consequently be less strong than the rest. Interviewees may also have
been giving inaccurate accounts because of the 'guinea pig effect' whereby
165
the awareness of being studied stimulated responses not previously felt.
Similarly, some may have redefined their roles (of which each person has
166
many), perhaps from a bargainer to a public relations officer. The more
blatant examples could be taken into account.
Error or bias on the side of the interviewer may also have arisen from
his personal characteristics: age, sex and class, for example, have been
167
demonstrated to influence responses. Also, the conduct of the
interviews may have subtly biased the results, such as through the tendency
of respondents to endorse statements by interviewers rather than to reject 
168
them. It is fully realised that the interview is necessarily a social
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situation and tnus is open to these influences. It is impossible to judge 
the damage inflicted by these shortcomings of the method. However, 
everything was done to avoid them, such as through a neutral appearance, 
and the elimination of obvious question bias.
The details of the statistical and econometric techniques are outlined 
in the relevant sections. The quantitative indications of effect and 
significance derived using these methods are very informative. But they, 
too, have shortcomings. In particular, the data were frequently 
inappropriate in their original form, or else they did not exist, 
especially in the case of institutional variables. This problem was 
minimised by various data adjustments and the formulation of proxy 
variables, but in some cases omissions could not be avoided. A second 
deficiency of the econometric approach was that the specification of a 
counterfactual was a very difficult task, and could only be done in a 
rough-and-ready fashion. In both cases, the response was to do the best 
that could be done with the method, and to interpret the results with care.
Each of the three methods fulfils a valuable function in the 
investigation. The candour with which potential and actual deficiencies of 
method are recognised is intended to comfort rather than disturb. The 
problems were acknowledged in the research process and corrected as much as 
possible. No more can be expected of empirical work in the social 
sciences. Individually, the methods still provide results that appear 
valid, and, combined, the methods seem to at least approach the desired 
aims of precision, unbiasedness, reliability and comprehensiveness.
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5. Summary
This chapter has sketched and justified the approach to tne research 
into financial pay restraint policies in the public sector. First, the 
methodology of the study involves carrying out empirical research, guided 
by a broad theoretical framework. The emphasis is on induction, although a 
deductive approach is used when the results can be cross-checked by other 
methods. Second, the field of study is confined to authorities that are 
publicly owned and controlled, albeit with variations in the public 
interests served, the source of public finance, and the procedures for 
accountability. Third, the general theoretical framework of pay 
determination emphasises industrial relations, economic and political 
factors. Pay is seen as heavily influenced by the economic-political 
environment and the organisational and procedural contexts, but also by 
bargaining strategies. Fourth, the research strategy is to uncover data 
relevant to the issues within a broad sample of authorities in the UK.
Three research methods are used in combination to minimise individual 
shortcomings: archival work, interviewing, and quantitative data analysis.
The foundations of the thesis having been laid, the superstructure of 
the thesis can be erected. The first phase is to analyse the forces 
prompting State intervention in public sector pay determination in the 
1979-83 period.
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APPENDIX 1: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
Append i x 1.1
Government Departments in April 1979
Agriculture Fisheries and Food 
Cabinet Office
Central Office of Information
Charity Commission 
Civil Service Department
Crown Estate Office
Customs and Excise, Board of
Defence
Education and Science
Employment
Energy
Environment
Comptroller and Auditor General, 
Dept, of
Export Credits Guarantee Dept.
Fair Trading, Office of
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
Registry of Friendly Societies
Government Actuary's Dept.
Health and Social Security 
Home Office 
Industry 
Inland Revenue
Intervention Board for Agricultural 
Produce 
Land Registry
Law Officers Dept.
Lord Chancellor's Dept.
National Debt Office 
National Savings, Dept, for
Ordnance Survey
Overseas Development Ministry
Paymaster General's Office
Prices and Consumer Protection
Office of Population Censuses
and Surveys
Privy Council Office
Director of Public Prosecutions,
Dept, of
Public Record Office
Public Trustee Office
Public Works Loan Board
Her Majesty's Stationery Office
Trade
Transport
Treasury
Treasury Solicitor's Dept.
Property Services Agency 
Queen's and Lord Treasurer's 
Remembrancer 
Scottish Office 
Agriculture and Fisheries for 
Scotland
Scottish Economic Planning Dept. 
Scottish Development Dept.
Scottish Courts Administration 
Scottish Home and Health Dept. 
Scottish Education Dept.
Scottish Record Office
Registrar General of Birtns,
Marriages and Deaths in Scotland 
Registers of Scotland, Dept, of 
Welsh Office 
Northern Ireland Office 
Northern Ireland Court-Service 
Administration 
House of Lords Offices 
House of Commons Offices and 
Commission
Office of the Pariiamentary 
Commissioner
Notes: Crown Agents and HMSO became public corporations in 1980.
Source: Derived from Supply Estimates 1979-80, HC266, HHSO, 1979.
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Appendix 1.2
Authorities, Bargaining Structure, and Interviewees
Authorities and Bargaining Units Employment Interviewees 
~^ n ~1$7? in Kid-1979
Govt. Departments (plus Royal Ordnance 720,000 
Factories, Manpower Services Commission,
Health and Safety Executive, and Science 
and Victoria and Albert Museums)
Civil Service National Whitley Council
(NWC) CSD Deputy Secretary
CSD Under Secretary 
CSD Principal 
Dept, of Energy: 
Principal 
MAFF Principal 
SCPS Research Officers 
CPSA Research Officer 
CSU General Secretary 
IPCS Research Officer
Joint Coordinating Committee for Govt.
Industrial Establishments
CSD Under Secretaries 
CSO Principal 
MOD Head of Central 
Management
TGWU National Secretary 
EETPU National Officer
Govt. Depts., Parliament, Courts, 
and Armed Forces
Top Salaries Review Body 
Armed Forces 
Armed Forces Review Body 
UK Atomic Energy Authority
OME Director
300,000 OME Director
13,461
Whitley Council for Non-Manual 
Workers
Joint Industrial Council for 
Manual Workers
AEA Manpower and IR 
Officer
TGWU National Secretary 
IPCS Chairman, TU side 
IPCS Secretary, TU side
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Universities 104,000 Warwick Univ.: Academic 
Registrar 
Birmingham Univ.:
IR Officer
University Teachers 46,500 CVCP Assistant Secretary 
AUT Deputy General 
Secretary
Central Council for Non-Teaching
Staffs: 57,500 UCNS Secretary and IR 
Officer
Jt. Committee for Clerical 
and Related Administrative 
Staff
Jt. Committee for Technical Staffs 
Jt. Committee for Computer Operating 
Staffs
Jt. Committee for Manual and 
Ancillary Staffs
NALG0 Organising Officer
ASTMS National Officer 
ASTMS National Officer
NUPE National Officer
National Health Service 1,197,000 0HSS Pay Information Unit 
C0HSE Research and 
PR Officer
Administrative and Clerical 117,000 
Staffs NWC
DHSS Management Side 
Secretary 
NALGO Assistant
Ancillary Workers NWC 175,000
Organising Officers 
DHSS Management Side 
Secretary
NUPE National Officer 
TGWU National Secretary
Nurses and Midwives NWC 404,000 DHSS Management Side 
Secretary 
NALGO Assistant 
Organising Officer 
COHSE National Officer
Optical NWC 10,000 DHSS Management Side 
Secretary
ASTMS National Officer
Pharmaceutical NWC 3,000 DHSS Management Side 
Secretary
ASTMS National Officer
Professional and Technical (A) 30,000 
NWC
DHSS Management 
Side Secretary
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¥
Professional and Technical (B) 
NWC
Ambulancemen NWC
Maintenance Craftsmen
Doctors' and Dentists' 
Review Body
HMSO
Printers 
Warehousemen 
Non-industrial Staff
Principal Non-Departmental Bodies:
Pol ice Authority for N. Ireland
Police Negotiating Board (UK)
Research Councils
Non-Manual Workers NWC 
Joint Industrial Council:
Manual Workers 
Maritime Staff
Central Institutions
Academic Staffs Salaries 
Committee
Non-Teaching Staff
Colleges of Education (Scotland)
NALGO Assistant 
Organising Officer 
ASTMS National Officer
35,000 DHSS Management 
Side Secretary 
ASTMS National Officer
17.000 DHSS Management Side
Secretary
NUPE National Officer 
TGWU National Secretary
30.000 DHSS Principal
EETPU National Officer
82.000 DHSS Principal
0ME Director
BMA Economic Research 
Officer
8.000
13,362 See Appendix 2
10,000
3,552
2,630
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National Joint Committee for 
Academic Staff
Non-Academic Staff
Remploy Ltd 10,577
British Council 4,459
General Lighthouse Authorities 2,868
British Library 2,282
Enterprise Ulster 2,250
Crown Agents 2,016
Public Health Laboratory 
Services Board
2,014
Notes: 1. Only non-departmental bodies employing more than 2,000
individuals are included.
2. The bargaining unit employment totals may not precisely 
aggregate to authority totals due to the use of different 
sources and rounding errors.
Sources:
E. Lomas, op. cit., p. 104, Table 1.
Civil Service Statistics 1980, HMSO 1980, Table 1.
R. Twigger, Civil Service Statistics, House of Commons Library Research 
Division Background Paper No. 85, 1980, p. 4.
CSD, Non-Departmental Public Bodies: Facts and Figures 1980, HMS0 1981.
Statistics of Education 1978; Volume 6: Universities, Table 25.
Standing Commission on Pay Comparability, Reports 1. 2. 13 and 15. HMSO
’1579- 81 .  '
ACAS, Industrial Relations Handbook, ACAS.
Report on Non-Departmental Bodies, Cmnd. 7797, HMSO 1980.
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APPENDIX 2
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITIES, BARGAINING STRUCTURE, AND INTERVIEWEES
Authorities and Bargaining Units Employment 
Principal Authorities:
England: 6 metropolitan counties
39 non-metropolitan counties 
Greater London Council
36 metropolitan districts
296 non-metropolitan districts 
32 London boroughs 
Corporation of City of 
London
Wales: 8 non-metropolitan counties
37 non-metropolitan districts 
Scotland: 9 regional authorities
53 district authorities 
3 unitary island authorities
Interviewees
LACSAB Under Secretary 
ADC Assistant Secretary 
(Personnel)
ACC Policy
Under Secretary 
Sheffield MBC Chief 
Personnel Officer
Bargaining Units:
National Joint Council (NJC) 
for Administrative, 
Professional, Technical and 
Clerical Staff: England and 
Wales
ibid.: Scotland
NJC for Local Authorities' (LA) 
Services (Manual 
workers): England and 
Wales
ibid.: Scotland
Joint Negotiating Committee (JNC) 
for LA Services (Building 
and Civil Engineering):
England and Wales
ibid.: Scotland
500,000 NALG0 Organising 
Officer
65.000
1,000,000 LACSAB Assistant 
Secretary
GMWU National Industrial 
Officer
120.000
LACSAB Assistant 
Secretary 
UCATT National 
Organi ser
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JNC for Local Authorities' Services 
(Engineering Craftsmen):
England and Wales
ibid.: Scotland
Police Negotiating Board 140,000
NJC for LA Fire Brigades 39,000
ibid.: Officers' Committee
Burnham Primary and Secondary 500,000
Committee
Burnham Further Education 78,000
Committee
Scottish Teachers' Salary 64,000
Committee
JNC for Former Approved Schools 
and Reward Homes in England 
and Wales
JNC for Further Education Teachers 
Assigned to Prison Dept.
Establishments
Soulbury Committee (LEA-based 
advisers)
JNC for Youth Workers and 
Community Centre Wardens
JNC for Chief Executives of 
Local Authorities
JNC for Chief Officers of Local 
Authorities
LACSAB Assistant 
Secretary
CSEU General Secretary
LACSAB Assistant 
Secretary 
Police Fed.
Secretary 
PR Officer 
Pensions Officer
LACSAB Assistant 
Secretary
FBU National Officer
LACSAB Assistant 
Secretary
NUT Salaries Official
LACSAB Assistant 
Secretary
NATFHE Negotiations 
Secretary
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JNC for Local Authorities' Services 
(Engineering Craftsmen):
England and Wales
LACSA8 Assistant 
Secretary
CSEU General Secretary
ibid.: Scotland
Police Negotiating Board 140,000 LACSA3 Assistant 
Secretary 
Police Fed. 
Secretary 
PR Officer 
Pensions Officer
NJC for LA Fire Brigades 39,000 LACSAB Assistant 
Secretary
FBU National Officer
ibid.: Officers' Committee
Burnham Primary and Secondary 
Committee
500,000 LACSAB Assistant 
Secretary
NUT Salaries Official
Burnham Further Education 
Committee
78,000 LACSAB Assistant 
Secretary
NATFHE Negotiations 
Secretary
Scottish Teachers' Salary 
Committee
64,000
JNC for Former Approved Schools 
and Reward Homes in England 
and Wales
JNC for Further Education Teachers 
Assigned to Prison Dept.
Establishments
Soulbury Committee (LEA-based 
advisers)
JNC for Youth Workers and 
Community Centre Wardens
JNC for Chief Executives of 
Local Authorities
JNC for Chief Officers of Local 
Authorities
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JNC for Chief Officials of Local 
Authorities (Scotland)
JNC for Coroners
JNC for the Fees of Doctors 
Assisting Local Authorities
JNC for Justices' Clerks
JNC for Justices' Clerks'
Assistants
JNC for the Probation Service
NJC for Workshops for the Blind
Scottish JNC for LA Water 
Supply
Standing Conference for Engineers
Standing Conference for Heating,
Ventilating and Domestic Engineers
Whitley Council for New Towns Staff
Whitley Council for the Staffs of 
Industrial Estates Corporations 
and Development Agencies
Source: Derived from ACAS, Industrial Relations Handbook, op. cit.
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APPENDIX 3
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
AUTHORITIES, BARGAINING STRUCTURE, AND INTERVIEWEES
Authorities and Bargaining Units Employment Interviewees
in 1979 197S-79
Nationalised Industries:
British Aerospace 70,200
Division or site manual 
workers BAe Personnel 
Services Manager
Division or site non-manual 
workers
British Airports Authority 7,500
Joint Negotiating and Consultative 
Committee
Subcomm. 1: Non-industrial staff 
Subcomm. 2: Industrial Staff 
Subcomm. 3: Fire Service Personnel
7,500
TGWU National 
Secretary
British Airways Board 57,000
NJC for Civil Air Transport 
(11 National Sectional Panels)
57,000 TGWU National 
Secretary 
BALPA IR Officer
British Gas Corporation 102,900
National Joint Industrial 
Council (NJIC) for the 
Gas Industry (manual 
workers)
40,000 GMWU National
Industrial Officer
Craftsmen's Committee 1,200
NJC for Gas Staffs and 
Senior Officers
58,000 NALG0 Organising 
Officer
NJC for Higher Management 2,500 NALG0 Organising
Officer
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British National Oil Corporation 1,000
British Railways Board 182,200
(240,000 incl. 
subsidiaries)
1956 Machinery of Negotiation 
(Salaried and Conciliation 
Staff)
Officer
TSSA Research Officer 
NUR Assistant to
BRB Principal IR
Assistant General
Secretary 
ASLEF Negotiating 
Officer
Railway Shopmen's National 
Council (NC)
Railway Workshop Supervisory 
Staff NC
Railway Professional and 
Technical Staff NC
Management Staff National 
Joint Committee
Other:
Freightliners Ltd. JNC 
National Maritime Board 
(Seal ink)
BTH Ltd. NC 
BTH Ltd. Staff NC 
Hovercraft Staff NC 
British Transport Police 
Force Conference
British Shipbuilders 84,000
Manual and Staff Workers CSEU General
Secretary
Management
British Steel Corporation 186,000
Joint Negotiating Committee BSC Manager, Pay
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British Transport Docks Board 11,600
NJC for the Port Transport 
Industry (dockworkers)
Other:
Other Manual Employees 
Clerical and Administrative 
Workers
Technical Staff 
Police
Southampton Workers
British Waterways Board 3,400
NJC for Wages Grades
NJC for Salaried and Senior 
Staff
JNC of the National 
Association of Inland 
Waterway Carriers and 
the TGWU
Electricity Council (including CEGB
and Area Boards) 159,800
NJIC (industrial 93,500
staff)
National Joint Board 29,500
(technical staff)
NJC (non-manual staff) 50,000
National Joint Committee 2,800
(Building and Civil 
Engineering)
National Joint Committee 1,700
(Managerial and Higher 
Executive Grades)
National Bus Company 64,300
and Productivity 
ISTC Research Officer
TGWU National 
Secretary
NALG0 Organising 
Officer
NALG0 Organising 
Officer
GMWU National
Industrial Officer
EMA Research 
Officer
NALG0 Organising 
Officer
NALG0 Assistant 
Organizing Officer
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Manual Workers TGWU National 
Secretary
White Collar Staff
National Coal Board 234,900
Joint National Negotiating 
Committee (industrial 
grades)
Clérical and Junior 
Administrative Staff
Management
National Freight Corporation 36,900
BRS Machinery:
National Joint Negotiating 
Committees (NJNC) for:
Operating Grades 
Engineering, Maintenance 
and Repair Grades 
Staff Employees
National Carriers Ltd.:
Joint Negotiating Committees 
for:
Operating Grades 
Engineering, Maintenance 
and Repair Grades 
Staff Employees
Post Office
Postmen, postal officers 200,000
and telephonists grades
NALG0 Organising 
Officer
NCB Director of 
Wages
NUM IR Officer
P0 Pay and 
Negotiations 
Officer
BT Head of Pay and 
Productivity
UCW Assistant 
Research Officer
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Engineering and technical 
grades
126,000
Clerical grades 38,000
Management and certain 
supervisors
22,000
Subpostmasters/mi stresses 20,000
Middle management 20,000
General management grades 7,000
Telephone sales 
representatives
1,000
Scottish Transport Group 13,800
National Council for 
the Omnibus Industry 
(drivers, conductors and 
garage staff)
Skilled maintenance staff
Coaching operators
White-collar Staff
North of Scotland 
Hydro-Electric Board 4,100
South of Scotland 
Electricity Board 13,700
Other Public Corporations:
Bank of England
Non-print staff 
Printers
5.500
1.500
British Broadcasting 
Corporation
Musicians, Orchestras
POEU Assistant 
Research Officer
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Performers, Freelancers 
Other Staff Groups 27,000
Cable and Wireless Ltd.
Civil Aviation Authority 7,471
Commonwealth Development 
Corporation 380
Covent Garden Market 
Authori ty 105
Development Board for 
Rural Wales 82
Highlands and Islands 
Development Board 249
Housing Corporation 600
Independent Broadcasting 
Authority 1,337
Land Authority for Wales 76
National Dock Labour 
Board 523
National Enterprise Board 89
National Film Finance 
Corporation 11
National Ports Council 80
National Research 
Development Corporation 182
New Town Development 
Corporations and 
Commission 8,763
Northern Ireland
BBC Controller, 
Remuneration 
and IR
ABS Assistant
General Secretary
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Development Agency 48
Northern Ireland Electricity 
Service
Northern Ireland Housing 
Executive
Northern Ireland Transport 
hfo Icfi ng~~Company
Passenger Transport 
Executives and London 
transport Executive
LTE: Railway Negotiating 
Committee
LTE: Bus Workers
Joint Negotiating Committee 
for Non-Manual Workers 
(PTEs)
Non-Manual Workers 
(by individual PTE 
in 3 PTEs)
Manual Workers (by 
individual PTE)
Property Services Agency
(Supplies)
National Water Council
and Regional Water Authorities 70,371
LTE IR Officer 
(Rail)
ASLEF Negotiating 
Officer
LTE IR Officer 
(Buses)
TGWU National 
Secretary
NALGO Organising 
Officer
NWC IR Officer 
Severn-Trent WA 
Director of 
Finance
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NJIC for the Water 
Service (manual 
workers)
ibid, (craftsmen)
NJC for Water Service 
Staffs (non-manual 
workers)
JNC for Water Service 
Senior Staffs
National Joint Committee 
for Chief Officers
Royal Mint
Royal Ordnance Factories
Scottish Development 
Agency
Scottish Special Housing 
Association
Trust Ports
Weish Development 
Agency
TGWU National 
Secretary 
GMWU National 
Industrial 
Officer
NALGO Organising 
Officer
500 NALGO Organising
Officer
1,399
23,057
660
3,131
480
Notes:
1. In 1980, the Crown Agents and HMSO became public corporations. British
Aerospace was reclassified as a private sector company in 1981 when a 
minority holding was sold.
2. Since 1979, several corporations have significantly contracted in size,
especially BSC which has halved its employment.
3. Some authority totals may not equal the bargaining unit totals due to 
the use of different statistical sources and rounding errors.
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Sources :
Lomas, op. cit., pp. 108-9.
Civil Service Statistics, op. cit. , Table 1.
Report on Non-Departmental Bodies, Cmnd. 7797, HMSO 1980, p. 182. 
ACAS, Industrial Relations Handbook, op. cit.
G. Bowen, Survey of Fringe Bodies, CSD 1978.
Supply Estimates 1979-80, Memorandum Table 63.
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The Conservative Party was convinced it was necessary to control wage
inflation. As Mrs. Thatcher stated:
There is no doubt - we all know it - of the need to contain the 
increase in wages within the increase in production.1
In this, the Conservatives were no different from their predecessors. As Sir
Geoffrey Howe noted, it was common ground between the parties that any
government
must secure wider understanding and a wider sense of reality and 
responsibility in the collective bargaining process.2
In spite of the similarities between the immediate objectives of the
two political parties, the motivations were somewhat different. This
chapter therefore examines the particular factors that stimulated the
Conservative Government to attempt to control public sector pay. Section 1
notes the importance of the Government's ultimate objectives of the control
of price inflation and public expenditure, and explains the perceived
relevance of public sector wage inflation to their achievement. Section 2
considers the strength of the underlying forces promoting wage inflation in
1979. Reference is made to the economic and political environment, the
institutional context, and the pay strategies of negotiators.
1. The Rationales For Control 1inq Pub!ic Sector Pay
The reduction of price inflation and the curbing of the growth of 
public spending comprised the two primary objectives of the Conservative 
Government. Success in achieving each hinged in part on public sector pay
1.1 The control of price inflation
The need to counter inflation was deemed fundamental to the
Government's economic programme:
The first essential in economic management is the conquest of 
inflation. This must be the foundation of a more stable economic 
environment.3
The zeal with which the objective was pursued was unparallelled in recent
years. The Chancellor of the Exchequer later said:
Only two decades or so ago an inflation rate of 5 per cent would 
have been considered too high. It js too high. The Government's 
ultimate objective is price stability... .4
At heart, the chief concern was competitiveness. The prospects for exports
at the time the Government took office were not encouraging. The quarterly
CBI Industrial Trends surveys of January and April 1979 had recorded a fall
in confidence concerning export prospects, and a relatively high percentage
of respondents mentioned 'prices relative to those of overseas competitors'
as a factor that was expected to prejudice export orders over the following 
5
few months. Indeed, the April Retail Price Index (RPI) had shown an
increase in prices of 10.1 per cent over the previous 12 months. It was
the first time it had been in double-digits since December 1977, and it had
6
risen steadily since October 1978 when it was 7.8 per cent. In 1978 III,
UK normal unit costs relative to the average for competing countries were
said to be 12 per cent higher than in 1975 and 30 per cent higher than in 
7
1976.
Competitiveness was regarded as critical owing to its implications for 
domestic prosperity. Competitive pricing would lead to greater sales, and
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hence greater output and employment, as well as higher real incomes.
In addition, price inflation was believed to have other deleterious
consequences. Uncertainty about future absolute and relative prices would
make forecasts of demand and profitabi 1 ity difficult, with the result that
9
investment and output would be depressed. Unnecessarily high pay claims
10
might also occur due to uncertainty, destroying jobs. Inflation would
also dampen consumption if savings were increased for precautionary motives
or to maintain real wealth holdings. Investment would be reduced by cash
flow problems caused by higher nominal interest rates. Transactions costs
11
would also rise or cash management become more involved. As well as
efficiency costs, distributional consequences would also follow as factor
returns increased at different rates due to differences in the anticipation
of inflation and in the ability to revise agreements.
Public sector wage increases were believed to play a part in the
determination of price inflation, although the money supply was accorded
the primary role. Indeed, the Government stated that:
to bring down the rate of inflation. ..it is essential to contain 
and reduce progressively the growth of the money supply.12
It was held that following an increase in the money supply, perhaps
due to the fiscal stance, the level and structure of interest rates, and
the associated gilt-edged stock operations, the private sector would
rearrange its portfolio of money and non-monetary (financial or real)
assets, reducing its money holdings so as to increase the demand for money
in line with the supply of money. These portfolio adjustments would be the
8
transmission mechanisms from the money supply to prices. First, demand 
inflation would result from the higher demand for real assets. Where the 
goods and services were imported, the exchange rate would depreciate and 
import prices rise. Second, a greater demand for domestic non-monetary 
financial assets would raise their price and depress the interest rate. 
Consumption would rise as savings became less attractive. Investment would 
increase as financing costs fell relative to prospective returns. The 
higher value of asset holdings produced by the increase in price would 
encourage greater expenditure so as to reduce wealth holdings to the 
desired real level. Prices would consequently be bid up. Finally, the 
fall in the interest rate relative to rates abroad would bring about a 
lower exchange rate and higher import prices. A third adjustment, the 
purchase of foreign financial assets from overseas residents, would also 
reduce the exchange rate and raise import prices.
Public sector wage inflation could affect price inflation if it 
increased public spending such that the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
(PSBR) rose, and the money supply was increased. If the PSBR was high, it 
would be difficult to finance the deficit by non-inflationary means through 
the sale of gilt-edged securities to the non-bank private and overseas 
sectors. The Government in that case would have to borrow from the banks. 
That act of credit creation would add to the money supply. Further, the 
acquisition of securities by the banks would increase their ability to 
expand credit (and thus the money supply), given a desired ratio of quasi­
liquid assets to advances. The precise relationship between the PSBR and
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the growth in the money supply would depend on the level and structure of
interest rates, and on whether a higher PSBR would raise the real value of
private sector financial wealth and induce the holding of more government
13
securities and less bank borrowing.
Costs per se were not a central part of the Conservative's
model of the generation of inflation. At the same time, it was realized
that, in the context of the UK, wage inflation did affect price inflation.
Imperfect product markets were acknowledged to exist so that cost increases
could be passed on, at least in part, without the degree of loss of output
14
and employment that would occur in competitive markets. The fact that
costs could directly affect prices was explicitly recognised by the
Government in a major Treasury economic policy statement:
By reducing the rate of growth in earnings in the private sector, 
a tight monetary policy will act to limit cost increases and thus 
also put downward pressure on private sector prices.15
Thus, as Sir Geoffrey Howe noted, in the context of monetary control, trade
union demands might make the reduction of price inflation more 
16
prolonged.
But it was not just private sector pay that was seen to influence 
price inflation: the public sector also contributed. The nationalised 
industries' costs were often reflected in their prices due to the 
monopolistic nature of the sector. Not only was the price index directly 
affected, but also in many cases the costs of private industry were 
inflated. A National Economic Development Office (NEDO) report calculated 
that 11 per cent of all intermediate goods and services bought in by
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companies at all stages of production were supplied Dy tne nationalised
industries. Moreover, the lack of alternative supply and technical
constraints meant that firms were very vulnerable to increases in the
17
prices of energy and communications. Meantime, public service wages had
implications for the taxes and rates paid by industry, and, ultimately, the 
18
prices charged. It was also thought that public sector wages influenced
19
those in the private sector, and hence costs and prices.
The link between public sector pay rises and the level of price
inflation was of import because, under a restrictive monetary policy, there
was little likelihood that public sector pay rises would be induced to fall
by as much as the money supply growth. The Treasury's economic policy
statement did mention that wage rises might fall with monetary targets (and
therefore price expectations), and due to poorer employment prospects as
20
the pressure of demand was reduced. However, the same memorandum
acknowledged that the manner of the formation of expectations would have a
21
bearing on how quickly price increases came down. Historical evidence
showed that earnings frequently grew faster than the growth of the money 
22
supply. This was unlikely to change. The threat of unemployment due to
monetary policy was somewhat distant and unrecognised. Monetary policy
23
would only directly affect the private sector's demand prospects. Even
where unemployment was evident, the Government felt that workers might not
24
make a connection between pay and employment.
In sum, although the Conservative Government came to power embracing 
the monetarist paradigm, it recognised that public sector wage inflation
could impact on prices through the PSBR. The theory was also abridged in 
recognition of some degree of cost inflation. Therefore, if the 
Government's primary objective of the reduction of inflation was to be 
achieved, public sector pay also had to be controlled.
1.2 The control of public expenditure
Second only to the control of inflation, the Conservative Government
attached great economic and political significance to the reduction of
public expenditure growth. As the Chancellor said in the first Budget
statement of the new Government:
We are totally committed to improving standards in the public 
services. But that can be achieved only if the economy is strong 
in the first place. So that will be our first priority. Finance 
must determine expenditure, not expenditure finance. Substantial 
reductions in expenditure can, and will, be made...25
Aside from the implications of the growth of public spending for the
PSBR, the money supply, and inflation, the health of the economy was also
believed to be influenced by the effects of public expenditure growth and
finance on the private sector.
First, public expenditure was held to be less productive than private
sector spending. For instance, Mrs. Thatcher asserted that:
More Government spending reduces the resources available to the 
private sector where they could be used very much better.26
More specifically, private enterprise was alleged to do more
To increase resources and opportunities through individual 
pioneering, effort and skill.27
Second, incentives were said to be reduced by the financing of high 
levels of public sector expenditure. High taxes and rates were believed to
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damage industry and individual enterprise. If a great deal of borrowing
was required, then the magnitude of bond sales would boost interest rates,
deterring investment and economic growth.
Ideological hostility was as much the reason for the salience of the
objective of rolling back the public sector as economic logic, however.
The political rationale was couched in terms of freedom. Thus one
statement of Conservative aims stated:
freedom is threatened, as even some Socialists have now admitted, 
by the increase in public spending as a proportion of the 
nation's resources.29
The historical rise in public expenditure was associated with a
30
curtailment of liberties in both the economic and political spheres.
Wider State employment was said to reduce economic freedom, and the
accompanying public production and provision reduced consumer choice in
31
areas such as health and education. In turn, the smaller degree of
economic freedom was thought to infringe political freedom. The reduction
of private property and its concentration in the hands of the State was
believed to strengthen the position of individual bureaucrats vis-a-vis 
32
Parliament. For the future, the worry was that the power of the State's
organs and the seemingly easy availability of finance would lead to the
continuation of State control in circumstances no longer warranting it, and
33
the unnecessary restriction of freedom.
That the pay of public employees needed to be controlled, given the 
attitudes of the Conservatives to the public sector, was unquestioned. Pay 
accounted for approximately 30 per cent of all public expenditure. The
28
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growth of public spending was correlated with public sector pay trends.
Moreover, other elements were difficult to control because they were
demand-determined - such as benefits paid in recession - so the pressure to
34
control pay was strong.
1.3 Conclusions
At the outset, similarities of priorities regarding wage inflation
between the major parties were indicated. In fact, there were also some
common threads in the rationales for controlling price inflation and public
expenditure. For instance, ever since 1972 when flexible exchange rates
were introduced, price competitiveness had been a major motive behind wage
controls. Earlier in 1979, the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer had
argued the need to control pay in order to contain public expenditure and
the PSBR. Some among Labour's ranks had also questioned the political
wisdom of a large public sector: for instance, Roy Jenkins said:
I do not think you can push public expenditure significantly 
above 60 per cent and maintain the values of a plural society 
with adequate freedom of choice.35
Nonetheless, the rationales of the Conservative Government for 
intervening in public sector pay determination from 1979 were distinctive. 
The thrust of their inflationary motive was monetarist rather than cost- 
oriented. Their opposition to public expenditure was also particularly 
fervent both in terms of efficiency and freedom.
2. The Conditions Generating Pub!ic Sector Wage Inflation in 1979
The rationales for controlling inflation assumed special importance on
121
the accession of the Conservative Government in May 1979, for the 
conditions of public sector pay determination were unarguably ripe for a 
high rate of wage inflation. Although the reasons were never fully 
articulated by the new Government, they can be isolated within the 
theoretical structure proposed in the last chapter. Thus, the following 
three subsections expose the inflationary elements in the economic- 
political environment, the institutional context, and in bargaining 
strategies.
2.1 The economic-pol i tical environment
The ability of an authority to give pay increases, it will be 
recalled, is influenced by the economic and political market, which 
determines the financial and administrative constraints on the freedom to 
fix pay. Intrinsically important is market structure - the actors that 
influence finance and expenditure, and their formally-defined and informal 
interactions - because of its implications for the distribution of power 
between actors in the market. Given market structure, the attitudes and 
actions of the key participants are of special significance.
This section documents the constraints on the ability to pay in 
central government, local authorities, and public corporations in May 1979, 
and traces the causes back to the structure of economic and political 
markets, economic market trends and the attitudes of relatively influential 
groups. The financial and administrative constraints reflected the state 
of incomes policy, economic forces, and political controls on the growth
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and distribution of budgets.
2.1.1 Central government
(i) Financial constraints
The incoming Conservative Government inherited relatively relaxed 
constraints on the ability to pay increases pertaining to the 1978-79 pay 
round. After three years of strict pay controls, Phase 4 had been widely 
disregarded. The Labour Government had been obliged to revise its policy. 
The 5 per cent limit had been given a £3.50 per week underpinning, and 
public service groups had been permitted to have their cases reviewed by 
the Standing Commission on Pay Comparability (SCPC). Public expenditure 
allocations for the financial year (FY) 1979-80 embodied the adjusted 
formula, and were to be revised as each special case settlement occurred,
subject to the general principle that a substantial proportion of any
36
excess cost was to be absorbed within the existing figure.
Other budgetary influences did not appear to limit funding for pay 
increases any further. On the one hand, real spending on current goods and 
services in central government was planned to grow by 3.25 per cent in
37
1979-80, so that, where permitted, the funds could be used for pay rises.
On the other hand, the allowance for price increases in the expenditure
figures had not been revised from its original 8.5 per cent level, in spite
of rising inflation; this meant that non-pay expenditure also competed
38
strongly for growth funds.
Overall, therefore, the financial constraints were flexible in that
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incomes policy had all but collapsed, and, although incomplete funding was 
available, it increased with the size of settlements. In these 
circumstances, the relatively high ratio of labour costs to total costs, 
which ordinarily constrained pay finance outside incomes policy, was 
immaterial. Pay increases of a large magnitude were possible.
(ii) The political market environment
The near-complete accommodation of pay policy and public expenditure 
to central government pay bargaining under Labour in 1979 can be attributed 
to the political market. The economic market was not directly relevant to 
central government. Although many authorities received revenue for 
services rendered to government departments and others in the economy, and 
some of the monies were officially deemed 'appropriations-in-aid1 (of 
expenditure), authorities were not at liberty to increase their revenue and 
use it as they wished: above a stated level, appropriations had to be 
returned to the Treasury in the guise of Consolidated Fund Extra Receipts.
Political market structure
The structure of the political market was the product of the pay policy 
and public expenditure planning and control procedures, as operated by the 
Labour Government. Formally, they had the effect of making the Government 
the dominant actor in the market, but, in addition, in 1979 the trade 
unions played a significant informal role.
The planning of pay restraint policy and public expenditure
The Phase 4 pay restraint policy was initially framed by the Labour
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increases further. However, the eventual form was effectively determined
in the political market involving both government and unions. Meetings
were held with the Prime Minister in October and November 1978 concerning
the lack of respect for Phase 4. No agreement on policy was forged because
the Trades Union Congress (TUC) General Council rejected the joint
39
statement that the participants had signed. Notwithstanding this, the 
revised form of Phase 4 introduced by the Government in fact contained the 
thrust of the ill-fated joint statement.
In the planning of public expenditure, many parties were notionally
40
involved: the Cabinet, Ministers, departments, and authorities. On the 
basis of Treasury guidelines regarding the status of existing policies and 
the limits of permissible variations, departmental finance divisions 
negotiated with policy divisions to produce proposals for change, and the 
estimated cost of departmental activities at fixed, 'Survey', prices. 
Bilateral negotiations between Finance Divisions and the Treasury ensued, 
sometimes at Ministerial level, to agree new projections of spending plans, 
after discussing new programmes and the statistical and policy assumptions 
underlying the extension of existing policies. The Public Expenditure 
Survey Committee (PESC), comprising departmental principal finance officers 
and the Treasury, agreed the report to emerge from the negotiations. The 
report, highlighting projections, and suggesting changes to current policy, 
and open issues, was then considered in Cabinet, in conjunction with a 
Treasury assessment of the scope for increasing public expenditure.
Government because the TUC did not agree with the need to curb pay
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Government because the TUC did not agree with the need to curb pay
Collective decisions were made. Provision for inflation was included
later, following Treasury advice.
While it would be foolish to totally discount the influence of
individual ministers and Departmental officials, it was nevertheless the
case that the Cabinet, particularly the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the
Prime Minister, held a strong position in the planning process. Informed
by the Treasury, the Cabinet was responsible for final decisions.
Outside groups were generally relatively powerless in the planning
process in 1979. Formally, the system was closed to those outside the
Cabinet and government departments. Informal representations were made,
but they had little ostensible effect for the most part. The one exception
was the TUC. In 1979, the Labour Government agreed with the TUC that there
should be annual talks between the TUC Economic Committee and the Chief
Secretary to the Treasury. In addition, consultations were arranged
between the appropriate Ministers and the TUC's Social Insurance and
Industrial Welfare, Education, Local Government, and Health Services 
41
Committees. But, by its own admission, the TUC realised that the 1979
discussions occurred after the main expenditure decisions for the year
immediately ahead had been taken, and the survey of the plans for the
42
following year was already in progress.
Although the expenditure plans for 1979-80 were presented as Supply
Estimates to Parliament for scrutiny, there was effectively no planning
role for Parliament whatsoever. The Treasury and Civil Service Committee
43
were later to denounce the system as a farce in no uncertain terms. On
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the 29 Supply Days set aside to debate the Estimates, it had become
44
customary to debate matters of general interest. When finance topics
45
were covered, they generally concerned taxation. Usually there were no
divisions. Indeed, between 1966 and 1981 there were only seven occasions
when Members of Parliament (MPs) gave notice of objections to a class of 
46
Estimates. MPs were unlikely to challenge their party's plans when in
government for fear of prejudicing their political careers; when in
opposition the incentive to oppose the government's plans may not have been
47
great because it was largely irrelevant to progression within the party.
In any case, scrutiny was far from straightforward. MPs did not have
48
adequate information about the expenditures under scrutiny. A Treasury
and Civil Service Committee report later said:
The use of specialist technical terminology, a complex lay out, 
and extensive cross-referencing, make the Estimates difficult to 
interpret. The sheer volume of figures is forbidding... A 
different set of conventions is used in central government from 
those in common usage in the private sector, the nationalised 
industries or local authorities.49
The Expenditure Committees, too, were unable to affect spending plans.
significantly. There was only a relatively short period between the
presentation of the Supply Resolutions and the passing of the Consolidated
Fund Act authorising payments. By this time, projects were usually well-
advanced, financed through votes on Account, preliminary to the
Consolidated Fund Act. Furthermore, the Committees suffered from having
50
only a small staff to work on the vast number of complex estimates.
One Commons Committee summarised the power arrangements thus:
There is almost no risk of any of the details of (the 
Government's) spending programme being subjected to close 
analysis and criticism on the floor of the House, or of any 
changes being made by means of amendments.51
Lord Hailsham's description of the UK system of government as an 'elective
52
dictatorship* was very apt.
The control of pay and expenditure
The Government's relatively dominant political market position was
cemented by the control it exerted over central government pay and
expenditure, once negotiated or planned. Fundamentally, the strength of
the Government reflected its statutory powers vis-a-vis central
government authorities. The Government was the ultimate source of all
finance. Hence it could control expenditure. Technically, it was able to
ensure that authorities spent no more than planned totals through the
system of cash limits and the Treasury-operated Financial Information
System. Parliament's control was again more apparent than real.
Cash limits imposed ceilings on the amount of cash that the Government
proposed should be spent on certain categories of public expenditure during
the financial year. Rules relating to the coverage, structure, and
53
operation of cash limits provided the government with its control.
All pay expenditure, apart from the fees of general practitioners in 
the NHS, was covered by cash limits. Pay expenditure could be contained 
unlike, for example, demand-determined social security benefits where the 
level of spending depended on the number of applicants meeting specified 
qualifying criteria.
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The structure of the cash blocks also provided for relatively tight 
control over pay. Central government expenditure was broken down by 
department, and by programme within departments, to match the span of the 
control and administrative systems. In addition, within the civil service, 
there was generally a separation of expenditure on pay and administrative 
items, (which were the responsibility of the Civil Service Department 
(CSD)), from other expenditure, (which was under the control of the 
Treasury). While the blocks permitted a degree of flexibility in the 
management of expenditure, pay expenditure could not easily be substituted 
for non-pay spending because the proportion of pay was so large: as much 
as 85 per cent in the civil service blocks, and 70 per cent in the NHS.
The operating rules made it difficult for spending authorities to 
augment their budgets. First, upward revisions of cash limits were only 
possible where policy decisions were taken by the Government to increase 
the provision of a particular service; where, in the eyes of the 
Government, pay and price increases turned out to be significantly greater 
than assumed, and where factors beyond the control of the spending 
authority caused the cash limits to be grossly unrealistic. Second, 
underspending on pay in one year could not be carried forward to the next. 
Third, offsetting over-expenditure on pay in one block of services by 
savings on another was not a facility open to budget holders. In the words 
of a Treasury civil servant:
Within the cash block system, we certainly do not contemplate 
being able to spend more in one cash block because you are 
spending less in another cash block. That is certainly not a 
feature of the cash limits system.54
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Finally, it should be noted, however, that the cash limits system only 
limited the provision for pay and price increases for one year. In the 
following year's cash limits, the full value of the pay settlement was 
included because the volume plans were priced at actual prices, (not the 
former inflation factor levels), plus the new factor.
55
The control powers of the Government in the cash limit system were
reinforced by the Treasury Financial Information System (FIS), and an
56
analogous, though less detailed, system operated within the NHS. First,
57
under FIS, expenditure was monitored by comparing the levels of actual 
spending with profiles of expected expenditure. Speedy and accurate 
information was available. Expenditure details from the Paymaster 
General's Office (which was responsible for transactions) were up-to-date 
as of two days previously. Second, on the basis of contrasts between the 
expected profile and actual spending, projections were made for the year, 
so that blocks with potential overspending could be more carefully 
assessed. Third, the technical exercise was supplemented with dialogue 
between the CSD or Treasury, and the department, in cases of significant 
overspending, in order to ascertain the causes and to ensure that remedial 
action was taken.
The Comptroller and Auditor-General also carried out checks on 
spending at the end of the financial year. The Public Accounts Committee
(PAC) examined reports on cases where overspending had occurred. The
58
threat of investigation acted as a deterrent to spending more than
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allocations. However, the procedure was necessarily post-hoc; there was no
59
prevention procedure as such.
Parliament, apart from the PAC, formally possessed some control over 
expenditure outturns, but its power was very much secondary to that of the 
Government. If authorities required additional finance above the cash- 
limited Supply Estimates, and it was sanctioned by the Government, 
Supplementary Estimates had to be presented to Parliament, which could 
assess the merits of the case . However, for the reasons referred to 
earlier concerning expenditure planning, Parliament was relatively ineffec­
tive. Yet it should be said that the scope for control was potentially 
greater in 1979 than in the preceding years, for the Supply Estimates and 
cash limits had just been assimilated to the same price basis. Previously, 
the basing of Estimates on the prices of the autumn of the previous finan­
cial year had meant that Supplementaries were not only required for expen­
diture over the cash limits, but also for expenditure above Estimates but 
below cash limits. The mass of Supplementaries had made Pariiamentary 
control very difficult, if not impossible. In particular, in the context 
of pay, it had been hard to distinguish routine claims to cover general
rises in pay from those which were out of the ordinary, and which should
60
have been investigated. Also, the differences in the structure of the
61
Estimates and the cash limits had made 'cross-walking' difficult.
Political market attitudes
The structure of the political market determined that the key actors 
affecting the availability of finance for central government pay were the 
Cabinet and the unions. The flexibility of the ability to pay reflected 
their attitudes.
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At heart, the Labour Government was opposed to generous provisions for
pay and expenditure. Even when the incomes policy appeared to be in early
trouble, the Prime Minister invited the TUC to talks to reach a more
mutually acceptable policy that would have kept inflation in single digits.
Although public expenditure was planned to grow in volume terms, the
initial plans for 1979-80 were based on low pay and price inflation factors
and a negative relative price effect (implying a slow growth of public
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sector costs relative to the private sector.)
Furthermore, in the Phase 4 White Paper, the Government had announced
63
that cash limits were to be adhered to, in support of the pay policy. At
least on the basis of the experience of the previous few years, this was a
credible stance. No revisions to accomodate pay bill increases in excess
of the assumed rise had been made in Financial Year (FY) 1976-77 and FY
1977-78. In FY 1978-79 cash limits had been raised only in special cases.
Extra provision had been made in February 1979 for payments to the police
in Northern Ireland, and for retrospective payments to prison officers in
England and Northern Ireland, but offsetting reductions were achieved in 
64
the Home Office case.
Meantime, union attitudes were strongly against pay restraint. At the 
1978 TUC Conference, a resolution in favour of free collective bargaining 
was passed:
Congress... considers that after three years of restraint trade 
unions must now negotiate freely in their members' interest.
Congress declares its opposition to Government policies of 
intervention and restraint in wage bargaining, including 
Government sanctions, and to any form of restrictive Government 
incomes policy.65
The unions' resolve was evident in the November 1978 General Council 
rejection of the Government-TUC statement, and the industrial unrest that 
characterised the so-called Winter of Discontent. Nevertheless, the
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autumn talks revealed a measure of support for a more relaxed policy
66
incorporating a role for comparability. The distribution of power in the 
political market in 1979 allowed the attitudes of the unions to compromise 
government pay and spending policies.
(iii) Summary
The relatively unchecked ability-to-pay of central government in 1979 
can therefore be attributed to the structure of the political market and 
the attitudes of the Government and unions. While the Government had 
considerable power over the planning and control of pay and expenditure, 
the TUC was allowed an informal role. The same market structure had 
facilitated pay control for the previous three years of incomes policy, but 
the vehemence of the negative attitudes on the part of the unions towards 
the fourth year of policy obliged the relaxation of the constraints on pay 
and expenditure.
2.1.2 Local authorities
(i) Financial constraints
If the ability-to-pay constraints on central government pay were weak 
in May 1979, those on local authorities were weaker. As in central gover­
nment, the negotiations in the 1978-79 bargaining round were subject to the 
relaxed version of Phase 4. Further, the levels of grant to local gover­
nment for FY 1979-80 included the low-pay underpinning and were to be 
increased, subject to offsets, upon the publication and agreement of the 
results of comparability studies. Since the January 1979 public expendi­
ture plans had allowed for a growth of local authority services of 1.6 per 
cent in FY 1979-80 over the estimated expenditure for FY 1978-79, technica­
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lly there was freedom to finance even higher increases, if desired, assu­
ming the underprovision for price inflation in the public services, (which
67
had been maintained at 8-1/2 per cent by Labour), did not usurp it.
In addition, in contrast to central government, local authorities had 
supplementary sources of finance which were being intensively exploited. 
Significantly, while the Labour Secretary of State for the Environment had 
made the initial rate support grant settlement consistent with single­
figure increases in rates, the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (CIPFA) estimates, based on returns from 330 of 402 rating
authorities in England and Wales, put the average domestic rate increase for
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1979-80 at 18 per cent and 14 per cent for non-domestic rate payers. The 
implication was that the awards of the Standing Commission on Pay 
Comparability (SCPC) could be fully financed. The high ratio of labour to 
total costs was not a relevant constraint at that time.
In other words, the situation was potentially very inflationary in 
local government in mid-1979 because of the effective abandonment of strict 
incomes policy and the accommodating role being played by public 
expenditure. It was more inflationary than in central government because 
the access to non-governmental finance reduced the need to raise 
productivity or reduce services to pay for the increases.
(ii) The political market environment
The lax constraints on pay and expenditure reflected the political 
market context: the centre-periphery submarket and the local submarket.
The central-local political submarket involved local authorities; their 
associations (the Association of County Councils (ACC), the Association of 
District Councils (ADC), and the Association of Metropolitan Authorities 
(AMA)); the Government, its departments, and Parliament; and pressure
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groups, including unions. The submarket determined the policies concerning
pay restraint and public expenditure (volume growth and government grant),
and thus certain constraints on the ability to pay. This segment of the
political environment was important in view of the significance of pay
policy for negotiations and because grants, at that time, accounted for
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nearly half of the finance for gross expenditure. First, the Rate 
Support Grant (RSG) was paid in respect of relevant expenditure, that is, 
broadly, current expenditure not financed by receipts. Second, specific 
grants were paid for particular services, usually as a percentage of 
expenditure, such as the 80 per cent grant towards the police service. 
Third, supplementary grants were paid for transport services and national 
parks according to the Environment Secretary's assessment of the 
formulation and implementation of policies by local authorities.
The local political submarket primarily involved local authorities and 
their electorates, who had an interest in influencing expenditure and rate 
decisions. The importance of the submarket lay in the fact that rates 
accounted for a quarter of revenue for gross expenditure, and could be 
increased under the General Rate Act of 1967 to cover any revenue 
expenditure not recovered from elsewhere.
To be sure, there existed an economic market in which local 
authorities provided services in return for fees and charges, and rents. 
However, it can be safely ignored. In the first place, it provided only
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approximately one-sixth of revenue for the purposes of gross expenditure. 
Furthermore, in 1979, the finance was generally subject to a degree of 
legislative regulation. Under the 1974 Local Government Act, general 
guidelines usually applied to fees and charges. Fixed or maximum charges 
for services sometimes applied, as was also the case with most licences,
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such as for dogs, cinemas and theatres. Rents had to be fixed so that they
were not in excess of the level needed to balance the Housing Revenue
Account after subsidies, according to the Housing Rents and Subsidies Act
1975. User charges levied in trading activities were not limited,
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however.
Essentially, the relatively loose financial constraints in local 
government in 1979 can be attributed to the Labour Government's power over 
grants and volume spending plans being compromised by the unions; to its 
lack of control over nominal spending in the centre-periphery submarket; 
and to the monopolistic position of the local authorities in the local 
submarket. Each political arena is discussed in turn.
The centre-periphery submarket
Political market structure
The structure of the submarket, which shaped the power structure, was 
determined by the procedures for planning and controlling pay and 
expenditure. The Government's power was more questionable than in central 
government.
The planning of pay and expenditure
There were two chief sources of weakness in the Government's position 
in the political market structure. First, as in central government, 
informal procedures gave the unions a significant voice in the political 
market in 1979, although Government retained the final say. Local 
authority unions were involved in informal discussions concerning Phase 4 
and had a significant impact on its revised form. Consequences duly 
followed for grants and nominal public spending. The second weakness was
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the absence of any procedure to allow the Government to influence cash 
spending plans other than through the amount of grant: expenditure 
guidance was only in volume terms.
Even so, the Government's position was secure in other respects. In 
the sphere of volume expenditure planning the discussions with local 
authorities took place under the aegis of the Consultative Council for 
Local Government Finance (CCLGF), on which sat the local authority 
assocations, the Greater London Council (GLC), and Ministers and officials 
of relevant departments. The starting point was the forecasting of 
expenditure by service and the extraction of implications for policy in 
Expenditure Steering Groups, composed of senior finance officers and 
service advisers from local government and civil servants. The Official 
Steering Group then held negotiations between government officials and 
local government officers on the forecasts of relevant expenditure and the 
level and distribution of grant. In addition, the Department of 
Environment (DoE) consulted the TUC Local Government Committee to discuss 
the prospects for the ensuing year and trade union priorities.
Parallelling the bilateral negotiations over central government
spending, the DoE and the Treasury consulted on the basis of the
Expenditure Steering Groups' figures to determine the total of local
authority spending to be suggested to the Cabinet. Final decisions on
expenditure, grant, and cash limits, were the prerogative of the Cabinet,
taking into account the CCLGF discussions and the views of unions and 
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others.
The balance of power in this process in 1978-79 lay with the 
government. This should not be exaggerated, but in contrast to before the 
mid-1970s, the amount of relevant expenditure was not assessed simply as a
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joint forecasting exercise which may or may not have agreed with the
previous Public Expenditure White Paper: instead, the government was more
73
concerned to influence the planned total. This was not surprising given
the greater perceived importance of the PSBR; the slower growth rate; and 
74
larger grant share. For example, in the negotiations for FY 1975-76
options for relevant expenditure had been specified, and the following year
relevant expenditure had been ordered to be kept within the level forecast 
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for 1975-76. Indeed, the local government side of the CCLGF felt that
while dealings with the Labour Government were reasonably effective, there
was often a lack of true consultation; rather, the forum was used to inform
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and explain centrally-taken decisions.
The relative strength of the centre over the periphery in volume
planning also emanated from the failure of the local authority associations
to counter with alternative strategies in the planning process. The
problem was organisational. Advisers and elected officials had little time
to develop policy initiatives due to local commitments. The permanent
secretariats were small relative to the broad range of functions of
associations; they were not larger due to the cost and their lack of links
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with local authorities.
The formal role of the unions was not significant. The TUC Local
Government Committee (LGC) typically made its views known about the level
of grant contribution, the inflation factor and, in particular, about the
level of provision of individual services, while government departments
stated their position, but there was no negotiation as such. To
illustrate, in the introduction to a meeting in October 1978, the
Pariiamentary Under Secretary pointedly said that:
The object of the exercise was to enable Ministers to hear the 
views of the TUC Local Government Committee before they reached
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decisions on their proposals for the RSG settlement for 1979- 
80.78 (Emphasis added).
Finally, Parliament was weak. In addition to the problems of
analysing voted expenditure identified in central government, Parliament,
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while being able to debate RSG Reports, could not amend the figures.
The control of pay and expenditure
Nor did the Government enjoy a powerful position in the political 
market concerned with the control of pay and expenditure. Although there 
were mechanisms to induce respect for volume plans, cash spending on pay 
and in total was not controlled. The Government's power was limited to the 
control of its own financial contribution through grant.
In more detail, grants to local government were tightly controlled in 
line with plans through the Government's administrative control system.
Cash limits encompassed all grants so that there were firm limits to 
the level of support. Control was facilitated by the cash block structure 
which assigned blocks to the relevant sponsoring departments.- The 
operation of the rules on relaxing the limits gave the Government as much 
power over local government grants as over central government finance. 
Although, as before. Parliament was relatively powerless, the Treasury's 
FIS monitored and controlled local government withdrawals of grant.
At root, governmental control of spending levels was restricted by the 
structure of the political market; procedural rules and convention led to 
the diffusion of power, with the result that the effectiveness of the 
guidelines depended largely on the attitudes of the local authorities. The 
Government had no statutory responsibility for local authority expenditure, 
and hence was confined to monitoring and exhortation. As part of this,
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local authorities filled out annual CIPFA/DoE returns showing their
expenditure budgets in real terms (and rate increases) to give the OoE an
early indication of whether the planned real spending levels would
materialise. In the event of a deviation, the government cajoled the
Associations through the CCLGF into advising their members to rebudget more
in accordance with government wishes. The DoE also issued circulars
advising on expenditure levels. However, the success of these steps hinged
on the views of the Associations - particularly the political views of the
dominant party - and on the loyalty of individual authorities to the
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outcome of consultations. The Associations were not in a position to
enforce any agreement, however, because they were not constitutionally able
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to bind members; in any case, there was little reporting back.
Government control was further weakened by the grant distribution
arrangements which gave authorities an incentive to increase their
spending. In 1979 there were three elements in the RSG. First, the needs
element compensated for differences in spending needs due to differing
service demands or costs. Second, the resources element accounted for
variations in the rateable resources of authorities. Third, the domestic
element related to the rate relief determined by central government.
Although the RSG was cash-limited, the needs and resources elements
guaranteed an increased share of grant upon an increase in spending. The
needs assessment, based on stepwise multiple regression analysis, credited
groups of similar, high-spending, authorities with high spending needs and 
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hence more grant. The resources element was calculated such that the
same marginal rate of support was granted, whatever the expenditure level;
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there was no penalty to raising expenditure.
Since there was no mechanism to control local authority cash
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spending, there was only the disincentive of the gearing effect: where
the percentage of expenditure provided by rates was small, the raising of
finance above the levels implicit in the grant settlement reguired large
percentage increases in rates. The DoE thought this a deterrent, although
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only an imprecise one.
In short, the Government in 1979 enjoyed only partial control in the
planning and control of pay and expenditure. As was admitted in The Right
Approach by the Conservative Party:
it is becoming clearer than ever that the present system of 
relations between control and local government does not provide a 
sure way of regulating either the level or the character of local 
spending.85
Political market attitudes
The financial constraints on authorities reflected the attitudes of
the dominant parties: the Government, the unions, and the local
authorities. The flexibility of the constraints on pay and grant was the
product of the attitudes of the Government and unions towards appropriate
wage increases in the 1978-79 pay round. As explained in relation to
central government, the Labour Government desired to keep the pay provision
small, but was forced to relax it in the face of union disagreement.
The freedom afforded by the real growth plans was the result of the
Government's views on the health of the economy. It was believed that
services could be permitted to grow slowly in view of faster economic
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growth, single-figure inflation, and a satisfactory PSBR. Local
authorities were apparently prepared to budget in line with these plans.
The Local Government Minister did not believe that the spending returns
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indicated a volume upsurge. This was plausible because the deviation 
between guidelines and actual current expenditure growth in real terms in
the four years from FY 1975-76 to FY 1978-79 had been small: 0.3, -0.4,
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-0.7, and 1.8 percentage points respectively.
The local authorities, largely unconstrained in the central-local
political market, were meantime preparing to increase nominal spending at a
fast rate, as the CIPFA/DoE rate returns hinted. The Minister interpreted
the action as indicating that treasurers were being cautious about the
89
prospective trend in inflation. The potency of the view of local 
authorities regarding cash spending was also due to the power of 
authorities in the local political submarket, however. It is to this that 
attention is now drawn.
The local political submarket
Theoretically, the relationship between the local authority and the 
electorate bears on the ability to raise rate finance and increase 
spending, while the reports of local auditors can affect local authority 
expenditure in real or money terms. In practice, the structure of the 
local political market in 1979 was not conducive to checks to local 
authority autonomy.
The electorate's formal power lay in the ballot box and the threat of
voting a council out of office. This did not amount to significant
influence, however. Unlike consumers in private industry, surveys showed
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that voters in local authorities did not see themselves as powerful.
Elections were infrequent or staggered so that electoral pressure was felt
only over the longer-term. When they occurred, participation was typically 
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low. Also, businesses - which paid a substantial proportion of the rate
bill - were not franchised. Even prior to 1969 when there was a business
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vote, only a fraction of businessmen could vote.
Voters may have been influenced by the size of their rate bills,
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particularly as they were highly visible lump-sum demands, but they were
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ill-equipped to respond to particular spending levels. Rate increases
were not reliable indicators because the Government contribution was apt to
vary with the overall percentage contribution and the distribution 
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formula. The electorate did not notice business rates because they were
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just one increased cost of many in price rises. Moreover, they were badly
informed about the level and even the type of service provision in the 
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authority. Information was either lacking because of published
indicators being scarce, or it was difficult to assess due to complex
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presentations, such as in local authority accounts. Also, national
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issues tended to dominate local factors in local authority elections.
Auditors, who were either district auditors appointed by the
Environment Secretary, or were appointed by local authorities from
professional practice, subject to approval by the Secretary of State, were
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free to comment on financial efficiency, including pay expenditure.
However, this was not a threat to the budgetary authority of local
government. First, audits were primarily concerned with ensuring that
public money was fully accounted for, and expenditure was legally
authorised. There were insufficient auditors to investigate value-for- 
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money regularly. Second, comparative studies would have been more
telling, but the central directorate of the audit service rarely carried 
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them out. Third, the auditor's report was only reported to the local
authority (except where the law had been infringed): unless there was a
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public outcry, the authority was not obliged to react.
Similarly, internally, local authorities were not under great pressure 
to ensure costs were minimised. Value for money was not emphasised. The 
Bains Committee, which had considered management structures, had found that
143
there was little machinery to achieve value for money. Financial and other
indicators were rarely used in budgeting, according to a report by Coopers
and Lybrand. The reason appeared to be, in part, that they were not
appropriate in the context of public services: high expenditure was
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regarded as indicating a good service as opposed to inflated costs.
The attitude of the local authorities, the dominant force in the local
political submarket, was that they were generally prepared to increase the
unconstrained financial magnitudes of rates and nominal expenditure in
response to inflation. A study of 20 local authorities in the late 1970s
found that authorities preferred to raise taxes to compensate for
inflation, rather than cut the volume of spending. Also, in the same
investigation, budgetary practice was found to be to update volume plans
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for inflation before applying government guidelines on real spending.
Hence the rate and cash-spending prospects of mid-1979.
(iii) Summary
In summary, local authorities were subject to constraints determined 
in two political submarkets, yet in 1979 the financial context was 
relatively abundant. The reason was in part that the constraints on the 
amount of finance at the disposal of authorities in 1979 were not tight. 
Although the Labour Government was able to control grant once planned, the 
planning total was variable (upwards) according to the comparability 
settlements in the pipeline, owing to the influence the trade unions were 
able to exert in the central-local political sub-market. Nor did rate 
finance appear to be limiting local government cash budgets. Electoral 
pressures were weak and the gearing effect was far from an absolute 
constraint. Local authorities could, and, in 1979, did, raise rates
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significantly.
Also, with regard to expenditure, the Government planned for a degree 
of real growth given the state of the economy. In 1979, as in previous years, 
local authorities seemed poised to abide reasonably closely by the 
guidelines. However, given the lack of firm control over local 
authority budget details, the associated funds could have been put 
towards pay budgets. Additionally, the ability-to-pay was relatively 
unconstrained because cash expenditure was not subject to significant 
downward, central or electoral, pressure for institutional reasons. This 
overrode the restrictions imposed by the high ratio of labour to total 
costs.
In comparison to central government, therefore, the financial 
atmosphere in 1979 was relatively more liberal. This difference reflected 
the access of local authorities to, and power within, the local political 
submarket where the Government had no jurisdiction.
2.1.3 Public corporations
(i) Financial constraints
Upon gaining power in 1979, the Conservative Party inherited a public 
corporations sector whose finance was only loosely constrained on the 
average. While this belied a range of inter-authority differences, the 
aggregate effect was to threaten single-digit inflation.
The external finance of nationalised industries was limited by 
External Financing Limits (EFLs), set by the previous Labour Government.
In the financial years (FYs) 1976-77 to 1978-79, the EFLs had in general 
been easy to meet. Outturns had been 32 per cent below the EFL in the 
first year, and 38 and 26 per cent below in the following two years.
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Across corporations, in FY 1978-79, four corporations had had negative 
outturns and paid back to the Treasury more than they had been required to; 
two more ended with negative outturns although they had been given
permission to borrow; one had used only 58 per cent of its EFL. The
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remainder were at or within 15 per cent of their respective limits.
The EFLs for FY 1979-80, which were of importance to the rest of the 
1978-79 pay round, were potentially harder to meet. The limits had been 
calculated on the assumption that the original Phase 4 policy would hold. 
There had been no revision when the low pay provision had been inserted,
and, significantly, there had been no undertakings to facilitate the
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financing of any catch-up increases, unlike in the public services. It 
therefore appeared likely that the external finance ceilings would bite 
more than usual, other things being equal.
But other things were not equal. Internal finance could be increased 
above assumed levels in many cases. Price restraint had ended and 
authorities were expected to move towards economic pricing, the precise
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extent in practice depending on the state of competition in the market.
In addition, some corporations faced rising demand trends so that there was 
more scope for raising prices and utilising labour more intensively, 
thereby increasing the amount of revenue per employee available for pay 
increases. For example, the Labour Government’s Public Expenditure White 
Paper had forecast steady upward growth for the electricity supply industry 
(ESI), the British Gas Corporation (BGC), the Post Office (P0), the British 
Airports Authority (BAA), and the British Railways Board (BRB). It is true, 
however, that elsewhere the prognosis for demand, and thus revenue and pay, 
was bleak. Markets were turning down for British Shipbuilders (BS), the 
British Steel Corporation (BSC), British Airways (BA), the National Freight
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Corporation (NFC), and the National Bus Corporation (NBC), causing the EFLs 
108
to have an impact.
Furthermore, in contrast to the public services, nationalised 
industries were typically capital-intensive, with greater opportunity for 
increasing pay budgets by a given percentage through non-pay economies, 
such as through cutting back on investment plans. This applied 
particularly to the energy industries and the telecommunications part of 
the P0.
There are, of course, public corporations other than nationalised 
industries. In 1979, some, such as HMSO, the Royal Mint and the Royal 
Ordnance Factories, were heavily dependent on central government funds 
and therefore saw similar financial constraints as regular central 
government bodies. Some others, such as the BBC, received grants, but 
had revenue-raising powers, often to levy fees. Thus the constraints 
were more akin to those in local authorities, although it is fair to say 
that fees were more regulated by the Government than were rates.
Finally, the Regional Water Authorities were treated like nationalised 
industries.
In sum, the public corporations sector was characterised by a diversi­
ty of financial arrangements and circumstances in 1979. Importantly, under 
the dominant financial regime of EFLs, corporations experienced tighter 
restrictions on external finance than in previous years, but internal 
finance from product and service sales was often flexible, especially in 
authorities in monopolistic industries and growing markets.
(ii) The economic-political environment
The ability-to-pay of public corporations in 1979 was derived from 
both the economic and the political environments. Economic factors
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impinged on internal resources. The structure of product markets 
affected the revenue of authorities through the elasticity of demand. 
Meantime, market demand trends affected output volume and revenues. 
Political influences operated in two political submarkets which comprised 
the overall political market environment of public corporations. The 
more important one, the government-industry submarket, affected external 
resources through the determination of the EFL, and internal finance and 
expenditure through a patchwork of financial and non-financial controls 
and laws regulating the structure of the economic market. The second was 
the industry submarket, involving the authority and satellite bodies, 
such as consumer councils. Here constraints were generated on internal 
finance, especially prices.
This section considers the elements of the economic and political 
markets and shows how they contributed to the degree of constraint seen 
in 1979. Attention is primarily directed at the nationalised industries 
owing to their predominant share of total public corporation employment.
The economic market environment 
Economic market structure
Of key importance to the generation of internal finance was the 
revenue from sales of goods and services. One means of raising 
additional finance was to increase prices. The extent to which this was 
economically feasible in 1979 was influenced by the market structures of 
the industries in which authorities operated: whether the industry was 
competitive or monopolistic affected the price elasticity of product 
demand, that is, the ability to increase price without reducing demand. 
Thus, price was constrained to a greater degree by the product market
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when the price elasticity of demand was small, that is, when a price 
increase would have caused a large fall in demand, perhaps leading in 
more extreme cases to reductions in total revenue.
The energy and communications sectors were largely monopolistic in 
1979. The electricity supply corporations and British Gas were sole 
distributors of their products, while the National Coal Board (NCB) had 
only marginal competition from coal imports. Although the sources of 
energy competed for custom, all having reasonably large shares of the 
energy market as a whole, price competition was probably not as intense 
as it could have been because of rigidities on the consumption side. 
Two-thirds of the output of electricity was used for purposes such as 
lighting, refrigerators, and electric motors, where alternative power 
sources could not be employed. Meanwhile, the NCB sold much of its coal 
to the electricity generating plants which were geared to that type of 
fuel. In the communications field, the Post Office held a monopoly in 
the areas of the letter postal service and telecommunications, although 
the two could compete with each other.
In comparison, the transport and manufacturing corporations faced 
more elastic demand due to the more competitive nature of their 
industries. In the transport sectors some corporations held monopoly 
positions within narrowly-defined industries, such as BR in the railway 
industry and the NBC in local bus markets. However, captive markets due 
to consumer rigidity did not exist because alternative means of transport 
were usually substitutable in a way not possible with energy sources.
Thus the NBC and BR both competed with other types of public and private 
passenger transport, and BR also competed in its parcels operations with 
private sector carriers. Hence these corporations were in fact more like
the NFC and BA than might be supposed. Nevertheless, the latter
authorities faced peculiarly competitive conditions. The NFC possessed
less than 10 per cent of the road freight market, competing with, among
others, BR, the PO, and private hauliers. BA accounted for only a very
small fraction of the international air travel market. The manufacturing
industries, BSC and BS, were comparable in market structure to BA in that
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they supplied a very competitive international market.
It followed that market structure made the financial background to pay 
negotiations more lucrative for groups in the energy and communications 
industries than in transport and manufacturing, other things equal. While 
other factors were germane to the overall financial position, market struc­
ture bore heavily on the degree of laxity of the constraints.
Economic market trends
As it transpired, the propellents of market trends tended to
reinforce the financial consequences of market structure. In the energy
sector, rising personal disposable income and increasing manufacturing
110
output was boosting demand in mid-1979. This was augmented by changes
in relative fuel prices: the increased price of oil, occasioned by the
second oil price crisis which was rooted in the Iran-Iraq war, induced
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greater coal-burn by the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB)
112
and vastly increased the demand by consumers for gas. Also relevant
in fuel-substitution decisions was a Government policy of October 1978 to
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burn more coal at power stations, and consumer fears of supply
114
restrictions in the oil market. It should be noted, however, that 
market trends were not as expansionary as they might have been. The
115
growing strength of the pound was making coal imports more inviting,
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and BGC was having to limit new customers so that winter peak demand
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could be kept within the capacity to supply.
In communications, the PO's telephone business was prospering as a
result of economic growth and associated personal income levels and
business activity. In addition, throughout the late 1970s there was a
switch from letter mail to telephone communication, reflecting changing
tastes. As with gas, supply constraints were restricting the expansion
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of telephone operations somewhat.
The transport corporations, meanwhile, did not see parallel market
developments in 1979. To be sure, economic activity and changes in tastes
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were increasing the demand for air travel, the use of British Waterways
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Board (BWB) warehouses and terminals, and BWB hire boat licenses.
Supply-side factors in BR, such as more high-speed trains, and marketing
120
devices, were also increasing demand. However, the demand for
transport had fallen earlier in 1979 due to the effects of the winter's
strikes, while supply had been hit by breakdowns caused by bad 
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weather. Also, there were deleterious price effects in most
122
industries caused by higher oil prices. BA was suffering from the
strength of the pound because over half its revenue was earned in foreign 
123
currencies.
Manufacturing industries in the public sector were in the worst
position because of continuing world-wide recession and overcapacity in
steel and shipbuilding. Steel had been in a slump since the 1973-74 oil
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crisis, although 1979 was seeing some growth in the world market.
Shipbuilding had been hit by the oil price increases which reduced the
125
demand for tankers and caused a trade slump. General world factors were 
being compounded by UK-specific factors. The rising value of sterling and
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increasing cost inflation relative to overseas were making BSC and BS less 
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price-competitive. UK producers to some extent were turning to imported 
sources of steel.
The political market environment
Interacting with the economic market context of bargaining in the 
nationalised industries was the political market context. While the 
economic market affected internal resources through market structure and 
trends, the political market influenced that structure through government 
legislation, and placed administrative constraints on the ability of 
corporations to use their economic market position to increase internal 
finance and distribute it to pay budgets. The political market also put 
limits on external finance.
The government-industry political submarket
The government-industry submarket is defined broadly to include the 
Cabinet, Parliament, government departments, and public corporations. It 
also encompasses any body or pressure group that seeks to influence the 
government's policy towards nationalised industries, but it does not 
include those bodies such as consumer councils that relate primarily to the 
corporations themselves.
In the government-industry political submarket nationalised industries 
enjoyed a relatively autonomous position. In this, they had more power 
vis-a-vis the government than did central government bodies and local 
authorities. Essentially, the government had an 'arm's length' 
relationship with the nationalised industries. This was rooted historically 
in the Morrisonian conception of public corporations and in the legislation 
which established the corporations. It was intended that there would be a
152
partnership between government and corporations whereby board members would
127
acknowledge the public interest as well as commercial criteria.
This ethos had two central practical implications for relationships in 
the government-industry political submarket. First, power was shared: the 
attitudes of both government and corporations were relevant to the 
determination of safeguards on industry behaviour. Second, detailed 
control over authorities was not possible: Ministers had no formal power 
to influence day-to-day management. Instead, statutes and White Papers 
established a multiplicity of general controls, which allowed room for 
manoeuvre. Thus, again the views of both government and industry were 
relevant to corporation decisions.
The specific nature of these two structural features in the context of 
corporation finances - the relative power over the determination of 
constraints and the technical control they afforded - together with the 
attitudes of the salient actors towards the terms of the constraints, 
determined the relative freedom of corporations.
External finance
External finance was subject to the public corporation form of cash
limits, external financing limits, but the government had less control than
in the public services, due to the structure of the political market.
First of all, EFLs were fixed by the Government, but in conjunction with
the corporations. The political market power of the corporations
consisted of consultations with sponsoring departments and the Treasury
over estimates of external financing requirements before referral to 
128
Cabinet. Typically, the Treasury wanted low EFLs in order to curb 
public spending (since nationalised industry borrowing was included in
153
the official definition of public expenditure), while the industries
wanted high EFLs to facilitate investment and ease the process of
managing in an uncertain environment. Departments tended to lie 
129
between. While it is difficult to discern the relative influence of
the parties at departmental and Cabinet levels in 1979, there is reason
to believe that the corporations were far from dominated by the Treasury.
Although deductions from managers' external financing requirements were
routinely made, the history of inter-departmental relationships indicates
that the sponsoring department would have lent its weight to the industry
rather than the Treasury. There was an element of deference by the civil
service towards professional industrial managers who possessed
130
specialised knowledge. This was particularly important in the public
corporations sector because so many factors in the setting of EFLs were
131
variable and hard to predict, especially those relating to revenue.
Once set, the prospects for government control were technically good
since the EFL system was capable of restricting the external finance of
authorities to within the specified limits. Although not all external
funding was drawn from public sources as such, it was all provided through
the government. First, loans, which formed the major category of external
finance for most nationalised industries, were controlled differently
according to their source. Medium- and long-term loans obtained from the
National Loans Fund (NLF) - a Treasury account with the Bank of England -
were subject to statutory limits above which fresh authority was 
132
required. Foreign borrowing over the same time horizon, from the 
European Investment Bank, the European Coal and Steel Community (in the 
cases of BSC and the NCB), or on the international capital market, was 
normally only undertaken with a Treasury guarantee which allowed control
154
over the amount and timing. The remaining type of loan, short-term
loans from banks and other financial institutions, had also to be
134
underwritten by the government.
A second kind of finance was public dividend capital (PDC) - a form of
share capital in which the government had a 100 per cent stake. PDC was
available to industries which were expected to be fully viable, but which
were especially subject to cyclical fluctuations in returns owing to
trading conditions and the nature of their assets. The intention was to
prevent large interest payments causing poor results in the downturn with
deleterious consequences for the ability of corporations to win 
135
contracts. In mid-1979 PDC was being given to BSC, BAe, BA, and the 
Giro part of the P0. By definition, it came from public funds and could 
thus be controlled.
The third component of external finance was grants which were not 
available to the private sector on the same basis. Since these were 
allocated by government, they could be restricted as desired. The grants 
included, first, assistance to authorities in order to stimulate output, 
the level of service, or the amount of investment. For example, the NCB 
was in receipt of assistance which contributed towards the cost of coke 
production and covered the cost of stocking coal and coke. The CEGB 
meanwhile was aided with the object of accelerating investment. A second 
type of grant was compensation, adding to finance where government policy 
caused financial performance to suffer through requirements that costs, 
prices, output or service be held at uncommercial levels. Notably, the 
grant to BR compensated for the cost of fulfilling obligations imposed by 
the government to provide passenger services and to maintain and operate 
certain level crossings. The third type of grant was a subsidy, paid to
133
155
4
make up losses or deficiencies whicn were not the result of government
policy regarding costs, prices or output. The NCB was receiving subsidies
towards the social costs of pit closures, premature retirement benefits
resulting from the closures, and assistance in meeting the deficiency in
136
the mineworkers' pension scheme.
Not only was the coverage of the EFLs complete across all public
corporations (except the British National Oil Corporation), control was
also facilitated by the EFL block structure: each corporation had its own
EFL. Also the operational rules controlled the Exchequer-sanctioned
finance in a way comparable to the public services. Limits were to be
respected and there was no guarantee that a financing deficit would be met
by an additional injection of external finance. Authorities were expected
to provide for pay and price increases within the limits. On occasions,
however, it was realised that exceptions to the EFLs would be necessary,
perhaps when unforeseen difficulties arose which were beyond the control of
the industry. For example, revenue shortfalls could occur due to market
demand shifts unrelated to the efficiency of the nationalised industry,
necessitating extra external finance if investment plans were to be 
137
fulfilled. Finally, government control was enforced through a
monitoring system comparable to that in the public services. Monthly or
quarterly financial returns were sent to the sponsoring department and the
Treasury covering investment expenditure, up-to-date estimates of financing
requirements for the year, and proposals for meeting them. Comparisons of
past and future spending were made with approved investment plans.
Discussions ensued in which corporations were required to explain
significant departures from the control figures and in some cases were
138
asked to take compensatory action.
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Formally, Parliament had a role in the political market, but its power
was in practice limited: EFLs were voted by Parliament. Whenever the cash
limits of nationalised industries were raised, they had to be announced in
Parliament. Hence, notionally, control operated through voting and the
envisaged reflection cast on public corporations by Pariiamentary
questions or references in debates or Commons committee investigations.
However, EFLs were generally approved by Parliament without change, due to
the cursory attention given the Public Expenditure White Paper and party- 
139
line voting. Pariiamentary questions could be sidestepped and excuses
140
given for the breaking of EFLs. Debates were typically wide-ranging and
141
hence did not maintain a focus on EFL abidance. The Select Committee
structure allowed the most penetrating questions to be posed, but even then
the investigations were after the fact. Furthermore, the Public Accounts
Committee did not have jurisdiction over public corporations to audit the
disbursement and efficiency of public expenditure because this would have
infringed the arm's length principle. However, it did examine individual
142
votes involving grants and subsidies to nationalised industries. 
Nevertheless, in sum, Parliamentary control was diffuse on the whole; 
industries probably preferred not to incur criticism, but there were few 
immediate Par 1iamentary pressures to cause them to stay within the EFLs in 
the face of conflicting pressures.
Therefore, it follows that the historically tight constraints on 
external finance faced by authorities in 1979 were a product of the 
attitudes of government and industries at the EFL planning stage, and the 
attitudes of the government towards the enforcement of EFLs. At the 
planning stage, the Government adopted a hard line in calculating the 
EFLs on the assumption of Phase 4 pay increases of 5 per cent and, in
m
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many cases, 10 per cent price inflation, although corporations no doubt
expected higher rates of increase, given trends in late 1978 when the 
143
EFLs were discussed. It is true, however, that internal revenue
assumptions may have been potentially conservative, as in the previous
year, due to corporations1 errors or attempts to insert flexibility.
In controlling external finance, the Labour Government was strict. As
indicated at the outset, no revisions to accommodate higher pay increases
were made when Phase 4 crumbled. In any event, the public corporations
144
accepted the discipline of EFLs in their internal budgeting. Annual 
reports made it clear that keeping within the EFLs was an important 
objective.
Internal finance
While the political market structure and attitudes yielded a 
relatively high degree of control for the government over external finance 
in mid-1979, internal finance was not subject to the same politically- 
determined structures. Generally speaking, the government had limited 
power relative to the authorities in the sector, and sometimes was not 
predisposed to use what power it had to control internal finance.
The political market relationships between the Government and 
corporations concerning internal financial resources were complicated, 
having many dimensions. The parties interacted in the context of 
financial targets; performance indicators; laws relating to product 
market structure and output or service levels; corporate plans; 
appointments to Boards of Directors; and directives and informal 
pressure. Each is considered in turn to show the structure of the 
relationship between government and corporations and the implications for 
relative power. Also indicated are the attitudes of the influential
158
actors in mid-1979 towards the control of product market revenue through 
those political market structures.
Financial targets, usually set in terms of total grant or a return on
145
assets or turnover, were agreed by government and industry. Although 
jointly determined, financial targets were technically capable of allowing 
the government to indirectly control the availability of internal finance. 
Primarily, they were intended to give an incentive to use capital 
efficiently, but in requiring certain returns, internal finance was pre­
empted, other things equal. In order that the corporations faced an 
effective discipline, forecasts of costs and prices were made. Estimates 
were made of the cost of supplying the full output associated with the 
corporation1s assets, based on the required rate of return laid down in the 
1978 White Paper, counter-inflationary policy, and the scope for raising
efficiency. Using this as a basis for prices, demand was estimated. From
146
this, cash flow was calculated and the financial target derived.
Therefore, if the non-pay assumptions were correct and the targets
respected and enforced, pay budgets were constrained. Annual reports were
to publish outcomes against target, to explain deviations and, where
appropriate, to comment on how corporations intended to improve their
performance. Public and Pariiamentary awareness could be heightened.
However, the attitudes of the government and corporations did not
yield great control in 1979. At the planning stage, it was true that the
government appeared in a strong position to fix the targets it preferred.
For example, the target for BGC was imposed and the government played a
147
leading role in setting that for the electricity supply industry. The 
financial targets, were tough in that they reflected the assumptions of the
159
Government's Phase 4 incomes policy. However, in July 1979, 3Ae, BAA, BRB,
BWB, NBC, NCB, NFC and STG had no published targets. Elsewhere, although
some industries in 1979 faced single-year targets, others were set to be
achieved over a three-to five-year period. Indeed, the targets were
148
originally conceived as a medium-term financial control.
When targets were implemented, the corporations did not always respect
them and the government did not enforce them. Authorities preferred to meet
the targets for reasons of corporate pride, but in some cases, where their
economic market position allowed, achieved them simply by raising price,
defeating the attempted restrictions on internal finance. For example,
previously, the PO had been discovered to price its services on a cost-plus
basis, the costs including the outcome of pay negotiations and the 'plus'
149
being the financial objective. Some others ignored the target where it 
was difficult to attain. For instance, in 1977 the British Transport Docks 
Board (BTDB) had been set a target of a 20 per cent return on capital by 
1980, but was prepared to yield to higher wage demands before meeting the 
target. The Chairman said:
To achieve that return on capital looks quite difficult now but 
will depend very largely on whether there is industrial trouble 
over pay controls.150
Although financial targets were cited and related comments were made by
the corporations in their reports, the Government, Parliament and the
public did not appear to put pressure on recalcitrant authorities. Nor did th
Government recalibrate targets to conditions where the assumptions were
unrealistic: the BTDB did not have a new target until 1980, for 
151
example.
Performance indicators provided little more control over internal 
finance. The political market structure bore similarities to that relevant
160
to financial targets. Both corporations and the government, through the
sponsoring departments, were involved in selecting indicators and deciding
on appropriate objectives. Control over internal finance was
technically feasible if the indicators were appropriately designed to cover
service standards and prices. Requirements to maintain services in
unprofitable areas, and to maintain the same standard of service elsewhere,
could limit the ability of the corporation to increase pay budgets by
cutting the volume of service or non-pay expenditure. Price objectives could
curb the product market power of authorities and thus could limit revenue.
The political market structure, in giving power to both corporations
and government in setting indicators, produced varying constraints
depending on which views dominated. The general case was that in 1979
authorities were reluctant to establish performance targets and indicators
due to problems of measurement, the uncertainty of contingent conditions
152
and beliefs that they were unnecessary. Where indicators were
established, it was rare for there to be targets. Price indices were
153
usually shunned in favour of service or output measures. Thus the
government was able to impose significant constraints only in certain
cases. For instance, the PO was not supposed to increase its prices any
faster than the general level of prices between 1978-79 and 1982-83. Also,
for BGC it was 'the government's wish that gas prices should be maintained
154
in real terms during the financial year 1979-80. '
The lack of enthusiasm for performance indicators in principle was 
compounded by the lack of full respect and enforcement in practice. 
Corporations were tentative in reporting performance for reasons of
155
commercial confidentiality and fears that the data might be misleading.
The significance of indicators was rarely explained, and comments on trends
161
a
reported each year. Public and Pariiamentary exposure were the only
157
inducements to conformity.
The other dimensions of the political market relationships between the 
government and corporations gave the government some power to exercise 
influence over internal finance, but it was not being used aggressively in 
mid-1979.
The government was in a position to use its statutory powers to define
the economic market structure and the duties of public corporations so as
to restrict the ability of authorities to increase revenues. For instance,
the Post Office Act, 1969, had given the PO a monopoly: it was
in particular to provide... such services for the conveyance of 
letters and such telephone services as satisfy all reasonable 
demands for them.158
This facilitated revenue increases through price increases. No attempts
were being made in 1979 to curb these monopolistic powers. The market
structures that had existed since nationalisation were maintained.
The state of the political market relationship regarding statutory
duties continued to constrain finances somewhat through the requirement
that industries serve a wider market than they would normally contemplate
on the basis of commercial criteria. For example, the Electricity Act,
1947 (as amended by the Electricity Act, 1957) stated that:
the Electricity Boards shall... secure as far as practicable the 
development, extension to rural areas and cheapening of supplies 
of electricity'.159
The supply of electricity to certain rural areas was unprofitable in itself 
and hence reduced the availability of finance.
Corporate plans, the product of a dialogue between the civil service 
and public corporations concerning the economic climate, market conditions,
to facilitate scrutiny were unusual. Some outcomes were not consistently
156
162
reported each year. Public and Pariiamentary exposure were the only
157
inducements to conformity.
The other dimensions of the political market relationships between the 
government and corporations gave the government some power to exercise 
influence over internal finance, but it was not being used aggressively in 
mid-1979.
The government was in a position to use its statutory powers to define
the economic market structure and the duties of public corporations so as
to restrict the ability of authorities to increase revenues. For instance,
the Post Office Act, 1969, had given the PO a monopoly: it was
in particular to provide__ such services for the conveyance of
letters and such telephone services as satisfy all reasonable 
demands for them.158
This facilitated revenue increases through price increases. No attempts
were being made in 1979 to curb these monopolistic powers. The market
structures that had existed since nationalisation were maintained.
The state of the political market relationship regarding statutory
duties continued to constrain finances somewhat through the requirement
that industries serve a wider market than they would normally contemplate
on the basis of commercial criteria. For example, the Electricity Act,
1947 (as amended by the Electricity Act, 1957) stated that:
the Electricity Boards shall... secure as far as practicable the 
development, extension to rural areas and cheapening of supplies 
of electricity'.159
The supply of electricity to certain rural areas was unprofitable in itself 
and hence reduced the availability of finance.
Corporate plans, the product of a dialogue between the civil service 
and public corporations concerning the economic climate, market conditions,
to facilitate scrutiny were unusual. Some outcomes were not consistently
156
162
and corporate strategy, were capable of affecting the funds available
for pay through their implications for output and investment. For example,
the NCB's plan included output objectives, and the BAA plan posited the
161
level of service that was to be provided. Revenue was thus potentially
constrained. Derivative investment plans, for which the Treasury
guaranteed partial approval for future years, also carried implications
for cost effectiveness and the availability of pay funding from savings.
However, the degree of influence of the corporate planning mechanism should
not be exaggerated. Objectives were prone to be overridden by short-term
pressures, such as the need of the Treasury to reduce EFLs in pursuit of
162
lower public spending. Further, the high turnover rates of Ministers
and civil servants meant that there was little political commitment to any 
163
plan.
The government also had the statutory power to appoint the chairmen of
the nationalised industries, and the board members, after consultation with
the Chairman. Through judicious choices, the corporations' financial
policies could be influenced at second hand. In 1979, the government's
power was hampered by the conventional terms and conditions of appointment
offered. Relatively low pay compared with the private sector, caused by
government rejections of the recommendations of the Top Salaried Review
Body, together with short-term appointments, made suitable candidates 
164
difficult to attract. Furthermore, the Labour Government frequently 
consulted with trade unions over appointments with the result that fiscal 
restrictionists were unlikely to be selected. In any case, the Government 
itself did not wish to weight Boards with individuals renowned for financial 
control: as the 1978 White Paper had made plain, the Government saw a role 
for members to be drawn from a range of backgrounds: from trade unions,
160
163
consumer groups, and the civil service, in particular, as well as 
165
business.
Statutes also empowered Ministers to give Boards directions of a
166
general character on particular subjects, and in the national interest.
In addition, the 1978 White Paper allowed specific directions after
T57
consultations with the industry concerned. But detailed intervention 
was not permitted. Therefore, the power of the government was not 
absolute: it was compromised and diffuse. It was sparingly used by the
Labour Government.
Through informal pressure Ministers technically had more power over
corporations. Boards were in a position where to resist would have put
their reappointment in jeopardy. They were under moral pressure to
168
acknowledge the nation's stake in the corporations. In the event of 
public rows, it was hard to win public support since the Government's
169
public relations machinery was stronger, and it was bad for business.
In spite of their potential influence over internal finance, Ministers in
the Labour Government in 1979 were not in the habit of meeting Chairman
other than very occasionally. Sir William Barlow, Chairman of the PO for
a spell, including the last 18 months of the Labour Government, only met the
Labour Secretary of State four times and tne Minister of State three 
170
times.
Expenditure
Pay budgets were also capable of being influenced by government- 
corporation political submarket relationships which impinged on expenditure 
(rather than finance). Many of the control mechanisms discussed above were 
able to be used, particularly performance indicators and informal pressure.
164
In practice, though, the Government was not in a position to influence 
authorities, or chose not to, for reasons identical to those cited earlier.
Given aggregate budgets, technical factors bore most heavily on the 
allocation of funds between expenditure heads. It was easier to increase 
pay budgets when the proportion of labour costs in total costs, including 
investment spending, was small. Thus the energy industries, the 
telecommunications part of the PO, 3A, BS and BSC were relatively 
unconstrained in this respect, while the postal service and transport 
industries faced more difficulty.
The industry political submarket
In the industry political submarket were, on the one hand, the
corporations, and, on the other, bodies that mostly interacted with them
directly, rather than indirectly through the government. The predominant
parties other than the corporations themselves were the industry consumer
councils such as the Electricity Consumers' Council (ECC), the National
Transport Consumers’ Council (NTCC), the National Gas Consumers' Council,
the Post Office Users' National Council (POUNC), the Domestic Coal
Consumers' Council, and the Airline Users' Committee.
In the political submarket, the councils' role was to consider any
171
matters affecting consumers. Their powers of representation after the
1978 White Paper included a voice at national level as well as regional
representation where appropriate, as is the cases of the ECC, and
services considered by the NTCC. Members were appointed to Boards in some
172
cases, such as the PO. Theoretically, when a recommendation was made by
a consumer council, the industry and council agreed necessary action. The
power balance in fact favoured the corporation, because it could refuse to
173
act on a recommendation if it wished. Indeed, in the late 1970s the
165
Thediscretionary action by authorities over, for example, pricing.
National Consumer Council was concerned at the lack of weight given to 
175
councils' proposals. In other words, the industry political submarket 
did not appear to be a significant constraint on the autonomy of public 
corporations.
(iii) Summary
To recapitulate, public corporations determined their ability to 
finance pay increases in an environment that was jointly economic and 
political. External finance was subject to tight political constraints. 
Together, the government and corporations agreed EFLs, but within this 
structure, the Government adopted a tough stance in 1979, refusing to raise 
the EFLs to accommodate higher pay increases. Once set, there were effective 
administrative mechanisms to achieve compliance. Internal finance was 
affected by both economic and political factors, but economic constraints 
dominated. The competitive market structure and generally adverse demand 
trends limited the finances of transport and manufacturing industries, 
while the monopolistic structures of the energy and communication 
industries and rising demand trends facilitated a greater ability-to-pay. 
Politically-determined rules, laws and decisions impinged on internal 
funds, but some had technical deficiencies that reduced their 
effectiveness, and the Government showed few signs of enforcing financial 
control. Expenditure was not significantly affected by the political 
market either, but, following from technical exigencies corporations with 
low labor-total cost ratios found it easier to increase pay budgets at the 
expense of non-pay spending.
views of councils were acknowledged and valued, but did not prevent
174
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2.1.4 Tne economic-political environments in the public sector in 1979
The economic-political market constraints on the financial autonomy of 
public sector authorities clearly varied from sector to sector in terms of 
form and intensity. At this stage, it is worth summarising schematically 
the situation in 1979, including the differences between authorities, so 
that in due course, in Chapter 6, the impact of the Conservative 
Government's pay restraint strategy can be clearly ascertained.
The criteria used to differentiate the degree and nature of authority 
autonomy parallel those used in the text. As far as the centre-periphery 
political markets are concerned, the market structures can be visualised as 
having yielded power relationships of three main types: unilateral 
government control, negotiated control, and autonomous authority control. 
Within each market structure, the attitude of the centre towards 
controlling finance can be typified, at the risk of oversimplification, as 
tight or lax.
With regard to other political markets and economic markets, their 
influence depended not only on structure, and attitudes or trends, but also 
on the extent to which they were pertinent to the economic-political 
environment. Their relevance can be simply summarised as non-existent, 
partial, or full (if the centre-periphery market was irrelevant). Market 
structures tended to be monopolistic or competitive, according to the 
extent to which authorities had to compete strongly, politically or 
economically, to raise additional finance. Market trends or attitudes were 
broadly favourable or unfavourable to increasing budgets in real terms.
Of subsidiary importance to these market characteristics was the 
technical factor of the labor to total cost ratio. This was generally 
'low' - around 25 per cent - or else was 'high', over 40 per cent.
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The table combines all these dimensions of the environment in which 
pay budgets were determined. An authority in the northwestern quadrant of 
the table would be relatively tightly constrained by the government and 
other markets, while an authority in the southeastern corner would enjoy 
relative autonomy.
The allocation of public sector authorities according to their 
environmental characteristics in 1979 shows the central government sector 
more constrained than other sectors due to its dependence on the centre- 
periphery political market. However, in that year it still experienced 
negotiated constraints, laxly controlled, albeit with difficulties of pay-- 
non-pay substitution. Local authorities were relatively autonomous due to 
the same kind of centre-periphery political market in central government, 
but, in addition, with a local political market in which they held a 
monopolistic position and which they were using to fund real expenditure 
growth. Public corporations were under more variable constraints.
Commonly, they were under negotiated and lax central control on the whole, 
because while external finance was reasonably well restrained, attempts at 
controlling internal finance were generally weak. Against this background, 
they experienced different economic market conditions and technical 
possiblities for expenditure substitution. Least autonomous were the NBC 
and the NFC, closely followed by BSC, BS and BA. The most autonomous were 
the public utilities and the BAA.
In conclusion, it is important to recall that the prospects for wage 
inflation were not solely derived from the financial context, although it 
was a key force. Also relevant were the institutional and strategic 
contexts. These are considered in the following two sections.
2.2 The institutional context
169
The institutional forces which bear on pay decisions, it will be 
recalled, are the internal organisation of the parties, the structure of 
collective bargaining, and pay determination procedures. It was evident in 
1979 that certain institutions, especially pay determination procedures, 
promoted greater pay rises than might otherwise have been negotiated under 
alternative institutional arrangements.
2.2.1 The internal organisation of the parties
The implications of the manner in which management and unions are 
organised for the level of wage increase depend on the role composition of 
each side, that is, the individual organisational positions and the bodies 
that are relevant to collective bargaining; the relative power of those 
individuals and bodies in the process of decision-making over pay; and the 
institutional mechanisms of control and communication whicn help determine 
the locus of power.
In management, the capability for control of pay existed up to a point, 
but inherent weaknesses were apparent in each of the major sectors. In 
central government, civil service pay determination involved an official 
side which consisted of senior civil servants from the Civil Service 
Department (CSD), and the relevant unions. Pay control within the 
management side was facilitated by the requirement that the civil servants 
be the agents of, or spokesmen for, Ministers; regardless of their personal 
feelings, or occupational identity, they were to implement the wishes of 
the government. However, this strong vertical power relationship was 
tempered by the weaker links between the CSD and the Treasury. As Mrs. 
Thatcher said:
170
A tight rein on bargaining was thereby prejudiced.
In the NHS, the management sides of the joint councils were comprised
of a secretariat furnished by the Department of Health and Social Security '
(DHSS), and regional and area health authority representatives. As in the
civil service, strong vertical control was seen. Formally, the Secretary
of State approved agreements, but more important than this was the
177
influence of Ministers through the DHSS representatives. As the Society
of Radiographers told the Royal Commission on the NHS:
__the majority of members of the Management Side appear to have
little or no control over the total amount of money available__
We believe that if negotiation is to have any real meaning then 
all the Management Side members must be able to take a full part 
in negotiations and not be over-ruled by a few powerful DHSS 
members.178
Yet some deficiencies of control still existed; in particular, the
management sides of the Whitley Councils were criticised as being poorly
179
informed and coordinated.
Local authorities showed less evidence of effective internal control
of pay strategy. Management Sides consisted of representatives of the
local authority associations and sponsor departments, together with
Provincial Council representatives in the two major, manual and white
collar negotiations. The Local Authorities' Conditions of Service
Advisory Board (LACSAB) provided the Secretariat.
Vertical control was variable. On the one hand, it was tough in the
Burnham Committees on education and the Police Council. The Department of
Education and Science (DES) representatives had a disproportionately large
180
number of votes, though not a majority, while the Home Office had
It divorced central responsibility for the control of manpower
from responsibility for the control of government expenditure.176
considerably more power than warranted by its role as employer of one
section of the police force, the Metropolitan Police. The relevant
Ministers were also responsible for giving statutory authority to
agreements. In addition, the Education Secretary determined the
composition of the Burnham sides, and appointed the independent chairman.
Elsewhere, government control was less in evidence. While a DoE working
party had overseen pay negotiations in 1978-79, it did not appear to have 
182
an impact.
There did not appear to be much control over LACSAB. Vertically, 
individual local authorities had little say in matters. Consultation 
occurred through the 'sounding board' procedure which operated through the 
employers' sides of the Provincial Councils. However, requirements of
183
speed and confidentiality restricted consultations during negotiations. 
Consequently, it was felt that inadequate account was taken of financial 
considerations. As the author of a Society of County Treasurers memorandum 
put it:
Whilst I recognize that Personnel officers have a contribution to 
make, I am concerned when I hear comments about Personnel 
Officers advising elected members on the size of pay awards which 
authorities can afford and on the detailed aspects of the pay 
awards which Treasurers have to implement.184
Horizontally, within the negotiation bodies, financial control was weak in
part because the provincial councils (and thus their representatives) had
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no responsibilities concerning finance or the rate support grant. The
Associations, which were concerned with finance, did not have control
because of the provincial council votes on two bodies, and the
internal organisational difficulties of appointing and coordinating
186
hundreds of members to bodies. Also, association members tended to
187
identify with their negotiation body rather than with associations.
Further, the size of negotiation bodies meant that the LACSAB secretariat
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The negotiating bodies as they operate at present are both 
unwieldy because of excessive numbers and not under the political 
control of the Associations. As long as this situation continues, 
the bringing together of decisions on pay and finance cannot be 
achieved.188
Public corporations, on the whole, had organisational structures that
promoted a balanced attitude towards pay control. On the one hand, there
was no monolithic control by government of the kind seen in central
government, since it had no formal role in the day-to-day operation of
nationalised industries. On the other hand, personnel departments did not
have free rein to do as they wished. The usual practice was for power to
be shared between the department and the Board. The industrial relations
function would advise the Board on negotiation strategy, and Board members
would weigh up the financial and personnel implications before deciding on
the license to give negotiators. Horizontally, at Board level, typically
both finance and personnel functions would have a hearing: as a 1980
survey showed, the extent of specialist representation of the personnel
function at board level was of the order of two-thirds of nationalised
industries outside manufacturing and coal, while board representation of
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some sort was even more prevalent. The implication of this power 
structure was that pay increases could conceivably be even more 
inflationary than financial circumstances implied, but, equally, pay could 
be contained to well within the ability-to-pay.
The organisation of the union side did not threaten inflation in 1979. 
First of all, at the intra-union level, the negotiators, generally national 
officials, were usually relatively autonomous in fact, although they were 
formally enmeshed horizontally and vertically with union leaders and the
effectively negotiated agreements outside formal meetings. As the AMA put
it in 1979,
rank-and-file in a variety of communication and control mechanisms. Some
negotiators acted within systems of ballots, conferences and committees,
which variously advised on claims and/or approved offers. Others had to
respect union policies in the formulation of claims. Nonetheless,
negotiators had a large degree of freedom in the determination of
bargaining stances, in recognition of the pressures of bargaining. They
were also in a position of authority to make influential recommendations
when submitting offers to votes. Generally speaking, the relative power of
negotiators meant that more moderate attitudes prevailed in bargaining,
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forced as they were by the nature of the job to compromise.
Second, at the level of joint-union bargaining - a very common 
practice in the characteristically multi-union setting of the UK public 
sector - relative power formally depended on the distribution of seats 
between unions, usually in relation to union membership in the bargaining 
unit. It is difficult to guage whether this organisational principle was 
unduly inflationary: it was probably not, for three reasons. First, it 
allowed less militant professional associations voting rights. Second, 
recently-expanding unions were often under-represented because seat 
allocations were slow to change due to inter-union rivalry; and since this 
often affected NUPE, a more militant union, negotiators adopted less 
strident attitudes. Third, the allocation of seats was only of 
significance in voting on offers, when to accept or reject generally only 
made the difference of a small fraction of the offer already tabled.
Third, on the wider level of inter-union coordination, through, for 
example, the TUC Industry Committees (such as the Public Services Committee 
and the Nationalised Industries Committee), little effect on pay bargaining 
was seen in 1979. A 1971 conference sponsored by the TUC had underlined
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the desirability of coordination between unions, but this was constrained
by the organisational constraints of the unions. Vertically, within the
power structure, the industry committees had no power to interfere in the
negotiations of individual unions. They confined themselves to a general
role of ensuring that public sector pay was not treated more restrictively 
191
than elsewhere. This was attempted through political, rather than
industrial, pressure. Vertical influence was also imperilled by the patchy
publicity given to committee reports and policies in individual unions.
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Not all representatives reported back to their governing bodies. 
Horizontally, too, there were weaknesses of committee influence caused by 
inter-union rivalries. In some cases it was not simply that policies were 
not implemented by some unions, but rather the ideas did not get off the 
ground in the first place. Indeed, the idea of a public services committee 
had been put forward by NALGO the year before David Basnett floated it, but 
the GMWU rejected it at that time.
Therefore, organisational factors were not forces for inflation on the 
union side. However, the management structures of public corporations and 
local authorities may have weakened resistance to pay claims.
2.2.2 Bargaining structure
Although the interpretation of the effects of bargaining structure is 
notoriously difficult, as the theoretical discussion made plain in Chapter 
2 , the weight of evidence points in the direction of bargaining structure 
containing wage inflation. In the public sector centralised bargaining 
dominated. The 1980 DE/PSI/ESRC survey showed that the most important 
level in establishments recognising manual unions was overwhelmingly the 
national/industry level. In fact, this understates the extent of
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centralised bargaining, for in most authorities, company/enterprise
bargaining (covering all establishments) also implied national-1evel
negotiations. The combination of the two categories accounted for
approximately 95 per cent of establishments, as the table indicates.
Exceptions included certain universities, British Aerospace, and a few
Passenger Transport Executives . Supplementary bargaining sometimes
occurred at other levels, for example over incentive schemes, but
regional/district, partial-company, and plant bargaining was only
'relevant1 in a small minority of establishments.
It has been argued by the Institute of Directors that the centralised
nature of bargaining has given trade unions the power to pursue unearned
pay increases, obstruct productivity improvements, and hold national
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strikes with wide consequences. However, there is good reason to
believe that centralisation actually helped more than hindered the control
of wage inflation. First, centralised negotiations facilitated
administrative scrutiny and control. Second, the settlements were more
visible than decentralised deals, heightening public and government
attention. Indeed, the rank-and-file of local authority unions were
unhappy with centralised bargaining, especially white-collar workers who
had no opportunity to profit from incentive bonus schemes during the
confining incomes policies of the late 1970s. Thus the 1978 NALGO Annual
Conference rejected an NEC paper which argued that the National Whitley
Council system was still most appropriate. Also, the social workers had
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struck in order, inter alia, to establish local bargaining.
At the national level - the most important level of bargaining - the 
number of bargaining units was relatively small in most cases. In central 
government, civil service unions bargained separately over the rates for
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their grades, but a common pay survey was carried out by the Pay Research
Unit (PRU). Universities in the bargaining consortium dealt with one
academic and four non-academic units. Although the NHS had eight Whitley
Councils, a Review Body for doctors and dentists, and separate negotiations
for the maintenance staff groups, and the local authorities had 24
bargaining units, many were very large. In the nationalised industries, it
was common to see between three and five units in each authority; perhaps
there would be two manual units, one for general workers, one for
craftsmen, and the remainder for various white-collar occupations, such as
administrative, clerical, and managerial workers. The striking exceptions
were in BA, where there were 11 National Sectional Panels covering detailed
occupations, and in the PO, where each union negotiated separately. (BS
had just consolidated its bargaining units in March 1979).
The high degree of unit concentration, and the fact that the
fragmented units in local authorities and the NHS were often large, meant
that settlements were highly visible and thus more susceptible to 
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control. Further, this dimension of bargaining structure avoided the 
frequently-cited problem of private sector bargaining, namely fragmented
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settlements which induced comparability claims and competitive bargaining.
Bargaining form also worked to control wage inflation. Public sector
agreements were typically formally written down in a precise and detailed 
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manner. In this, they were much tighter than in the private sector,
usually carefully regulating the ability of management and workers to
198
generate additional pay increases. For example, the electricity supply 
industry incentive schemes were closely circumscribed by the formality of 
the national agreements.
Bargaining scope did not appear to be an abnormally inflationary force
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in 1979. Renumeration topics were much the same as in private industry.
Although public sector unions had more rights to consultation than did
199
unions in the private sector , there was no evidence that these powers
resulted in more wage inflation. In fact, it has been argued that the200
fruits of consultation were limited.
2.2.3 Pay determination procedures
While the public sector bargaining structure did not appear to 
generate higher inflation than alternative institutions, the pay 
determination procedures had characteristics that were inflationary. First 
of all, formal pay criteria, laid down in procedural agreements, served to 
increase the pay of certain public service groups faster than was likely 
under conventional collective bargaining. The criterion used was 
comparability. For the Armed Forces, this meant job evaluation, based on 
factor analysis, of service and outside jobs. Pay in the non-industrial 
civil service was derived from a pay survey exercise by the Pay Research 
Unit. Average earnings in the fire service were linked to the upper 
quartile of the New Earnings Survey (NES) distribution of adult male manual 
workers' earnings, (adjusted for the period between the April survey and the 
November settlement date), while the police service had its pay linked 
to the percentage change in the May average earnings index. In addition, 
in 1979, at the change of government, several public service groups were 
awaiting comparability assessments by the Standing Commission on Pay 
Comparability (SCPC) as the sole basis of their 1978-79 settlements.
That these procedures were potentially inflationary, at least in the 
eyes of the Conservative Party, was indicated by the narrowness of the 
comparability criterion. By definition, it did not automatically provide 
for rises appropriate on the grounds of labour supply and demand, and
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efficiency. As the Conservative Party delicately put it with reference to 
the SCPC:
taking account of relative efficiency, job security and labour 
supply raises difficult theoretical and practical issues.
Nevertheless, the Government believes that the Commission must 
tackle these problems if its work is to have the full confidence 
of the general public.201
Apart from the argument of principle, there were technical features
which may have made the criterion unduly expensive. In the civil service
pay research process, the selection of an external field of comparators202
generally resulted in the under-representation of small firms, and a
203
relatively large proportion of public sector authorities. The concerns
were that although large firms were more comparable in terms of pay
structure, they also paid higher wages; and that the comparisons internal
to the public sector were circular and fuelled wage-wage inflation.
Similarly, the use of public sector analogues by the SCPC was criticised,
204
as were those not sufficiently subject to market forces. In addition,
in some fields, such as technical jobs, the number of analogues was small
205
so that the variance was high and the results statistically unsound.
Secondly, at the working party stage in civil service pay 
determination, when 'true money rates' were negotiated, (taking into account 
differences in fringe benefits and other advantages between internal and 
external jobs), the value of the coverage of contributory and non­
contributory pensions to the civil service was typically estimated at only 
206 207
5 or 6 per cent, and index-linking involved a 2.6 per cent deduction.
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This appeared to many to be insufficient, particularly as 63 per cent of 
central government employees were covered by non-contributory pensions, 
compared to 18 per cent in the private sector and 21 per cent in the public 
sector, and because few private sector schemes followed the cost of
180
living closely.
Finally, since the comparability formulae were being operated in 1979 
with the object of catching up ground lost over more than one year, the 
rises implied by the criterion were likely to be large relative to the 
current going rate. This was accentuated to the extent that the formulae 
operated with a lag and the wage inflation rate was falling.
Another significant procedure in public sector pay determination that 
was a potential threat to wage inflation in 1979 was the access of many 
groups to third parties. Some groups had their pay determined by third 
parties on a permanent basis: Review Bodies set the pay of the armed 
forces, doctors and dentists, and top-salaried groups. Certain other 
groups were in the process of having their pay fixed by third parties on a 
one-off basis: as indicated above, many in the public services were the 
subject of SCPC references, and some in the public corporations were 
undergoing arbitration. Even where bargaining units were not actually 
using third parties in mid-1979, most had access to arbitration on a 
unilateral basis if they so wished.
The facility of third-party intervention appeared liable to generate 
pay increases that were relatively inflationary. The difficulties with the 
SCPC have already been cited. Review Bodies' inquiries were rife with 
inflationary features. First, the pay criteria used tended to neglect 
market-oriented factors. The armed forces, it will be recalled, had their 
pay determined by comparability. Relative pay increases featured 
prominently in the other two bodies, although it was never attempted to 
match the 1 eve! of top-salaried renumeration in the private sector. Also, 
from time to time, the cost of living and tax changes surfaced to play a 
role in the doctors and dentists case. Second, the pay research process
209
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had defects. In specifying the internal field, there was no job evaluation
exercise carried out for doctors and dentists at all, nor in the recent
past for top salaried groups. Analogues were far from scientifically
determined. Doctors' and dentists' pay was supposed to stay at the same
percentile on the NES non-manual pay distribution. Top salaried analogues
had been found in 1973 by an Advisory Group, but the Review Body had since
generalised those comparators to include others with a similar job title.
Third, of themselves these criticisms of principle and practice need not
have been any more inflationary than conventional collective bargaining,
but they became more problematic when implemented by the Review Bodies.
The Bodies seemed to adopt a client relationship vis-a-vis their charges,
as evidenced by subjective assertions regarding trends in morale and the
primacy of their groups' claims over those of others in the community.
Fourth, the implications of the Review Body deliberations in 1979 were that
210
large catch-up increases were required to bring pay levels up to date.
Unilateral arbitration was of concern because, as the Conservative 
Party said:
Experience is that awards frequently came down in the employers' 
favour. But it is important that arrangements for arbitration 
should not weaken the employer's negotiating position by always 
providing an appeal to a third party to seek an improvement to a
"final offer"... Ministers__have doubted whether arbitrators
always take proper account of what the employer can afford to pay 
and of the wider national interest.211
Local authorities, similarly, resented the lack of control over third 
212
parties. Furthermore, there were indications that unions saw
arbitration as a means of obtaining higher increases. One union official
in the industrial civil service was reported as saying:
We were finding that whenever we had a disagreement about 
something and went to third-party arbitration, we always got more
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from the Government than we could ever negotiate. The Government 
was much more likely to accept a position when it came from an 
outside body.213
Regarding the structure of the pay round, the intervals between
settlements were customarily 12 months, the spacing that was established in
pay restraint policies in the 1970s with the intention of reducing the
chance of escalating inflation. The effect of the order of the pay round
was unclear, however. In 1979, most public sector workers settled in
November, January, April or July, within the context of an August-July pay
round. The CBI argued that since many public sector groups settled early
in the round, before many private sector units, they set target increases
which were not necessarily related to the capacity of the market sector of
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the economy to pay. Inflation, it was held, was therefore unduly high.
On the other hand, the unions believed that the pay round served to reduce
their gains. The local authority manual settlement was seen as a key
bargain because of its early, November, date, and its wide coverage (of a 
215
million workers), but the unit had little leverage to set a high 
216
target. In addition, the spread of settlements throughout the year was
seen as reducing the sense of identity of workers and the potential for
217
mutual support, although the same could be said of employers.
Payment systems largely helped control pay increases because a large 
proportion of pay was in the form of basic pay and allowances. For non- 
manual workers it was over 90 per cent, and was approximately 70 per cent 
for manual workers. Most of the remainder of total pay was overtime pay. 
Less than 10 per cent of manual pay was accounted for by PBR and other 
incentives, there being fewer schemes than in the private sector, and those 
in the public sector being concentrated in the industrial civil service,
local authorities, the gas and electricity industries, and BR workshops.
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The high proportion of basic pay limited the scope for increases in pay
outside negotiations. Indeed, as a result, in previous policy episodes,
public sector groups had often lost relative standing in the pay 
219
hierarchy. It gave rise to frustration on the part of NALGO workers,
for example, who could see local authority manual workers benefitting from220
higher overtime and incentive payments. It should be said, however,
that certain incentive scnemes were reputed to be loose. For instance, the
Local Government Audit Service report for 1979 showed that bonus schemes
were sometimes not streamlined within authorities to yield consistent
levels of pay for given output. Others were not based on work study but on
221
historical targets. Supervision of schemes was often defective.
2.2.4 Summary
The institutional context of public sector pay determination in 1979 
bolstered pay increases, particularly through procedures involving formal 
comparability criteria and third parties. The organisation of management 
may also have facilitated the success of union claims in the public 
corporations and local authorities. Nevertheless, the largely centralised, 
consolidated, and formal, bargaining structure and the dominant pay systems 
aided the control of pay. Union structure, the scope of bargaining, and 
the structure of the pay round appeared to be neutral in impact.
2.3 The strategies of negotiators
Within the economic-political environment and the institutional 
context, negotiators' strategies influenced pay increases. Of importance 
were the preferred pay criteria; the economic, political and strategic 
power of the parties; and the politics of wage decisions within and between 
management and unions.
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2.3.1 Pay criteria
The criteria that were being favoured in 1979 were comparability and 
the cost-of-living. Managements made a case for certain economic criteria, 
but they were less prominent in the context of the time. Apart from the 
SCPC cases, there were a number of groups which strove to preserve or re­
establish long-established links with others. For example, in the NHS, 
administrative and clerical workers followed the non-industrial civil 
service, while craftsmen followed the relevant private industry agreements. 
Non-manual workers in the Atomic Energy Authority also followed the civil 
service. Manual water workers matched the pay of electricity and gas 
workers. Had the SCPC not been in existence, local authority building and 
civil engineering workers would have looked to the local authority manual 
woerkers, as would tne NHS ancillary workers. Elsewhere, comparisons were 
common too, but they were less rigid. The pervasive influence of the 
comparability argument was due to its apparent fairness to all parties. As 
the Priestley Commission argued in 1955, comparability was fair to the
employee and employer and taxpayer because each was receiving or paying the
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same as in outside industry.
The cost-of-living was of importance in the public sector, although 
comparability appeared dominant. As elsewhere in the economy, workers had 
expectations of at least keeping up with prices, if not actually increasing 
real wages. Indeed, under Stage 3 in 1973-74 most public sector groups 
negotiated threshold agreements to compensate for price increases over 7 
per cent. The significance of regular increases to simply boost real pay 
levels - or prevent them falling by as much - was recognised by the 
Conservatives:
There is a very large number of working people - perhaps the
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majority - who have never gone without an annual pay rise. For 
them the pay round is expected to provide an automatic increase, 
delivered as it were with the milk; and as a result they have 
come to feel... there is no connection at all between their 
performance and their pay.223
The use of these criteria implied large pay rises in 1979. The 
relative and real pay of public workers had fallen during the Labour 
Government's incomes policy. NES data revealed that between April 1976 and 
April 1979 the ratio of public to private sector pay had dropped 10.1 
percentage points. Public services had been most greatly affected, with 
local authorities falling 16 per cent points and central government 13.9 
points. Public corporations had suffered only slightly, by 4.9 points.
In real wage terms, over the same period, the public sector had lost 7.6
per cent: 14.8 per cent in local government, 12.2 per cent in central
government, and 1 per cent in the corporations sector. To catch up, cover 
current inflation, and match private sector increases, required rises of 
over 20 per cent on average. This figure would have been higher in units 
where the process of comparison was subject to upward bias. The prognosis 
for pay control was correspondingly gloomy.
2.3.2 Bargaining power
Economic bargaining power was influenced by the costs of the 
bargaining process, the costs of industrial action, and the costs 
associated with the settlement, given the political and strategic power of 
the groups. In mid-1979 economic bargaining power lay with unions in most
cases. Phase 4 had been relaxed, and although employers would not accede
to every demand, the costs of negotiating high increases were not 
prohibitive in terms of time and intensity. While it is hard to assess the 
resources of public sector workers and unions for financing industrial 
action, the low level of strikes since the mid-1970s had probably allowed
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some accumulation of resources. In addition, the state of the law on
social security meant that the dependants of strikers could claim
supplementary benefit to cover basic needs, after deductions had been made
to take account of other income, including strike pay. PAYE tax rebates
were also paid. Academic analyses have questioned the significance of this
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source of economic power. Nevertheless, tne CBI certainly believed it 
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to be important. The costs of the implementation of settlements were 
unlikely to be significant in most instances, apart from delays due to 
awards being staged, because public spending allocations were to be revised 
to accommodate the greater part of pay bill increases. The exceptions to 
the rule were nationalised industries which had rigid EFLs; which could not 
raise price sufficiently due to demand elasticity; and which could not 
reallocate finance to pay expenditure heads due to a high labour-total cost 
ratio.
The economic bargaining power of management was limited; the costs of
resisting claims were high. The bargaining process would have been long,
given the earlier success of other public sector workers breaking
through the constraints of Phase 4. The costs of industrial action were in
many cases relatively high due to the essentiality of the goods and
services and the immediate impact on the public and the consequent
political costs - as indeed the Labour Government had discovered to its 
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cost. The costs of settling at a low level would probably have been 
considerable: there would likely have been discontent and labour market 
shortages.
Unions were also in a position to support their claims in the 
political market which focused on pay determination issues. Public sector 
unions commonly sponsored M.P.s so that, inter alia, their case for pay
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increases could be aired in Parliamentary debates and to senior government
ministers. Meetings with Ministers and departmental officials were
regularly scheduled, not only at the TUC level, but also at the level of
the individual union. For example, in education and health there were
working parties and advisory committees in various areas at which views
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regarding negotiations could be pressed. Ties between the Labour Party 
and the unions meant that Ministers were relatively accessible when the 
Party was in office. Finally, the unions were able to lobby Parliament and 
departments.
The strategic power of public sector unions, given the economic-
political and institutional contexts, reflected their organisational
strength, technical factors, and the legal regulation of union organisation
and action. Organisationally, the unions in the public sector were strong.
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In aggregate, public sector union density in 1979 was 82.4 per cent. At
industry level, density exceeded 90 per cent in national government, the
energy corporations, and posts and telecommunications. Transport
industries were above average but varied, with railways and road transport
showing very high membership rates, and port and inland water transport and
air transport average levels. The NHS and local government were below
average but, still, approximately three-quarters were organised.
Organisational strength was helped by the closed shop. In 1980, in public
corporation establishments with manual workers, 72 per cent of manual
employees were in a closed shop. The comparable figure for central and
229
local government was 22 per cent.
The technological conditions of production yielded power to many 
unions. First, it was possible in some sectors to withdraw labour at 
certain points in the production process and cause significant disruption.
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Examples included particular electricity workers, railway signalmen, and
electricians and computer operators throughout the sector. It should be
added tnat the output of some other groups would not be missed other than
in the long run. Second, often for technical reasons, many authorities
were monopoly producers, so no alternative sources of supply were
available. This was important to union power in the public services and
the energy and communication corporations, although in some cases in the
past the government had secured replacement services in ostensible
monopolies, such as the fire service.
While industrial relations law influenced relative bargaining power,
it cannot be said that the basic tenets of the legislation were directed at
that purpose as much as at more general objectives, such as order in 
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industrial relations. Organisational bargaining power, discussed above,
was affected by laws relating to worker organisation. Under the Employment
Protection Act 1975, independent unions seeking the right to negotiate with
management, in the event of lack of success, were able to refer the issue
to the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Committee (ACAS). If the
ensuing recommendations were not implemented by the employer, the Central
231
Arbitration Committee (CAC) could make an arbitration award. Employees
also had the right not to be penalised by the employer for joining an
independent union, or participating in its activities at an appropriate 
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time. Managements and unions were able to agree to establish closed
shops, subject to the condition that workers with genuine religious
objections were exempt, and could file for unfair dismissal if dismissed as 
233
a result. The TUC's Independent Review Committee heard the cases of 
individuals excluded from closed shops by unions.
Power in negotiations was also influenced by the law relating to the
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disclosure of information and to industrial action. Subject to safeguards
employers were obliged to disclose information relevant to collective
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bargaining to recognised independent unions. Trade unions were immune
from legal proceedings for restraint of trade in contemplation or
furtherance of a trade dispute, unless the actions were illegal for an
individual. Union members enjoyed somewhat lesser immunities against
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actions in tort for damages. Picketing was permitted, subject to an
advisory limit of six, at the place of work in dispute and at other
locations, such as customers and suppliers, in furtherance of a trade 
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dispute. In relation to both industrial action and picketing, the 
courts interpreted the words 'in furtherance' very widely so that indirect 
action was immune as long as it was genuinely believed to have some effect 
on the settlement of the dispute.
Taken together, these bases of relative bargaining strength gave 
public sector unions relatively significant power. There was some 
variation between units, with the energy industries in particular 
possessing comparatively great economic, organisational and technological 
power. Communications workers, other than postal workers, were also 
relatively strong. In contrast, the declining and competitive industries 
probably gave workers least power in 1979. Without relaxed cash limits, 
non-essential public service groups, especially white-collar workers, would 
have been weak. In broad concurrence with this analysis, the leaked 
Conservative Party Committee (Carrington) report of the late 1970s was 
pessimistic about the ability of the government to 'win' any
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confrontations, especially with the power and fuel industries. Another 
committee, chaired by Nicholas Ridley M.P., ranked industries into three 
groups on the basis of their vulnerability. It saw the weakest as
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including the railways, the civil service, and the steel industry.
2.3.3 Politics of wage decisions
Given the financial and institutional contexts, and given the extent
of the ability to take industrial action in pursuit of claims based on
preferred criteria, the exact demands made and action taken depended on the
politics of wage decisions within and between unions and management. In
mid-1979, the balance of attitudes within union politics was such that
claims were being aggressively pursued. Of central importance was the
disposition of the membership towards responding to perceived injustices.
Prior to the 1970s, a unitary ideology had been predominant due to the
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nature of public sector work and the concept of public service.
However, a change of mood followed, apparently triggered by the relatively
harsh treatment of public sector groups under the incomes policies of the
late 1960s which disturbed hitherto-stable relativities. For example,
NALGO members severely criticised their local government negotiators at a
specially-convened conference in 1969, encouraging a perceptibly tougher
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negotiating stance thereafter. Also, the teachers' action of 1969-70
marked the beginning of a new era. By 1979, while the unitary ideology
still existed for some workers, as manifested in membership of professional
associations, (in teaching and the NHS for example), rather than unions, a
more pluralistic vision of industrial relationships prevailed. Unions were
more 'unionate', being more prepared to flex their political and industrial
muscle in given situations , as indicated by their membership of the TUC
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and record of industrial action.
This prevailing sentiment was independent of party politics. Unions 
were militant, often in spite of conservative memberships. For instance.
191
an NOP survey in October 1974, when the Labour Party won the election, found
that only 30 per cent of a sample of NUT members intended to vote 
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Labour. At the same time, militancy was evident even when Labour was in 
office. For example, NUPE was strident in its opposition to the public 
spending cuts of the Labour Government in the 1970s.
The attitude of the leadership probably caused some variation in the 
militancy of the policies to be generated by union political machinery, 
but, in aggregate, militant leadership did not appear to be a decisive 
factor in 1979. Although leaders of such unions as COHSE and SCPS were 
quite militant, the leaders of the NUM, NUR, UPW and EETPU, for example, 
were relatively moderate, the NUR and UPW leaders being incomes policy 
advocates.
The grass-roots industrial militancy was met by a relatively receptive
management in mid-1979. The ethos amongst management was generally of a
pluralist kind, partly inculcated by the statutory requirement to bargain,
and partly the result of self-selection, that is, the tendency of more
enlightened managers to take up public sector posts in preference to
private sector jobs. More important, managements had the objective of
being a 'good employer'. For the non-industrial civil service, this meant
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that pay was to be related to pay levels of good outside employers.
According to the 1946 Local Government Charter, the local authorities were
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to be in the 'first flight of good employers.' Incomes policy had 
overridden this view in the late 1970s, but when Phase 4 was relaxed, it 
came to the fore again in management discussions regarding wages.
The politics of management-union negotiations did not appear to 
influence the inflationary spiral one way or the other in 1979. Both sides 
generally shared pluralist outlooks and high-trust relationships which were
conducive to each side achieving its objectives. Thus there were no 
significant additional factors, such as deception and macho-management or 
macho-unionism, introduced into the pay determination process.
3. Conclusions
Thus the newly-elected Conservative Government was anxious to control 
public sector pay due to its implications for the treasured objectives of 
low inflation and reduced public expenditure. The Government's anxiety was 
heightened by the inflationary factors at work. The economic-political 
environment was accommodating, except in certain public corporations where 
economic markets were competitive and deteriorating. The use of formal 
comparability criteria and third parties, together with management 
organisation in local authorities and public corporations were forces for 
high pay increases, but other features of the institutional context, such 
as bargaining structure and pay systems, helped control. Nevertheless, even 
where groups did not have third-party treatment or formal comparability 
criteria, they were demanding real and relative catch-up increases, 
enforcing claims with their significant bargaining power, and generally 
receiving favourable responses from the employers who were under a good 
employer obligation.
The strategy adopted by the Conservative Government against this 
backdrop in pursuit of its objective of controlling public sector pay, 
together with the reasons for the choice of approach, is discussed in the 
following chapter.
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PART III
ISSUE 2:
THE FORM OF THE FINANCIAL PAY RESTRAINT STRATEGY
Chapter 4
The Style and Distinctiveness of Pay Control 
Under Cash Limits
208
In the face of the inflationary pressures exposed in Chapter 3, the 
Conservative Government sought to achieve its objectives through the 
control of the finance and expenditure of public sector authorities. The 
focus of this chapter is on the chosen form of the strategy. To facilitate 
the analysis the first section identifies a number of key dimensions of pay 
restraint strategies. Using these as a framework, the policy prevailing in 
1979-83 is outlined in Section 2 and is contrasted with previous approaches 
in Section 3. The reasons for the departure in strategy are considered in 
the fourth section. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
1. Dimensions of Pay Restraint Policies
Various attempts have been made to single out distinguishing features 
of pay restraint strategies. They tend to fall into two categories. One 
focuses on the rules governing pay increases. This tends to result from 
an explicit or implicit pluralist theoretical framework in which inflation 
is seen as caused by competing groups and the State's role is to regulate 
the real and relative pay objectives of the parties through rules. The 
second concentrates on the relations between the State and employers and 
unions in the process of wage restraint. This is often a product of a more 
radical perspective in which relations between classes are deemed important 
to the inflationary spiral, and the State is seen as directly or indirectly 
influencing those relationships. Unfortunately, the dimensions of 
strategies that are isolated are not without shortcomings, at least from 
the point of view of the present analysis.
The decomposition of policies on the basis of rules has taken a number
of forms. First, some authors have considered only selected rules. For
instance, McCarthy looked at 'targets', that is, norms and guidelines, and
1
'criteria', defined as exceptions and special cases. Brown narrowed his
209
coverage to procedural mechanisms in the design and enforcement of 
2
policies. Burton drew up a seven-fold typology of policies based on the
severity of the method of enforcement: government exhortation to
designated patterns of behaviour; surveillance, analysis, and public
exposure of undesirable wage movements; active government denunciation of
non-cooperative behavior; paradigmatic behaviour in the public sector; the
extraction of commitments to voluntary compliance; government intimidation
3
and deterrence; and legal powers and sanctions. The difficulty with these
breakdowns of policy characteristies is their unduly restrictive focus:
rules regarding both pay increases and policy support must be distinguished
in any thorough analysis of approaches to pay restraint.
Some authors have had wider vision. Notably, Towers separated out
aspects of design and implementation. The dimensions of policy design were
the coverage or comprehensiveness of the policy; the extent to which it
penetrates beyond a national policy; the degree of allowed flexibility; and
the status and role assigned to agencies. The characteristics of policy
implementation were the degree of compulsion; the timing and phasing of
policy; and the complementarity of the policy with other policies and 
4
economic events. In addition, Blackaby referred to variations in respect
5
of norms, exceptions, cooperation and compulsion, and non-wage policies.
Similarly, Clegg discussed norms, exceptions, policy administration, and
6
the restraint of other incomes and prices. Tarling and Wilkinson looked
briefly at the form of the policy (whether there was a freeze, or a norm
7
with exceptions); sanctions; and administrative institutions. The problem 
with these definitions of policy dimensions is mainly one of detail; the 
potential variations in design along each dimension are not distinguished. 
In other exercises, the salient rules in policies have been determined
210
and used to draw up typologies of approaches. Thus Braun categorized seven
styles: freezes on temporary controls; informing public opinion; mandatory
or voluntary implementation of guidelines; pay increase investigation and
approval measures; coordinated wage determination, including compulsory
8
arbitration; and institutional engineering. In a similar view, Gennard 
and Wright distinguished exhortation; neutral expert reports; money incomes 
control; and collective bargaining framework agreements, where peak
9
representative organizations decide the criteria for wage increases.
Robinson and Mayhew isolated incomes policies, institutional engineering,
and indirect policies, such as labour legislation and labour market 
10
efficiency policies. However, as the typologies stand, they are too
broad to be useful. Rather than simply isolate dominant features, the
present chapter defines the dimensions of strategies in detail.
Analyses of approaches distinguished according to the relationships
between the State, employers and unions generally concentrate on the role
of the State. Thus Crouch drew up ideal-typical positions of state
domination: market individualism, liberal collectivism, and corporatism,
11
and subtypes of these. Along similar lines, Roche distinguished
'auxiliary' State control (through moral persuasion, facilities and
inducements); corporate control based on legislative definitions of
corporate statuses, institutions, and incomes policy arrangements;
corporate control based on a social contract characterized by voluntary
corporate institutions, and moral persuasion; and market control consisting
12
of the reconstitution of markets and the control of the money supply.
While these are important broad distinctions, the choice of the particular 
enforcement rules too can exercise a significant influence on the pay 
determination process. A further problem is the neglect of the rules
211
governing pay increases themselves.
Therefore, a new framework is required to analyze the components of 
pay restraint strategies. The framework must recognize the importance of 
the rules relating to both pay increases and to policy enforcement. With 
this in mind, the following two subsections consider the dimensions of 
policy design - the nature of the policy rules regarding pay increases; 
and the dimensions of policy support - the backing given to the policy 
design to ensure its provisions are effective.
1.1 The design of pub!ic sector pay restraint policies
As many previous analyses have pointed out, there are two main types 
of rule relating to pay increases: they can be termed the 'general pay 
rule' and the 'exceptions' to the rule.
1.1.1 The general pay rule
The general pay rule specifies the increases which all groups subject 
to the policy are permitted by the policy to receive. Rules vary 
qualitatively in terms of three features, each reflecting an aspect of the 
stringency of the approach taken by policymakers:
i) the 1 eve! of the economy at which the rule operates - whether it 
applies to the economy in aggregate; to an individual authority; at the 
level of the bargaining unit; or within, to the individual employee.
ii) the monetary focus of the rule: it may be directed at the financial 
budget; the pay bill; or average pay increases.
iii) the quantitative precision of the rule. Budget finance may be 
governed by limits, or possibly ranges. Pay bills and average rises may be 
subject to unqualified rules, such as 'responsible bargaining', or
212
quantified rules, such as norms (with rises permitted above and below), 
ranges (where maxima and minima are fixed), and limits (where there is 
simply a maximum). Individual rises may be fixed or they may be 
conditional (where some, but not total, leeway is allowed in the 
distribution of the pay bill or average increases).
An example illustrates the meaning of the three features of general 
pay rules. The Labour Government's Phase 4 of 1978-79, which preceded the 
introduction of the Conservative Government's policy, initially involved a 
general pay rule directed at the level of the bargaining unit, focussed on 
average pay rises, and imposed a limit of 5 per cent.
1.1.2 Exceptions
Exceptions are provisions in the policy which permit increases (in pay 
or finance) in excess of those facilitated by the general pay rule. Two 
types of exceptions can be distinguished.
i) Exemptions clauses state criteria which, if met, automatically allow 
additional rises to a specified extent, subject to local agreement. For 
example, productive overtime might be allowed to be rewarded at the usual 
premium rates. Four gradations of control can be defined, albeit rather 
artifically: first, where there are no exemptions; second, where only 
work-related exemptions are permissible, such as increases in finance 
resulting from greater service or output levels, and rises in pay due to 
increases in productive overtime, changes in shiftworking, payment-by­
results schemes, and increments; third, where other exemptions of minor 
total cost are allowed in addition; and, finally, where other exemptions of 
relatively large total aggregate cost, such as threshold payments and 
productivity deals, are also permitted.
ii) Special case provisions permit increases in pay or budgets above tnose
facilitated by the general pay rule, but only in limited instances. The 
attainment of particular standards does not automatically imply entitlement 
to extra-large rises. The government or a nominated adjudicator has the 
task of selecting groups for special treatment. Broadly speaking, the 
policy on special cases might be to preclude them altogether; to allow 
them, but on a limited basis; or to allow them on a wide front.
1.2 The support of pub!ic sector pay restraint poiicies
To achieve compliance, public sector pay strategies may be supported 
in three ways: by agreement to the policy; by enforcement measures; and by 
auxiliary policies.
1.2.1 Policy agreement
The style of policy consent is determined by two features:
i) the parties to agree to the poi icy design: whether none do, or just 
employers or unions, or both employers and unions.
ii) the basis of the agreement: whether the agreement is secured through 
(contingent or guaranteed) benefits for the parties in return for 
restraint; or through shared norms. For example, Phases 1 and 2 (1975-77) 
were agreed by the unions at peak organizational level on the basis of a 
contractual arrangement which was supposed to give them greater influence 
over economic and social policy-making.
1.2.2 Policy enforcement
Enforcement refers to the steps taken to ensure compliance with the 
policy. The key aspects of enforcement are monitoring and preventative
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or remedial action.
i) Monitoring is the process by which policy operators are made aware of 
the response of target bodies to the policy design. It involves both 
'informing* and 'vetting'. Informing is the alerting of policy 
administrators to provisional or final outturns of expenditure or pay 
rises. It may be attempted through independent discovery by the policy 
operator, or automatic notification. Vetting is the assessment of whether 
the policy design has been violated. It may be carried out by the 
government or a nominated administrative body, or by a peak organization.
ii) Preventative or remedial action relates to the actual or threatened 
use of measures to stimulate compliance. Various approaches are possible: 
there may no action taken; government exhortation and education may be 
seen; intra-organizational exhortation, for instance by the TUC or CBI, may 
occur; or legislative penalties in the form of fines or imprisonment may 
exist, as may administered sanctions, such as through TIP (tax-based 
incomes policy) schemes, or the public expenditure system.
1.2.3 Auxiliary policies
The third and final means of enforcement is through auxiliary policies, 
which influence the extent to which target units comply with the policy 
design. It may be that the primary aims of the policies do not pertain to 
pay control in the public sector, but intentionally or otherwise they do 
have an impact. Examples include general economic policy, other cost- 
control strategy, and policy towards the legal regulation of industrial 
relations.
General economic policy affects the demand for labour. Through the
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implications for bargaining power and the room for manoeuvre within 
financial budgets, pay increases can be influenced. Also, economic policy 
determines the level of direct and indirect taxation, and thus real 
disposable income and pay claims. Private sector pay policy is important 
to public sector pay control because it determines the degree to which 
public-private pay differentials are kept in line, and hence the extent to 
which relativity claims surface in negotiations. Policies to control 
other costs and prices, also influence the salience of public sector 
pay claims that reflect eroded real and relative pay levels. Trade union 
legislation policy influences the bargaining power of unions, and 
hence the intensity with which claims are pursued.
2. The Style of the Cash Limits Pay Restraint Strategy 1979-83
With the complete analytical framework in mind, the Conservative 
Government's strategy of 1979-83 can now be described element by element. 
The main objective is to outline the style of the approach with only 
perfunctory attention to the details of the rules and policy support. The 
minutae of the operation and the impact of the policy will be explored in 
greater depth in Chapters 6 to 8.
2.1 The general pay rule
The essence of the strategy was to limit the ability-to-pay of the 
authorities in the public sector. In the words of the Conservative 
Manifesto:
Pay bargaining in central and local government, ano other 
services such as health and education, must take place within the 
limits of what the taxpayer and ratepayer can afford... In the 
great public corporations, pay bargaining should be governed, as 
in private ones, by what each can afford. There can be no 
question of subsidising excessive pay deals.13
To this end, the Government set cash limits on Exchequer finance to central
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government and local authorities, and external financing limits (EFLsj. on
public corporation grants, Public Dividend Capital, and borrowing. In
determining the limits, the Government had regard to its public spending
volume plans, (at least until 1982-83 when cash figures per se came to
dominate), and to its willingness to provide for cost increases through the
so-called pay and price planning factors. The pay factor was set for
August-July pay rounds rather than financial years. It was announced in
the autumn with specific objective of influencing the pay round. As the
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Mr. Biffen, said in November 1979:
The Government's general intention is to publish the cash limits 
in time for spending authorities to take account of them in 
making major decisions affecting their costs in 1980-81, 
including the costs of pay settlements.14
In terms of the framework of analysis put forward in the last section,
the strategy was designed to operate at authority level: cash limits
and EFLs were set on cash blocks managed by individual authorities. The
monetary focus was authorities' financial budgets. In the civil service,
budgets for pay and general administrative expenditure were generally in a
separate cash block with a separate limit. For most other public service
authorities, the limit was on current expenditure more broadly, and for
public corporations on overall finance. The quantitative precision of the
general pay rule was of a high degree. The cash limits and EFLs were
maximum amounts of finance that the Government was prepared to allocate or 
15
sanction because the Treasury was not keen on the idea of a range for
16
fear of losing control of expenditure.
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Bargaining
round
Pay factor Price factor Cost factor
(for following 
financial year)
Central Govt Local Auths
1979-80 N.A. N.A. 14 13
1980-81 6 11 N.A N.A.
1981-82 4 9 N.A N.A.
1982-83 3.5 N.A. N.A N.A.
Table 4.1: Cost, pay and price factors in the pub! ic services 1979-83
Some specific details of the general pay rule over the bargaining 
rounds 1979-83 are set out in Table 4.1. Both the price and pay 
assumptions in the public services are given. The factors for public 
corporations were never made explicit, although inevitably, in the 
negotiation of EFLs, assumptions had to be made.
Combined pay and price factors were set for the 1979-80 round, with 
central government having more latitude. In the following two rounds, 
there were separate pay and price factors, and they were the same 
throughout the public services. No price factor was made explicit in 1982- 
83 under the new cash planning system. The inflationary provisions were 
steadily reduced.
Under this form of pay restraint, pay increases did not have to 
conform to the pay planning factor. As the Government explained in respect 
of the 1981-82 round:
The pay factor does not imply that all public service pay 
increases will or should be 4%. Some may be less, and some may 
be more. There is no automatic entitlement to any particular pay 
increase: each must be justified on its merits. The pay factor 
is a broad measure of what the Government thinks reasonable and 
can be afforded as a general allowance for increases in pay.17
Nevertheless, the cash limits regime was intended to induce lower pay
increases. If the pay factors were exceeded, lower employment and
services would result. The theory of the strategy was baldly stated in The
Right Approach.
Every organisation should be put into a position in which 
workers and management are obliged to face together the 
inescapable choice between realistic pay levels and job 
security, or excessive earnings and a doubtful future.18
In the public corporations, the EFLs were intended to operate in a
comparable fashion. As Mr. Brittan, Chief Secretary to the Treasury,
said in 1981:
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I think the existence of the EFL can actually help to guide pay 
negotiations because it does provide a useful discipline, and you 
can say, if you are running a nationalised industry, to those with 
whom you are negotiating on pay that if you insist on taking, by 
use of monopoly labour power, an excessive pay claim, the effect 
of that will be to prejudice the investment which the long-term 
future of the industry requires, because there is a limit.19
2.2 Exceptions
Cash limits and EFLs did not cover the whole of the finance of the
public sector. They were confined to the elements of finance that were
officially defined as public expenditure. Local authority non-grant
finance, such as rate income, and the internal finance of nationalised
industries, derived mainly from sales revenue, were exempt. Cash-limited
expenditure, however, could not be increased through any automatic
mechanism: authorities could not rely on supplementary provision above the 
20
cash limits. The implication was that central government pay budgets
were wholly controlled, while local authority and nationalised industry
budgets were only partly controlled.
In special cases the cash limit constraints could be relaxed. The
Government's policy was that if the rate of inflation was substantially
higher (or lower) than allowed for, it would take stock of the position in
21
the light of all the circumstances of the time. Similarly, in the
nationalised industries, the Government realised that the EFLs could not be
immutable because revenues and expenditures might differ from assumed
levels and cause the borrowing estimate to be exceeded. For instance, an
22
exceptional winter could change the cash flow of an energy industry.
In practice, there were special cases made in the public services in 
Financial Year (FY) 1979-80 in order to accommodate the increases
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recommended by the Standing Commission on Pay Comparability (SCPC) and
certain other catch-up settlements. However, the adjustment of the cash
limits was limited so that substantial offsetting economies had to be 
23
found. Otherwise, the special cases were more selective, reflecting the 
Government's public spending objectives.
2.3 Enforcement
The policy rules were subject to tough enforcement procedures.
Monitoring occurred through the Treasury's Financial Information System.
Under the Analysis of Public Expenditure (APEX) system operated by the
Paymaster General's Office (PGO), accounts were kept of payments made by
authorities. This was made possible because most departments authorised
payments by notifying the PGO, which then carried out the transaction.
Authorities not covered by the convention submitted separate details to the
system. Vetting by the Treasury took the form of comparing actual
expenditure against profiles of anticipated expenditure. Remedial action
involved discussing with authorities their plans for meeting the ceilings,
24
if it appeared that overspending was likely. The sanctions at the
disposal of the Treasury were administrative and financial. If cash limits
were overspent, and there was no upward revision granted by the Government,
the Accounting Officer (normally the Permanent Secretary or the head of an
agency) had to explain the causes of the need for an Excess Vote to the
25
Public Accounts Committee. The financial penalty was that the cash limit 
for the following year was reduced.
Although these procedures were capable of preserving cash limits 
intact most of the time, the Government supplemented them with exhortation 
to authorities to live within their allocations.
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2.4 Agreement
The public pay policy was not agreed with the CBI or the TUC. It was
imposed. To be sure, the Government was prepared to discuss pay: as the
Chancellor, Sir Geoffrey Howe, said in 1981:
The Government may not yet have been open enough but trade 
unions should recognize the need for open and informed discussion 
on pay and competitiveness.26
However, this was intended to exhort and educate the unions to the
Government's way of thinking rather than to bargain over pay factors.
Although there was no explicit agreement, the CBI did support the
Government's public sector pay stance. For example, a CBI working party
report urged the Government to 'adopt ambitious objectives for monitoring
27
its own employees' pay.' It argued 'that there should be a
significant further reduction in the relative position of public service 
28
pay. ’
2.5 Auxiliary policies
While cash limits were the centerpiece of the Conservative
Government's strategy, public sector pay was also affected by a broad range
of other policies. Significantly, economic policies were adopted to
control finance exempt from cash limits. The Government was anxious to
curb public spending including pay, from all sources, including local
29
authority rates and corporation revenue. It therefore passed legislation 
giving the Environment Secretary powers to reduce grants in cases of 
perceived local government overspending. Exhortation was common. For 
example, in announcing the Rate Support Grant in November 1979, the 
Secretary of State for the Environment, Mr. Heseltine said:
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__I wish to appeal to every elected Councillor in the land.
You cannot opt out of the battle against inflation. You have 
responsibilities both to the country as a whole and to your 
ratepayers. I urge you therefore to plan your budgets on the 
basis of this settlement, to rate in accordance with the volume 
of expenditure I have requested and to make prudent use of the 
balances you hold. Do not raise a penny more in rates than you 
must.30
The nationalised industries were subjected to an array of policies 
impinging on their finance and expenditure, including tougher financial 
targets and performance indicators. Again, exhortation featured too.
For example, at the 1980 Conservative Conference the Transport Minister 
spoke in the following terms:
we share one common interest and that is the best possible value 
for the public both as passenger and taxpayer... Putting the 
customer first means that the passenger should not be required to 
pick up the bill for excessive wage settlements.31
Second, economic policy sought to reform the ownership and structure
of public industry through privatisation and the liberalisation of competition
The rationale was explicitly in part to resolve problems of pay control.
Public ownership was deemed a problem because there was no real fear of
bankruptcy. As the Ridley Report put it, where nationalised industries
have the nation by the jugular vein, the only feasible option is 
to pay up.32
The monopolistic structure of the nationalised sector was criticised
because, as Sir Geoffrey Howe stated:
monopoly profits can all too easily be absorbed in the business - 
sustaining inefficient processes, excess capacity, overmanning, 
inflated earnings, or cross-subsidising inefficient activities in 
the face of competition.33 (Emphasis added)
Third, economic policy had the objective of reducing the planned 
growth of public expenditure, as explained in Chapter 3. The prospective 
reduction in budgets implied that given pay factors would bite harder: 
the lack of financial flexibility in the form of real growth money meant
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that greater employment cuts were likely if pay increased faster than
the pay factor. The lower demand for labour, such as in the civil service,
34
also served to threaten to weaken the bargaining power of the unions.
At the same time as operating the cash limits strategy, the Government
attempted to influence public sector pay through other cost-control
policies. In the public sector itself, it set out to reform pay
determination procedures in the areas of comparability and third-party
intervention, for example. In the private sector, it sought to control
pay, and thus relativity claims by the public sector through the control
of the money supply. It was expected that pay rises would de-escalate with
35
the fall in labour demand and the lowering of price expectations. In
both sectors, exhortation to lower settlements was seen. For example, Sir
Geoffrey Howe said in July 1982 that sanity and realism in pay
means earnings rising by less than our competitors... It means 
substantially lower pay rises than last year. It means bearing 
in mind that price inflation is coming down. It means 
recognizing that increases in earnings tend to end up 
considerably higher than settlements... and that settlements tend 
to end up higher than plans.36
These policies were complemented by the use of labour law reform to 
reduce union bargaining power. The Government explicitly stated that it 
intended
to restore a broad balance of power in the framework for 
collective bargaining. Reforms to be effected by the Employment 
Bill, such as those removing specific abuses in picketing and the 
closed shop, have been designed to that end.37
2.6 Summary
In brief, the cash limits pay restraint strategy was characterised by 
a general pay rule which fixed limits on financial budgets of authorities, 
subject to exemptions, mainly rates and product revenue. After 1979-80, 
special dispensation to exceed the cash limits was relatively rare. The
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policy was enforced through the Treasury FIS system and exhortation. The 
pay factors were not agreed with the unions, but the CBI approved of the 
Government's approach. Additionally, there were a number of auxiliary 
policies which were aimed at tightening the grip of the Government on 
finance and expenditure, and at reducing the inflationary potential of 
bargaining institutions and influences. Thus the strategy had a broad 
front, addressing not only sources of inflation in the financial context, 
but also sources in the institutional environment and in bargaining 
strategies.
3. The Distinctiveness of the Cash Limits Pay Restraint Strategy
Using this characterisation of the Conservative Government's strategy, 
together with similar types of analyses of previous attempts at restraining 
public sector pay, the main differences can be isolated. Comparisons are 
made with all post-war policies where the primary intention was stated to 
be to reduce wage inflation. The phases of demand management, mainly in 
the 1950s, which undoubtedly indirectly influenced public sector pay, but 
which had the major objective of maintaining a level of demand that would 
not boost price inflation, are excluded.
3.1 General pay rule
The closeness with which the general pay rule defines pay increases 
can be represented on a single dimension on which the three characteristics 
of the pay rules isolated earlier are conflated. The unified scale is 
predicated on the assumption that the individual negotiating team is most 
constrained by the level at which the rule operates, then by the monetary 
focus, and least by the quantitative precision of the rule. There may be 
valid counter-examples, but this is expected to be the usual situation.
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Level Focus Precision Policies
Economy Financial budget Various
Pay bill Various
Average rises Various
Authority Financial budget Limit 1979-83 Cash limits (CL1-4)
Range
Pay bill Various
Average rises Various
Bargaining unit Pay bill Various
Average rises Unquantified 1956-57 Price Plateau
1970-72 (N-l)
Norm 1962-64 Guiding Light
Range 1970 Pre-election phase
Limit 1965-66 Planned Growth of 
Incomes
1974-75 Social Contract Mk. I
1977-78 Phase 3
1978-79 Phase 4
Employee Average rise Conditional 1974 Stage 2
1973-74 Stage 3
1975-76 Phase 1
Fixed 1976-77 Phase 2
Fixed
(freezes)
1948-50 Labour freeze 
1961-62 Pay Pause 
1966-67 Freeze/Standstil1 
1968-69 Post-devaluation
Table 4.2: General pay rules in postwar pay re
1972-73 Stage 1 
straint strategies
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Possible variations in pay rules are listed in Table 4.1. Less 
constraining policies are at the top of tne table, more specific policies at 
the bottom. Post-war policies appear in the body of the table according to 
the characterisation of their general pay rules. Whether they were 
respected is not considered.
The cash limits strategy (CL1-4) is clearly differentiated from
previous forms of intervention. The 1979 Conservative Government projected
its strategy at the financial budgets of authorities, whereas most policies in
previous years had been directed straight at bargaining units at average
increases, or at individual employees' pay increases. Thus, during the
Price Plateau, the Government intended that pay would only rise if
productivity rose in the bargaining unit: the unions were deemed to have no
38
cost-of-living grounds for increases. Under (N-l), negotiators were
39
supposed to de-escalate the settlement levels in their bargaining units.
Groups were subject to a 3-3.5 percent norm under the 1962-64 Guiding Light 
40
policy. In 1970, prior to the General Election, a range of 2.5-4.5 per
41
cent increases was stated for bargaining units. Relatively commonly,
units faced limits on average increases - of 3.5 percent in 1965-66,
according to the cost of living during the Social Contract Mk. I, 10
42
percent under Phase 3, and 5 percent in Phase 4. Pay limits were set by
Stages 2 and 3, for negotiating units but individuals were subject to 
43
maximum increases. The distribution of increases was fixed by the Phase
1 £6 per week increase policy, and by Phase 2 which allowed individuals 5
44
per cent rises within the limits o f £2.50 and £ 4 per week. Several other 
policies froze pay increases, subject to various exceptions.
The difference of approach is ably demonstrated by the bunching of 
policies in the table. The bulk can be seen as conventional incomes
••JL
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3.2 Exceptions
Exceptions to general pay rules can be summarised in terms of the 
liberality of exemptions clauses and the attitude towards special cases.
Table 4.3 cross-tabulates these two facets of exceptions. Policies are tight 
if they are in the north-west region of the table, and loose if they appear in 
the south-east region. The post-war policies, represented by their dates of 
operation, are allocated to cells. The cash limits policy is allocated by 
sector, since exceptions varied by sector.
The institutional form of the exceptions was inevitably different under 
cash limits. Exemptions related to rate and revenue finance that was not 
capped by cash limits, rather than to pay increases that were eligible under 
stated criteria. Special cases referred to instances of relaxations of cash 
limits rather than pay formulae.
Nevertheless, there were certain qualitative similarities with previous
policies. In the past, most strategies had begun by allowing only work-
related exemptions or work-related and other minor exemptions, with rare
special cases; in later stages, major exemptions and special cases became more
common. For example, Stages 1 and 2 permitted minor exemptions only, but
Stage 3 allowed threshold agreements and special cases, such as for the
45
miners, nurses and teachers. Phases 1 and 2 legitimised work-related
exemptions, but Phases 3 and 4 allowed productivity deals as well as special
cases for firemen. Review Body groups, and university teachers in 1977-78, anc
46
on a wider scale the following year. After a loose year of policy in 1979-
policies, and the new strategy as a 'financial' pay restraint policy, given
its focus.
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policies, and the new strategy as a 'financial' pay restraint policy, given
its focus.
3.2 Exceptions
Exceptions to general pay rules can be summarised in terms of the 
liberality of exemptions clauses and the attitude towards special cases.
Table 4.3 cross-tabulates these two facets of exceptions. Policies are tight 
if they are in the north-west region of the table, and loose if they appear in 
the south-east region. The post-war policies, represented by their dates of 
operation, are allocated to cells. The cash limits policy is allocated by 
sector, since exceptions varied by sector.
The institutional form of the exceptions was inevitably different under 
cash limits. Exemptions related to rate and revenue finance that was not 
capped by cash limits, rather than to pay increases that were eligible under 
stated criteria. Special cases referred to instances of relaxations of cash 
limits rather than pay formulae.
Nevertheless, there were certain qualitative similarities with previous 
policies. In the past, most strategies had begun by allowing only work- 
related exemptions or work-related and other minor exemptions, with rare 
special cases; in later stages, major exemptions and special cases became more 
common. For example, Stages 1 and 2 permitted minor exemptions only, but 
Stage 3 allowed threshold agreements and special cases, such as for the
exemptions, but Phases 3 and 4 allowed productivity deals as well as special 
cases for firemen, Review Body groups, and university teachers in 1977-78, anc
45
miners, nurses and teachers. Phases I and 2 legitimised work-related
46
on a wider scale the following year. After a loose year of policy in 1979-
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Special
Cases
Exemptions
None Work-Related Work-Related 
and Other Minor
Work-Related 
and Other Major
None 1980-81 (CG) CL2 1956-57 Price
Plateau
1948-50 Labour 
Freeze
1965-66 Planned 
Growth
1982-83 (CG) CL4 1966 Freeze 1967 Restraint 1967-68 Moderation
1975-77 Phases 
1 and 2
1972-73 Page 1 1968-69 Post-
devaluatio
1973 Stage 2 1970 Pre-election 
phase
1980-83 (LA) CL 2-
Few 1981-82 (CG) CL 3 1970-72 (N — 1) 1961-62 Pay
Pause
1973-74 Stage 3
1962-64 Guiding 
Light
1977-78 Phase 3
1979-83 (PC) CL 1-
Many 1979-80 (CG) CL 1 1974-75 Social
Contract I
1978-79 Phase 4
1979-80 (LA) CL 1
Table 4.3: Exceptions in postwar pay restraint strategies 
Note: Minor exemptions refer to those with a small financial benefit; 
major exemptions to those with greater implications for pay, such as 
productivity deals.
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80 when comparability increases promised in Phase 4 were paid, the strategy 
was tightened, becoming more akin to the early phases of other strategies. 
Special cases were few. Exemptions were very limited in central gover­
nment. Steps were taken to restrict exemptions through rates and revenues 
in local authorities and public corporations as time progressed; however, 
there was still more flexibility than customary in the early stages. The 
usual phase of relaxation was not reached during the period under study.
3.3 Enforcement
The enforcement of a policy design consists of a combination of moni­
toring, and reacting to events on the financial or bargaining scene. These 
two aspects are represented in Table 4.4. Enforcement is tougher in policies 
appearing towards the north-west quadrant, and slacker towards the south-east 
corner. Inevitably the ranking of characteristies involves much judgment and 
may not be universally appropriate. The most debateable ordering is the 
ranking of administrative sanctions over legal powers: this is done because 
there is usually a great reluctance to use the courts in statutory policies, 
although it could be argued that there is a considerable threat effect.
The cash limits strategy was enforced as strongly as most recent 
policies that had set explicit pay rules outside a catch-up period. The
Labour Government had supported Phases 1 to 4 with the public expenditure
47
system, including cash limits, from when they were introduced in 1976. The
NBPI policy had been statutorily supported between 1966 and 1970 to
facilitate early warnings of increases, while Stages 1 to 3 from 1972 to 1974
48
had incorporated legal penalties for flouting the policies. The cash 
limits policy matched these policies for intensity of enforcement, if not 
surpassed them, through its use of the Treasury FIS to monitor and react to
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Reaction Monitoring
Automatic 
Notification 
and Vetting
Independent 
Discovery 
and Vetting
Automatic
Notification
Independent None 
Discovery
Administrative
Sanctions
1975-79 
Phases 1-4
1979-83 CL1-4
Legi slative 
Powers
1966-70 
NBPI Policies
1972-74 
Stages 1-3
TUC/CBI
Exhortation
1965-66
Planned
Growth
1961-62 
Pay Pause
1948-50
Labour
Freeze
1956-57
Price
Plateau
1974-75 
Social 
Contract I
Government
Exhortation
1962-64
Guiding
Light
1970-72 
(N — 1 )
Table 4.4: Enforcement in postwar pay restraint strategies
authorities' spending levels. It was certainly tougher than other policies 
which relied on exhortation and varying levels of sophisticated monitoring 
procedures.
3.4 Agreement
The strength of commitment to a policy depends on the extent to which 
both management and unions agree to it, and whether it is based on 
normative grounds, that is, in principle, or on calculative grounds in 
return for economic or political gains. These two aspects are c r s s -  
tabulated in Table 4.5. The degree of commitment increases towards the 
north-west area. The postwar policies have been allocated to pertinent 
cells. There may be some room for argument over the attributed attitudes 
of public sector employers: the indicator used here is whether an 
agreement is explicit, although it is realised that employer attitudes may 
in fact coincide with government attitudes where the government is the 
employer, or where they are pressured by government elsewhere in the public 
sector.
The lack of any explicit agreement between the Government and the 
parties over pay factors under the cash limits policy mirrors many previous 
policies. Normative agreement with both parties had not been seen since 
inflation took off in the late 1960s: agreement, when reached, had been 
with the employers alone on normative grounds, or had been with the unions 
in return for economic measures and favourable legislation.
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Parties Basis of Agreement
Normative Benefits None
Employers 
and Unions
1948-50 Labour Freeze 
1965-68 NBPI Policies
Unions 1974- 75 Social Contract I
1975- 77 Phases 1 and 2
Employers 1968-70 NBPI Policies 1956-57 Price Plateau
Neither 1961- 62 Pay Pause
1962- 64 Guiding Light 
1970-72 (N—1)
1972-74 Stages 1 & 2 
1977-79 Phases 3 & 4 
1979-83 CL 1-4
Table 4.5: Agreement in postwar pay restraint strategies
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While the cash limits policy had these formal similarities with
previous policies, it differed in that there was no attempt to consult with
the parties over the policy details. Prior to Stages 1 to 3, lengthy talks
with the unions and employers had occurred; although they failed, the form of
the policies recognised some points raised, such as the need for a flat-
49
rate element and tne need for price control. Phases 3 and 4 had also
50
followed discussions with the TUC and CBI. As shown in Chapter 3, the 
Government was sensitive to the TUC's views in the revision of Phase 4.
3.5 Summary
The cash limits pay restraint strategy therefore marked a distinct change 
in the orientation of policies to control public sector pay. Notably, the 
general pay rule was aimed at authorities' financial budgets rather than pay 
increases at more micro-levels. Exceptions were generally more extensive in 
local authorities and public corporations under cash limits than under early 
stages of conventional incomes policies, but more restricted in central 
government. The support for the policy design was similar to many policies of 
the 1970s in that it rested on strong enforcement provisions and an absence of 
agreement. However, breaking with convention, in the cash limits case there 
was no attempt to gain consent.
4. The Causes of the New Departure in Pay Restraint Strategy
In particular, two dimensions of the cash limits pay restraint strategy 
warrant explanation because of the break they represented with the past: the 
switch to a more laissez-faire approach from direct regulation, and the 
imposition of the strategy without any attempt to agree it with the 
parties. The causes lay both in ideological positions and in pragmatic 
responses to the economic and political effects of the alternative policy
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options.
4.1 The switch to 1aissez-faire control from direct regulation
Of fundamental importance to the change of style of general pay rule was
the ideology of the freedom of the individual from the fetters of State
intervention. It had gained prominence since the late 1960s and had been
evident in the policy statements of the Heath Government. For example, in
discussing the Party's economic and social approach, Mr. Heath stated:
Our purpose is to bring our fellow citizens to recognise that 
they must be responsible for the conseguences of their own 
actions and to learn that no-one will stand between them and the 
results of their own free choice.51
While it is true that there was a U-turn in economic policy towards the 
direct control of incomes in 1972-74, it was a pragmatic decision 
caused by the failure of market policies rather than a philosophical 
change of heart. The Chancellor of the Excheguer, Mr. Barber, made this
Restricting the growth of the money supply to the extent that 
has sometimes been suggested would mean less economic growth, 
less investment, less modernisation, less industrial activity, 
far more unemployment, and lower living standards. That is not a 
price I am prepared to pay. To those who complain that what the 
Government proposed involves some interference with the free and 
untrammelled interplay of market forces, I would reply, "Yes, it 
does". But the purpose of the Government's proposals is to 
prevent rip-roaring inflation, and that inflation would play far 
more and worse havoc with market forces than our proposals 
would... The control of inflation must be an overriding 
consideration.52
The ideology became dominant among Conservative Party policymakers in the 
mid-1970s. Notably, it increased in popularity when Mrs. Thatcher replaced 
Mr. Heath as party leader, and, more gradually, as ministers of a social
democratic leaning changed their philosophies in the face of events. This 
coincided with the gain in stature of the concept of the social market 
economy, particularly through the writings of Hayek and Sir Keith Joseph
clear
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and the publications of the Institute for Economic Affairs. According to 
this ideology, the market, in the right social framework, was held to be the 
most fair and democratic manner of organising the economy. Self-interest 
and fellow-feeling were believed to co-exist. Self-interest was disciplined 
by competition - the prospect of profit and loss - and by checks and 
balances, such as the government, trade, public awareness, and producers 
and consumers. Fellow-feeling was promoted by government policies to 
protect individuals and locales from the worst effects of the operation of 
the market.
The role of the State in this model was to provide the framework of
laws that ensured the market worked effectively, and to provide a safety-
net. As far as collective bargaining was concerned, the checks and balances
in the market disciplined self-interest, removing the need for government
intrusion. This supposedly carried advantages over conventional incomes
policy. The politicisation of the economy through incomes policy impinged
on the social and political life of individuals: social justice, a
fundamental element of freedom, was imperilled by rewards being determined,
not by market forces, but by the arbitrariness of bureaucratic rules. The
sense of injustice was liable to cause turmoil in society.
The absence of market discipline encouraged conflict to be carried further
than it would otherwise have been. Greater government coercion might have 
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resulted.
The concept of the social market economy continued to feature in
Conservative Party thought and underlay the approach to pay determination
of the Party when in power in 1979-83. As Mr. Nigel Lawson said in 1982,
'Free markets... are... the economic dimension of the wider freedom we
56
cherish for its own sake.' Cash limits, without detailed intervention,
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were the appropriate technique to control pay in the public sector.
Apart from the ideological persuasion of the Administration, in 
general Ministers were unconvinced that conventional incomes policy 
represented an effective alternative. Put simply, they did not think it 
reduced wage increases. In the context of Phase 4 (1978-79), Mrs. Thatcher 
asserted:
It is a policy that suffers from the one defect that in politics 
is always fatal. It doesn't work. Indeed, it can be deeply 
damaging, causing strikes and, as we saw at Ford's, settlements 
higher than would otherwise have been agreed.57
More precisely, incomes policy was believed by most Conservative
policymakers to dampen pay in the short term, but at the cost of
frustrations caused by standardised limits, and ultimately, a pay 
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explosion. Earlier counter-inf1ationary success was believed by
Mr. Biffen, amongst others, to be independent of incomes policy:
It was the structures and disciplines of the IMF, and the 
movement in the monetary aggregate, which had a major impact on 
incomes.59
Furthermore, incomes policy was deemed to create inefficiencies.
Incentives to work were held to be destroyed by the common standards 
embodied in the general pay rules of incomes policies. Mrs. Thatcher said 
the Conservative Party
cannot accept that the objective (of containing the increase in 
wages within the increase in production) is best achieved by 
having an absolutely rigid limit of X per cent applying 
regardless of the several and many different circumstances of 
industry and commerce, regardless of the conditions on the shop- 
floor, regardless of the profitability of various concerns. I do 
not think that we shall get the increase in production and 
prosperity, which is what we all want, by that method.60
All this is not to imply that a careful study was carried out of the
efficiency of alternative policy approaches. Indeed, it was not. A
Treasury Deputy Secretary told the Treasury and Civil Service Committee
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As far as incomes policies and simulations of them and that sort 
of thing are concerned, I really do think those are questions for 
the Chancellor. It is difficult for us without actually handing 
in our resignations in advance to get too far into alternative 
policies.61
Nevertheless, the prejudices and hunches of Ministers, combined with their 
ideological perspective, led to the rejection of direct regulation in 
favour of the more indirect approach.
4.2 The preference to impose the strategy
The reluctance to attempt to negotiate with unions or employers over 
the terms of the cash limits strategy was partly ideological. A 
corporatist approach would have heightened the politisation of the market, 
and reduced individual freedom. Naturally, this would have been 
antithetical to the ideal of the social market economy. Consequently, it 
was not a viable approach.
More important were the Government's pragmatic arguments. The 
Conservatives were particularly worried about the economic and political 
costs of negotiating restraint. The general argument was set out in The 
Right Approach:
Unions tend to demand and obtain policies in exchange for 
restraint which either damage the national interest as a whole 
(such as tight price controls) on which they hope will further 
their own interests at the expense of the rest of the community.
The basic bargain is likely to mean that the Government promises 
to do things that ought not to be done, in exchange for a promise 
of wage restraint which is in everybody's interest anyway.62
The potential economic costs were most clearly articulated by the Earl
of Gowrie, speaking for the Conservative Government in the House of Lords:
If the trade-off is expansion of public expenditure, or of 
public borrowing, or of the money supply - although I put that as 
least important - then we are agreed that the counter- 
inflationary effects of pay policy are nil. Worse, they are 
probably minus, and if they are minus they do not have much 
choice of holding, of going on, or of obtaining sufficient
consent... If the trade-off is price controls... then what is the 
effect on investment and productivity?63
More concretely, specific policies implemented during the currency of the
Social Contract had apalled the Conservatives - in particular, subsidies
on food and housing, the 1975 Industry Act, and the renegotiation of the
terms of EEC entry, which were believed to be economically wasteful and 
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inflationary.
Politically, the worry was that pay agreements would increase union
power and threaten Pariiamentary democracy. Legislation favourable to
unions passed during the Social Contract was believed to have 
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increased militancy. Corporatist agreements per se were seen as
prejudicing the authority of Parliament:
It is not possible to represent and include other interests in 
the country in this bargaining process. It erodes the authority 
of moderate union leaders and exposes them to militant pressures.
It threatens to undermine and supplement still further the role 
of Parliament... It is not appropriate for any party which 
accepts that it is the proper duty of government to represent the 
community as a whole.66
More improbably it was feared the substance of agreements might 
imperil the political system:
If the trade-off is a corporate socialist state, withdrawal from 
the Common Market, import controls, disarmament, supply - rather 
than price-rationing and all the rest of the package of the 
left... then that may not be compatible with Parliamentary 
democracy or the party system.67
Finally, it was unlikely that the Conservative Government would have been 
able to introduce an agreed policy even if it had wanted to. As the Earl 
of Gowrie admitted:
I am quite prepared to concede... that a formalised pay policy, 
without of course inflationary trade-offs like price controls or 
increased Government borrowing, might be the fairest way. But it 
was not on offer to the last Government and still less is it on 
offer to this Government.68
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5. Summary and Conclusions
The contribution of this chapter has been to show precisely and 
rigorously the sense in which the Conservative Government's pay restraint 
strategy in the public sector marked a radical change with past strategies. 
Critically, the general pay rule did not control in the same detail as 
previous pay limits, and the policy was imposed without an attempt at 
agreement. Beyond this, local authorities and public corporations saw more 
exemptions than in the past due to the technical details of expenditure 
control, although special case increases were limited. Also enforcement of 
the strategy was achieved through the administrative framework of 
expenditure control.
The Conservative Party adopted the relatively laissez-faire approach of 
cash limits in order to preserve individual freedom and because it was 
believed that incomes policies were incapable of long-term success from a 
counter-inflationary and efficiency standpoint. Attempts were not made to 
agree the cash limits strategy because in so doing the social market 
economy and democracy would have been threatened, and the economic and 
political quid pro quos would have been unconscionable. In any case, the 
unions would probably not have agreed to restrain pay for a Conservative 
Government.
It was a previously untested approach, and it was inevitably therefore
something of a gamble. Doubters believed that it would founder and
69
eventually secede to a more conventional incomes policy. The next part 
of the investigation analyses how effective it turned out to be.
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PART IV
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FINANCIAL PAY RESTRAINT STRATEGY
Chapter 5
Public Sector Pay Increases Under The Financial Pay Restraint
Strategy 1979-83
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The originality of the form of pay restraint adopted in 1979-83 
behoves any analysis of the period to scrutinize the impact on pay 
increases particularly carefully. Accordingly, Part III of this 
investigation is devoted to a detailed study of the performance of the new 
strategy. In the present chapter, the efficacy of the strategy is assessed 
in statistical terms. In the following four chapters, those 
accomplishments are explained with reference to qualitative and econometric 
evidence.
The verdict on a pay restraint strategy depends on whether it 
independently reduces wage inflation. Also, in view of the variety of 
policy options available, the competency of a policy should be judged 
relative to that of alternative approaches.
Section 1 of this chapter examines the trends in pay rises during the 
currency of the strategy. Putting the 1979-83 experience in further 
perspective, Section 2 compares the extent of pay de-escalation in the era 
of the cash limits policy with that in previous periods of pay restraint 
strategy. With this as background, the third section addresses the 
issue of the role of the financial pay restraint strategy in the 
determination of pay increases, and measures and compares the policy's 
effect, in comparison with previous attempts.
1. Pay Increases Under Cash Limits 1979-1983
An examination of the trend of pay increases during the financial 
pay restraint policy is instructive in that it shows the extent to which 
the public sector labour market exhibited counter-inflationary tendencies, 
making a contribution to the Government's campaign against price inflation 
and public spending growth.
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The pay trends are assessed with reference to earnings increases, as 
well as their primary determinants, namely settlement rates and what is 
referred to here as the pattern of work, that is, overtime working, 
shiftwork and incentive scheme participation. Changes in earnings are an 
important indicator because they directly affect wage inflation and also 
indirectly through comparability claims (based, for example, on the average 
earnings index or couched in terms of attaining a particular position in 
the pay hierarchy). In addition, settlement rates are important in their 
own right, providing a more reliable guide to the price-inflationary 
consequences of pay increases, since other determinants of earnings 
increases, related to the pattern of working, are more (although not 
totally) related to output changes.
The 1979-83 period is divided into four pay rounds beginning in August
and ending in July. The rationale for retaining the notion of an annual
1
pay round, to which some commentators object, is threefold. First, 
nearly all groups in the public sector settled once every 12 months. Only 
a limited number of shorter or longer agreements were negotiated, and then 
generally simply as an interim measure due to economic difficulties or 
because of a revision of the settlement date. Second, apart from these 
instances, the order of settlements was maintained. Third, there was a 
degree of uniformity within the pay round, in that the pay factor was the 
same, or very nearly so, for all authorities in the public services. Each 
August saw a new pay factor take effect. Therefore, even if there was more 
dispersion in pay outcomes than in the immediately previous years, there 
was an institutional regularity about the process of pay negotiations.
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1.1 Earnings increases in the pay rounds 1979-83
Ideally, in order to gain an impression of the trends in wage 
inflation, a reasonably aggregated analysis is appropriate, supplemented 
with a broad subsectoral breakdown to identify the primary sources of the 
observed overall increases. The pay rounds should each be distinguished 
since they represent periods when distinctive attempts were made to reduce 
wage inflation.
1.1.1 Data considerations
Unfortunately, no earnings series exists which meets these 
requirements. The New Earnings Survey (NES) produces public sector results 
in aggregate and by agreement, but the April survey date comes about mid­
way in the pay round, most settlements occurring in January, April and 
July. As a result, the April-April increases represent the aggregation of 
parts of two rounds. In contrast, the Average Earnings Index (AEI), being 
monthly, can be used to assess August-July pay rounds, but the public 
sector is not clearly distinguished. Figures are only reported for 
industries in the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), which makes 
difficult the identification of certain public corporations in otherwise 
private industries. Further, the SIC changes in 1980 complicate matters. 
The other alternative, the Earnings and Hours survey, which is carried out 
each October, provides a reasonable approximation to the beginning of the 
pay round, given that few groups settle in August and September.
A difficulty is that the coverage is limited to manual workers. Also, 
while the series is more disaggregated, making groups more easily 
identifiable, police and fire employees are excluded and some government 
industrial workers are classified in private sector SICs.
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The approach aaopted here is to develop a series based on NES agreement 
data which is more representative of pay levels at the end of each pay 
round. The essence of the method is to use settlement information to 
determine whether the April NES figure includes the current pay round 
increase; where it does not, then the statistic is revised. In the latter 
case, if there is only one settlement between successive Aprils, the second 
April figure is used as the reference point for the pay levels existing at 
the end of the previous round. If there is more than one settlement 
between successive Aprils, the settlement data are used to interpolate 
between the April figures. In both cases, the principle of the revision is 
to update the initial April rates of pay for overtime, payment-by-results, 
shift, and 'all other pay' (mainly basic rates and allowances) given 
normal and overtime hours and proportions of workers earning each type of 
pay. The effect is to derive average earnings figures which include 
current round settlements up to July, but on the assumption that the 
pattern of working (overtime, shifts and payment-by-results) of the 
previous April persists. Throughout, adult male figures are used to reduce 
any problems of small samples.
While it is reasonable to be confident in the adjusted NES series, it 
is wise to cross-check any results with reference to another series. The 
average earnings index is most appropriate as it has the most similar 
coverage to the NES and increases can be calculated for individual pay 
rounds. The main problem is, as cited above, the coverage, and also the 
fact that late settlements may be counted in the wrong period.
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1 . 1.2 Results
The NES Analysis
The changes in NES-adjusted average gross weekly earnings are 
summarised in Table 5.1 for each cash-limited pay round between 1979 and 
1983, as well as for 1978-79 for the purposes of comparison. Figures are 
presented for the public sector as a whole as well as major subsectors, 
calculated as unweighted averages of individual bargaining unit increases 
in view of the absence of full information on the employee coverage of 
agreements.
It should be noted that pay increases have been allocated to the round 
in which they were negotiated rather than the round in which they were 
implemented. Hence comparability awards paid in 1979-80 but agreed in
1978- 79 are classified as 1978-79 increases. Also it should be noted that 
the number of observations for 1982-83 was less than in the other years 
with the result that the figures may not be comparable or totally reliable 
for some subsectors.
It is clear that the era of financial pay restraint saw a general de- 
escalation of pay rises after the 1978-79 peak in the public services and
1979- 80 in public corporations, when catch-up increases had been negotiated 
in the wake of four years of conventional incomes policy. The downward 
trend was especially marked in the first two years of the new strategy, 
(denoted as Cash Limits 1 and 2 or CL1 and CL2), when earnings increases 
were more than halved for most. The 1981-82 round (CL3) showed a more 
tentative diminution in increases. The de-escalation resumed in 1982-83 
(CL4) more noticeably. Overall, in CL3 and CL4 combined, increases did not 
quite halve.
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Policy Phase 4 
Year 1978-79 
Sector
CL1
1979-80
CL2
1980-81
CL3
1981-82
CL4 CL1-4 
1932-83 1983-84
Central Government 27.3 18.4 8.0 8.1 2.3 41.4
Civil Service 26.6 21.4 7.5 11.6 NA 45.6
NHS 28.7 16.0 8.4 6.8 1.7 36.6
Universities NA NA NA 3.7 4.1 NA
Local Authorities 28.7 15.4 8.1 8.0 6.6 43.5
Police and Fire 29.9 17.4 14.4 13.1 11.2 68.7
Other 28.5 15.1 6.9 7.1 5.2 38.6
Public Corporations 19.4 20.7 11.3 9.0 5.5 53.2
Energy and Utilities 22.1 20.6 11.6 11.5 5.1 55.0
Communications 22.2 24.5 8.9 8.9 5.5 55.7
Passenger Transport 16.5 21.7 9.5 5.4 7.2 50.6
Manufacturing 11.0 13.0 16.7 8.7 5.3 50.9
Public Sector: Total 23.8 19.4 9.7 8.5 5.4 49.0
Pay Factors 14/13 6 4 3.5
Table 5.1: Percentage increases in average gross week 1y earnings in the 
UK pub!ic sector 1978-83 
Notes: N.A. means not available
+ means aggregate understates the true figure due to missing 
observation.
Source: Derived from adjusted NES statistics, Analysis by Agreement,
Department of Employment, various issues, 1978-84.
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Pay increases, it is clear, fell concurrently with the Government's 
pay factors for the public services. Without wishing to attribute 
causation at this stage of the analysis, the correlation between the pay 
factors and pay increases is at least suggestive that the policy was 
influential. Of course, as was to be expected from the form of the policy, 
the earnings increases exceeded pay factors in most cases. This was more 
pronounced with the intervention of a third-party or reference to a fixed 
pay formula.
Although there was a general diminution of pay increases over the 
period, some groups experienced lower rises than others. At a broad 
sectoral level, public corporations generally received higher increases 
than did central and local government, especially in 1980-82. At a more 
disaggregated level, the ranking of groups was far from stable year by 
year, but certain tendencies were apparent, as revealed in the overall 
increases for the period. The police and fire groups advanced the most, 
with increases of two-thirds, followed by a large bunch, including the 
public corporations and the civil service, which received rises of 
approximately a half; the NHS (especially nurses), and other local 
authority groups fared least well, with increases of only just over a 
third. Even after accounting for the catch-up rises negotiated in CL1, 
public corporations fared better.
It is worth pointing out that public corporations and civil 
service typically saw more internal variation in pay increases than the NHS 
and local authorities. Indeed, the manual workers in the gas and water 
industries, together with non-manual employees in the coal industry 
received increases of the order of the police and firemen. In the other 
direction, non-manual steel employees suffered more than the sectoral
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average indicator, in fact overlapping with the teachers who headed the 
local authority pack.
The AEI Analysis
An analysis using the average earnings index yields similar 
conclusions, which is comforting given the unorthodox method of adjusting 
the NES data. Table 5.2 reports the earnings increases in each pay round 
for various SICs. Note that here the figures relate to rises implemented 
in the August-July periods rather than increases negotiated in the round. 
Adjustments would be difficult to make in view of the level of aggregation 
and the absence of accurate information on the relative sizes of all 
bargaining units. Hence, the payment of SCPC awards in CL1, the year after 
many references were made, inflated the CL1 figures. Also the CL3 Public 
Administration increase included the late CL2 settlement in the civil 
service which followed industrial action. The CL2 increases in Education 
and Health Services were also boosted by awards by the Standing Commission 
on Pay Comparability (SCPC), following references in the previous round. 
Even so, a downward trend in pay increases is evident, especially in CL2
Policy CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4 CL1-4
Year 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1979-83
Sector
Public Services
Public Admin. 23.1 8.3 11.5 7.3 59.5
Education and 
Health Services 13.9 18.8 12.6 4.7 59.5
Public Corporations
Coal and Coke 23.5 10.1 8.7 4.9 54.9
Electricity, Gas, 
Other Energy 
and Water 36.6 15.6 9.9 6.7 85.3
Transport and 
Communications 16.0 13.1 12.2 9.7 61.4
Other Transport 
Equipment 
(incl. ship­
building) 20.7 11.6 8.5 3.0 50.5
Table 5.2: Percentage increases in average earnings in the UK public 
sector 1979-83
Note: Phase 4 figures are omitted due to differences in SIC
definitions, and the inclusion of SCPC awards in the CL1 figures.
Source: Derived from the Average Earnings Index, Department of Employment
Gazette, various issues, 1979-83. ........
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In fact, if corrections were possible, it is reasonable to suppose that CLI 
would have seen some of the reduction in earnings increases, too. In this 
event, the broad NES picture would be confirmed.
With the caveat concerning the timing of SCPC awards firmly in mind, 
the relative extent to which groups gained smaller increases under cash 
limits can be seen. In the absence of data on police and fire increases, 
the public utilities fared best. Transport and communications pay 
increases followed with the SCPC-inflated rises of the public services. 
Coalmining and shipbuilding apparently received tne smallest increases. If 
the SCPC rises could be netted out where they were in truth part of 
Phase 4 settlements, a similar hierarchy to that identified in the NES 
would be seen.
1.2 Settlement rates and changes in working patterns in the pay rounds
1979-83.
Having established that earnings increases diminished during the cash 
limits pay restraint strategy, and occurred more in some sectors than 
others, it is appropriate to account for the trends through a statistical 
decomposition of the increases. In addition, as intimated earlier, it is 
useful to distinguish settlement rates because they have direct 
implications for unit labour costs and thus inflation, in contrast to 
changes in working patterns which are more often associated with output 
changes and are therefore less inflationary.
1.2.1 Data and method
The only data source to disaggregate pay into its various elements is 
the NES. The settlement and working pattern effects are calculated from 
the adjusted pay rates derived in Section 1.1 and the NES data on hours of
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work and the proportions of employees working overtime and shifts and 
participating in incentive schemes. The procedure is to assess the 
monetary increase that results from the change in each rate and each hours 
and incidence figure, one-by-one, holding everything else constant. The 
percentage increase over initial average earnings can then be calculated.
1.2.2 Results 
Settlement rates
The increases in average earnings due to the combined increases in the 
rates for ‘all other pay', overtime, shift and incentive pay - that is, 
excluding any changes in overtime hours and the proportions of employees 
working overtime, shifts and under incentive schemes - are shown in Table 5.3. 
It can be seen that the earnings increases largely reflected settlement 
rates, being of broadly similar magnitudes. However, the trend in settlements 
was more unequivocally downward each round in the 1979-83 period than was the 
trend in earnings increases. In aggregate, in CL1 and CL2 the reductions in 
settlement rates were 4.7 and 7.7 points respectively, halving the settlement 
rate of Phase 4. Further decreases followed in CL3 and CL4, halving the 
settlement rate once more. The implications for reductions in price 
inflation were therefore more consistently cheerful than the earnings 
trends were for wage inflation.
Thus, apparently, bargaining behaviour in annual negotiations 
continually changed. The hesitancy in the downward path of total earnings 
increases must therefore have been due to changes in the pattern of 
work. Settlements shadowed the cash limits pay factors. Apart from where 
third parties' pay links were involved, public service increases tended to 
exceed the pay factors by up to four percentage points.
i
Pol icy
Year
Sector
Phase 4 
1978-79
CL1
1979-80
CL2
1980-81
CL3
1981-82
CL4
1982-83
CL1-4
1979-83
Central Government 26.5 17.0 9.1 6.9 4.4 40.8
Civil Service 23.8 21.2 8.8 9.0 N.A. 43.87
NHS 31.8 13.6 9.3 6.6 4.3 38.1
Universities 26.5 N. A. N.A. 3.1 4.6 N.A.
Local Authorities 29.9 16.1 10.1 8.4 6,.8 48.0
Police and Fire 38.5 17.3 18.8 12 .2 10,.3 72.4
Other 28.2 15.9 8.5 7 .7 5..9 43.3
Public Corporations 19.4 22.1 13.6 9,.7 6..0 61.2
Energy and Utilities 21.5 21.8 14.0 10,.9 6.,4 63.7
Communications 23.6 24.5 11.5 8,.8 5.9 59.8
Passenger Transport 15.8 23.3 12.8 10..2 8. 4 66.1
Manufacturing 11.8 17.1 15.9 5..6 2. 1 46.3
Public Sector: Total 24.1 19.4 11.7 8.,7 5.9 52.9
Table 5.3: Percentage settlement rates in the UK public sector 1978-83 
Notes: As for Table 5.1 
Source: As for Table 5.1
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At a disaggregated level, the hierarchy of increases was in general 
the same as for total earnings increases: police and fire employees gained 
the most over the cash limits policy period, followed by, in order, the 
public corporations, the civil service, local government and the NHS.
There were more detailed differences, however. Settlement increases were 
mostly higher than earnings increases, but especially in certain corpora­
tions and local authorities where supplements to basic rates were a greater 
proportion of pay. As a result, manual workers in the utilities and road 
passenger transport fared particularly well in negotiations (although not 
as well as police and fire employees), followed by the miners and non- 
manual utility workers; meantime, post office (so-called) manipulative 
grades received less than average, along with local authority groups, while 
British Steel (BSC) non-manual workers saw their pay increase as little as 
for NHS workers.
Most of the settlement rates represented increases in basic weekly 
rates or in overtime, shift and incentive rates, but reductions in normal 
hours of work also contributed, especially in CL3 and CL4. Before the cash 
limits policy era, the post office engineers had been awarded a reduction 
in hours from 40 to 37.5. The SCPC reduced the hours of nurses and 
professional and technical workers (supplementary to medicine) in CL1. 
Negotiated hours reductions occurred in the public sector first under the 
policy in 1980-81 when gas and water manual workers and university 
ancillary workers cut their hours. CL3 then saw the avalanche of 
reductions. A large number of groups in the public corporations were 
the beneficiaries, including units in electricity supply, transport 
(including British Rail (BRB), London Transport (LTE), the National Council 
for the Omnibus Industry (NCOI), the British Transport Docks Board (BTOB)
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and the British Waterways Board (BWB)), and also in British Shipbuilders 
(BS). In the public services, the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) and NHS 
electricians and plumbers benefitted. The following year, CL4, more 
corporations followed suit, such as municipal road transport, the BBC and 
BSC, together with BRB footplatemen, but it was mainly public service 
groups who shortened their workweek, including various manual groups and 
town hall workers in the local authorities, the industrial civil service, 
university technicians and NHS maintenance craftsmen.
Changes in work patterns
Changes in overtime hours and the proportions of employees working 
overtime, shifts and under incentive schemes, served on the whole to dampen 
earnings increases and therefore to reduce wage inflation. Yet the overall 
average magnitude of the implications of work pattern changes should not be 
exaggerated, since the public sector was characterised by a high ratio of 
basic pay to total pay, and so large changes in non-basic elements did not 
have a great impact on average earnings. Nevertheless, changes in work 
patterns did carry significant implications for certain groups at 
particular times.
Overtime hours and coverage
The restraint on earnings caused by changes in work patterns emanated 
primarily from overtime work, for the most part, largely because of the 
relative importance of overtime pay in supplementary pay. Table 5.4 
depicts the impact of changes in overtime hours and employment on average 
earnings in each pay policy period.
Whereas Phase 4 had seen increases in overtime hours and employment, 
the cash limits era generally saw reductions. Some cuts were seen in CL1,
Pol icy Phase 4 CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4 CL1-4 Phase 4 CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4 Cl
Year 1978-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 79-83 1978- 79 79-80 80'-31 81 -82 82-83 79-1
Sector
Central
Govt. 0.2 -0.5 -0.4 0.5 -0.3 -1.1 0.1 0.4 -0.9 0.2 -0.3 -0.6
Civil
Service 0.2 0.0 -Û.2 1.0 N.A. 0.9+ 0.1 0.1 -1.0 0.9 N.A. 0.0
NHS 0.1 -0.9 -0.6 0.3 -1.0 -2.2 0.1 0.6 - .9 -0.4 -0.4 -1.0
Uni v. N.A . N.A. N.A. 0.0 0.0 0.0+ N.A. N.A.. N.A.. 0.0 0.0 0.0+
Local
Auth. 0.6 -0.3 -1.0 0.0 -0.3 -1.5 0.1 -0.4 -0.9 0.1 -0.3 -1.5
Pol ice 
Fire
and
-0.2 0.7 -2.5 0.4 0.3 -1.1 -0.6 -0.4 -1.3 0.3 0.1 -1.2
Other 0.8 -0.5 -0.7 •-0.1 -0.4 -1.6 0.3 -0.4 -0.8 0.0 -0.4 -1.6
Public 
Corps. 0.3 -0.3 -1.2 ■-0.2 -0.6 -2.2 0.5 -0.9 -1.2 0.0 -0.5 -2.5
Energy
Util.
&
0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.0 -0.4 -1.5 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 -1.3
Comm. 1.0 0.3 -2.3 0.4 -0.6 -2.2 0.5 -0.9 -1.2 -0.8 -0.3 -3.2
Pass.
Trans. -0.6 -0.3 -1.4 •-1.2 -2.1 -4.9 1.0 -0.4 -1.9 -1.1 0.5 -3.0
Mfg. -0.3 -0.2 -1.6 0.7 0.3 -0.8 0.6 -3.0 -1.1 2.2 -1.1 -3.0
Public
Sector:
Total 0.4 -0.3 -1.0 0.0 -0.5 -1.8 0.3 -0.5 -1.0 0.1 -0.4 -1.8
Table 5.4: Percentage changes in earnings due to changes in overtime
hours and employee coverage in the UK pub!ic sector 1978-83 
Notes: As for Table 5.1
Source: As for Table 5.1
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amounting to more than 5 per cent of earnings for workers in municipal road 
transport, 8SC and Scottish local authorities. They reached a crescendo in 
CL2 with significant reductions occurring in BS, tne police service, and 
BRB workshops, and among manual Post Office (PO) engineers and manipulative 
grades, and local authority engineering craftsmen and electricians. The 
situation stabilised in CL3, although BS and the industrial civil service 
gained ground through overtime, and BRB workshop employees suffered further. 
In CL4, the overtime cuts resumed on a moderate scale, especially among BSC 
manual workers.
Over the period as a whole, the public corporations were particularly 
hard hit, although the local authorities and the NHS also saw overtime fall. 
The trend was most significant among manual workers, whose pay was more 
dependent on overtime than was that of non-manuals. Individual groups 
experiencing the most significant cuts in pay were the BRB workshop 
employees (over 15 percent) and municipal road transport workers (10 
percent). Other transport workers, including NCOI employees and BRB 
conciliation grades, also saw sizeable reductions. Post office workers, 
Scottish local authority manual workers, and engineering craftsmen and 
electricians, steelworkers, NHS maintenance workers and British Gas (BGC) 
manual workers all saw aggregate reductions of 7 per cent or more.
Incentive scheme coverage
A rising proportion of employees under incentive schemes led to 
increases in incentive pay which added slightly to overall pay increases, 
but which did not significantly prejudice wage inflation. Table 5.5 shows 
that over the period only 1.2 per cent was added to earnings increases by 
incentives.
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Policy
Year
Sector
Phase 4 
1978-79
CL1
1979-80
CL2
1980-81
CL3
1981-82
CL4
1982-83
CL1-4
1979-83
Central Govt. 1.2 0.8 0.2 0.1 -0.1 1.0
Civil Service 1.6 0.2 0.1 0.0 N.A. 0.3+
NMS 0.3 1.4 0.3 0.1 - 0.1 1.7
Uni versities N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.0 0.0 0.0+
Local Authorities - 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.5 0.2
Police and Fire - 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other - 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.6 0.3
Public Corporations 
Energy and
-0.1 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 1.8
Uti1ities -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.7
Communications
Passenger
0.0 2.4 1.7 0.6 0.0 4.8
T ransport 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6
Manufacturing -1.24 -0.2 3.3 -0.4 1.7 4.5
Public Sector:
Total 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.3 1.2
Table 5.5: Percentage changes in earnings due to changes in the
employee coverage of incentive schemes in the UK public 
sector 1978-83
Notes: As for Table 5.1
Sources: As for Table 5.1
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Most of the increases in incentives came in the first two years of the 
policy. Typically, new schemes were implemented at that time. In later 
years, old bonuses were consolidated and new ones were offered under exis­
ting schemes. For example, the PO introduced a twice-yearly bonus from 
July 1979, based on corporate results and amounting to 2 to 3 per cent each 
year. From CL2, BSC required pay increases to come from locally identified 
and negotiated performance improvements. NHS maintenance workers also 
participated in the National Financial Incentive Scheme in greater numbers, 
adding significantly to the group's pay increase. Likewise, more non-manual
NCB employees became eligible for incentives, and more industrial civil
2
servants were paid under the Special Efficiency Bonus Scheme.
Over the whole period, in addition to the above-mentioned groups, 
Scottish local authority manual workers, local authority engineering 
craftsmen and electricians in England and Wales, manual gas workers, and 
municipal transport workers all experienced above-average incentive pay 
rises due to changes in the proportions of employees eligible.
A few bargaining units saw reductions in pay from this source where 
workers were taken off incentive schemes. Usually this was temporary, yet 
over the four years of cash limits policy, local authority building and 
civil engineering workers, BS, and non-manual BGC employees made a net loss 
of up to 2-1/2 per cent of earnings.
Shift coverage
Changes in the proportion of workers on shifts also added to earnings, 
but as Table 5.6 shows, the extent was almost imperceptible until CL4. 
Although increased shiftworking is associated with a change in 
the time at which work is done rather than greater output, price inflation 
was not endangered between 1979 and 1983 due to the trivial amounts
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involved.
Some individual bargaining units, however, saw small but significant 
changes in pay due to changes in shiftwork coverage. In CL1, the cutback 
in shiftworking in BSC reduced pay rises by 1 to 2 per cent on average, 
while BGC manual workers and electricity supply (ESI) technical workers 
experienced pay increases of 1 per cent. More widespread reductions in 
shift pay, amounting to approximately 1 per cent of earnings, were seen by 
ESI manual and technical workers, water industry manual employees and 
municipal transport workers in CL2. At the same time, equivalent amounts 
were gained by BRB workshop employees, NCOI workers, BSC, and NHS nurses 
and ancillaries. Significant reductions in shiftworking did not 
materialise thereafter, apart from the case of ESI manual workers in CL4. 
Instead, increases of around 1 per cent were seen: in CL3 by the ESI 
manual workers themselves and the industrial civil service, and in CL4 by 
BSC, municipal transport, the fire service, and NHS administrative and 
clerical staff.
Over the whole of the first Conservative period of office, few groups 
gained or lost significantly. BSC manual workers lost, but BSC non-manual 
workers gained, as did manual gas employees and NHS white-collar staff and 
nurses, all by between 1 and 2 per cent.
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Policy Phase 4 CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4 CL1-4
Year 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1979-8:
Sector
Central Government 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7
Civil Service 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 N.A. 0.2-
NHS 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.4 1.0
Universities N . A. N.A. N.A. 0.0 0.1 0.1-
Local Authorities -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4
Police and Fire -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.5
Other -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Public Corporations -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.5
Energy and Utilities -0.4 0.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.1
Communications 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Passenger Transport -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.7 0.8
Manufacturing -0.1 -1.0 0.7 -0.1 2.5 2.1
Public Sector: Total -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
Table 5.6: Percentage change in earnings due to changes in the employee 
coverage of sh i ftwork ing in the UK publi c sector 1978-83
Notes: As for Table 5.1 
Sources: As for Table 5.1
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1.3 Summary
This section has attempted to establish the broad trends in public 
sector pay determination under the cash limits pay restraint policy, as 
well as to provide a measure of detail to illustrate the general remarks.
Three salient features characterised the period.
First, the policy was accompanied by a de-escalation of pay increases 
in terms of earnings, but more clearly in terms of settlement rates.
While the increases were up to 4 per cent greater than the pay factor at 
the subsectoral level, a diminution of wage inflation was implied, by the 
trend.
Second, public corporations tended to negotiate greater increases than 
central and local government, although the dispersion of settlements meant 
that there was a degree of overlap. Emergency services, manual workers in 
the utilities and in road passenger transport obtained the best 
settlements. Next were the miners and the non-manual utility employees.
Below civil servants and the other corporation employees, (except PO 
manuals and BSC non-manuals who fared less well), were other 
local government workers and NHS employees.
Third, the de-escalation in earnings largely reflected the trend in 
settlements, but pay increases tended to be moderated as well by changes in 
the pattern of work, especially cutbacks in overtime hours and coverage. This 
was particularly true in 1980-81 (CL2) and for manual workers. As a result, 
the low rank of local authority and NHS manual workers was consolidated, while 
the relatively high settlements of road passenger transport workers were 
tempered somewhat.
2. The Cash Limits Pay Pol icy Experience in Historical Perspective
To gauge the significance of the counter-inflationary trends in pay
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2.1 Guiding principles
The pay bargaining experience during each series of policies is
encapsulated by three types of statistics: the average de-escalation, the
maximum annual de-escalation, and the maximum continuous de-escalation. The
first, the average de-escalation, refers to the average annual pay increase
during the operation of a strategy compared with that in the preceding
strategy. This measures the overall changes under the policy, capturing both
the extent and duration of lower pay increases. This has been employed in
3
certain previous analyses to demonstrate the success of wage controls. Here, 
however, it is simply a descriptive device to show how bargaining changed, 
with no implications for policy effectiveness, in view of the fact that other 
variables have to be controlled before verdict can be passed on the 
independent effect of policy.
The second criterion, the maximum annual de-escalation, indicates the
greatest change in bargaining behaviour between one year and the next
during a strategy, or, as sometimes put, the greatest extent to which
expectations were broken. It is simply calculated as the largest year-on-
year percentage decline in earnings during each strategy. According to
McCarthy, a halving of pay increases is probably the most that managers of
4
the economy can hope for.
The third statistic, the maximum continuous de-escalation, measures the 
greatest continuous fall in pay increases over successive years of decline 
during the currency of a strategy. It therefore assesses the extent to which 
bargaining behaviour underwent a sustained change.
bargaining under the cash limits pay restraint strategy, it is useful to
contrast them with the movements in pay under previous strategies.
2.2 Data and method
In pursuit of this objective, two data sets are utilised. One is the
October Earnings and Hours Survey of manual workers' earnings. This series
has the advantage that historical comparisons can be made back into the 1950s.
Also October is a month very close to what has been, at least since 1974, the
effective start of the pay round. A public sector series is generated by
weighting the public sector industry pay figures by the employment levels
pertaining in 1979. A similar series has been calculated elsewhere, but it
5
covered a shorter period and omitted air transport. The series used here 
overcomes those shortcomings. Where there were no data for certain early 
years for London Transport (LTE), BRB, the NHS and air transport, it was 
assumed that increases were the same as in comparable industries. When the 
SIC codes changed, the data were spliced as sensitively as possible to make 
them compatible with the 1968 SIC.
The broader NES is used as a cross-check since the October inquiry 
suffers from a focus on manual workers and miscategorises certain public 
service employees, as mentioned earlier. The raw April figures are used in 
the absence of the settlement details required to correct them to a July 
basis. Of course, the NES is not perfect given its April timing and short 
life, but nevertheless it affords a rough-and-ready, secondary, basis for 
comparisons of recent policy episodes. As before, adult male earnings are 
used in order to exclude the effects of movements towards equal pay for 
women which were exempted from policies in the first half of the 1970s, and 
to capture the underlying rates of increase negotiated under the policies.
These data are used in preference to the average earnings index because, 
prior to 1976, public administration and education and health workers were 
excluded from its coverage. The wage rates index is not adopted due to its
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exclusion of non-manual workers and its focus on wage entitlements or 
minima, rather than earnings.
Given these data, the procedure adopted is to attempt to isolate 
policy-on and policy-off periods as best can be done. Due to the timing of 
the series this is not always as precise as would be desirable. For example, 
Stage 3 began to collapse in the Spring of 1974, but the choice of the policy- 
off period when using October data is October 1973 to 1975, covering the whole 
of Stage 3 and the Social Contract Mk. I. It should also be noted that since 
the series record increases at the point of actual implementation rather than 
the date from which the increases were effective, periods that 
might be supposed to be policy-on phases are sometimes more properly 
categorised as policy-off because they contain late catch-up increases: CL1 
is a good example. Having grouped the policy phases into broad strategies, 
the three statistics are calculated for each strategy. The changes in pay 
increases during the strategies on all three dimensions appear in Tables 
5.7 and 5.8.
2.3 Results
Gratifyingly for policymakers and administrators, the overall change 
under every policy-on strategy except the Guiding Light phase in 1962-64 was 
downward on average, according to the October manual workers survey. The de- 
escalation under the cash limits strategy was relatively large. As the first 
column of figures shows, earnings increases were only a third of the previous 
policy-off phase on average. Only Phases 1 to 4 of 1975-79 and the 1961-62 
Pay Pause saw remotely similar de-escalations.
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Pol icy 
0n/0tf
Policy October
Dates
Used
%
Average
De-escalations
Kaximum
Annual
Maximum
Continuous
Off - 1950-55 N.A. N.A. N.A.
On Price Freeze 1955-56 -25.8 -25.8 -25.8
Off - 1956-61 -21.4 -48.8 -73.1
On Pay Pause 1961-62 -42.7 -55.5 -55.5
On Guiding Light 1962-64 +110.8 + 3.7 + 3.7
On NBPI Policy 1964-69 - 4.0 -43.2 -43.2
Off - 1969-70 +115.5 +115.5 +115.5
On (N-l) 1970-72 - 0.8 - 15.5 - 15.5
On Stages 1 to 2 1972-73 - 3.0 + 13.0 + 13.0
Off Stage 3 and 
Soc. Con. Mk. I 1973-75 +108.5 + 3.4 + 3.4
On Phases 1 to 4 1975-79 - 48.4 - 57.3 - 71.2
Off CL1 1979-80 + 56.4 + 56.4 + 56.4
On CL2 to 4 1980-83 - 63.7 - 56.3 - 73.7
Table 5..7: Changes in earnings increases of public sector manual 
under pay restraint strategies 1950-83
workers
Note: Negative numbers denote de-escalations of earnings increases.
Source: Derived as explained in the text from adjusted October Earnings 
and Hours Enquiry, Employment Gazette, Dept, of Employment, HMSO, various 
issues.
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Policy Pol icy April % De-escalations
On/Off Dates Average Maximum Maximum
Used Annual Continuous
On (N — 1) 1970-72 N.A. +15.1 +15.1
On Stages 1 to 3 1972-74 +10.2 -10.1 -10.1
Off Social Contract 
Mk 1 1974-75 +123.0 +112.3 +112.3
On Phases 1 to 4 1975-79 -55.7 -60.4 -77.1
Off CL1 1979-80 +78.6 +78.6 +78.6
On CL2 to 4 1980-83 -54.2 -44.3 -68.3
Table 5,.8: Changes in earnings increases of adult male manual and non-
manual public sector 
1970-83
workers under pay restraint strategies
Note: Negative numbers denote de -escalations of earnings increases.
Source: Derived from New Earnings Survey, Dept. of Employment, HMS0,
various issues.
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•  *
While the precise figures are more unreliable due to the mismatch of the 
timing of surveys and policies, the NES results convey the message that the 
reduction in pay during the cash limits strategy was approximately as great 
as in Phases 1 to 4. Since some SCPC awards were paid in CL2, the cash 
limits era probably saw greater reductions, as the October data indicate.
The financial pay restraint strategy also appears to have been in force 
during one of the most significant single-year reductions in wage inflation. 
According to the October figures, earnings increases were slightly more than 
halved during the CL2 policy. This was of the same order as Phase 1 (1975-76) 
and the Pay Pause, and slightly greater than in the late 1950s and in 1965-66 
during the NBPI strategy. The NES figures actually rate the changes under the 
Labour Government's incomes policy as more significant than under cash limits, 
but, as mentioned above, the NES understates the diminution in CL2. In any 
case, both strategies saw creditable reductions in pay inflation by McCarthy's 
criterion.
Powerful sustained changes in bargaining behaviour were also 
experienced under the cash limits strategy, involving a fall in increases 
of nearly three-quarters over successive years. Only Phases 1 to 4 and the 
late 1950s saw comparable changes: the October series shows almost exactly 
the same reductions in earnings increases, while the NES, understating the 
cash limits changes, shows the Labour Government's strategy saw a slightly 
greater reduction. Interestingly, prior to Phases 1 to 4, no active policy 
was accompanied by a sustained dampening of pay increases beyond one year. 
Further NES calculations showed that, at a sectoral level, public services 
saw de-escalation in terms of all three criteria that was as strong as 
under Phases 1 to 4, but that the public corporations exhibited smaller 
reductions than previously. However, as in Section
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1.1.2, this may just reflect the spreading out of the public corporation 
catch-up increases over both Phase 4 and CL1.
In sum, the cash limits strategy appears to have accompanied one of 
the most significant de-escalations of pay increases in the public sector 
since the Second World War in overall, single-year, and sustained terms.
Only the Labour Government's strategy in the late 1970s consistently rival­
led it on each dimension. Whether the financial pay restraint strategy was 
actually a significant cause of the de-escalation cannot be determined from 
the data presented here: this question is the concern of the next section.
3. The Counter-Inflationary Effect of the Financial Pay Restraint Strategy
As the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 makes plain, pay increases 
are determined by a variety of influences. Pay restraint policy is but one 
factor. It may be, therefore, that the de-escalation identified under the 
cash limits strategy was caused by the background economic, political and 
institutional conditions rather than cash limit pay factors. Consequently, 
this section seeks to assess the independent significance of the cash 
limits pay restraint strategy, holding other causal variables constant, 
insofar as the data and techniques allow.
The assessment of the impact of pay restraint strategies on public sector
pay is relatively uncharted territory. While many studies have compared
movements in wages with counterfactuals, (that is, what would otherwise
have occurred in the absence of pay restraint policy), they have tended to
be at the level of the economy in aggregate, the private sector or
manufacturing industry. Only Elliott and Fa 1 lick have specifically
considered the public sector, but they did not cover the late 1970s or the 
6
early 1980s. In view of this, it is necessary to carry out a further 
investigation.
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3.1 The general approach
Qualitative and quantitative investigations are possible. The 
qualitative approach involves estimating the counterfactual in a very 
general way on the basis of impressions of salient factors. For example, 
Blackaby has used this technique, contrasting pay increases in the NBPI 
period of incomes policy with the potential increases resulting from 
increases in direct taxation and the effects of devaluation, while Stage 1 
and 2 rises (1972-73) were set against the implications for bargaining of
output growth, falling unemployment, and rising import prices.
The quantitative approach involves econometric estimations of the 
deviations from what would otherwise have happened in the wage bargaining 
area. Two alternative methods can be used. First, the 'policy- 
off' approach involves the estimation of a policy-off wage equation from 
time series observations of wage increases and appropriate independent 
variables when pay restraint is not in force. The equation is then used to 
estimate the increases that would have been expected in each policy-on 
period had a policy not been in force. Subtracting the estimated figure 
from that observed produces the effect of policy in the period. For 
example, Jefferson et. al., used this method to examine the effectiveness
of UK postwar incomes policy up to 1967, as did Perry for the U.S.
An embellishment of this approach is to estimate an additional and 
separate policy-on equation, and to use an F-test to compare the 
intercepts and slope coefficients in the two equations in order to judge 
whether there are significant differences. For example, Lipsey and Parkin 
investigated whether incomes policy altered the coefficients and intercept 
of the U.K. wage equation over the period 1948-67, as did Thomas and Stoney
7
8
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for 1950-66, and Taylor for 1955-67.
The second alternative method is the dummy variable approach. A wage
equation is specified for the whole period including, as independent
variables, the usual collective bargaining variables, supplemented with
dummy variables for each policy. The dummies can be simple intercept
dummies which are assumed to shift pay by the same amount at all
combinations of the other independent variables: in other words, it is
assumed that there is a parallel shift in the wage equation. The postwar
studies of Bodkin et. al., Brechling, the NBPI, Smith, as well as Elliott
10
and Fallick used such dummies. More sophisticated dummies can be
included. Slope dummies allow for shifts in the relationship between
independent variables and pay increases during a policy. The economy-level
11
work of Godfrey and Burrows and Hitris have taken this tack. Also
dummies of different intensities can be included to capture whether
12
policies are 'hard' or 'soft'. Whatever the type of dummies included, if 
the associated coefficients are negative, then the policies have been 
effective. The magnitude of the coefficients indicate the degree of 
effectiveness.
This investigation employs dummy variables on the grounds that the 
other methods are relatively more problematic. The impressionistic 
technique is not sufficiently rigorous. There is a danger that the 
judgment of the otherwise existing wage inflation rates would rely on ad 
hoc factors and imprecise estimations of their relative weight.
The quantitative approach, in comparison, is more rigorous. Yet the 
'policy-off' approach has major flaws, at least in the context of UK 
public sector pay determination. Very few policy-off years have occurred 
since 1961. Thus a policy-off wage equation would be based mainly on the
9
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behavioural parameters of the 1950s. It is questionable whether the 
derived estimates of what would otherwise have happened in later decades 
would be realistic. It has been argued, for example, that there was a 
structural shift in behaviour in the mid-1950s due to rising expectations 
and changes in bargaining institutions, and that wage equations should take 
account of this. Labour market institutions have also changed in 
many ways that might have impinged on wage behaviour: for instance, 
redundancy payments have increased, legal safeguards over employment have 
been improved, and the fixed costs of employment have risen, all weakening 
the propensity of the employer to fire workers. Furthermore, policy-off 
periods may not be independent of incomes policy effects, for catch-up 
increases may be paid, further biasing any policy-off estimates.
Nor is the dual equation approach without problems. Apart from 
excluding some catch-up increases, the policy-on equation effectively 
generalises about behaviour under all policies, hard and soft. This tends 
to reduce the significance of the effect of policy. It is more informative 
to use a method that distinguishes the impact of each strategy.
In comparison, the dummy variable method is advantageous because it 
does not rely on such an unreliable policy-off equation; behaviour may have 
changed in the postwar period, but at least the estimation of the wage 
equation attempts to generalise for the period as a whole rather than a 
distant, historical, phase of it. In addition, the use of multiple 
intercept dummies permits the isolation of the effect of each individual 
policy, rather than the general impact assessed by contrasting policy-on 
and policy-off equations. Regretably, however, the number of observations 
in the time series data set precludes using slope and catch-up dummies as 
wel 1.
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Of course, the econometric approach advocated here is not perfect. As
Robinson and Mayhew point out, first, dummy variables are blunt
instruments for capturing complex and adaptive interactions between
13
political and economic forces. While this is true, the objective is 
simply to gain an impression of the significance of the counter- 
inflationary effect of the cash limits strategy. The complexities behind 
the statistics are to be analysed in the following chapters. A second 
criticism put forward is the uncertainty regarding the correct form of the 
wage equation. To this may be added the problems of operationalising it. 
This is acknowledged. All that is claimed is that it is the best that can 
be done given the theoretical framework, the data that are available, and 
econometric techniques.
3.2 The specification of the wage equation and the data used
Ideally, a number of different wage equations should be specified in 
order to provide the fullest possible picture of the counter-inflationary 
effect of the cash limits strategy. In particular, equations should be 
specified at an aggregate public sector level and also at subsectoral 
levels, in case the results vary by sector. The independent variables 
should be drawn from the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2, 
operationalised with the appropriate lag structures.
3.2.1 The dependent variable
In order to generate a wage equation with statistically significant 
independent variables, a long period of continuous data covering the public 
sector is required. This leads to the use of the Earnings and Hours series 
once more. April and October data are available up to 1970 and NES 
figures are used to interpolate between the annual October surveys from
1970 onwards. The detailed MLH data facilitate aggregate public sector and
subsectoral analyses. In contrast, the NES, independently, is too short,
while the pre-1976 average earnings index excludes much of the public
sector. The basic wage rates index is longer but it distinguishes only
broad SICs which are difficult to aggregate into a public sector index.
The minor shortcomings of using the Earnings and Hours Survey relate to its
coverage. As indicated earlier in this chapter, it focuses on manual
workers; police and fire employees are excluded from the survey; and
certain public service industrial employees, and a few public corporations,
are inextricably included in private sector SICs.
The specification of the dependent variable is determined by the need
to identify increases during pay restraint periods as precisely as
possible: six-monthly rates of change are most appropriate. Due to this,
the practice adopted in some studies of using overlapping annual changes to
14
reduce noise in the equation is rejected here.
3.2.2 The independent variables
While the theoretical framework posits a multitude of potentially
significant pay determination factors, they tend to be difficult to
operationalise. First, it would be appropriate to proxy the economic and
political environment because of the financial constraints it generates.
However, the available variables for which data exist are of doubtful
theoretical validity. Public expenditure growth would not be a good
indicator because until 1976 it was determined simultaneously with pay
rises, rather than being cash-limited before pay negotiations took place.
Any correlation might therefore be misleading. In certain other studies,
15
political party dummy variables have been included, but there is really 
no solid a priori foundation for such an approach in this instance: Labour
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Second, problems are also encountered in relation to the institutional
and organisational context. No time series data exist on managerial and
union organisation, bargaining structure, and pay determination procedures.
One factor which is sorely missed is a so-called 'bargaining intensity
index' which would account for the proportions of the public sector
settling between observations, and hence for the timing of implementation 
16
dates. Unfortunately, unlike the wage rate index, the Earnings and Hours 
index does not detail the number of workers settling in each period. A 
seasonal dummy for one of the half-years between surveys would not 
adequately capture the variations, for agreements before the 1970s were 
commonly two years in length, in contrast to the one-year agreements of 
later years.
As a result, the selected independent variables, described below, 
emphasise bargaining strategies, especially the criteria used to justify 
offers and claims, and the relative power of the parties. It will be 
recalled that the main criteria adopted are real income growth, 
comparability, and the state of the labour market, while power depends on 
economic, strategic and political factors.
It is helpful to decompose real wage objectives into the maintenance 
and growth of real incomes. To capture real wage resistance, the change in 
the retail price index over the most recent period is used. Negotiators 
refer to this index more than any other price indicator. The recent change 
rather than a lagged value or a more complicated distributed lag function 
is employed because fieldwork showed that bargainers were quick to update 
their arguments in the event of a change in the index. This does not cause
Governments were frequently as anxious to reduce inflation as Conservative
Governments.
problems of simultaneity between price and wage increases, however, because
the ramifications of public sector pay for economy-wide prices are somewhat
delayed and indirect. In any case, it has been found elsewhere that even
when prices are modelled in a separate equation and two-stage least squares
17
is used, the results are much the same as with a single wage equation.
Real wage growth aims are indicated by the constant term and a time
trend representing increasing expectations. Further embellishments, such
as changes in direct taxes, and shortfalls of pay from desired levels, are
not included. Suitable tax data are not available. Real wage targets,
proxied in the past by economic growth rates or ad hoc figures, would be 
18
too arbitrary. While a time trend may also be regarded as arbitrary, it 
has a more sound theoretical basis than currently exists for the 
alternatives.
It is difficult to specify the increases gained by the key comparators 
of each public sector group over the 34 years under study. Consequently, 
the changes in private sector pay in aggregate are favoured instead.
However, the series is highly correlated with price increases, so it is 
omitted from the analysis to prevent multicol1inearity.
The conditions in the labor market are proxied by the level of, and 
changes in, the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate may be 
influential because it indicates to workers how difficult it is to find a 
new job should the pay claim result in displacement. The change in the 
rate may serve to guide workers as to the probability of being displaced: 
if the rate is rising fast, they may feel more at risk. Another 
possibility is that in these conditions price expectations fall more 
rapidly, and employers, seeing more net displacement, are not prepared to 
bid for labour as competitively. Finally, unemployment is an indicator of
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the extra demands made on current employees, and hence on overtime and
other pay supplements. Of course, the reliability of unemployment as a
labour market indicator is less than perfect due to variations in labour
hoarding and discouraged worker behaviour. One author has proposed using
an 'unemployment plus hoarding' rate, but data for the whole period are 
19
unavailable.
The measurement of the unemployment variables is in terms of the ratio 
of unemployment to employment in each industry, aggregated as appropriate. 
The data are gathered from the Employees in Employment series, taking the 
months nearest April and October, and splicing in various years when the 
basis of the series changed. Where the coverage of the unemployment 
figures does not match that of the pay series, the unemployment rate of a 
comparable group is used: for instance, London Transport and British Rail 
were assumed to have unemployment rates of the magnitude of the Railways 
Minimum List Heading. Throughout, no lags are included in view of the 
apparent awareness of negotiators of current unemployment.
Regarding power and militancy, the specification is based on a belief 
that, broadly, union power and militancy increased during the period, 
concurrently with real wage expectations, albeit with variations according 
to economic conditions. Hence the constant, time trend and unemployment 
variables are assumed to proxy power as well as real wage growth and labour 
market bargaining criteria.
While this makes the interpretation of the independent variables
ambiguous, the alternative proxies are too deficient to use. One category
encompasses global measures of relative power, such as pushfulness indexes
and strike statistics. For example, the Dow and Dicks-Mireaux five-point
20
subjective rating of union pushfulness is both very imprecise and
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difficult to develop 35 years in retrospect, distinguishing April from
October each year. Meantime, strike statistics suffer from the conceptual
problem that they represent employer resistance as much as union militancy.
They may not therefore exemplify relative power very well: a positive
coefficient may mean management is stronger sometimes, at others that the
unions are. Further, they do not capture, nor is there any guarantee that
they correlate with, all forms of the exercise of power.
Proxies for particular sources of power are problematic for
theoretical reasons, too. Strategic power might be represented by the
level of, or change in, union density. However, workers do not necessarily
join unions because they are militant and are prepared to take action: as
the union growth literature stresses, government action and employer
21
attitudes can be significant catalysts. Political power could be proxied 
by whether the governing party is Labour or Conservative, but there is no 
necessary reason why Labour Governments should have been more acquiescent, 
given the history of pragmatism under most Conservative administrations.
In sum, public sector manual workers' earnings are regressed on a 
constant, a time trend, price increases, the level and rate of change of 
unemployment, together with twelve pay restraint policy dummies.
Corrections are made for first-order serial correlation.
3.3 Results
The regression results in Table 5.9 show that the equations are 
reasonably well specified. The degree of fit is fairly good, although the 
adjusted coefficient of determination deteriorates as the focus becomes 
more disaggregated. Each variable, other than policy dummies, is 
significant in one case or another. The price change variable, proxying
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comparability and real wage protection arguments, is very significant in 
most cases. Real wage growth arguments and/or union power reflected in the 
constant and the trend are significant in the corporations and services 
respectively. Labour market arguments and/or economic power are apparently 
significant: the change in unemployment is appropriately negative and 
significant in each case. Although the unemployment level variable 
generally has an incorrect sign, it is usually insignificant and outweighed 
by the effect of the other unemployment variable.
The results appear realistic when considered sector by sector. In the
public services, the significance of the price and trend variables fits
with the common conception of a concern with comparability and
22
(accelerating) real wage growth, and rising militancy. The significance 
of unemployment indicates that these non-market criteria are mediated 
somewhat by the market, through either or both labour supply and demand 
arguments and economic power.
In the public corporations, the importance of real wage growth and 
comparability is seen once more in the price variable, but again in line 
with appearances, the arguments seem less potent and significant compared 
to the public services. The labour market, meantime, has a stronger 
effect, as might be expected in the trading sector. At the same time, the 
size and significance of the constant suggest a measure of union power not 
seen in the public services.
Given the apparent validity of the collective bargaining variables, it 
seems reasonable to give at least some credence to the findings regarding 
the effect of the pay restraint strategies, subject to the caveat cited 
earlier concerning the appropriateness of intercept dummies, and the 
likelihood that their significance may be understated due to the large
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number of independent variables relative to the number of observations.
The results for the cash limits era broadly confirm the earlier 
impressions gained from the data on increases. Holding collective 
bargaining variables constant, the public sector as a whole saw a year of 
catch-up increases (recorded here as occurring in CL1), followed by three 
years of policy which reduced earnings each year below what they would have 
been by magnitudes of six to eight percentage points, significant at the 90 
per cent level.
At a subsectoral level, the public services experienced a small catch­
up under CL1, but thereafter saw sizeable restrictions in pay increases. 
Although the policy effects were not significant at predetermined 
thresholds, they should not be written off in view of the lack of degrees 
of freedom. Also, independent of the pay factors, it is likely that the 
expenditure cuts built into the cash limits increased unemployment and 
hence reduced wage inflation.
The public corporations benefitted more through CL1 than did the 
public services, other things equal, but the strategy bit in later years, 
significantly in CL3 and CL4. The magnitude of the restraint was less than 
in the public service subsector, however.
285
I
Independent Variable Public Sector Public Services Public Corporation
Constant 0.87 0.68 2.76**
(0.77) (0.36) (3.54)
Time trend 0.01 0.06* -0.05
(0.25) (1.34) (0.99)
% Unemployment/ 1.21 0.26 1.37**
Employment (1.14) (0.17) (1.80)
% Change in Unemployment/ -0.10** -0.07** -0.11**
Employment (4.09) (2.48) (4.73)
% Change in Retail Prices 0.59** 0.77** 0.26**
(4.55) (4.59) (1.88)
1950 Wage Policy -0.83 -0.73 -1.13
(0.38) (0.28) (0.47)
1956-57 Price Freeze 0.79 0.40 0.78
(0.73) (0.31) (0.70)
1961-64 Pay Pause and -0.78 -1.18 -0.32
Guiding Light (0.87) (1.12) (0.32)
1965-70 N3P1 Policy -0.23 -1.31 0.73
(0.22) (1.03) (0.64)
1970-72 (N—1) 0.40 -0.72 1.77
(0.25) (0.38) (1.03)
1972-74 Stages 1 to 3 -0.46 -1.27 0.80
(0.26) (0.61) (0.43)
1974-75 Social Contract 4.94** 2.77 8.41*
Mk. I (2.26) (1.00) (3.68)
1975-79 Phases 1-4 -3.03 -3.76 -0.10
(1.24) (1.05) (0.05)
1979-80 CL1 1.78 2.08 4.35*
(0.55) (0.43) (1.59)
1980-81 CL2 -5.95* -6.51 -1.63
(1.41) (1.08) (0.49)
1981-82 CL3 -7.27* -4.92 -5.74*
(1.31) (0.64) (1.30)
1982-83 CL4 -7.94* -4.39 -7.65*
(1.33) (0.55) (1.58)
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0.78 0.73 0.73
2 
R
DW 2.19 2.25 2.01
N 67 67 67
Table 5.9: 
Notes: 1.
Regression results of public sector manual workers' 
earnings, Apri I ancTUcTober l~§~5'0'-'8'3
t-statistics are in parentheses:
** significant at 95% level: 1-tailed test
* significant at 90% level: 1-tailed test
Regressions are corrected for first-order serial correlation 
by using AR1 procedure
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In contrast to previous strategies, the cash limits strategy performed
remarkably well. The only other period to see negative effects that
approached significance in the public sector in aggregate was the Labour
23
Government's Phases 1 to 4. However, the net effect was relatively 
small. At a disaggregated level, near-significant restraint was also 
imposed in the public services during the 1961-62 Pay Pause and 1962-64 
Guiding Light and in the NBPI era of the late 1960s, but again it was 
minor. The public corporations, prior to the financial pay restraint 
policy, had shown little evidence of being restrained by government pay 
strategies: no period saw a remotely significant negative effect, and only 
the 1950 policy reduced pay increases by more than one percentage point.
The cash limits era was therefore distinctive.
4. Summary
The first two sections of this chapter demonstrate that the cash 
limits strategy was accompanied by a de-escalation in pay increases of a 
magnitude unmatched by previous policies apart from Phases 1 to 4. The 
third section shows that the cash limits strategy appears to have 
significantly contributed to that fall, and to a much greater extent than 
previous strategies.
Public service workers suffered greater reductions in increases than 
public corporations employees during, and due to, the cash limits policy. 
Nevertheless, the size and significance of the impact of the strategy in 
the corporation sector represented a much more striking break from past 
performance than did the effect of cash limits in the public services, 
which had been prone to suffer the brunt of conventional incomes policy. 
Having constructed a picture of the impact of the cash limits pay
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restraint strategy, the task is now to explain why it was successful 
overall, and why it had a differential impact across the public sector. 
Chapter 6 considers the role of the economic-political environment, before 
the institutional and organisational environment and pay determination 
strategies are analysed in Chapters 7 and 8.
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Since the cash limits pay restraint policy was levelled at 
authorities' finances, inevitably the search for the explanation of the de- 
escalation of wage inflation must start with tne financial context of 
public sector pay determination and therefore also with the economic- 
political environment. However, it does not end there. As the policy did 
not precisely fix or limit pay rises, in contrast to conventional incomes 
policy, the institutional context of pay determination together with 
negotiators' strategies, were also potentially influential forces. As a 
result, chapters 6 to 8 not only point to salient features of the economic- 
political context, but also to the institutional environment and bargaining 
strategies that caused the overall diminution of wage inflation and 
different effects sector by sector.
This chapter explores the impact of the cash limits pay restraint 
policy on public sector authorities' finances. It is important to 
recognise once more that the effect of the policy can only be seen in 
conjunction with the features of the context in which it applied: it did 
not operate in a vacuum. The scope for pay increases was not simply a 
reflection of the design of the policy, although the pay factors and 
exceptions were certainly important; also relevant were other accounting 
factors. The size of total budgets was in addition determined by the price 
planning factor, planned real expenditure growth (and subsequent 
revisions), overspending and underspending, and the availability of 
supplementary finance. The possibility of reallocating funds between 
expenditure heads was affected by the planned real growth of non-pay 
expenditure, and the ratio of labour to total costs. Similarly, the 
explanations of the financial constraints recognise that the cash limits 
policy was influential in conjunction with the wider economic-political
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environment in which authorities made decisions.
The framework of the chapter is organised by sector. For each part of 
the public sector, the financial constraints are outlined and then 
explained in terms of the broad economic-political market environment. In 
the final section the findings are collated and related to the trend in, 
and pattern of, increases in pay.
1. Central Government
1.1 The financial context
Under the Conservative Government the financial constraints on central 
government authorities were tightened from their comparatively loose state 
under Labour’s Phase 4 when the financial year (FY) 1979-80 expenditure 
plans accommodated a large part of the special case settlements. The 
stringency of the financial constraints was of a high degree relative to 
other subsectors. Responsible for this were the cash limits policy design 
and the other accounting influences on the magnitude and division of 
budgets.
1.1.1 Government finance
The general pay rule of the cash limits policy, in the form of pay 
planning factors, led to slower budget growth in nominal terms. The pay 
factors were steadily reduced, as stated in Chapter 4, from 14 per cent in 
the 1979-80 pay round, to 6 per cent, 4 per cent, and 3.5 per cent in the 
next three years. No longer were pay rises accommodated. Instead, they 
were constrained, the pay factors being set below the rate of price 
inflation.
The general pay rule constraints were reinforced by the rarity of
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exceptions to the pay factors. While the Government took over the 
commitments of the Labour Government to honour the awards of the Standing 
Commission on Pay Comparability (SCPC) to university manual workers, made 
election promises to respect other increases subject to offsetting 
economies, and promised to fund the Phase 4 awards of the armed forces and
1
the civil service, thereafter the Government was much more discriminating.
Central government cash limits were only revised upwards to accommodate pay
2
increases for the armed forces in the 1979-80 and 1980-81 pay rounds,
health service workers in the 1981-82 round, and for clinical academic
3
staff in universities in 1981-82 and 1982-83. Even then, the cash limits
were not always raised sufficiently to meet the costs of the higher pay
increases. For example, the NHS settlements in 1981-82 were explicitly
under-financed. Health authorities were told that they would have to find
one-third of the cost of the initial pay offers above the 4 per cent pay
4
factor; in fact, their contribution to the final offer was greater.
At the same time, but distinct from the pay policy, budgets were under
pressure from other sources. First, the price planning factors underlying
the cash allocations for non-pay expenditure were also set to instil a
sense of financial discipline. In FY 1979-80, the 8.5 per cent assumption
of the Labour Government was retained by the incoming Administration, in
5
spite of rising inflation. The following year saw a cost factor for both
wages and prices of 14 per cent in central government, based on predictions
of the mid-year inflation rate (between 1979 IV and 1980 IV) at the time
the Estimates were drawn up. However, by the start of the financial year,
6
the Chancellor admitted that there had been underprovision. In FY 1981-82 
the price factor was set at 11 per cent, a more realistic figure, though 
still constraining. A 9 per cent factor followed the next year.
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Thereafter, no specific price factors were stated because plans were made 
in cash terms, with no breakdown into volume and inflation components. The 
severity of the assumptions was ensured by a reluctance on the part of the 
Government to sanction revisions of cash limits due to underprovision for 
price increases.
The stringency of the cash limits assumptions for both pay and prices
has been estimated very approximately by the Treasury by comparing the
inflation factors with weighted price and wage indices for all cash-limited 
7
spending. The percentage squeeze implied by the comparison appears in the 
second column of Table 6.1. Clearly, authorities were under pressure 
throughout, but especially in FY 1979-80.
Second, the provision for the reel growth of central government 
current expenditure on goods and services was reduced below the plans of 
the Labour Government. It is true that planned growth was of the order of 
two per cent each financial year up to FY 1981-82 (after which cash 
planning replaced volume planning), mainly the result of increases in 
defence and health spending. But this overstates the real growth of 
budgets containing pay in some authorities at certain times; much of the 
growth occurred in non-pay budgets. When separated by the cash block 
structure or budgetary procedures, budgets including pay frequently grew 
more slowly or even declined in real terms. Also, budget holders could not 
count on benefitting from revisions to cash limits. As Table 6.1 shows, in 
central government votes there were actually net deductions in two years. 
Generally speaking, the cash limits were only varied within a margin of 
plus or minus one per cent or so. Approximately half the relatively large 
upward revision in FY 1979-80 was due to SCPC awards, rather than volume 
expansion.
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FY Price
factor
% squeeze Net revisions 
to cash limits(%)
Total of cash 
limit over- 
spending(%)
Total over- 
spending and 
under- 
spending(%)
1979-80 8.5 4 + 2.9 0.2 - 0.7
1980-81 14 2 - 0.1 0.2 - 1.1
1981-82 11 1 + 1.3 0 - 1.8
1982-83 9 n.a. ♦ 1.0 negligibl e - 2.1
1983-84 n.a. n.a. - 0.9 0 - 1.6
Table 6.1: The impact of cash limits on central government expenditure 
blocks. FY 1979-80 to FY 1983-84 
Note: % squeeze relates to all cash-limited expenditure.
Sources: Calculated from various Cash Limits White Papers; and
Treasury Memorandum,'The Operation of Cash Limits' in 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Budgetary 
Reform, Session 1981-82, 6th Report, Appendix 2.
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The most significant example of the real cuts was in the civil
service. The Government decided to reduce the size of the civil service
8
from 732,300 in April 1979 to 630,000 by April 1984. In October 1983,
soon after the bargaining rounds under study, it was already down to
636,300, a fall of 14 per cent, involving a saving on the pay bill of over 
9
£0.75 billion. Since the relevant cash blocks in the civil service
generally contained only pay and general administrative expenditure, their
real growth was severely limited. Elsewhere, towards the end of the
period, NHS employment growth was halted. In FY 1983-84, health
authorities were required to settle manpower targets which would reduce
10
employment by 0.5 per cent. Relatively speaking, the growth implications 
were less pronounced because of the size and timing of the cuts, and the 
greater freedom of budgetary manoeuvre under the broad cash block 
structure.
Third, overspending was extremely rare. It amounted to little in 
global terms, as the penultimate and final columns in the table indicate. 
The tendency was to underspend. Although relatively large pay rises could 
technically have been financed in part by lower underspending - and this 
may have occurred in FY 1979-80 and FY 1980-81 - the amounts of extra 
finance involved were fractional.
1.1.2 Allocation of the budget
The position was not relaxed by the prospects for reallocating finance 
between expenditure heads in favour of pay. Not only was non-pay 
expenditure constrained by the inadequacy of the price inflation factor 
mentioned above, but also by the Government requiring efficiency savings to 
be made, which meant that there was little 'fat' for redistribution towards
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pay. To this end, in the civil service there were a large number of
scrutinies and reviews under Lord Rayner which produced significant
savings. In FY 1979-81 alone, there were 108 departmental scrutinies of
activities and 3 major interdepartmental reviews, resulting in savings of
£180 m. per annum, and £29 m. once and for all. In 1982, there were savings
of £60 m, following 27 scrutinies and 3 reviews. Another 30 scrutinies and
11
4 reviews were begun in 1983. In the NHS, in FY 1979-80 and FY 1980-81,
the cash limits were set on the implicit assumption that economies would be
12
made, although the extent was not stated. However, in FY 1981-82 an
explicit efficiency target of 0.4 per cent was set, against which full-year
savings of 0.3 per cent were achieved, and in FY 1982-83 a target of 0.5
per cent was established, and Rayner scrutinies were introduced. The
following year no precise target was mentioned, but authorities were
13
expected to plan and implement substantial cost improvements.
Finally, the high ratio of labour to total costs characteristic of 
most central government authorities and cash blocks made any expenditure- 
substitution very marginal. This was especially true in the civil service 
blocks where pay was 85 per cent of the blocks containing pay and general 
administrative expenditure. In other authorities, such as the NHS, it was 
still approximately 70 per cent of current expenditure.
1.1.3 Summary
Overall, the financial constraints implied tightly controlled pay 
budgets, especially in the civil service, and only to a slightly lesser 
extent in the NHS and armed forces. The intended implications of the 
restrictive pay assumptions were largely realised. Real growth money, 
overspending, and reduced underspending, had to be set against the 
stringency of the price planning factors and the lack of significant
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virement opportunities.
1.2 Tne political market environment
The restrictive financial climate - both the cash limits policy 
effects and its financial setting - can be attributed to the political 
market context of 1979-83. While many of the structural features of the 
mid-1979 market outlined in chapter 3 endured the first term of office of 
the Conservative Government, others changed, together with governmental 
attitudes, resulting in greater constraints on public expenditure than 
previously seen.
1.2.1 The political market structure
Significant changes occurred in both the expenditure planning and 
control processes, tending to strengthen the hand of the Cabinet. This was 
partly because the parties involved in decision-making changed, and partly, 
because the rules governing the behaviour of Government, authorities and 
others in the political market for public expenditure were revised.
The planning of public expenditure
Arguably the most important change in the planning process was the 
exclusion of the TUC from any meaningful consultation. The TUC had been 
influential in the framing of the revised Phase 4 policy and the associated 
cash limits under the Labour Government, but, in line with the new approach 
to pay restraint policy, there was no role for the unions thereafter.
Soon after the Conservatives came to power, they started the 1979 
survey in preparation for the 1980-81 White Paper, but there were no talks 
between Treasury Ministers and TUC Economic Committee along the lines 
agreed with the Labour Administration concerning broad priorities of 
programmes, the quality of services, and the economic assessment
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underpinning the plans. The TUC pushed for greater involvement in the
PESC exercise, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not amenable to the 
15
idea. To be sure, TUC committee representatives saw the Prime Minister
and other ministers in 1979, but that was to respond to the budget rather 
16
than to shape it. The TUC also continued to participate in the
tripartite National Economic Development Council (NEDC), but were
sceptical of the influence it had over Government thinking. They believed
that the Government's aim was to use the occasion to give the impression
that the parties to the Council were in agreement with their basic 
17
policy. The TUC summarised their position in the political market in the 
following way:
the central feature of this Government's approach to economic 
management was the exclusion of the trade union movement from any 
positive rule. A comprehensive and coherent alternative policy 
had been set out by the TUC but the Government had not deigned to 
discuss it, let alone to take any of the TUC's views into 
account.18
The TUC was effectively reduced to a peripheral role involving various
forms of public protest, particularly through the Campaign for Economic and
Social Advance (CESA) which was launched in the summer of 1979. The notion
was to alert the public to the implications of the Government's economic
19
policies, and to mobilise support for a reversal of those policies. 
Initially, an information campaign was pursued through 'Cuts Checklists' 
publications. 1980 saw public demonstrations such as the 'Day of Action' 
in May and a Labour Party-sponsored national march and demonstration in 
Liverpool in November. The focus was unemployment in 1981; there was a 
week of activities, including marches, rallies and a conference, in April, 
and the following month the 'People's March for Jobs' occurred.
This did not apparently increase the political market power of the 
TUC, however. Support for these activities was widely seen as very
14
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partial. Even the TUC owned up to organisational deficiencies, at least in 
20
internal documents. It recognised that it had failed to catch the
imagination of the activists, let alone others. The GMWU and COHSE
criticised the amount of preparation and consultation with unions before
the Day of Action. While the UCW and NUT argued that education of the
membership was of paramount importance, the publicity material was
difficult to read, and its distribution within unions, except NALGO, was
badly organised. The GMWU also felt there had been strategic mistakes in,
for example, issuing a general call for vague action, rather than
concentrating on those likely to come out. As the CESA proceeded, the
21
constraint of scarce union resources tended to crop up more. Much more
generally, the unions were in a difficult position because the
Conservatives' policies were divisive - some people fared well while others
were unemployed, for example - so that support for TUC action was 
22
inevitably uneven.
Without the need to consult the unions, the Government was in a strong 
position to determine public expenditure. It further strengthened its 
ability to restrict spending through four innovative rules in the planning 
process.
First, the so-called 'Star Chamber' was added to the planning
23
procedure in order to attempt to preserve pre-set planning totals. The 
Star Chamber was a Cabinet committee established in 1981 under the 
chairmanship of Mr. William Whitelaw with the brief to conciliate 
differences not settled in the bilateral negotiations between the Treasury 
and spending departments, in such a way that the outcomes would be perceived 
as fair by the parties, yet not breach the planning total.
The new procedure appeared to have some effect on the number of
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unresolved issues going to Cabinet, and ultimately public spending growth.
In the 1979 and 1980 PESC rounds there had been a large number of appeals
to Cabinet over the head of the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Mr. John
Biffen. Mrs. Thatcher had been unable to obtain the spending cuts she
desired, due to the politics of the Cabinet, in which Ministers tended to
help each other against the Treasury. The most notable example was in the
autumn of 1980 when the Defence, Environment and Education Secretaries
defended their corners so aggressively that the Treasury could make only
24
half the £2b cuts it desired. The PESC round of 1981 saw the 'Star 
Chamber' resolve many of the impasses. Although some others were still 
appealed to the Prime Minister, this was perhaps inevitable in view of the 
tough stance of the new Chief Secretary, Mr. Leon Brittan. In the last 
year of interest, 1982, the Star Chamber was not used as the inflation 
factor was less stringent.
Secondly, cash planning was introduced from FY 1982-83 onwards.
Political market activity thus focused on the cash levels of expenditure
25
desired rather than expenditure volumes and pay and price factors.
Although there is no way to tell, the new method of planning appeared to
strengthen the position of those in the political market in favour of lower
spending growth. This was certainly the intention, as was revealed in a
letter from Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor, to Mr. Len Murray at the TUC
One reason why public expenditure has been so excessively 
buoyant, and has had to be cut back,...may be found in the too 
exclusive concentration of forward planning on "volume" figures 
without sufficient attention to the financial constraints.26
It was explicitly stated that, under the new rules, there could not 'be any
commitment to particular levels of volume provisions stretching away into 
27
the future.' This reduced the power of spending departments which could
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no longer argue that they needed particular allocations of funds to finance 
their volume plans.
Thirdly, the Conservative Government reduced the planning period
covered by Public Expenditure White Papers from 4 years to 3 years,
starting with its Marcn 1931 White Paper for FY 1931-32 to 1983-84. Tnis
increased, or at least reflected, the tendency to focus on short-term
financial conditions and make fewer long-term volume planning commitments.
Fourthly, and finally, the Government delayed its release of the
Public Expenditure White Paper until March in 1980, 1981 and 1982, and
February in 1983, with the effect of making the link between taxation and
expenditure more visible, thus heightening awareness of the economy's
ability to pay for greater public expenditure.
The increased power of the Government survived procedural changes that
occurred in Parliament, whereby the House of Commons attempted to increase
its influence in the political market. The reforms were seen by their
progenitors in the Select Committee on Procedure (Supply) as providing 'a
real opportunity for the House to begin to re-assert its historic function
28
of scrutinising and controlling public expenditure.' Beginning in the
1982-83 session, the former Supply Days were replaced with 3 Estimates Days
and 19 Opposition Days. Estimates Days were to be devoted to debates and
votes on Supply Estimates, priorities being decided by Parliament on the
advice of the Liaison Committee, comprising the chairmen of all the select
committees. Estimates could be reduced but not increased. Opposition Days
were for debates on topics chosen by the Opposition. Presentational
changes were also made to the Estimates: introductory notes were added and
29
more detailed subhead narratives given.
In fact, these reforms did little to increase Pariiamentary power over
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the planning process. Apart from the fact that they were introduced only
at the end of the period under study, they did not counter many of the
deficiencies in the system of accountability to Parliament. First, there
remained problems with the information given about the programmes that were
to be voted upon. Votes and subheads were often explained in terms so
general as to be useless, or simply stated the broad aims of the programme.
It was not always possible to assess the level of service against the 
30
outlay. In some cases the votes and subheads did not match identifiable 
31
programmes. With cash planning, the volume detail in the Expenditure
32
White Paper was diminished. Second, the scrutiny process was hindered by
the later publication of the White Paper under the Conservatives. There
was little time to discuss the proposals before they were given final form 
33
in the Estimates. The debates on the White Paper did benefit, however, 
from the practice of holding them after the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee had reported on it. Third, the voting process was far from
34
discriminating. Parliament could not control the detail of expenditure. 
Also, the Government could rely on approval for its plans due to its 
Parliamentary majority.
The new Select Committees, set up along Departmental lines in 1979, 
significantly raised consciousness, although they had little perceptible 
influence on Government plans. This contradicts the view of the chairman 
of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee (TCSC), Mr. Du Cann, who posited 
that
the intention behind their establishment was to sharply alter the 
relationship between MPs and the Executive, to redress the 
balance of power between the two, and that is what is 
happening.35
It is true that the inquiries of the Public Accounts Committee and the 
deliberations of the TCSC and the Procedure Committee led to the
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improvement of Parliamentary scrutiny, but, as seen above, problems
remained of a considerable nature. Certainly, the TCSC voiced concern over
certain expenditure practices that appeared to weaken control, such as
staging pay increases within given cash limits, and the Government changed
its policy in response. However, it also made more general criticisms of
36
economic policy to no avail. The fundamental weakness of the Select
Committees in the political market was that they were only advisory: they
37
had no power to amend the Government's expenditure plans.
The control of public expenditure
The political market power of the Government in planning expenditure
was matched by its power in the control of expenditure. As a result, the
enforcement of the cash limits pay restraint policy was assured, as was the
broader public expenditure policy of the Government. Expenditure continued
to be controlled through the Treasury's Financial Information System and
according to the operational rules of the cash limits system. However, the
1979 vintage of the system was augmented during the period in three ways
which produced tighter Government control.
The first change to occur was at the beginning of the 1980-81 pay
round when staging or delaying agreements was made difficult, if not
impossible. Following the 1979-80 non-industrial civil service settlement,
which involved a delay in the implementation date in order to finance the
deal within the cash limit, the TCSC recommended the practice be
discontinued for fear that public expenditure control would be prejudiced
38
by the consequent inflation of base figures for the following year.
Hence the Government stated a new policy:
The Government...thinks it desirable for the future to avoid the 
delay or staging of awards, and will avoid it where it is itself
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the employer. If, this general policy notwithstanding, a public 
services employer were to stage or delay an award, the 
Government, when setting the relevant cash limits for the 
subsequent year, would not allow for the element of the award 
which had only been made compatible with the cash limit by such 
delay or staging.39
The second reform was in the use of the contingency reserve with
effect from FY 1981-82. Hitherto, the reserve had been charged whenever
there were changes in the planned volume of spending. Under the new rules,
40
any increases in price or pay factors were also to be charged.
Obviously, this provided a disincentive for the Government to relax its 
stance.
Thirdly, the introduction of cash planning from FY 1982-83 meant that 
pay and price increases in excess of the implicit inflation factors would 
reduce volume spending, not only in that financial year, but in succeeding 
years too. In the absence of volume planning, there was no opportunity, as
there had been before, to have (full) volume plans revalued the next year
41
at outturn wage and price levels. This encouraged a closer adherence to 
the inflation factors, where managers were able to exert influence.
Finally, it should be mentioned that a recommendation by the Treasury 
and the Public Accounts Committee for limited flexibility in the carry-over 
of capital expenditure from one year to the next was turned down by the
Government because it was feared that up to £250 m. might be added to
42
public expenditure in FY 1982-83. Hence the cash limits remained intact.
1.2.2 Political market attitudes
The dominant position of the Government, particularly the Cabinet, in 
the political market meant that the financial constraints were largely a 
reflection of Government attitudes. The roots of the pay factor restraint 
policy, together with the other financial constraints, such as the real
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growth provision, the price factors, and savings requirements in non-pay
expenditure, could be discerned in Government attitudes towards public
expenditure, inflation, waste in expenditure, and bureaucracy.
As seen in Chapter 3, the Government was elected on a platform that
included public expenditure restraint. Tnis did not just prompt the
control of wage inflation through the policy of lowering pay factors year
by year, but pervaded the general approach to public finance. Of course,
within the broad strategy there were priorities: the defence budget was
favoured for political reasons, while the health budget had to grow
annually by 0.7 per cent if services were to be maintained and match 
43
demographic trends.
Expenditure restraint did not find total support throughout the
Cabinet, however. While the Prime Minister made a virtue out of
expenditure cuts, some Ministers fiercely resisted attempts to reduce their
44
programmes, as did Mr. Francis Pym at Defence, for example. This had two
consequences for the shape of the financial constraints. One was that the
real growth rate of public expenditure was positive in central government
programmes, although no doubt less than it would otherwise have been. The
other was that in the absence of agreed cuts, inadequate inflation factors
were used to make volume reductions. As one participant put it:
We have a great argument about the volume of spending next year.
When the Treasury is defeated by the forces of the anti-Christ, 
they regroup and try again through the back door of cash 
1imits.45
Second, the Government's attitudes towards inflation necessarily 
coloured the view of the Cabinet in setting the pay factor. As the 
Treasury stated:
For the public services, one of the Government's main roles is to 
set the expenditure provision from which the pay bill will be met 
at a level appropriate to market forces, such as recruitment and
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retention needs, and to what can be afforded. This provision is 
intended to influence the relevant negotiations.46
Thirdly, the Government was preoccupied with the inefficient use of 
47
funds. This led to attempts to make savings, to eliminate functions, and
to increase competition in, and privatisation (contracting-out) of 
48
services. The two primary methods of achieving these goals were the
Rayner scrutinies and reviews and the management information system for
ministers (MINIS). The lessons of scrutinies in one department were
applied more broadly across the civil service by the Civil Service 
49
Department (CSD). MINIS originated in the Department of Environment
where Mr. Michael Heseltine used it to cut the staff by a third. The
system worked by collecting information about staffing, organisation,
functions, costs, resources, and past performance; the department's work
50
was then reviewed to ensure efficiency. The financial management
initiative (FMI) of the Government in May 1982 in effect universalised
MINIS, requiring managers in departments to assess outputs or performance
51
in relation to objectives and resources. In addition, specific inquiries
took place. The Wardale chain of command review in the Civil Service
52
recommended the abolition of a number of open-structure posts. As the
period under study ended, the Griffiths NHS management inquiry was being
conducted. It had been commissioned to advise on the management action
needed to secure the best value for money and the best possible service to
patients. The inquiry was in no doubt that major cost improvements could 
53
be initiated. As a result of such reviews, planned spending levels were 
curbed.
Fourth, the Government was vehemently opposed to bureaucracy. It was 
particularly antagonistic towards the civil service. One reason may have
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been that Mrs. Thatcher was the first Prime Minister since Sir Alec
54
Douglas-Home not to nave been a former civil servant. The result was
partly the efficiency campaign cited above. Also, apparently often
independent of efficiency considerations, the Government demanded that
55
departments should aim to contract out much more of their work. It was 
not surprising that the financial conditions in the civil service were 
austere.
Although not powerful, certain other parties in the political market
had attitudes supportive of the Government's stance. The Treasury and
Civil Service Committee, in particular, was more anxious than the
Government itself to control expenditure in line with plans. As noted
earlier, in its reports it was critical of the delaying and staging of
agreements; it also warned the Government against interpreting planned
employment cuts as warranting larger pay rises; and it pushed for the wider 
56
application of MINIS.
In addition, departments and authorities were prepared to keep within
the cash limits. Apart from Ministerial commitment to the constraints,
57
departmental civil servants were reluctant to break the limits. Their
reasons were that the subsequent Treasury inquisition, as it was referred
58
to by an interviewee, involved too much time, trouble and embarrassment.
Meanwhile, there were dissenting views from the union movement, as the
Campaign for Economic and Social Advance indicated. The attitudes of
Congress were clearly stated in a 1979 resolution:
(Congress) rejects entirely the argument that the legitimate pay 
increases gained in excess of the cash limits must be paid for by 
reductions in manpower, and the proposition that the required 
level of public services should depend upon public service 
workers being prepared to accept less than a fair reward for 
their labour. It further rejects the policy of refusing to up- 
rate cash limits in respect of known changes in costs and 
expenditure.59
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However, tnese views were made largely irrelevant by the structure of tne 
political market.
1.2.3 Summary
The political market therefore changed during 1979-83 to generate a 
tough cash limits pay restraint policy and other austere financial 
measures. Structurally, the market re-formed to give the Cabinet effective 
power over other parties. In particular, the role of the unions was 
diminished by the Government's choice of method of pay restraint 
enforcement. Numerous changes to the rules regarding the planning and 
control of public expenditure added to the power of the Government to curb 
spending. The Conservatives made use of their stronger market position to 
impose stringent financial constraints in order to move towards their 
objectives of lower inflation, reduced public expenditure growth, and less 
waste and bureaucracy.
2. Local Authorities
2.1 The financial context
The financial constraints faced by local government became 
progressively tighter over the period 1979-83. There were pressures on 
both finance and expenditure. Government grant, being a proportion of 
approved expenditure, was affected by the assumptions underlying the 
expenditure figure, (namely the pay factor in the pay restraint policy, the 
price inflation factor, and the planned real growth of expenditure), as 
well as by the rate of grant contribution. Other finance largely reflected 
trends in rate income. Local government expenditure was guided by the 
Government's plans. Although tough, it should be said that relative to
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central government tne constraints were not as inflexible.
2.1.1 Government finance
The cash limits pay restraint policy, based on declining pay
factors, was instrumental in steadily tightening the ability to pay.
Around the time of the Rate Support Grant (RSG) announcement, usually in
the autumn, the pay factor to cover the bargaining round until the
following July was chosen and embodied in the RSG Increase Orders for the
current financial year, (until the Orders were abolished under cash
planning), and in the RSG settlement for the forthcoming year. The time-
path of the pay factors was the same as in central government, except the
cost factor for FY 1980-81 was 13 per cent, one per cent less than in
central government, due to the mix of expenditure. The factors acted as
true constraints since they were set below local authorities' expectations
of pay increases. For example, the FY 1980-81 13 per cent cost factor was
less than the 17.5 per cent assumption that local authority associations
60
had been working with in the RSG negotiations.
Exceptions to the pay factor were only common at the beginning of the
period as a result of the recommendations of the Standing Commission on Pay
Comparability and other pay reviews. While the Government kept
its election promise to honour those settlements, funds were subject to a
61
significant across-the-board reduction, however. In this spirit, since
the FY 1979-80 financial allocation contained only 5 per cent to cover pay
rises, the first Increase Order in January 1980 provided additional money
to cover settlements, minus a deduction of £310 m. The second Increase
Order, with effect from November 1980, put a cash limit on outstanding
62
awards to white-collar staff, teachers, and craftsmen, of £150 m. In the 
same way, the RSG settlements for FY 1980-81, announced in November 1979,
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and for FY 1981-82 in November 1980, included an allowance for outstanding 
63
awards. This was estimated by the Association of Metropolitan
64
Authorities (AMA) as affording increases of only 10 per cent. Tne
pressures on finance were summarised by one Director of Finance:
when eventual comparability awards were known there were not too 
many treasurers still smiling. This led to either supplementary 
rates or an effective cutback in allowances for inflation on 
goods and services. On many heads of expenditure it is this 
hidden real term cutback that has made more impact on service 
levels than any overt 2 per cent reduction exercise.65
After the commitments of the past had been fulfilled, there were few
exceptions to pay factors. The only reported occasion when the RSG was
increased to accommodate pay increases was to cover the police pay
66
increases in FY 1981-82.
Other financial influences on grant reinforced the effect of the pay
restraint policy. In the years they were announced, the price factors were
comparable to those in central government (except for the lower, 13 per
cent, cost provision in FY 1980-81). They also had similar consequences.
By underestimating inflation, the amount of grant given to local government
was reduced in real terms. This was most significant in FY 1979-80 and
1980-81. In the first year, when the Labour Government's 8-1/2 per cent
assumption was not revised in spite of higher inflation, it was calculated
that inadequate pay and price provision in grants amounted to 2.8 per cent
of relevant expenditure, implying an underestimation of inflation of
approximately 4 per cent, a figure comparable to that calculated by the
67
Treasury for the public services as a whole (cited earlier). In the
following year, the cost assumption of 13 per cent contrasted with the 15
per cent figure proposed by authorities in the RSG negotiations, and the 19
68
per cent assumed on average in budgets. The consequences for the amount
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of grant led to claims by employers that they could afford only 9 per cent 
69
for pay increases.
The pressures caused by insufficient allocations to cover inflation
were compounded by the planned current volume expenditure levels on which
the Government was prepared to pay grant. In contrast to central
government as a whole, current expenditure was set to decline in real terms
each year under volume planning. Once set, there were no upward revisions 
70
during the year. Table 6.2 shows that the planned real cuts were 
especially harsh in FY 1981-82 when reductions of 3 per cent were required 
against the previous year's planned levels, which in fact were 2.5 per cent 
below outturn.
In later years when the plans were in cash terms, grant was restricted
by volume cuts or insufficient allowances for inflation, whichever
interpretation is preferred. In FY 1982-83, the RER survey revealed
authorities were budgeting for inflation of 7.9 per cent, but the cash
increase in plans was only 2 per cent, an implicit real decrease in
expenditure plans of 5.9 per cent. In the next year, inflation was
budgeted at 5.6 per cent against a 3 per cent cash increase in government
71
plans, a real reduction of 2.6 per cent.
Not only was expenditure planned to fall, but also the Government's 
contribution was reduced. It fell from 61 per cent to 59.1 per cent in FY 
1981-82 due to the narrowing of the coverage of the grant figure from
England and Wales jointly to England singly. It was then cut significantly
72
to 56.1 per cent in FY 1982-83, and to 52.8 per cent in FY 1983-84.
The constraints imposed by grant allocations were further tightened by 
grant holdbacks each year after 1979-80, arising due to authorities 
infringing the Government's expenditure guidelines. The penalties amounted
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Year Country Real/ Base % change % % Adjustment
Cash Tmplicit Over to next year's
terms in plans spending 'plans
1979-80 Eng. & Wales real 78-79 outturn -1.4 2.0
1980-81 Eng. & Wales real 78-79 outturn -2.0 2.5
1981-82 England real
/cash
80-81 plans -3.l(real) 8.0(cash) +6.5(cash)
1982-83 England cash 81-82 budgets +2.0 6.5 +5.0
1983-84 England cash 82-83 budgets +3.0 3.0 +2.5
Table 6.2: Local authority planned current expenditure and overspending, 
FY 1979-80 to FY 1983-84
Source: Public Expenditure White Papers
Year Coverage % RSG contribution Grant holdback (£ M)
1979-30 England & Wales 61.0 -
1980-81 England & Wales 61.0 200
1981-82 England 59.1 124
1982-83 England 56.1 312*
1983-84 England 52.8 224*
Table 6. 3: Government grants to local authorities: contributions and
Note: * 
Source:
holdbacks FY 1979-80 to 
denotes provisional.
RSG Announcements.
FY 1983-84
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Therefore, in total, government grant to local authorities was 
severely restricted by the pay restraint policy on pay factors. This was 
supplemented by low price factors in the first few years of the 
Government's term of office. From FY 1981-82 onwards, the volume or cash 
expenditure plans, grant holdback, and lower contribution rates were the 
primary additional causes.
2.1.2 Other finance
The financial outlook was less austere than the grants position
implied, however. Authorities were usually able to raise their rate income
at a much faster rate than the inflation assumptions of the Government,
thus offsetting some of the explicit and the back-door cuts in real grant 
74
provision. Nevertheless, the extent of rate increases declined over
time, so that the general picture of a declining ability to pay was
sustained. Table 6.4 shows the trend in average rate increases for
domestic and non-domestic ratepayers in England and Wales.
Balances were also drawn on each year to finance expenditure, but the
amounts involved were trifling, being between 0.4 and 1.1 per cent of net
75
rate fund expenditure.
2.1.3 Expenditure
Apart from constraints on grants, authorities faced expenditure 
76
targets each year. Volume targets were set in FY 1980-81 and 1981-82, 
while cash expenditure targets were given for later years, reflecting the 
basis of expenditure planning by the Government. The volume targets were 
the same for all authorities. They were to achieve real reductions of 2
73
to 1 or 2 per cent of grant each year. Table 6.3 gives the monetary
amounts.
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Therefore, in total, government grant to local authorities was 
severely restricted by the pay restraint policy on pay factors. This was 
supplemented by low price factors in the first few years of the 
Government's term of office. From FY 1981-82 onwards, the volume or cash 
expenditure plans, grant holdback, and lower contribution rates were the 
primary additional causes.
2.1.2 Other finance
The financial outlook was less austere than the grants position
implied, however. Authorities were usually able to raise their rate income
at a much faster rate than the inflation assumptions of the Government,
thus offsetting some of the explicit and the back-door cuts in real grant 
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provision. Nevertheless, the extent of rate increases declined over
time, so that the general picture of a declining ability to pay was
sustained. Table 6.4 shows the trend in average rate increases for
domestic and non-domestic ratepayers in England and Wales.
Balances were also drawn on each year to finance expenditure, but the
amounts involved were trifling, being between 0.4 and 1.1 per cent of net
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per cent below FY 
cent below FY 1980
1978-79 outturns in FY 1980-81, and real cuts of 3.1 per 
-81 plans in FY 1981-82. Cash targets applied on an
Year Rate Increases ill
Domestic Non-domestic
1980-81 27 22
1981-82 19.5 16.9
1982-83 15.4 12.3
1983-84 7.1 6.0
Table 6.4: Rate increases in local government in England and Wales, FY 
1980-81 to 1983-84
Source: Public Finance and Accountancy, 1980-83, June issues.
m
individual authority basis. In FY 1982-33, the cash targets were uniformly 
based on FY 1981-82 budgets, revalued by the pay and price factors of 4 and 
9 per cent respectively, and cut in real terms by no more than 1 per cent 
where authorities had met their volume targets and had expenditure levels 
below the levels used in grant calculations; elsewhere they were cut by up 
to 7 per cent. In FY 1983-84 low-spenders were allowed a 4 per cent cash 
increase; this implied a 1 per cent real cut if inflation turned out to be 
5 per cent, as the Government believed it might, although it did not state 
an official price factor. High-spenders were asked to reduce cash spending 
by 1 per cent, probably tantamount to a real fall of 6 per cent.
Table 6.2 shows that, in aggregate, overspending was seen each year.
However, typically, two-thirds of authorities attained, or were within two
per cent of, the targets. Indeed, approximately half the overspending in
1983-84, according to budget figures, was in the Greater London Council
77
(GLC) and the Inner London Education Authority. It follows that the 
expenditure targets were taken into account by most authorities.
The implications for the ability to pay varied according to whether 
the targets were set in volume or cash terms. Volume targets were not a 
significant constraint on the ability to pay, since expenditure was 
permitted to increase to cover inflation. In contrast, cash targets were 
constraining because they included both volume and inflation provisions.
The consequences for pay could have been worse, however. Normally, under 
cash planning, unlike under volume planning, current plans are not 
increased to reflect the outturn of the previous year, such as pay or price 
rises over the inflation factors (where stated) or volume overspending. 
However, the cash bases were increased in FY 1982-83 and 1983-84 for local 
authorities, as the last column of Table 6.2 shows, which eased the cash
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expenditure restraint.
2.1.4 Allocation of the budget
There was a modicum of flexibility in tne allocation of monies between
the spending heads of budgets, but pay expenditure was still closely
circumscribed. Pay was approximately 70 per cent of current expenditure.
As the price factors intimate, non-pay spending was subject to squeeze too,
so there was little excess 'fat1 to redistrioute. Only minor amounts of
rate finance could be diverted from the capital budget to current spending
79
because government capital grants had been severely cut.
2.1.5 Summary
Local authorities therefore faced an increasingly stark financial 
environment. The ability to pay was progressively reduced by the pay 
restraint policy of diminishing pay factors which lessened the amount of 
government grant; grant was also restricted by inadequate price factors, 
real cuts in planned spending, and grant percentage cuts and penalties. 
While this put downward pressure on the ability to pay, it was alleviated 
by rate increases up to and including FY 1981-82. But, thereafter, cash 
expenditure targets effectively removed this source of flexibility, given 
the extent to which authorities were prepared to keep within, or close to, 
targets. Rate increases were duly small in FY 1983-84. With a cut in 
volume in prospect, and little scope for expenditure reallocation, the 
effect of the pay factors was brought home to negotiators.
In comparison with central government, local government's ability to 
pay was somewhat less constrained in the first half of the period under 
study, the pay factors not biting to the same extent. It became much more 
similar in the second half, with both sectors having to recognise the 
implications of the pay factors. The proximate causes lay in the character
78
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of the financial constraints. Central government authorities by and large 
had fixed cash budgets throughout, which, while notionally increasing in 
real terms, were limited by inadequate price factors. As has just been noted, 
local authorities were not subject to controls over total nominal 
expenditure until later in the period.
2.2 The political market envionment
The root causes of the increasingly stringent financial environment of 
local authorities can be traced to changes in the structure of the 
political market, largely in the centre-periphery segment, in which the 
authorities, their associations, Government, Parliament and pressure groups 
interacted. The Government assumed a much more dominant role in both the 
planning and control of expenditure, including the formulation and 
administration of the pay restraint policy. A different informal style 
within the pre-existing formal structures was adopted, and radical changes 
to the system of rules governing central-local financial decision-making 
power were made.
2.2.1 The centre-periphery political submarket structure 
The planning of expenditure
The Government's position in the planning of expenditure was
strengthened chiefly through rejecting union influence on the cash limits 
80
pay restraint policy. The pay factors were of the Government's own 
choosing, so grants to local authorities were under greater control. Total 
cash expenditure was therefore subject to more indirect pressure.
Quite apart from the lack of involvement in pay factor decisions, 
established procedures for consultation with the unions over local
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government finance were ignored on occasions. For example, on gaining
power the Conservative Government, without consultation, announced its
policy towards manpower reductions which underlay its expenditure volume
objectives. Furthermore, due to only short notice being given, just three
unions were able to attend the meeting at which the announcement was 
81
made. Also, the Government unilaterally changed the basis of the Joint
Manpower Watch employment survey without discussion, although the survey 
82
was a joint exercise.
Within the formal expenditure planning process, in which views were
taken on expenditure totals and grant levels, the Government paid less heed
to the attitudes of other parties. The Consultative Council on Local
Government Finance (CCLGF) had been criticised in the past for being
dominated by government; under the Conservatives, local authority
association heads complained that there was even less consultation and that
83
the CCLGF was merely a means of telling them what to do.
In particular, the room for manoeuvre in negotiations in the
expenditure steering and sub-groups was more restricted. In the FY 1981-82
RSG negotiations, for example, the groups were presented with benchmarks
for service levels by the Government, with no discussion. When forecasting
the effects of current policies, the departmental view tended to prevail.
This was especially the case in education over prospective savings in
school meal expenditure, and over the accruals from school closures
84
stemming from the decline in the school-age population.
A second factor was that even when genuine negotiations occurred, the
results were frequently overridden by Cabinet spending decisions. For
instance, after the FY 1981-82 negotiations, additional cuts were 
85
imposed. For FY 1982-83, discussions were based on initial budgets for
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the Environment Secretary had demanded revised budgets. After the
negotiations, further cuts were made in the planning total. Only the
education expenditure group managed to reconvene to give further
86
consideration to the appropriate service levels. In respect of the RSG
for FY 1983-84, the Environment Secretary asserted tnat, although he was
going through the statutory consultation process, the cash totals and grant
87
figures were not negotiable.
As well as the shift in power between interested parties towards the 
Government caused by consultation practices, respect for Governmental 
interests in expenditure planning was enhanced by the changes in the rules 
of the planning process identified in the context of central government. 
While grant allocations and spending plans were probably tougher due to the 
Star Chamber, the shortening of the planning period and the delayed 
publication of the White Paper, the key reform was in the switch to cash 
planning in FY 1982-83. For the first part of the Conservative 
administration's period of office, volume spending by local authorities had 
been the focus of expenditure plans. Local authorities therefore retained 
power over cash spending. Later, with cash planning, the focus turned to 
desired cash spending levels. This did not mean, however, that local 
authorities totally surrendered their power to Government. Although under 
significantly more pressure, for constitutional reasons local government 
retained its autonomy over spending. In other words, local government 
became subject to a system more akin to cash limits, but still different. 
Expenditure was not so much limited as guided.
Parliamentary intervention in the planning process continued to be 
marginal. Although 1982-83 saw reformed Pariiamentary procedures
FY 1981-82, but in fact the expenditure outturn was very different because
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already possible to debate the RSG Reports. While the Estimates could be
reduced, significant change was unlikely due to the timing of the scrutiny
process. Furthermore, it was not open to Parliament to vote to change
88
anything other than the grant provision.
The control of expenditure
The Government's heightened power over the planning of expenditure was
matched by an increased control of outturns. This was achieved by means
of changes to the rules concerning both finance and expenditure. In
particular, by the end of the period the main sources of local authorities'
power - rate finance autonomy and cash spending freedom - had been bridled.
First, with respect to government finance, the Government gained a
stronger political market position in the control of grant through the
amendments to the cash limits system identified in the discussion of
central government finance. The charging of increased inflation factors to
the contingency reserve encouraged the maintenance of initial pay factors.
The policy on staging from 1980-81 prevented the inflation of the base
expenditure figures for subsequent years, and hence the amount of grant.
Finally, cash planning, which did not automatically include overspending or
inflation in excess of pay and price factors in the base for the following
year, gave the Government the option of tightly controlling grant, not just
in the current year, but also over the medium term.
Rate flexibility was curtailed with effect from FY 1982-83 through the
Local Government Finance Act 1982 which provided for the abolition of 
89
supplementary rates. Although main rates were potentially higher, once 
raised, the availability of finance was thus more inflexible. Authorities 
therefore no longer had as much freedom during the year. In particular, 
supplementary rates could not be raised in the face of collective 
bargaining pressure or to pay for government grant penalties.
concerning debates on the Estimates, little was gained because it was
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The original intention was to weaken local government's authority even
more, redistributing it to tne Government and electorate. The initial form
of the Bill provided for limits to be set on main rates by tne Government.
According to this, if a supplementary rate was needed which took local
authorities over the limit, then approval by means of a referendum, framed
90
by the Government, was required. However, this idea never came to fruition.
It should also be pointed out that after the end of the period of
interest, in FY 1985-86, selective rate limitation was introduced. The
Government identified high-spending authorities according to general
criteria, and the Environment Secretary then assessed tne maximum rate to
be demanded to finance approved expenditure, taking balances into 
91
account.
Perhaps the most radical changes in the political market structure in 
1979-83 occurred in the area of expenditure control, where the Government 
gained power relative to local authorities. First of all, penalties were 
introduced to induce local government to keep to volume, and, later, cash 
plans. As the period proceeded, the penalties became less general and more 
focused on overspenders, and the tariff structure changed to penalise 
major transgressors more and more severely.
In FY 1980-81, the so-called 'transitional arrangements' applied 
before the passing of the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980.
Three types of penalty were imposed by the Government. First, a general 
reduction in the RSG of £ 200m. was made in the November 1980 Increase 
Order. Second, no additional urban programme grant was given to Hackney, 
Islington, and Lambeth. Third, it was proposed to reduce the grant of 
authorities where rates exceeded 155p in the pound unless the planned 
expenditure volume target had been met or exceptional efforts had been made
to cut spending.
In FY 1981-82 the penalties became more directed and big overspenders
were penalised more. If the three-year volume target reduction was not
attained, then grant was reduced in general, but with percentage exemptions
varying according to whether overspending was between 0 and 2 per cent,
between 2 and 4 per cent, or over 4 per cent. Authorities spending below
Grant Related Expenditure (GRE) - that is, the Government's assessment of
93
an authority's necessary expenditure - were exempt from penalty.
The targets for FY 1982-83, differentiated by authority, were enforced
along similar lines except the penalties showed more variation, being 3p in
the pound for each percentage point over target expenditure, up to a 15p
94
maximum. Again, spending below GRE led to exemptions. While the
penalties appeared to give more control to the Government, its position was
somewhat undermined by the exemptions which gave authorities license to
95
overspend up to their GREs.
The loophole was blocked in FY 1983-84, and the tariff was increased
so that lp in the pound was payable for each 1 per cent of overspending up
to 2 per cent; and 5p in the pound for each percentage point thereafter,
96
without any maximum.
As well as applying the stick of penalties, the carrot of grant 
incentives was used to curb spending. Whereas the years up to and 
including FY 1980-81 had seen grant partly distributed according to needs 
and resources, which encouraged higher spending, a block grant unifying 
these elements and removing those incentives was introduced for FY 1981-82 
by the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980. No longer was grant 
dependent on past expenditure levels; needs were instead assessed according 
to authority characteristics, especially the size of client groups.
92
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Further, constant percentage marginal grant contributions characteristic of
the resources element, were replaced by a threshold and taper by which the
government's marginal grant contributions fell when actual expenditure was
97
greater than 10 per cent above GRE. The tariff was made steeper in FY 
98
1982-83.
Finally, the structure of the political market changed at the expense
of local authorities with the growth of audit by independently-appointed
bodies. The Government encouraged and ordered audit and scrutiny by
private sector accountants in numerous cases. For instance, Coopers and
Lybrand reported on 26 councils and, inter alia, recommended a greater
99
degree of contracting out. Meanwhile, the Chief Inspector of Audit
100
carried out a critical review of bonus schemes. The Local Government
Finance Act 1982 established an independent Audit Commission charged with
the duty of satisfying itself that local authorities had proper
arrangements for securing value-for-money; and the duty of carrying out and
publishing across-the-board studies into the economy, efficiency and
101
effectiveness of local authority services. Such measures made 
expenditure control more likely.
While there is no doubt that Government power was duly increased, it
did not have absolute control. If authorities were willing to increase
main rates to cover the prospective grant penalties, then the spending
targets could be ignored quite legitimately. The lack of full control was
manifest in the Government being obliged to partially adjust the base
expenditure figures under cash planning for a given year, in recognition of
102
overspending by authorities in the aggregate in the previous year.
2.2.2 Centre-periphery political submarket attitudes
The relatively strong position of the Government in the political
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market meant that the financial constraints faced by local authorities 
largely reflected the Government's attitudes. However, the fact that the 
authorities were not obliged to succumb to absolute rate and expenditure 
control, although under pressure, meant that authority attitudes were 
relevant too.
The basis for the Government wishing to utilise its political market
power over local authorities was primarily macro-economic, as in mid-
1979. According to the Government:
Neither local government nor local taxpayers are in a position to 
assess either the relative claims of local services as a whole to 
national resources or the overall economic impact of local 
expenditure. These are matters on which the central government 
must take a strategic view in the course of its management of 
economic policy. For these reasons, it is essential that the 
Government should be able to influence local revenue-raising and 
local expenditure.103
The primary concerns in limiting finance and expenditure were inflation,
the magnitude of public expenditure, and efficiency.
The worry about inflation was explicit in RSG announcements. For
instance, the 1980-81 Report stated that 'the Government is not prepared to
104
print money to finance levels of expenditure the country cannot afford.'
The result was stiff pay and price assumptions and reduced expenditure 
plans.
The financial claims of the local authorities were also seen as
prejudicing the health of the economy. The general argument was stated by
the Chief Secretary to the Treasury:
...their actions, like those of the rest of the public sector, 
can at their worst stifle enterprise, choke off growth and 
destroy jobs.105
More specifically, the 1981-82 RSG announcement, for example, was partly 
based on the promise that a crowding-out of the private sector was
occurring:
We must reduce the demands of government - local as well as 
central - on the wealth-producing sector of the economy. ...the 
combined financial decisions of all local authorities have a 
powerful effect on interest rates and the economy in general.106
This stance was not only manifested in financial restraint. Notably, the
Government vigorously urged authorities to reduce manpower. For instance,
after the election, the Environment Secretary called for a freeze on
recruitment whenever possible and an urgent review of manpower 
107
requirements. In addition, the Government reduced the number of
circulars and removed a large number of statutory controls, a move which
facilitated a decline in the standard of service and the level of 
108
expenditure.
The third aim was 'to secure a more efficient and a more cost-
109
effective system of local government.' This was seen in the financial
restrictions and in Government policy towards audits and privatisation.
Thus, the financing of the SCPC settlements was reduced in order to secure
110
improvements in efficiency and productivity. Privatisation was
encouraged especially in building work, where private contractors were to
111
compete with direct labour organisations, and in refuse collection.
In contrast, by and large, local authorities were anxious about the
level of service provision and would not have chosen to cut back on
spending. However, this was overridden in some cases by political
goodwill. For example, the attitude of the associations towards the FY
1980-81 settlement was relatively mild because the Conservatives were 
112
dominant in each. This was less true in later years because Labour 
gained control of the AMA in 1980. In individual authorities,
113
overspending was more likely where there was not a Conservative majority.
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The local authorities were more strident in their opposition to the
legislated controls on their autonomy. For example, all the associations
were opposed to the Planning and Land Act 1980: as the Conservative leader
of the GLC remarked, ‘it takes a genius to unite the AMA, ADC, ACC, LBA and 
114
GLC.' The ACC, however, were apparently willing to compromise their
principles: they withdrew their opposition in Parliament in return for a
115
favourable grant distribution.
Therefore, there was some coincidence of views between the Government 
and local authorities, but differences remained. The political market 
structure determined which carried weight.
2.2.3 The local political submarket structure and attitudes
The local political submarket structure changed as a consequence of
developments in the centre-periphery submarket. The efforts of the
Government to increase its control of finance and expenditure naturally
restrained the power of local authorities vis-a-vis the electorate. There
was less need to increase rates because spending was subject to targets
that were generally respected, and supplementary rates were abolished.
Within this framework, however, the electorate was still relatively
weak. For instance, the link between rates and services was difficult to
discern because of the considerable variations in rate demands from year to
year, caused by changes in grant distribution, penalties, targets and 
116
balances. The Government in fact acknowledged the deficiencies of the
submarket and proposed changes; these included a statutory duty on
authorities to consult representatives of non-domestic ratepayers before
setting their rates, and a requirement to provide a separate statement to
117
each ratepayer annually. However, these had not been introduced by the
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end of the period under study.
2.2.4 Summary
During the period the Government gained power in the planning process 
through a more unilateral style of grant and expenditure plan determination 
and the advent of cash planning. This was complemented by firm cash limit 
control of grant, a block grant which reduced the incentives to spend, and 
penalties for infringing expenditure targets. The Government was therefore 
more able to enforce tough financial restrictions reflecting the need to 
counter inflation, reduce public spending, and increase efficiency.
Meantime, local authorities raised rate finance to ease the ability 
to pay before FY 1982-83 because they enjoyed a powerful position relative 
to the electorate, and because spending targets were in volume terms. 
Thereafter, cash expenditure targets reduced this source of flexibility; 
although not absolutely bound by the targets, the majority of authorities 
chose to acquiesce, partly out of political goodwill and partly due to the 
penalties.
3. Pub!ic Corporations 
3.1 The financial context
As in the public services, the public corporations saw a more 
restrictive financial environment from 1979-80 onwards. At the same time, 
all things considered, public corporations fared better than central and 
local government, albeit with a significant diversity of experience.
The increased stringency, and the pattern, of the financial 
constraints reflected the pay restraint policy as well as other financial 
exigencies. External finance was limited by successively tougher EFLs, in 
part due to the pay policy, while the growth of internal finance was curbed
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by dips in output in recessionary years and by progressively lower price 
increases. Relatively low labour-total cost ratios alleviated some of 
the pressures on pay budgets. This section explains how these various 
influences accounted for the overall financial constraints. Before 
examining the contribution of pay restraint policy and other factors, 
however, the severity of the constraints is examined.
3.1.1 Overall financial context
The financial context of pay bargaining in the public corporations 
became more restrictive, as in the public services, in that total finance 
from external and internal sources combined generally grew at a slower and 
slower rate over the period FY 1979-83 in nominal terms.
This trend is illustrated in Table 6.5. The figures are calculated 
from totals of external finance outturns and internal income (which mainly 
constituted sales revenue). Two points should be noted about the method of 
calculation. First, while the sectoral coverage narrowed as industries 
were privatised, the percentage changes relate to matched populations: the 
percentage declines are not a function of a smaller public sector coverage. 
Second, there may be slight inaccuracies in the transport sector figures 
because the internal finance data relate to calendar years in most cases, 
rather than government financial years. The broad trends are very unlikely 
to be affected, however.
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Financial year beginning 
Sector
1979 1980 1981 1982 1979-82
Compounded
Energy & Utilities 21.32 15.97 21.11 8.00 84.03
Communications 19.49 12.46 19.30 12.09 79.70
Transport 17.52 10.89 6.79 -2.17 36.15
Manufacturing -4.37 10.56 3.86 -5.89 3.34
All public corporations 15.34 13.57 13.79 4.09 55.15
Table 6.5: Nominal growth of pub!ic corporation finance FY 1979-83
Notes: See text.
Sources: (Derived from Annual Reports of Corporations, 1978-83;
Various Public Expenditure White Papers, 1979-84.
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The table makes plain that the nominal growth rate of total finance 
slowed slightly in FY 1980-81 and 1981-82 compared with FY 1979-80, and 
decreased significantly in FY 1982-83. At a disaggregated level, the trend 
was more equivocal, as might be expected when looking at more narrowly- 
defined trading sectors. Mainly, as the aggregate figures hint, FY 1981-82 
saw a resurgence in the growth rate of finance, before the decline 
continued.
The sectoral differences in financial growth were pronounced. In each 
year, (apart from FY 1982-83), energy and utility industries, (especially 
BGC), experienced faster growth than other sectors, closely followed by 
communications. Transport fared more poorly, in part due to significant 
declines in NFC finance in the first two years, and smaller declines in the 
latter two years in BAB and in the last year in BRB. Manufacturing, 
predominantly comprising BSC and BS, suffered the slowest growth.
The constraints from the slower nominal growth of finance were 
reinforced by there being little or no real growth in most years for the 
public corporations as a whole. This was not dissimilar to the situation 
in the public services. As Table 6.6 illustrates, this is likely to have 
made the diminishing nominal financial growth rate harder to deal with.
The real growth figures are simply the nominal rates deflated by 
appropriate price indices. Except for FY 1981-82, each year saw slight 
falls in the real growth of finance. As the compound real growth figures 
in the last column indicate, the hierarchy of sectors for the period as a 
whole was as in nominal terms. Transport, and especially
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Financial year beginning 1979 1980 1981 1982 1979-82
Compounded
Sector
Energy and utilities 3.55 0.48 8.43 1.07 14.03
Communications 1.99 -2.56 6.80 4.90 11.43
Transport 3.76 -6.89 -4.18 -9.74 -16.44
Manufacturing -18.37 -4.20 -7.02 -11.93 -35.96
All public corporations -0.87 -2.25 + 1.92 -2.88 -4.08
Table 6.6: Percentage real growth of pub!ic corporation finance, FY
1979-83 
Notes: See text.
Sources: As for Table 6.5
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manufacturing, saw significant real reductions, while energy and utilities 
and communications prospered, feeling the pressures of a falling nominal 
growth rate much less.
Authorities appeared to be genuinely constrained by the nominal and 
real growth of finance. Statistical data provide circumstantial evidence, 
while qualitative data directly corroborate the contention.
First, corporations were much closer to the external finance 
constraints (EFLs) during the period under study than in the years 
preceding it. This probably indicates the wider financial context was 
tougher, particularly as a number of corporations had been attempting to 
reduce their reliance on government-sanctioned finance permitted by the 
EFLs; it is unlikely that the data imply a conscious choice to use external 
finance as much as possible, independent of the severity of the financial 
situation.
Table 6.7 uses four criteria to illustrate the stringency of the 
constraints. For those with positive EFLs, that is those able to receive 
external finance, the table records the number of authorities overspending 
the final EFL, and those spending between 90 and 100 per cent of the EFL. 
For those with negative EFLs, the criteria are the number failing to 
achieve the required repayments, and the number achieving 100 to 110 per 
cent of them. The total number of authorities meeting these criteria 
relative to the total number of corporations each year is the statistic of 
major interest. The figures demonstrate that the percentage of corporations 
close to the EFLs was appreciably greater in FY 1979-82 than in the 
previous year, with most authorities apparently constrained. FY 1982-83 
saw fewer authorities tightly constrained.
Financial year beginning 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Number of corporations
1. overspending 
positive EFL 2 0 1 4 1
2. using 90-100% 
of positive EFL 4 13 8 5 3
3. failing to meet 
negative EFL 0 1 2 2 1
4. achieving 100-110% 
of negative EFL 0 1 1 0 0
Total (1-4) 6 15 12 11 5
Percentage of all 
corporations 35.3 88.2 75 .0 64.7 31.3
Table 6.7: Indicators of degree of stringency of EFL constraints on
public corporations, FY 1979-83 
Source: Derived from Public Expenditure White Papers.
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Second, otner evidence from public corporations and the Treasury lend
support to the thesis of stringent financial restrictions. The Treasury
calculated that in FY 1980-81, even after internal finance had been
increased, authorities were so constrained that they had to defer £440 m.
in payments, reduce current spending by £375 m. , cut investment by £200 m.,
118
and make other economies of £165 m. The Nationalised Industries*
Chairmen’s Group (NICG) also catalogued a number of instances where
investment had to be curtailed due to financial constraints. For example,
six authorities, including ESI, BGC, BT, P0, and BR, suffered a shortfall
in investment funds of £470 m. that would have been put into projects in FY
119
1981-82 or over the medium term. Later, the constraints were to force 
the NCB to accelerate pit closures, resulting in the year-long miners' 
strike.
Offsetting these exigencies somewhat, the public corporations were 
able to substitute between heads of expenditure in favour of pay more 
easily than in the public services, where pay was already the greater part 
of budgets or cash blocks.
Overall, therefore, the growth of total public corporation finance was 
comparable to that of the public services. A reduction in nominal growth 
was seen, within the context of declining real resources on the average. 
There was much more differentiation between public corporations than in the 
public services, however, and greater opportunity for internal budgetary 
flexibi1ity.
3.1.2 External finance
Constraints on the availability of external finance, including the 
provisions under the pay policy, played a significant role in the
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However, external finance was not the prime cause of the hardship 
experienced by corporations in real terms. Towards the end of the period, 
external financial constraints certainly contributed to the lack of real 
growth of total finance, but until then they actually facilitated higher 
real growth than would have otherwise been possible.
Statistics bear this out. Table 6.8 makes an attempt to identify the 
constraints set by Government on external finance. The indicator employed 
is the percentage increase in the sum of the final EFLs in each sector (or 
actual external finance where the EFL was overspent) over the previous 
year's outturn. This is in contrast to the preceding tables, which 
embodied the extent to which the financial opportunities were used.
While the sectoral figures, particularly for communications and 
manufacturing, are somewhat erratic, the general trend, and the broad trend 
in energy and utilities and transport, was towards slower and ultimately 
negative nominal growth. As the final column indicates, the familiar 
sectoral differences were evident in the availability of external finance, 
although communications saw faster growth than did energy and utility 
corporations.
A comparison of the aggregate changes with the rate of price increase 
demonstrates that, overall, the external financial constraints did not 
appear to imply real external finance reductions until FY 1982-83. At a 
disaggregated level, however, external financial restrictions did contribute t 
the real decline in total finance of manufacturing and transport corporations 
over a longer period.
diminution of the rate of increase in nominal total finance, even though
external finance was on average less than 10 per cent of the total.
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diminution of the rate of increase in nominal total finance, even though
external finance was on average less than 10 per cent of the total.
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Financial Year beginning 1979 1980 1981 1982 1979-82
Sector
Energy and utilities 431.30 58.38 67.05 -18.27 43.39
Communications 333.33 -45.42 459.82 31.80 187.80
Transport 30.09 24.71 1.84 -10.90 8.81
Manufacturi ng 9.38 60.25 -29.10 -24.01 -0.46
All public corporations 64.65 26.67 19.94 -13.72 17.92
Retail Price Index Increase 17.16 15.41 11.70 6.85
Table 6.8: Percentage nominal growth in final EFLs (includine
overspendinq) over outturn of previous year, FY 1<>79-83
Sources: Derived from Public Expenditure White Papers.
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It is worth noting that beneath this apparent laxity lay originally 
much more stringent constraints which had to be relaxed in the face of 
deteriorating trends in internal finance. Table 6.9 shows the change in 
the initial EFL as stated in the Financial Statement and Budget Report 
(FSBR) relative to the previous year's outturn. Clearly, the reduction in 
annual growth rates involved much smaller nominal and real increases than 
were eventually permitted. The initial growth provisions were the result 
of the pay restraint policy and the assumptions regarding prices, internal 
finance, and the appropriate volume of expenditure that should be 
externally financed.
As stated in Chapter 4, the pay restraint policy assumptions for 
public corporations were not generally publicised. However, patchy eviden­
ce indicates that the assumptions were usually conservative. In particu­
lar, according to the Treasury, in FY 1979-80 the 5 per cent assumption
dating from the original Phase 4 policy was vastly below the actual growth
120
in pay costs of 17 per cent. In FY 1980-81, too, the assumptions were
restrictive. Sponsoring departments sent out letters to nationalised
industry chairmen in the autumn of 1979, urging them to bid for funds for
FY 1980-81 on the assumption that pay rises would be well below the current
rate of inflation of 17.5 per cent; it was hoped that pay bargaining would
121
consider expected price increases, rather than past increases.
Parenthetically, it should be said that once more this picture was not
uniform across authorities. It appeared that, particularly in the earlier
part of the period under investigation, there was significant
differentiation. Notably, in FY 1980-81 BSC's EFL afforded only 'the most
modest of pay increases', which contrasted with the NCB, which was given a
122
pay increase assumption of 20 per cent.
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Financial year beginning 1979 1980 1981 1982 1979-82
Sector
Energy and utilities 153.04 48.52 -42.67 -17.19 -2.60
Communications -52.78 -72.92 275.00 31.80 +57.97
Transport 30.09 11.13 -7.04 -8.08 +3.25
Manufacturing 9.38 -30.06 -31.89 -47.92 -25.61
All public corporations 26.38 -2.36 -15.64 -19.29 -6.95
Retail Price Index increase 17.16 15.41 11.70 6.85
Table 6.9: Percentage nominal growth in initial EFLs over outturn of
previous year, FY 1979-83
Source: Derived from Public Expenditure White Papers.
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The pay assumption constraints were reinforced by the implicit assum­
ptions regarding non-pay cost inflation and the growth of product revenue. 
First, the allowances for non-labor cost increases were inadequate. The 
deficiency was especially vast in FY 1979-80 when the public corporations
were generally working with 10 per cent allowances against cost increases
123
in practice of 17 or 18 per cent on average. For example, BAA received
124
12 per cent against an outturn of 20 per cent. FY 1980-81 also saw
125
significant underestimates, according to the Treasury.
Second, the extent to which internal finance was to rise was overesti­
mated. This caused particular hardship in FY 1980-81, for which GDP growth
of up to 2 per cent had been assumed, but when in fact GDP declined 2.7 per
126
cent. Internal resources were thereby reduced by approximately £ 1.3b.
In a similar way, the recession hit industry finances in FY 1981-82. As
early as the time of the EFL announcement, it was acknowledged by the
127
Government that economies of £0.8b would be necessary.
Quite independently of the cost inflation and output assumptions, 
pressure on finance also emanated from planned reductions in the extent to 
which corporations were permitted to raise external funds. It was intended 
that year by year authorities in the aggregate would progressively move 
towards a position where net repayments would be made. As the 1980 Public 
Expenditure White Paper put it:
this improvement reflects the Government's determination that the 
industries' investment should be strictly appraised, that their 
efficiency should be increased and that steps should be taken to 
phase out underpricing.128
In that White Paper it was planned that net repayments would begin in FY
129
1983-84, external financing having reached £2300 m. in FY 1979-80. The
following year, the plans were put back slightly, but still FY 1983-84 was
130
expected to see provisions of only £50 m. in external finance. By the
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time of the 1982 White Paper it was realised that as much as £2.6b would
probably be required in external finance in FY 1983-84; even so, this
131
entailed a reduction in external funding. Thus, while the planned cuts 
in external finance did not fully materialise due to the recession's effect 
on internal finance, there were persistent efforts to reduce it.
The initial EFLs were modified during the financial year and at its 
end to take account of financial realities. Through this, significant 
additions to external finance were made. Table 6.10 shows the net addition 
to initial EFLs each year and over the whole period FY 1979-83. Overall, 
the net increases to the public corporations were generally substantial, 
being approximately one-quarter in FY 1979-82; only FY 1982-83 saw net 
reductions in EFLs, once set.
The additions to external finance broadly reaffirmed the ranking of 
authorities that was seen in the growth of initial nominal EFLs, with the 
exception of manufacturing which fared relatively better than previously, 
due to the FY 1980-81 revision. Communications, especially BT, experienced 
relatively large increases, raising their original EFL by nearly one-half 
over the period. Energy and utilities, and manufacturing, received average 
increases, while transport was rarely given any extra funds.
Overspending tempered the force of the initial nominal growth 
constraints too, but to a lesser extent. Only in FY 1981-82 was 
overspending large, as Table 6.11 shows. Significant overspending generally 
only occurred once in each sector during the period. Energy and utility 
corporations accounted for most overspending, followed by communications, 
manufacturing, and finally, again, transport.
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Financial Year beginning 1979 1980 1981 1982 1979-82
Sector
Energy and utilities 278.26 — 88.35 -20.22 20.47
Communications 277.78 -307.69 105.61 -- 45.39
Transport — 11.25 4.55 -0.99 3.82
Manufacturing — 129.12 2.07 25.65
All public corporations 23.50 26.29 23.14 -6.44 15.80
Table 6.10: Percentage net additions to the EFLs of pub!ic corporations,
FY 1979-83
Source: Deduced from Public Expenditure White Papers.
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To summarise, external finance accounted for much of the downward 
trend in nominal financial growth in public corporations due to the pay 
restraint policy, and the inflation and revenue assumptions used in EFL 
calculations, but revisions and overspending meant that, at least until FY 
1982-83, external finance in total did not impose real constraints on 
finance.
3.1.3 Internal finance
Revenue increases softened the implications of rapidly declining 
external financial growth, but nevertheless preserved the de-escalative 
effect of pay restraint. Table 6.12 shows that the nominal growth rate in 
internal finance actually rose slightly during FY 1979-82, before declining 
in FY 1982-83. While the disaggregated picture reveals much variation, it 
is evident that, at various times, each sector saw internal revenue increase 
and offset some of the effects of the decreasing trend in external finance.
While moderating the downward trend, internal finance severely 
constrained overall real financial growth, reinforcing the real 
implications of the pay restraint policy. Table 6.13 shows that in real 
terms revenue declined in FY 1979-81, causing real total finance to 
decrease too. Real internal finance grew by only small amounts in the 
following two years, contributing to overall financial growth in FY 1981- 
82, but failing to prevent a large fall in FY 1982-83.
Over the period as a whole at a sectoral level, great differences were 
apparent. The authorities under greatest external financial pressure were 
also under the most internal financial pressure, as the last columns of 
Table 6.12 and 6.13 indicate. Transport and manufacturing saw significant 
real cuts in internal finance, while energy and utility authorities and,
347
especially, communications appeared to suffer relatively few real constraints.
Financial Year beginning 1979 1980 1981 1982 1979-82
Energy and utilities 1.74 6.64 130.80 — 24.04
Communications — 40.00 18.37 — 12.76
Transport — 0.97 5.00 0.45 1.67
Manufacturing ““ 45.90 7.45
All Public Corporations 0.09 3.44 23.14 7.90 9.03
Table 6.11: Overspending as _a percentage of final EFLs in public
corporations, FY 1978-83
Source: Deduced from Public Expenditure White Papers
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Financial Year beginning 1979 1980 1981 1982 1979-82
Sector
Energy and utilities 18.07 15.21 19.31 9.79 78.18
Communications 12.43 19.82 13.31 25.34 91.32
Transport 15.64 9.12 8.34 2.92 40.70
Manufacturi ng -1.20 18.58 15.27 -1.97 32.39
All public corporations 13.28 13.59 15.78 9.15 62.61
Table 6.12: Percentage nominal growth in revenue of pub!ic corporations,
FY 1979-83
Source: Derived from Annual Reports of public corporations.
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Financial year beginning 1979 1980 1981 1982 1979-82
Sector
Energy and utilities 0.77 -0.17 6.82 2.75 10.42
Communications -4.04 3.82 1.44 18.49 19.75
Transport 2.10 -8.37 -2.79 -4.05 -12.74
Manufacturi ng -15.67 2.75 3.20 -8.25 -17.76
All public corporations -2.65 -2.34 3.70 1.84 0.40
Table 6.13: Percentage real growth in revenue of public corporations, FY
1979-83
Source: Derived from Annual Reports of public corporations.
Underlying the buoyant nominal, but restrictive real, revenue trends 
were price increases and product demand changes. Generally speaking, rises 
in price were close to the Retail Price Index (RPI). As a result, in most 
authorities, price increases followed a decreasing trend, encouraging nomi­
nal financial growth to fall and real finance to stabilise. Three other 
dimensions of pricing behaviour modified this picture, with important 
implications for nominal and real internal finance.
First, the electricity and gas corporations were required by the Govern­
ment to price their output at higher levels tnan they would otherwise have 
charged, in order to establish relative price levels between different 
energy sources that were deemed appropriate for economic reasons. Gas 
price increases were therefore increased by an extra ten per cent each year
for three years, beginning October 1980, while electricity prices were
132
raised by an additional 5 per cent. This had the effect of bolstering
revenue growth in FY 1980-83, in spite of a falling RPI and economic recession
Second, towards the end of the period a few authorities adopted
policies which sought to freeze prices. For example, the SSEB froze prices
in FY 1982-83 (as did the whole electricity supply industry in FY 1983- 
133
84). The P0 did likewise. This accentuated the reduction in public 
corporation inflation and revenue growth in FY 1982-83.
Third, certain corporations followed their markets rather than the 
RPI. For example, BS, BSC and BAB, with an eye to the competition, freque­
ntly raised price only slightly, and in some cases actually cut price.
Thus BS complained of 'weak pricing' in its markets, while BSC was con­
scious of the need to minimise price rises until the European steelmakers
134
could agree to fix prices. Also the NC3 was anxious not to lose domes-
135
tic business to cheap foreign suppliers, such as from Australia. Domes­
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tic transport markets also saw careful pricing. For instance, BRB offered
several discount schemes aimed at particular demographic groups, such as
pensioners and students, and on certain routes at certain off-peak 
136
times. Such policies curbed price increases and helped to keep revenue 
growth down, often making it negative.
Taken together, these pricing policies also indicate some proximate 
reasons why particular authorities saw greater revenue growth than others. 
In particular, it is possible to understand the immediate reason why the 
energy and utility sector saw appreciable increases, while transport and 
manufacturing industries did not.
Contemporaneously, downward product demand trends added to the tighte­
ning of internal financial constraints. Although the growth of internal 
revenue rose slightly for a time, it was restrained by reductions in sales 
volume year by year after FY 1979-80. Also, the lower sales levels neces­
sarily implied significant real constraints, other things equal. Table 
6.14 shows the extent of the changes in sales volumes for public corpora­
tions for which data are available. As can be seen, output declined after 
1979-80, and was nearly eight per cent lower at the end of the period than 
at the beginning of FY 1979-80. FY 1980-81 saw the greatest average reduc­
tion, with 10 of the 12 industries experiencing decreases in sales. The 
following two years saw smaller volume reductions, but still eight indus­
tries (out of a total of 11 and 10 respectively) failed to increase sales.
All major sectors, bar communications, suffered volume reductions over 
the period as a whole and hence found budgets pressured from this source. 
Once again, energy and utility corporations were hurt less than transport, 
and manufacturing declined by far the most. There was much variation 
within sectors, however.
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Financial year beginning 1979 1980 1981 1982 1979-1
Industry Indicator
Energy and (average) 
utilities
2.8 -3.5 -0.5 -5.3 -6.5
NCB disposals (m.t. ) 8.1 -6.4 2.6 0.3 4.1
ESI GWH sales -0.2 -4.1 -0.1 -1.7 -6.0
NSHB units sold 2.0 -2.8 -7.1 -17.6 -24.1
SSEB units sold -0.8 -2.1 -1.1 -2.3 -6.2
BGC m. therms 5.0 -2.1 3.0 n.a. n.a.
Communications
PO letters posted 5.4 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 4.3
Transport (average) 2.8 -5.4 -5.9 -0.7 -9.1
BAB revenue passenger km. 22.2 15.9 -4.9 -3.9 29.4
BRB passenger miles 4.2 -1.0 -3.0 5.0 5.1
BWB tonne/km. traffic -1.5 -7.4 -7.3 -1.2 -16.5
NFC vehicle mileage -9.5 -27.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
NBC passenger journeys -1.3 -7.3 -8.4 -2.3 -18.5
Manufacturing
BSC deliveries (m.t.) -16.0 -9.5 12.6 -13.1 -25.6
Unweighted average 1.5 -4.4 -1.3 -3.8 -7.9
Table 6.14: Percentage sales volume growth indicators for selected pub!ic
corporations, FY 1979-83 
Source: Annual Reports of corporations.
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3.1.4 Allocation of the budget
The flexibility within public corporations1 total budgets was 
facilitated by the generally low ratio of labour to total costs. With 
ratios of between approximately 15 and 60 per cent, there was clearly scope 
for increasing pay expenditure at the expense of non-pay expenditure. The 
financial constraints duly nad less severe implications for pay in the 
capital-intensive utility and manufacturing industries and BT, while 
transport, the NCB and the P0 avoided the strictures to a lesser extent.
3.1.5 Summary
The financial context of public corporation pay bargaining was 
therefore characterised by a de-escalation in the increase of monetary 
funds available for all spending purposes. The constraints appeared to 
bite, with real financial growth generally being negative. The relatively 
low ratio of labour to total costs reduced the stringency on pay budgets, 
however, and yielded more flexibility to the average authority than in the 
public services.
The reduced nominal growth of budgets can be accounted for in terms of 
the pay restraint policy, supplemented by the price and revenue 
assumptions, which progressively tightened the EFLs; and by lower product 
prices combined with falling output. The real reductions in finance 
reflected the inability or unwillingness in some sectors to raise prices as 
much as the RPI, together with the widespread sales reductions. External 
finance, after offsetting these forces in the early period, added to them 
in FY 1982-83.
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The public corporations sector was highly differentiated. It appears 
that most of the financial factors bearing on external and internal finance 
- from pay restraint policy and other EFL assumptions to product price and 
sales - acted in unison to make the energy and utility industries and 
communications relatively free from significant constraints, and to make 
transport and, especially, manufacturing face more severe limitations.
3.2 The economic-political market environment
The tougher financial environment in which public corporations 
operated after 1979 was the joint product of the structure of, and trends 
in, political and economic markets. The government-industry political 
submarket directly retarded the growth of external finance, and, more 
indirectly, influenced the availability of internal finance and its 
allocation among budget heads. The industry political submarket affected 
internal financial growth too, but to a lesser extent. Economic markets, 
meanwhile, had a direct restraining impact on sales revenue. This section 
explains precisely how the political and economic markets produced these 
constraints.
3.2.1 The political market environment
It will be recalled that 'political' financial constraints as opposed 
to economic financial constraints, emanate from two segments of the 
political market: the government-industry submarket, including all parties 
influencing the government's policy toward public corporations; and the 
industry submarket, covering the corporations and other bodies interacting 
with them directly rather than through the government. The role of each 
submarket in financial restraint is considered in turn.
The government-industry political submarket
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External finance
The reduction in the growth of final external financial constraints 
reflected, first, the strong political market position of the Government, 
which, if anything, became more dominant after 1979, and, second, the 
attitudes of the Conservatives towards pay restraint policy and expenditure 
control. These structural and attitudinal characteristies were apparent in 
both the planning and control of external finance.
The planning of external finance
As in 1979, the primary participants in external finance decisions,
including the assumptions concerning pay and other items, were the
Government and the corporations themselves. The distribution of
responsibility for determining EFLs remained unchanged: the Government had
the ultimate authority, but allowed consultation rights to corporations
137
when their bids for government-sanctioned finance were discussed.
Although the distribution of responsibility did not change, the
power of the Government in fact increased due to changes in the timetable
for setting EFLs. Before FY 1981-82, the limits were not agreed until mid-
to late-November, by which time many authorities had already fixed their
budgets: Government decisions were therefore likely to reflect those
budgets. However, from that year tne schedule was brought forward so that
EFLs were determined in early October, often before budgeting exercises,
affording the Government a greater opportunity to establish EFLs at levels
it wished. Earlier discussions may also have increased the probability of
the inflation provision being understated, since authorities were known to
138
have more time to react and compensate.
Other parties - unions, the Nationalised Industries' Chairmen's Group
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(NICG), and Parliament - tried to increase their political market
influence, but to little avail. The unions, who had not persuaded the
Labour Government to plan relaxed EFLs for FY 1979-80 in the face of the
breakdown of Phase 4, fared no better with the new Conservative Government.
Representations were made to Ministers by individual unions, and by the TUC
through meetings under the auspices of the National Economic Development
Council and TUC industry committees. Also, a new union pressure group, the
Triple Alliance of the NUM, NUR and the ISTC, put the collective case for
the rail, steel and mining industries. Although active in campaigning for
more liberal external funding, the unions were generally not allowed any
significant role in decision-making.
It is true that the NUM was involved in discussions with the
Government and the NC8 in 1980 over the implications of EFLs for pit
closures, following a strike in the South Wales coalfield and a threat of a
country-wide strike ballot of miners. It is also the case that the outcome
was a substantially increased EFL for FY 1981-82 and the withdrawal of the
139
programme of accelerated pit closures. However, this was very much an
isolated incident, and was not to be repeated even when the issue of
accelerated pit closures resurfaced at the end of the period under study.
The NICG came to have a high profile in the political market,
representing the views of nationalised industries as a whole to 
140
Ministers. In spite of the group's visibility, it had little real
power. The Government listened to its suggestions, and, indeed, made minor
141
changes in the method of financial control in response, but ignored its
attempts to influence the planning of finance through the argument that
key, approved, investment projects had been held back due to insufficient 
142
funding.
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It should also be mentioned that, at the same time, tne CBI was active
143
in the political market, urging the curbing of public sector funding,
but there is no evidence that this significantly affected the Government's
thinking. Tne Government maintained its independence in decision-making.
In any case, it was already of the same opinion.
Finally, Parliament continued to have a marginal impact. EFLs were
announced as part of the Autumn Statement by the Chancellor, and were
debated. However, the familiar problems of debates being very general, and
voting on the Statements being along party lines, persisted. Also, EFLs
144
were often changed subsequently, only being announced in Parliament.
At the end of the period being studied, and too late to have any impact, the
Select Committee on Procedure (Finance) proposed that the EFL total be
145
subject to approval in Parliament on an amendable motion.
The Supply expenditure element in external finance - that is, the
finance which is not borrowed by corporations, mainly grants to the NCB and
BRB - was, of course, subject to the same procedures as in the public
services. But, as noted in that context, even with procedural reform in FY
1982-83, Parliament still had little power.
Given that the Government dominated the government-industry political
submarket, it was the attitudes of the Conservatives that lay behind the
plans for progressively stricter access to external finance, as embodied in
EFLs set at the beginning of the year. The aggressive approach to pay
restraint and the fiscally conservative stance of the Government in
consulting with authorities are ably illustrated by two examples from the
period. First, in September 1979 the chairman of BSC, Sir Charles
Villiers, warned the Industry Secretary, Sir Keith Joseph, that meagre EFLs
146
made a strike over pay increases likely. Joseph merely 'took note'. A
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strike duly occurred a few months later. Second, in November 1981 the BRB
was forced to submit a revised grant claim for FY 1981-82 in the face of
the deepening recession which was reducing internal finance. Although
accepted, it was expected that the claim for FY 1982-83 would 'demonstrate
that firm action has been taken on unit costs, which have been rising, and
on service levels in the light of the change in demand'. When BRB
requested a real increase in grant of £60 m, (approximately 7 per cent) the
following year, it was rejected. Instead, the grant was reduced in real 
147
terms. Such examples are profuse. For example, for FY 1982-83 the
nationalised industries’ total bids for increased finance amounted to
around £2-1/2 billion, in addition to nearly £1-1/2 billion already
included in the earlier plans. In the event, only an additional £1.3
billion of the bids were accepted and included in the EFLs at the start of 
148
the year.
The rationales for dealing with corporations in this way can be found
in the Government's attitudes towards inflation and public expenditure.
Essentially, there was concern that higher spending by nationalised
industries would either crowd-out productive private sector investment or
contribute to inflation, or both. As the Treasury asserted,
Any increase in public expenditure, either current or capital, by 
government or by nationalised industries, would, if financed in 
such a way as to avoid an increase in the money supply, involve 
some reduction in private expenditure, through the operation of 
market forces. There would be some increase in interest rates or
in the exchange rate, or some combination of both__the scale of
these effects is very uncertain, but it is unlikely that such 
crowding-out would be 100 per cent. But if there were some net 
increase in expenditure, there would be some increase in 
inflationary pressures. Hence it is necessary to avoid both any 
"crowding-out" effect and higher inflationary pressures by 
offsetting any increases in capital expenditure by nationalised 
industries by reductions in current expenditure.149
The differences in external financial constraints between corporations
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did not only appear to reflect economic constraints, such as industry 
growth prospects, investment requirements, and inescapable deficiencies in 
internal finance, but also a pragmatic posture on the part of the 
Government in recognition of the power of the unions in each industry to 
mount damaging industrial action. It was certainly this which led the 
Government to establish a more generous initial EFL for the NCB in FY 1981- 
82, as explained earlier. The deteriorating steel market probably also 
figured in Sir Keith Joseph's low pay inflation assumption for 8SC cited 
above, and his reluctance to change the EFL even under pressure: he did 
not seem to believe that there would be strike action, or if there was, 
that it would have significant economic consequences.
The control of external finance
The Government also retained its strong position in the political 
process of controlling external finance to within the EFLs. If EFL 
revisions were to be made or overspending was to occur, it could only 
happen with the acquiescence of the Government.
As in 1979, all external finance was provided by or through the
Government. (It is true that some authorities raised finance through the
sale of shares during the period as part of the privatisation programme,
150
but in doing so they removed themselves from the public sector.)
External finance was completely subject to EFLs. Aiding control, each 
corporation had a separate EFL.
151
The rules of the EFL system remained largely intact. Authorities 
could not expect to obtain relaxed EFLs automatically. It was required 
that offsetting measures be taken, such as price increases or offsetting 
economies, before a revision of EFLs could be countenanced.
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One change was made to the rules, but it did not amount to a 
significant loss of control. Following NICG representations, the 
Government agreed to allow some end-of-year flexibility with effect from FY
1981-82. Extra borrowing of one per cent of forecast turnover and fixed
152
investment expenditure was permitted. Control was not lost for several 
reasons. One, the amounts concerned were comparatively small. Two, the 
amount had to be deducted from the EFL for the following year. Three, 
there was an explicit assumption that the flexibility would be used to 
avoid disruption arising from short-term factors, such as the timing of 
payments, rather than wage increases with long-term implications. Finally, 
the flexibility was subject to clearance by Departments.
Supporting the official rules, periodic returns continued to be made
to the sponsoring department and the Treasury as part of the monitoring
process. During the 1979-83 period, the Government's position in this
respect was strengthened. Partly it was the result of a 1981 review of the
monitoring process, which led to organisational changes to improve the
153
monitoring capabilities of the Departments and the Treasury. Partly, 
also, the process was generally more effective due to greater experience of 
managing EFLs.
As a result of the political market structure pertaining to the 
control of finance, only the Government's attitudes were relevant. Since 
there were many revisions to EFLs and a degree of overspending, it might be 
thought that the Government was not wholeheartedly behind the reduction of 
inflation and public spending. However, this would be a misreading of the 
situation. The Government relaxed the EFL constraints due to the largely 
unavoidable effects of recession on internal finance, which was quite 
within the rules of EFL operation. The pay restraint policy was strictly
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adhered to. It was not a case of accommodating the profligacy of public
corporations. In practice, the Government required that authorities in
difficulties exhausted all internal options before consenting to change the
EFL. For instance, in FY 1980-81, costs grew faster than expected, output
less than assumed, causing a deterioration o f £1.3 billion in the internal
resources of corporations. The Government was only prepared to offset 40 
154
per cent of this. Hence the magnitude of the relaxation of EFLs should
be interpreted as demonstrating the toughness of the Government, rather 
than its weakness.
Internal finance
While the Government was using its dominant position in the 
government-industry political submarket to de-escalate the growth of 
external finance, it used its existing powers, as well as some new powers, 
to suppress the growth of internal finance and thereby reinforce the 
pressures on pay determination. This contrasts with the mid-1979 situation 
when the Labour Government possessed many of the same options but chose not 
to use them to control internal revenue, even after the breakdown of the 
counter-inflationary policy.
Nevertheless, the political market structure continued to be
characterised by a role for the Government that was less dominating than in
the public services, due to the arm's-length nature of government-industry
relationships. The Government had no power to control revenue or price
directly. Indeed, it abolished the Price Commission with the Competition 
155
Act of 1980. Instead, as before, the Government's influence was 
indirect, relying on powers that were primarily intended to regulate other 
aspects of corporation behaviour.
362
One of the most influential political market mechanisms used by the 
Conservative Government to control internal finance was its power to 
legislate economic market structure. A series of pieces of legislation was 
passed, liberalising competition in various product markets, especially in 
the transport sector, but also in the energy, utility and communications 
industries. The intention was, inter alia, to keep prices down.
In transport, the 1980 Transport Act relaxed the licensing of long­
distance coach services. As a result, competition grew, so that by the end
156
of the period, over 100 new express coach services had been started.
The NBC and BRB were obliged to price more competitively. The 1980 Civil
Aviation Act, meanwhile, liberalised air transport licensing, creating more 
157
competition for BAB. The Government also succeeded in increasing access
to routes, such as the London-Hong Kong route, which was opened to private
carriers. Greater competition in the Western European market was also 
158
sought.
Elsewhere, changes in market structure were introduced, but were less 
far-reaching. In the communications sector, competition was increased in 
three ways. First, BT was split off from the P0 by the British 
Telecommunications Act 1981, so that the postal service and the telephone 
industry competed with each other. Second, the Government used its powers 
under the 1953 Post Office Act to relax the PO's monopoly over time- 
sensitive mail and Christmas cards with effect from November 1981.
159
However, the revenue at risk was only one or two per cent of the total.
Third, in February 1982, a 25-year license was granted to Mercury, to
compete with BT, but no real competition was expected for at least five 
160
years. It should be said that while these changes were of comparatively 
minor importance during 1979-83, the Industry Secretary threatened to use
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f'ls monopoly derogation powers further if the performance of the PO was 
161
inadequate.
In the utilities sector, the Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act 1982
abolished the 86C monopoly over the supply of gas: private companies were
allowed to supply gas to industrial consumers using the BGC pipeline 
162
network. The 1983 Energy Act removed restrictions on the supply and
163
generation of electricity by private companies. However, these measures
did not have significant implications in the period.
Of more widespread importance was the Government's use of performance
targets in a manner that controlled finances more closely than hitherto.
Although notionally the targets were jointly determined with authorities,
in practice in 1979-83 the Government was dominant in the process. It
adopted tougher attitudes, mainly to ensure financial targets were not met
164
by reducing services or raising prices. First, it required most
authorities, rather than a selection, to establish targets.
Second, the primary concern was no longer with service levels, but
with economic indicators, such as price and cost trends, which had greater
implications for revenue. For example, the PO was set the target of
keeping price increases below the RPI over the period 1978-79 to 1982- 
165
83. Towards the end of the period BT was given a target price increase
166
below the RPI, to be achieved over a five year period. In these cases,
prices were directly influenced. More common, however, was the
establishment of targets in terms of real unit costs, which indirectly
reduced the need for greater finance. For instance, BGC was asked to
reduce the real net trading costs per therm of gas sold by five per cent
167
between 1980-81 and 1982-83.
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targets. For example, tne BRB target was set only just within the limits
168
that the Chairman believed achievable. Another illustration is the fact
that during the period some targets were renegotiated so as to be more
restricting. For instance, the PO had been aiming to keep real unit costs
stable between 1977-78 and 1982-83, but was then told to reduce real unit
169
costs by 5 per cent between 1981-82 and 1984-85. Similarly, the Energy
Department wanted the Electricity Council to increase its target from a 3
per cent real unit cost reduction between 1982-83 and 1984-85 to a 4.25 per 
170
cent cut.
Fourth, the monitoring process appeared more sophisticated. Instead
of relying on public pressure upon publication of the annual reports, it
became typical for quarterly departmental monitoring and dialogue to occur.
Sometimes targets could not be achieved due to inescapable factors, such as
volume reductions which increased unit costs in spite of economies having
been made. However, in some cases of non-achievement, the Government
adjusted future targets to oblige authorities to offset past performance:
this was the case with the PO, for example.
The Government did not just use market structure and rules of conduct
to prevent large price increases, it also used informal pressure and
judicious Board appointments. Informal pressure - referred to by Sir Peter
Parker as 'government by nudge and fudge' - was preferred to the use of 
171
directives. Many more meetings were held between Chairmen of public 
corporations and Ministers under the Conservative Government than had been 
held under Labour. In the first 16 months of the Conservative's first term 
of office, Sir William Barlow met the Secretary of State 19 times and the 
Minister of State 12 times (excluding social gatherings), compared with 4
Third, the Government was a tough negotiator and set stringent
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and 3 times respectively in 18 months under Labour. Pricing policy was
no doubt prominent given the public criticism of pricing by Ministers.
Board appointments were carefully made to make the nationalised
industries more responsive to the Government's formal and informal
instructions. This was made possible by a somewhat stronger Government
position in the political market in this respect. First, the Government
paid less heed to the advice of other interested groups. For instance,
there was no consultation with the unions, although under Labour some had 
173
provided input. Also, in the appointment of Water Authority Board
174
members, local authority powers to make nominations were curtailed.
Second, the Government was more able to recruit who it wanted because it
withdrew nationalised industry board members from the purview of the Top
175
Salaries' Review Body, and paid market rates.
The outstanding example of an appointment to ensure fiscally
conservative policies were followed was, of course, Mr. Ian McGregor, the
Chairman of BSC, and, later, the NCB. But in fact widespread changes in
personnel occurred - 14 of 24 Chairmen being replaced between January 1978
and January 1981 - allowing the Government to install executives favourably
176
disposed to the Conservatives' policy. Apart from Chairmen, Board
members were typically drawn from private sector business to a greater
extent, often from finance or accounting functions. Many were part-timers,
which had the effect of reducing the tendency of members to feel a 'client
relationship' towards the industry, and of increasing their ability to take
177
harsh financial decisions.
These political market controls were already available to the 
Government at the beginning of the period. With the 1980 Competition Act 
they were complemented by yet another: the Monopolies and Mergers
172
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Commission (MMC). The Secretary of State was empowered
to refer nationalised industries and other public undertakings 
to the MMC for an investigation into their efficiency and costs 
and into any possible abuse by these public sector bodies of 
their monopoly power which might work adversely for the 
consumers.178
The MMC made a positive albeit limited contribution to revenue 
179
control in the period. First, some investigations involved specific
analyses of competition and pricing, and, increasingly, attention was
directed at efficiency, management and control, and finance. The primary
focus, however, was on quality of service, investment appraisal,
and manpower and industrial relations. Second, the MMC reports of 1980-83
covered several public corporations, but at the same time, inquiries were
not conducted in many others due to the scheduling problems which allowed
only one investigation in each industry every four years. Third, the
recommendations of the MMC appeared to be heeded, at least in part, by the
corporations. This reflected positive corporation attitudes and close
Departmental monitoring. For example, the Post Office accepted all but
four of the MMC's 45 recommendations, and their implementation was
encouraged by Departmental scrutiny and the setting of more ambitious 
180
performance targets.
Not all the Government's actions in the political market retarded
internal financial growth, however. Importantly, although financial
targets constrained pay budgets by limiting the disbursement of finance,
they actually increased the need to raise additional revenue, other things
being equal. Using the powers it possessed in mid-1979, the Government
adopted a more demanding posture, requiring more authorities to negotiate 
181
financial targets. In some cases, such as electricity, the targets were
182
imposed rather than negotiated.
of return above previous levels. For example, the Yorkshire Electricity
Board saw its target increased from 0.6 per cent on average net assets in
FY 1979-80 to an average of 1.61 per cent for the three years FY 1980-81 to 
183
1982-83. Meanwhile the CEGB saw an increase from between 1 and 1.5 per 
184
cent to 1.8 per cent. As a result, there was upward pressure on prices.
The effects of this attitude were reinforced by other policies. One
was to increase the targets of BGC and the ESI so as to raise gas and
electricity prices to economic levels. As indicated in the delineation of
the financial constraints in the previous section, gas prices were 10 per
cent greater than inflation each year for the three years FY 1980-81 to FY
1982-83 in order to achieve an average 9 per cent return on net assets
185
employed, valued at current cost. Meantime, the Electricity Council had
to raise prices by 5 per cent more than inflation each of the three years
186
so as to earn a 1.8 per cent return on average net assets.
The switch to current cost definitions of financial targets also
effectively increased prices. With costs stated at higher levels than
historic costs, more revenue was needed to meet the targets. For example,
the South Wales Electricity Board was obliged to raise tariffs by an extra
187
4.6 per cent upon adoption of current cost accounting.
While the medium-term financial targets promoted higher prices, it
should be said that this was limited somewhat by the frequent failure of
corporations to meet the targets in a given year. This was partly due to
economic market exigencies, and partly because the Government attached more
188
importance to EFLs than to financial targets. It was not so much a 
function of institutional deficiencies in monitoring and remedying the 
evolving situation.
In fixing the targets the Government's policy was to increase the rate
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Expenditure
Although most of the Government's attention was focused on restricting 
external and internal finance, it was also addressed to the allocation of 
finance between competing uses: the proportion available for pay purposes 
was not simply technologically determined, it was also influenced by the 
political market.
First, the financial targets pre-empted funds. In attempting to 
attain the targets, authorities had to withhold substantial sums of money 
from revenue. Second, since most authorities had targets cast in terms of 
real unit cost growth (or decline), performance targets put limits on the 
extent to which budgets could be increased simply to finance cost 
increases. Third, corporate plans agreed with the Government stated the 
levels of investment that had been approved. Industries and Government 
alike were reluctant to see investment curtailed in order to fund pay 
increases, although there is evidence that this occurred. In addition, 
commitments made historically in the political market added constraints.
For example, the NCB was obliged to make payments to miners under the 
voluntary early retirement scheme, and cover other social costs. Taken 
together, these factors constrained pay budgets to a greater or lesser 
extent, depending on the political and technical context of the authority 
concerned.
The industry political submarket
In comparison with the government-industry submarket, the industry sub- 
market, containing the individual corporation together with bodies and 
organisations with which it interacted independently of government, was of 
relatively minor importance to the growth trends in internal finance and
369
First, the nationalised industry consumer councils were weak. Being
consultative, the machinery lacked real power because industries were free
to reject recommendations. A Department of Trade report in 1982 indicated
that the Government planned to give more guidance to make them more
189
effective, and was considering the introduction of legislation.
However, little progress was made during the period under study. The
Energy Act 1983 gave statutory status to the Electricity Consumer's
Council, perhaps increasing its power, but it was too late to have
consequences for the last pay round under investigation.
As a result of the strong political market position of the
corporations, there were few noteworthy instances of consumer
pressure preventing price increases. For example, following
representations from the Domestic Coal Consumers' Council the November 1980
coal price increases were limited to modest levels, only partly covering 
190
cost increases. Even here, the NCB was obliged to raise price by a
191
further 8 per cent the next January in order to fund the new pay award.
Secondly, in only a limited number of cases did public corporations 
interact with each other to produce agreements of a political nature 
relating to price and output that might not have been strictly justifiable 
on competitive grounds. The NCB secured agreements with the CEGB and BSC 
to make the coal market more secure in the face of rising imports of coal 
made economic by the strong pound and low-cost foreign producers. In 
October 1979 the CEGB agreed to a five-year understanding involving the
192
supply of at least 75 million tonnes a year at prices linked to the RPI.
193
BSC agreed to limit coking coal imports to 4 million tonnes in 1980.
Through these agreements the NCB managed to stabilise its real revenues
thus to tne explanation of the overall financial constraints on corporations.
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Meanwhile, BSC and European Community steel producers agreed a series
of crisis measures through Eurofer. Essentially, a voluntary cartel
established minimum prices and output quotas until it began to crumble in 
194
late 1980. Quotas were established through the EEC from July 1981, and,
at the end of December 1982, Guidance Prices were set at levels existing
195
earlier in the year before a major decline in the market. At the same 
time, the EEC attempted, on behalf of producers, to stem the flow of non- 
Community imports, but this was not successful in the depths of the 
recession.
3.2.2 The economic market environment
The retardation of the growth of internal finance, and the consequent 
supplementation of constraints imposed by pay policy and other external 
financial forces, were not just a product of politically-determined 
indirect constraints on price increases. They were also a consequence of 
economic influences on product market structure and demand trends. Also, 
the economic market environment, in conjunction with legislative influences 
on market structure, was largely responsible for the pattern of internal 
financial constraints across authorities.
Economic market structure
Finance was subject to more control during the 1979-83 period with the 
emergence of more competitive product market structures. Partly these 
arose due to the political decisions of the Conservative Government, 
especially in the transport sector, but competition also increased for 
other reasons. The sectors where the most significant changes occurred for 
non-political reasons were transport and manufacturing, where the market
somewnat a n d  avoid more ..ustere mceriial financial constraints.
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structure was not wholly determined by the Government, but was open to 
overseas competition.
In the manufacturing sector, BSC suffered greater competition due to
the growth of supply from countries outside the U.S. and Europe. There was
already vast overcapacity in the EEC itself. Hence when the cartel
arrangements were weak, BSC was forced to price at low levels. Even then,
BSC lost two-thirds of its export business because it found sales were
196
unprofitable at ruling prices. Meanwhile, BS too faced increased
competition from the Third World, the Far East, and Japan. Notably, in
spite of excess capacity in the merchant shipbuilding industry, there was a
continued expansion of shipbuilding capacity in the Far East. The tactics
used by such countries were extremely competitive, including dumping
supplies on markets at less than cost. Far Eastern selling prices were
admitted to be 15-20 per cent below costs, while EEC costs were about 35
197
per cent above Far Eastern prices in FY 1982-83.
In the transport sector, the airline industry became more competitive
independently of domestic political decisions. In particular, deregulation
198
in the U.S. paved the way for more competition on transatlantic routes. 
Fares were duly affected.
The differences in internal financial growth were partly due to the 
sectoral variations in market concentration. Other things equal, the 
energy and utilities and communications sectors, facing little competition, 
even after the structural changes of the period, were able to raise revenue 
relatively easily. The transport industries, as in 1979, had less market 
power than the utilities and communications corporations; and, by the end 
of the period, following airline deregulation and political decisions 
concerning market structure, they found their relative market power reduced
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further. Manufacturing remained the least monopolistic, economic forces 
having increased competition. For these reasons, the transport and 
manufacturing sectors found it relatively difficult to raise revenue.
Economic market trends
It will be recalled that internal financial growth was restrained by 
deteriorating sales trends, among other things. More competitive market 
structures may have been part of the cause, but market trends were also of 
independent relevance. The decline in sales volumes was primarily a 
demand-side phenomenon in the product market, rather than due to supply- 
side constraints, (although there were odd instances of strikes restricting 
sales). The demand trends had two main components: first, there was a 
cyclical decline in sales, especially to industry; and, second, in some 
sectors there was a downward secular trend. The decreases in output were 
moderated where demand was more oriented to domestic consumers whose demand 
was relatively income-inelastic; where corporations were in the non­
manufacturing sector rather than the manufacturing sector; and where tastes 
were increasingly favouring the product.
Manufacturing corporations felt the full effect of the trend and 
cyclical forces. BSC was severely hit by de-industrialisation trends in 
the vehicle industry and mechanical engineering brought on by rising 
imports. For example, in 1979, the growth of car imports reduced BSC sales 
of steel to the car industry by 120,000 tonnes. Even more was lost in
sales to suppliers of the car industry in construction, machine tools and
199
other metal-using industries. At the same time, there was a cyclical
decline in sales of steel and ships due to the slump in manufacturing
industry generally and in world trade. Additionally, the strong pound made
200
sales sluggish, especially in FY 1980-81.
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The transport industries, which saw smaller sales declines, also
suffered from long- and short-term factors. With de-industrialisation and
the growth of service industries, freight transport was less necessary.
Compounding this, the recession reduced demand temporarily. Not only did
business demand fall significantly, but also domestic demand because the
income elasticity of domestic consumer demand was high. Thus BRB
complained that freight traffic fell due to the recession, while falling
personal disposable income caused leisure travel to be curtailed and
201
unemployment reduced season ticket sales. BAB experienced both lower
202
business and personal travel. NBC, being wholly domestic consumer-
oriented, found that unemployment and part-time work reduced workweek 
203
travel. BWB saw freight traffic decline, and pleasure craft use was 
204
unable to offset it.
The energy and utility industries lost sales, but at a slower rate
than in transport, mainly because the income elasticity of demand of
domestic consumers was not as great. There was a secular movement towards 
205
conservation, and industrial consumption fell in the recession, but this
was moderated by the smaller decline in domestic energy use. For example,
in the electricity supply industry, lower manufacturing output reduced
sales of electricity by 8.4 per cent in FY 1980-81, and by 1.7 and 2.2 per
cent in the following two years. However, overall sales only fell by 4.1,
0.1 and 1.7 per cent respectively, due to the effect of domestic consumer 
206
demand.
In contrast to other sectors, the communications sector experienced 
relatively buoyant demand due to secular trends towards greater 
communications, especially in telephone usage. To be sure, the industrial 
recession reduced the sales growth rate below that expected, but domestic
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demand and the trend increase compensated somewhat.
3.2.3 Summary
Having shown the joint importance of the political and economic market 
environments, factor by factor, it is worth summarising the major 
influences on, first, external finance, and, second, internal finance.
The progressively lower nominal growth rate of external finance, and 
eventual real decline, was solely due to political market forces. The 
structure of the market gave the Government significant power over 
corporations through the system for financial planning and control. As a 
result, the financial trends reflected the Government's pay restraint 
policy as well as its public expenditure objectives, modified by the force 
of recessionary pressures on internal finance.
The internal financial trends - the real decline and the (hesitant) 
nominal growth reductions - were due to both political and economic forces. 
Price increases were indirectly restrained by political decisions by 
Government: of particular importance were policies towards market 
structure and performance targets, aided by informal pressure, judicious 
appointments, and the MMC. The economic causes of greater competition in 
transport and manufacturing were relevant too. Output declined for most of 
the period due to the economic and political forces behind the more 
competitive market structures, and the secular and cyclical economic trends 
in most markets.
Within the slower-growing budgets, flexibility diminished. Larger 
financial targets, and performance targets, which were levelled more closely 
at particular costs were primarily responsible. Even so, there was 
generally more flexibility than in the public services.
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Variations occurred across corporations for botii political and 
economic reasons too. In the political market, the Government favoured the 
energy and communications sectors more than transport and manufacturing in 
choosing how fast to increase external finance. Transport also suffered 
most from the Government's deregulation policies. In the economic market, 
the structural changes and demand trends reaffirmed the hierarchy of 
stringency.
4. Synthesis and Conclusions 
4.1 A schematic synthesis
The essential arguments of this chapter are that the period 1979-83 
saw financial budgets increase at progressively slower rates, frequently 
involving real cuts or minimal growth; and that the explanation lay 
predominantly in the powerful role the Government played in the centre- 
periphery political markets, which facilitated the implementation of a 
strict cash limits pay restraint policy and the imposition of complementary 
constraints on governmental and non-governmental finance; while in other 
political and economic markets, authorities were constrained by 
governmental rules on finance and by market prices and demand.
Table 6.15 summarises the intensity of the constraints and their 
economic and political market sources in 1979-83 and how the picture 
differed from mid-1979. As in Table 3.1, which showed the situation in 
mid-1979, the structural and attitudinal characteristics of the centre- 
periphery political market, together with the labour-total cost ratio, 
appear on one dimension, while the pertinence and structure of, and trends 
in, other markets are on the other dimension. Again, the nearer an 
authority is to the upper left-hand quadrant, the more constrained it is.
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The arrows show how the constraints changed between mid-1979 and the end of 
the period under study.
The constraints of 1979-83 were clearly tougher than in mid-1979, as 
the upward and leftward directions of the arrows indicate. The ultimate 
reasons for the increased stringency included the change from negotiated 
outcomes to unilateral Government control and/or the change of attitude 
towards tight restrictions in the centre-periphery political market. The 
upward direction of the arrows represents this. At the same time, other 
markets became more competitive or exhibited adverse trends, as the 
leftward-pointing arrows demonstrate.
Differentiating between authorities, central government was most 
tightly controlled. The Government unilaterally and stringently limited 
finance in the centre-periphery market. It was particularly influential 
due to the lack of access to other markets and the high proportion of 
labour costs in total costs.
Local authorities were constrained, but not by quite as much as 
central government. In spite of a notional negotiating relationship in the 
centre-periphery market, the Government's tough attitudes prevailed with 
little effective debate. Offsetting this, particularly earlier in the 
period, the local authorities were able to exploit their monopolistic 
position vis-a-vis the electorate and raise finance from the rates. This 
became a less viable option with nominal expenditure targets.
It is evident from the table that the public corporations included 
some authorities which were approximately as constrained as local 
authorities, while others were appreciably less shackled, although still 
distinct from the private sector. All public corporations enjoyed a 
negotiating relationship with Government, in which the latter was generally
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as aggressive as elsewnere in the public sector. In manufacturing and 
certain transport industries, the pressure on finance was enhanced by 
competitive product markets, frequently with depressed demand and a high 
ratio of labour to total costs. In the communications, energy and 
utilities, and other transport industries, the market structure afforded 
more monopoly power, markets were not usually as depressed, and capital- 
intensive production was more common.
4.2 Economic-political environments and pay increases
There is an obvious correlation between the financial constraints on 
budgets generated by the economic-political market environments and pay 
increases in the 1979-83 period. It has been demonstrated that budgets 
increased less and less in nominal terms, often with little real growth, at 
the same time that pay increases were de-escalating. Also, the rank order 
of authorities in terms of financial constraints bore great resemblance to 
that in terms of pay increases: communications and energy and utilities 
fared relatively well, while transport and manufacturing did not.
It would seem highly probable therefore that the pay restraint policy, 
along with other financial constraints, was a causal influence in the 
diminution of public sector pay inflation in the period. However, this 
does not amount to conclusive evidence: it has to be shown that 
negotiators were reacting to the budgetary constraints rather than other 
factors. To this end, the investigation must assess the role of the 
institutional context and bargaining strategy more generally before final 
conclusions can be drawn.
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During the 1979-33 era of the cash limits pay restraint strategy, pay 
bargaining came under pressure not only from the austere financial 
environment, but also from the institutional environment. In mid-1979, at 
the inception of the strategy, it will be recalled that there were numerous 
aspects of the institutional environment that were inflationary: 
particularly the organisation of management, formal comparability criteria, 
and the access to third parties. While certain of these features remained 
in existence during the following four years, the general character of the 
institutional environment became progressively more conducive to the 
control of pay rises. In the same way that the financial constraints of 
the period had an uneven effect, the institutions of pay determination 
constrained some groups more than others.
This chapter explores the role of the institutional environment in 
facilitating lower pay increases in the major areas of the public sector 
during the period. Sections 1 to 3 show the ways in which the organisation 
of management and unions, bargaining structure, and pay determination 
procedures appeared to contribute to lower public sector wage inflation. 
Section 4 attempts to explain the reasons for the more stringent 
environment.
1. Management and Union Organisation
Within a given financial context, pay negotiations can produce 
different outcomes depending on the organisation of management and unions 
As the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 hypothesized, and as Chapter 3 
demonstrated regarding mid-1979, of key importance is the horizontal and 
vertical power distribution within the parties, as determined by 
organisational structures and processes such as the formal and informal
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allocation of responsibilities, communication channels and control 
mechanisms. This section considers the distribution of power, first within 
management, and second on the union side, and its role in public sector pay 
determination during 1979-83.
1.1 Management organisation
There is considerable evidence that the downward pressure on pay rises 
was associated with a stronger degree of control of pay determination, both 
vertically and horizontally, within public sector organisations. Further, 
the generally more stringent control of central and local government pay 
bargaining relative to public corporations appears related to the variation 
in pay increases.
1.1.1 Central government
In mid-1979 negotiators in the central government sector operated in a 
context of strong vertical control by Ministers, but weaker horizontal 
control by other groups in management. The next four years saw even more 
intense vertical control, and more significant horizontal control 
throughout the subsector. Overall, central government bargaining was 
controlled more by management organisation than were local authorities or 
public corporations.
The formal role of Cabinet Ministers in central government pay 
determination was nothing new: through departmental representatives, the 
Government was able to influence negotiations in the civil service and 
NHS, as well as those involving university teachers. What was a departure 
from past practice was the greater informal use made of this facility in 
order to curb pay increases. The Government gained in power at the expense 
of the management at the bargaining table.
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In the civil service, as previously, it was the remit of tne CSD
(and later the Treasury) to give effect to the intentions of Ministers, but
1
Ministers clearly controlled the actions of the CSD more closely. In the
first place, Ministers ensured that the CSD took a hard line. Before
negotiations, prospective offers had to be submitted for Ministerial
approval. An example of the tough stance of Ministers emerged in the early
stages of the industrial civil service negotiations in CL2 when the
Minister concerned demanded a lower initial offer than the CSD had been
intending to make. The rationale was to avoid upsetting local authority
2
negotiations that were proceeding. The preoccupation with keeping public
service settlements broadly in line with each other, in order to avoid any
escalation, was a recurrent theme in government intervention, as will be
evident in the discussion of other authorities.
Secondly, Ministers frequently circumvented the CSD and other relevant
Government departments altogether. Although the Ministry of Defence (MoD)
was the major employer in the industrial civil service, and was represented
on the Management Side in negotiations, the Lord President of the Council
and the Prime Minister had a tendency to determine the course of
3
negotiations without consulting MoD. Also, in the non-industrial civil
service the Lord President played a highly visible role. In CL2 he
responded personally to the unions' claim, suspended the pay research
4
process, and made offers throughout the strike.
In the NHS, as with the civil service, the formal involvement of 
Ministers remained the same, with a senior DHSS official representing 
Ministerial views in negotiations and the Minister retaining the right to 
veto agreements. However, within this framework Ministerial input was 
more significant, in spite of persistent protestations that Ministers would
stand back. For example, in spite of tne supposed prerogative of the NHS
Management Side members to determine budget allocations to pay, after due
consultation, with constituent authorities, DHSS representatives let it be
known that Ministers would be unlikely to countenance any offer above the
pay factor. The chief concerns were 'knock-on' effects elsewhere in the
6
public sector and the real level of patient services. Other instances of
Ministerial involvement abound. The Secretary of State for Social Services
handled the CL3 negotiations and strike personally, meeting the unions and 
7
announcing offers. At other times, Ministers issued statements saying
that it would be inappropriate for health authorities to reduce services in
8
order to finance pay increases. Also, the Prime Minister herself spoke 
directly to the Review Body on Doctors' and Dentists' Renumeration (DDRB),
9
impressing on them the inability of the economy to afford large increases.
It should be added that this is not to imply that health authorities wished
to pay above the pay factor - indeed, the Regional Whitley Council briefing10
groups were firmly against it in most regions - but that the main source
of downward pressure in negotiations emanated from the Government.
University academic negotiations also felt the influence of
Government. The DES representatives in Committee B firmly refused to allow
increases over 7 per cent in CL2, although the universities believed they
could afford it. The worry was that it might prejudice the
Government's position in the civil service negotiations. In the end, a
staged, 19-month, deal was allowed, but the initial instalment was only 7 
11
per cent.
While the general pattern was one of greater Ministerial power in 
negotiations, there were parts of central government where Ministerial 
influence was less far-reaching. During university non-academic staff
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negotiations, the Universities' Council for Non-Teaching Staffs (UCNS) was
in communication with the DES, but the Government had no formal role in pay
determination. As a result, UCNS retained the initiative, subject to the
12
wishes of the universities. Elsewhere, fringe bodies were frequently
able to avoid Government influence. For example, the Atomic Energy
Authority (AEA) met the Department of Energy and the Treasury to hear the
Government's views on pay. While senior AEA management generally wished to
respect the Government's wishes, they were prepared to evade control when
necessary. In CL2, for instance, the October settlement was reached before
the cash limits pay factor had been finalised. Negotiators knew that the
Government was aiming for 'single figures', and 9 per cent was offered.
The Energy Department sent a letter asking that the offer be withdrawn,
but, conveniently, the letter was not opened until after the offer had been 
13
accepted.
At the same time that vertical control was increasing, horizontal
control of negotiators by representatives of other management functions and
by other negotiators became more significant. In the civil service, the
Treasury gained power. The major institutional change was the abolition of
the CSD and the consequent transfer of responsibility for civil service pay
to the Treasury. The intention was to increase financial awareness: as
the Prime Minister said, 'Those sections of the CSD (being transferred)
will now be closely in tune and in touch with policy changes on resources 
14
and control'. Certainly, management side arguments became strongly 
market-oriented. Also, the Treasury's stringent attitude was plain to see 
in Government evidence to the Megaw Inquiry, which, it is alleged, it 
'beefed up' by, for example, misrepresenting the trend in civil service pay 
relative to analogues, (by taking a distorted sample), in order to make the
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pay research system appear unduly expensive.
In the NHS too, the finance function played a greater role. More
Treasurers were included in Management Sides, and it was reported that the
Chairmen of Management Sides referred to them much more. Whitley Council
members were said to report back to health authority Treasurers to a
greater degree than before. In the DHSS itself, the Finance Division
15
checked the costing of items being negotiated.
In addition, management negotiators controlled each other to a 
greater extent. Management Side Chairmen met monthly under a senior DHSS 
official. The Secretaries also met. The objective in each case was to 
proceed more in accord so as to minimise damage that might result from a 
lack of coordination.
Three issues tended to arise in meetings in relation to the
control of NHS pay. First, costing practices were discussed. To avoid unions
exploiting differences, they were standardised.
Second, the scope for redistributing funds between Whitley Councils
was determined at this level, as individual councils could not presume it
to exist. The policy was to reject petitions for redistribution in order to
avoid prompting inflationary counter-claims based on upset relativities.
It was realised that these would be all the more likely in a period of
17
declining real incomes. (It is true that differential increases emerged 
in CL3 and 4 but this was due to Ministerial intervention rather than 
management strategy).
Third, the joint committees of Chairmen and Secretaries examined the 
repercussions of offers in individual bargaining units for other Whitley 
Councils. Where there was a danger of pay escalation, offers could not be 
made. For example, in CL2 the Whitley Council for ancillary staffs wanted
15
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tto maintain a link with the local authority manual workers. This involved
7.5 per cent increases financed out of a 5.2 per cent increase in the pay
bill. The idea, in that form, was rejected by the committee because rival
claims of 7.5 per cent would have had more profound effects on the pay
18
bills of other Councils. That these internal management controls were
effective was attested to by a union official who complained Whitley
19
Councils could no longer be 'picked off'.
The power of NHS negotiators was also circumscribed by the division of
responsibility for pay-fixing and day-to-day management by health
authorities. Although regional representatives on Whitley Councils were
formally free to agree to increases above the pay factor, they were very
reluctant to do so. A common attitude was that 'it was not for the Whitley
Councils to manage the NHS' by requiring local management to find savings
20
to fund pay settlements.
In the university sector, a major development occurred: the Finance
and General Purposes Committee (FGPC) of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors
and Principals (CVCP) gained overall financial control of bargaining for
non-academic staff. Previously, UCNS had no cause to take note of the
FGPC, but after the reform, as intended, it became painfully aware of
financial considerations. The FGPC decided the sum to be offered on the
basis of a CVCP secretariat paper concerning the likely income and
expenditure of universities, including the probable Government spending for
21
the following financial year. There was little consultation with UCNS,
22
although UCNS did begin to submit more papers to the FGPC. The outcome
was that bargaining was more tightly constrained. Management side members
remarked that the FGPC did not understand bargaining, while a union
23
official characterised offers as random.
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1.1.2 Local authorities
Bargaining in the local authorities sector was less controlled by 
management organisation than was central government bargaining.
Nevertheless, significant increases in vertical and horizontal control were 
seen.
The vertical distribution of power between the Government and LACSAB 
and its management negotiators favoured the Government more than in mid- 
1979. First of all, where the Government was represented on the 
negotiating body, as with teaching and the police, while there were no 
formal organisational changes, the Government assumed a more powerful role.
It used its powers more aggressively to enforce its wish to contain 
increases.
In teaching, the DES was prepared to limit pay increases on behalf of
the Government. In CL2, the Secretary of State had indicated to the DHSS
members that 7-1/2 per cent was the maximum he was prepared to see offered,
24
but, as negotiators did not want to go further, the veto was not used. The
following year a 5.9 per cent offer was vetoed before arbitration 
25
occurred. In CL4, according to the National Union of Teachers (NUT), the
DES would have vetoed increases over 5 per cent, so 4.98 per cent was 
26
agreed.
In July 1981 the Home Office, against the wishes of the Association of 
County Councils (ACC) on the Police Negotiating Board, proposed that there 
be 'an examination of the case for changes to the level at which the link
was made, the method by which the link was established, or the pay
27
structure'. The Government clearly had the objective of lower pay rises 
in mind.
More generally, where the Government had no direct role in
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negotiations, it used informal channels to attempt to exercise influence
over managements' stances. It met with LACSAB at the beginning of each
28
round to make government policy clear. Frequent calls were made to
LACSAB to monitor the progress of negotiations. For example, the Secretary
of State for the Environment was particularly anxious about the firemen’s
negotiations in CL2 and called to underline the importance of the
29
settlement for the local authority manual workers' negotiations. The
Government also made frequent contact with the local authority
associations, especially when of a Conservative persuasion. The most
outstanding example of this again relates to the CL2 firemen's
negotiations. Privately, the two sides agreed the implications of the
link, but after pressure from the Secretary of State, the local authority
associations withdrew the offer, and instead offered the 6 per cent pay 
30
factor.
It remained the case, however, that the parties were formally
autonomous and were not obliged to abide by the recommendations of the
Government. In the firemen's case, the employers had to reinstate the
offer in the face of union opposition. Also, the employers were willing to
offer 7.5 per cent that year to the manual workers, and did so without the 
31
Minister being aware.
Meanwhile, the vertical distribution of power between the local
authorities and LACSAB continued to favour the centre. LACSAB carried out
more surveys to assess the levels to which local authority managements were
prepared to go, and stated that they tried to ensure that all or most
32
authorities could afford the settlements. However, complaints were still 
heard that local authority views were disregarded. In particular, the CL3 
local authority manual settlement of 5.9 per cent against a 4 per cent pay
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*factor was widely criticised by district and county councils. LACSAB, in
response, underlined its strong position by reaffirming its right to make
pay decisions as it thought fit, even when it knew that a large proportion
33
of authorities would have to finance the deals through savings. At the
same time, some attempt was made to involve councillors in corridor
34
discussions to a greater degree.
Horizontal control of LACSAB by the local authority associations,
primarily representing the financial interests of local authorities,
occurred to a slightly greater extent than in 1979, but LACSAB remained
influential. While there was no significant change in the representation
of the finance function on negotiating bodies, there was a greater respect
for the views of the associations. As the Secretary of LACSAB said:
Two years later the problems are no less but there is a healthier 
relationship and understanding between members and officers who 
focus on finance and those who focus on pay.35
Also, the ACC tried to increase its influence over LACSAB by becoming
more sophisticated in its approach to negotiations. In 1980, a Manpower
Subcommittee of the Policy Committee was set up to provide a forum for ACC
representatives on negotiating bodies to discuss common problems and
strategies. Membership of the Subcommittee included not only the ACC
Chairman and certain Policy Committee members, who were often financially-
35
oriented in interest, but also co-opted personnel executives.
In spite of these developments, the associations remained subordinate
to LACSAB. One ACC official felt LACSAB was soft and untrustworthy, not
37
always following association advice. An Association of District Councils
(ADC) official believed that LACSAB's influence was not felt at the initial
meetings with unions, but grew to be more important at later stages of 
38
negotiation.
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Compared with the public services, public corporation negotiators
possessed a reasonable degree of latitude. Nonetheless, they became
subject to greater control as time proceeded.
Most importantly, power was lost to the Government. As in mid-1979,
the Government was not represented on any negotiation body, nor was
permission required for particular offers. However, the hand of Government
was felt through informal mechanisms, especially after CL1. The Government
gave very general advice regarding the development of the pay round through
both Ministerial and official channels. Meetings between Ministers and
Chairmen of nationalised industries were commonplace. For example, the
Local Government Minister met the chairman of the National Water Council
39
(NWC) to urge restraint pending the local government manual settlement.
In another instance, the Chairman of the Post Office (PO) was pressured
40
directly by the Prime Minister. At the official level, letters and calls
from departments to corporations emphasised the need for single-figure
settlements and sought to minimise repercussions elsewhere in the public
sector. For example, the London Transport Executive (LTE) received a
letter of advice from the Department of Transport concerning forthcoming 
41
negotiations. In the same way, the Home Office contacted the BBC, and
42
the Department of Industry and Treasury made suggestions to the PO. The
Environment Secretary issued a letter to all corporations in CL3, asking
them to avoid making any offers above 7.9 per cent before the local
43
authority manual workers settled.
The corporations were certainly willing to heed Government advice, 
other things being equal. Primarily, this reflected a recognition of the
1.1.3 Public corporations
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deficits, such as BSC and BR, were told that their future finance depended
44
on productivity improvements. Grant-aided corporations too feared for
their funding: for instance, the BBC was worried lest the licence fee not
45
be increased as much as they wished. Certain others feared financial
inquiries. The NWC was concerned about further assessments of the fairness
46
of boards' increases in water charges. Corporations in relatively sound
financial shape were not immune: for example, British Telecom (BT) and the
Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) tended to be wary of upsetting the
Government because of the potential impact on approval for investment 
47
programmes. Other reasons given for respecting 'advice1 included the
power of Ministers to appoint chairmen, and hence remove them from 
48
office; and the personal loyalty of chairmen to the sponsoring 
49
departments.
Of course, the condition attached to corporations' obedience did not
always hold: other things were not always equal. Industrial relations
realities had to dominate on some occasions. For instance, the National
Coal Board (NCB) said the Department of Energy generally listened to the
50
NCB, rather than advised it. Also, the NWC had to flout the 'single­
figure settlement' advice in CL2 and raise its offer from 10 per cent to
51
12.3 per cent to avoid a strike. In some cases, the final settlements
were camouflaged so as to give the impression that they reflected the
Government's advice, when in fact they did not. This was particularly true
52
of the energy and utilities sector in CL2.
Although public corporation negotiators lost power to Government, they 
largely maintained control over lower levels of management. As previously, 
pay offers were conceived at central headquarters, or by a combined
dependence of the corporations on the Government. Industries with
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management structures existed). Local management were involved in a
dialogue with headquarters in many authorities, but they did not have
53
responsibility for the terms of offers. It is true that there was some
decentralisation of power within the LTE and BBC, but the import of this
must not be exaggerated. From the Spring of 1981 the LTE rail and bus
businesses were free from control by the Central Personnel Organisation.
However, within the two businesses, pay decision-making power was still 
54
very centralised. In the BBC, the views of first-line and other local
management in the user directorates were sought to a greater degree, but
55
the final decision still rested with the centre. Also, as will be noted in 
the discussion of bargaining structure, even when pay increases could be 
determined at a devolved level, local autonomy was still subject to central 
guidance.
At a horizontal level, negotiators came under increasing pressure, 
although they maintained a significant degree of power. The parties 
formally involved in decision-making continued to be the personnel and 
finance functions, the Personnel Board Member, Regional Chairmen (where 
appropriate), and the Board, but the relative power distribution shifted.
As elsewhere, the finance function appeared somewhat more powerful, with 
careful note being taken of financial parameters. At Board level, the 
composition of the membership changed as part of a deliberate Government 
strategy. The balance became weighted more towards part-time, non­
executive, members with a background in private industry. With certain 
exceptions, industrialists tended to believe that the public sector 'had an 
easy ride', and therefore tougher stances were produced. For example, in 
BR the industrial relations department had to strengthen proposals to
employers' committee (as in the utility industries where regional
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obtain the full backing of the Board. In the ESI, the Engineers' and
Managers' Association (EMA) felt that the lay views that engineers were
57
over-paid influenced negotiations. Consumer Council Board members were
also said to have become more powerful. It was alleged that they
complained about the pay of electricity showroom staff relative to that of
58
retail trade workers in general.
The reason why the industrial relations function retained some
influence in spite of these changes, was, once more, that industrial
relations considerations were of great importance in the day-to-day
operation of the corporations. For example, it was said that in the NCB,
the finance function moderated its views when the industrial relations
59
implications were discussed. In the PO, the papers sent to the Board,
while written after consultations with the finance department, were
60
industrial relations-oriented, and the Board rarely overrode them. In BT
and the BBC the parameters set by the Boards for negotiations were
61
primarily those suggested by the personnel function.
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1.2 Union organisation
In mid-1979 union organisation had not been a significant force for 
wage inflation. During 1979-83 it became much more sophisticated in 
certain respects - particularly at the level of inter-union coordination - 
but yet did not form a significant obstacle to the Government's attempts to 
lower public sector wage inflation.
1.2.1 Intra-union organisation
The internal union controls on negotiators continued to have little 
upward effect on pay increases. National officers remained in a powerful 
position and responsive to bargaining realities. It is the case that some
officers allowed tne rank-and-file to have more say in decisions, given the
tough bargaining climate and the fear that members might become
discontented with negotiators if agreements involving cuts in real income
were reached without consultation. In some negotiations, recommendations
to the members were not made, while in certain others, a choice of offers 
62
was given. Potentially, given the divorce of members from the bargaining 
area, more militant rank-and-fi1e strategies could have been pursued.
However, in practice this did not appear to occur. The national officials 
remained influential in that they framed the questions to members or 
chaired consultative meetings, and frequently made clear the implications 
of alternative paths of action, including the need for industrial action, 
thereby affecting the outcome of consultations. Also, in any case, as will 
be developed in the next chapter, the weak bargaining power of most unions, 
caused by spending cuts and falling demand, was obvious to most union members, 
curbing their wilder expectations and making them more similar to those of 
the negotiators.
Horizontally, at headquarters level, an increase in the role of
research departments was evident, with the potential consequence of better-
argued claims and higher increases. For instance, the First Division
Association (FDA) appointed a new research officer, while COHSE and the
63
EETPU saw their research departments gain in influence. Many unions
submitted lengthy papers to substantiate their case to the SCPC and
arbitral bodies. The SCPS believed that their very professional research
had convinced the membership of the validity of the union's case and had
64
stimulated industrial action. It is difficult to assess the impact of 
research on pay negotiations, but it is hard to believe that the effect was 
anything but marginal, even in the civil service or SCPC cases. As noted
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previously, the civil service settlement was little above the pay factor, 
while the SCPC appeared to be quite independent in its choice of methods 
and analogues.
1.2.2 Joint-union bargaining
The dominant type of representative organisation continued to favour 
higher increases, everything else equal. Unions, rather than professional 
associations, continued to form a majority on most negotiation bodies, 
especially in public corporations, but also in the puDlic services.
Changes in representation rights on the teachers' negotiation bodies gave 
professional associations an additional seat, but the balance of power was 
not altered significantly.
The representativeness of voting rights had mixed consequences. NUPE
continued to be under-represented which, arguably, was a restraint on
militancy, given NUPE's usual stance. In contrast, militancy may have been
increased by the under-representation of the Royal College of Nursing (RCN)
and the National Association of Schoolmasters (NAS/UWT) on their respective
bodies, both groups having experienced a considerable growth in membership
65
in a period of general decline. But not too much should be made of this 
because the unrepresentativeness was relatively marginal, and other 
constraints on pay were much more pressing.
1.2.3 Inter-union coordination
The most significant dimension in union organisation in the 1979-83 
period was coordination between unions, something that had previously been 
rare. Developments occurred at two levels: at union level and under the 
auspices of the TUC Industry Committees. In both cases, the implications 
for pay increases were positive, yet far from substantial.
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Independent coordination occurred of both a formal and informal kind. 
Formal joint committees were set up in a number of sectors. In the non­
industrial civil service, the Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) was
established in May 1980, covering the nine unions. Its goal was to
66
increase coordination and cooperation. In the universities, a committee of
the non-teaching staff unions, excluding ASTMS, met to exchange 
67
information. In the public corporations, bodies included the Railway
Federation of Unions, set up in September 1981, embracing ASLEF and the
NUR. Inter alia, it was intended to coordinate pay claims and strengthen
68
railway union organisation. An Iron and Steel Coordinating Committee was
69
established during the 1980 steel strike. Informal coordination commonly
occurred through contact between unions on the same negotiation bodies.
Coordination between bargaining units was facilitated by national officers
70
sitting on several bodies.
These forms of coordination generally had relatively little impact. 
First, the cooperation tended to be short-term. The Iron and Steel 
Coordinating Committee broke up after the strike, for example. The effects 
of the coordination were therefore largely confined to a few years.
Second, the content of the coordination was sometimes relatively trivial, 
particularly where it was mainly information-sharing. Third, inter-union 
rivalries precluded effective coordination in cases such as the railways, 
where the Transport Salaried Staffs Association (TSSA) refused to join the 
Federation, and NUR-ASLEF clashes persisted, and in the universities where 
ASTMS left the committee. Fourth, even where the content was significant, 
such as in the coordination of industrial action, the consequences for pay 
increases did not always appear to be very great. As noted earlier, the 
civil service settlement was only fractionally above the pay factor.
4 1 1
Coordination through TUC Committees became more prevalent and
sophisticated after CL1. In the first year of cash limits, the mid-1979
stance persisted. There was no wish to coordinate bargaining. Some
unions, such as NALGO, believed the appropriate approach was to make cash
71
limits more flexible rather than change union organisation. Certainly, the
willingness of Government to fund the SCPC increases made tnis seem the
right tactic. There continued to be problems of securing vertical control
over constituent unions which jealously guarded their autonomy. The
Industry Committees themselves were wary of intervening in pay
determination, and possibly segmenting the union movement along sectoral 
72
lines. Horizontal cooperation was also made difficult by union rivalries,
and institutional features such as the multitude of settlement dates and
73
negotiation procedures.
Coordination emerged in CL2 due to increasing management coordination,
especially in the NHS. The TUC Health Services Committee (HSC) began to
74
exchange information to a greater extent. The Public Services Committee
(PSC) circulated 'Pay Bulletins' containing progress reports on public
service negotiations. The NHS ancillary workers and ambulancemen, together
with the local authority manual workers submitted the same basic claim in
75
the early months of the round. The desire for more coordination
increased before the start of CL3 in recognition of there being a single
paymaster, coordinated management action, and interdependent settlement 
76
dates. In June 1981 the PSC analysed the prospects for intensifying the
77
pay campaign. A TUC Congress resolution in September called for more
78
coordination. The following month the TUC Local Government Committee
(LGC) set up a Local Government Coordinating Committee (LGCC) to determine
79
the strategy to be pursued.
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There were essentially five elements in the coordinated strategy.
First, communication between unions was enhanced. Information was shared.
An analysis of the New Earnings Survey (NES) was circulated. The progress
80
of the pay round was reviewed periodically. Second, it was attempted to
submit claims at the same time, and where possible to establish common 
81
settlement dates. For example, the LGC and the HSC tried to submit all
82
their claims by January 1982 in CL3. In addition, some groups managed to
change their settlement dates, mainly to April, as a later section will
show. The notion behind these tactics was to increase solidarity. Tnird,
common elements were included in claims. In CL3 they were the maintenance
83
of real living standards and a reduction in working hours. The next round
84
saw low pay arguments added. Fourth, joint publicity was organised by the 
85
Industry Committees. Fifth, joint industrial action was coordinated. For
example, through regional and local coordinating committees, the HSC
86
organised the action in the NHS dispute in 1982.
In spite of what were far-reaching changes in a short-period of time,
the impact on pay increases was probably relatively small. In the eyes of
87
the unions, the most notable success was the NHS dispute. Claims and
negotiations were coordinated; other unions were requested not to undercut
83
the NHS groups; and industrial action was successfully organised. However, 
the final settlements for nurses and associated professions of 7.5 per cent 
in CL3 and 4.5 per cent in CL4 against initial pay factors of 6 and 3.5 
per cent respectively, and for other NHS workers of 6 and 4.5 per cent 
against initial pay factors of 4 and 3.5 per cent, were not high (even 
after accounting for the timing of their implementation). Certainly, 
exceeding the initial pay factors by one or two per cent was unusual in the 
NHS, and could be attributed partly to union organisation, but nevertheless
413
it did not represent a markedly higher settlement.
Elsewhere, there was little sign of great impact. Settlements were
relatively close to tne pay factor, and other factors seemed able to
account for much of the difference. Union coordination of claims did not
appear to influence the course of negotiations.
Many reasons explain the limited consequences of inter-union
coordination. First, the vertical control of unions by the TUC Committees
remained problematic. Some unions were prepared to surrender their
autonomy by agreeing to a common strategy, but others were more reluctant.
89
Union conferences sometimes preferred to adopt an independent approach. In
some quarters the common claim was disliked because it was too precise and
90
members could not identify with it. The GMWU preferred a flat-rate element 
91
in CL4, for example. Not all unions saw advantages to a common settlement
92
date: they preferred to negotiate in the wake of other deals.
Organisational problems also hindered the effectiveness of vertical
coordination by the Industry Committees. Meetings were infrequent, usually 
93
only quarterly. Coordination was relatively tentative outside the NHS in 
94
CL3. It was also rather slow in some respects: for instance, the NES
95
analysis was too late to be of use.
Secondly, horizontal relationships between unions were not always
optimal. One weakness in coordination arose where bargaining units
included significant numbers of employees who were not represented by TUC 
96
affiliates. For example, a persistent concern in the NHS dispute was 
whether, or when, the RCN would break the common front. Another problem 
related to the TUC unions themselves. In particular, the nationalised 
industry unions showed a profound lack of interest. Members of the 
Nationalised Industries Committee (NIC) were missing at key meetings
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They had to be cajoled into providingregarding the pay campaign.
information for a nationalised industry pay bulletin in CL4. Basically,
they felt their industries were under less financial pressure than the
public services in most cases. Also, they saw the 'opposition' as the
authority, not the Government, and hence could not share in fighting the 
98
common employer. Some public service unions, too, were not enthusiastic,
99
caring more about combatting the trend towards privatisation.
Thirdly, management tactics reduced the chances of union success. In
some cases, they delayed negotiations to the usual date, reducing the
opportunity for joint action. For example, one year, the teachers'
negotiations were delayed until April, although they were looking to meet
in January. Also, managements were not prepared to change settlement dates
unless they could see advantages in it. The industrial civil service
100
unions found the provisos placed upon a change of date unacceptable.
Further, coordinated action was deterred by agreeing to go to arbitration
101
rather than succumbing to joint-union pressure. In addition, sympathy
strikers were disciplined in the civil service after supporting NHS 
102
workers. Finally, managements were not above orchestrating the round to 
their own advantage. This has already been demonstrated in relation to 
management organisation. They were happy to have the local authority 
manual workers settle first because they were relatively weak. They were 
also pleased to see the NHS agree to relatively low increases in CL4, (as 
the second part of the two-year staged settlement), before other groups had 
settled.
1.3 Summary
The evidence indicates that the formal and informal features of 
organisational structures and processes probably bolstered management
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1
negotiators more than union negotiators. Management bargainers saw 
relatively tight Government control, and felt some pressure from parties 
with financial interests. Union organisation was characterised by rank- 
and-file and research department involvement; unions rather than 
professional bodies predominated; and most notably, inter-union 
coordination took place. However, basic attitudinal and structural 
weaknesses on the union side meant that management negotiators had a more 
solid organisational backing.
It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the de-escalation of 
pay increases over the 1979-83 period was at least facilitated by, if not 
in part caused by, organisational factors. Further, the variations in the 
autonomy of management negotiators across subsectors of the public sector 
appeared to be related to the magnitude of settlements: where there was 
tighter control of negotiators, increases were less.
2. Bargaining Structure
Bargaining structure - the levels, units, form and scope of bargaining 
- was a restraining force in pay determination in mid-1979. Over the 
following four years it was even more so.
2.1 Bargaining levels
Bargaining levels did not change much at all, remaining highly
centralised. The only major change was at the British Steel Corporation
(BSC). After the 1980 strike, BSC chose to impose decentralised bargaining
103
local management and unions were charged with negotiating bonus schemes. 
Centralised bargaining facilitated control, given the surrounding 
environment of the time. Most important, it put management negotiators
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within close earshot of increasingly-prevalent Government advice. As
always, it also made the settlements highly visible and susceptible to
social pressure from the public and the media.
In assessing whether centralised bargaining promoted control, it is
perhaps significant to mention that where the question of the appropriate
level of bargaining was discussed, centralisation was favoured by the
employers. The NWC, which was to be dissolved in September 1983, decided
that it would be in the water authorities' interests to continue pay
bargaining at a multi-employer level, although certain other items could be 
104
decentralised. The Megaw Inquiry, also, could not see any merit in
departmental pay in the civil service, apart from in parts of MoD. It felt
105
that central control over cash limits would be threatened.
Elsewhere, where decentralised bargaining took place, the potentially
inflationary consequences of decentralised bargaining were frequently
minimised by centralised management coordination and control. In BSC, for
example, flexibility was not absolute. National framework agreements set
parameters for local negotiations, and also affected pay themselves through
106
the setting of minimum payments and the periodic consolidation of bonus.
In British Aerospace (BAe), where divisional bargaining took place,
107
headquarters determined the pay offers.
This view is underlined by the fact that local bargaining was not
necessarily synonymous with high pay increases. Universities outside the
108
UCNS consortium were generally low-paying institutions. Also, while
some bonus schemes had decayed, as in local authorities and the NHS, others
were far from lucrative. For instance, in BSC, in the last quarter of
1982, the schemes did not pay a bonus in 30 of 62 cases due to
109
deteriorating business conditions. In any case, the inflationary effect
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of many local increases was offset by rises in productivity.
2.2 Bargaining units
Bargaining units continued to be highly concentrated. Most
authorities had units that grouped together the representative
organisations at each broad occupational level. The trend, albeit a minor
one, was towards consolidation. In BT, the STE and SCPS came to form a
combined bargaining unit for managerial ana professional grades, pending
the transfer of SCPS members in BT to the STE. Also, the CPSA and CMA 
110
bargained jointly. Elsewhere, in the non-industrial civil service, the 
civil service unions not only coordinated their stances, but also bargained 
together through the CCSU after CL1.
On balance, the effect appeared to be to aid pay restraint. The 
chances of sectional claims were reduced. Where concentration was high, 
there were relatively few serious leapfrogging incidents. Where it was 
low, they were more frequent. For instance, in CL1 there were upset 
relativities in the civil service and BT. The IPCS groups in the non­
industrial civil service felt they got an unduly bad deal out of the pay
research exercise, and eventually went to arbitration to improve their 
111
relative standing. In BT there were several claims and counterclaims by
the engineering and staff unions. After the SCPS settlement, the manual and
white-collar engineers complained that the new pay structure would
permanently alter pay relativities in favour of non-engineering supervisors
and managers. Arbitration gave the engineers an increase. A separate
arbitration award benefitting the POEU determined that management was
obliged to reopen the 1979 agreement as promised, and made a small wage
award. This led the CPSA, in turn, to demand that its agreement be 
112
reopened.
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Of course, this is not to say that fragmented bargaining always
implied inflationary leapfrogging. Some organisations were able to contain
it. It has already been seen that, in the NHS, management organisation
kept the various Whitley Councils in line. British Airways, with its large
number of National Sectional Panels, also generally succeeded in reaching
113
the same settlement with each of its groups. At the BBC, finite limits
were set to the extent to which sectional claims would be financed. Before
October 1980, leapfrogging was common, mainly due to arbitration awards,
but from then on the cost of any regradings had to be met from the budget
114
for total labour costs. A further reason why fragmentation did not 
necessarily imply a lack of control was that it was often the case that 
even fragmented units were large and therefore highly visible to the 
public, government and the media.
2.3 Bargaining form
Agreements were written down and were precise, as in mid-1979.
Reflecting centralised management control over decentralised bargaining, it
was not unusual to see explicit frameworks for local productivity deals or
bonus schemes. For instance, in British Shipbuilders, model added-value
productivity schemes were circulated. The required characteristics were
115
stipulated, including the need to be self-financing. As a result of 
such detailed agreements, bargaining form was generally conducive to pay 
control at all levels of bargaining.
2.4 Bargaining scope
The subjects of bargaining did not appear liable to boost wage 
inflation. Indeed, a more dominant theme in the 1979-83 period was 
management wanting to obtain productivity concessions in return for
419
increases in pay. Thereby, pay increases were variously curbed or delayed 
because the productivity gains were not forthcoming, or they were financed by 
the greater efficiency.
Apart from minor productivity deals and incentive schemes, some
authorities based the greater part of their pay increases on the
achievement of substantial changes in working practices that had previously
been regarded as non-negotiable. This was the case in BSC as already seen.
In BR, management refused to pay the CL2 award by the Railway Staffs
National Tribunal (RSNT) until it won guarantees on key productivity items
116
relating to single manning of trains.
Unions did not generally attempt to widen the scope of bargaining to
increase their compensation. They recognised that all renumeration items
had a financial cost, and, given limited budgets, preferred to concentrate
117
on increasing basic rates to benefit the majority. In addition, the
unions usually lacked the power to widen the subject coverage of 
118
negotiations. Instead, greater attention was directed at items other
than compensation. In particular, health and safety issues were raised
more, in part due to the impact of expenditure cuts on working 
119
conditions. Other growing concerns were new technology, flexible hours,
120
and employment protection.
2.5 Summary
Overall, bargaining structure contributed to pay restraint between 
1979 and 1983. Centralised bargaining enabled the centralisation of 
management decisions to influence negotiators effectively. The high degree 
of concentration of bargaining units was associated with few leapfrogging 
claims. The precision of national agreements left little leeway for
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deviation in the payment of general increases, and in some cases carefully 
restricted the autonomy of local negotiators. Finally, the scope of bar­
gaining encompassed working practices, thereby reducing the inflationary 
effect of increases.
The role played by bargaining structure in the de-escalation of public 
sector pay increases was essentially a facilitating one. The changes in 
bargaining structure over tne period were not significant or widespread 
enough to have caused the trends in pay. But the characteristies of 
bargaining structure did enable other forces to have the impact they did.
3. Pay Determination Procedures
Quite apart from the organisation of the parties and the bargaining 
structure, the procedures followed in determining pay - formal criteria, 
third-party intervention, settlement dates, and pay systems - collectively 
contributed to the diminution of wage increases in the public sector.
3.1 Formal pay criteria
The formal criteria - that is, criteria laid down in agreements or in 
the terms of reference of standing bodies - did not appear to promote low 
inflation. Table 7.1 shows the pay increases gained by groups with formal 
pay criteria in each round of the pay restraint policy. It is clear that 
the groups generally fared better than those in the other authorities in 
central and local government.
That said, the formal criteria played a role in the de-escalation of 
pay increases during the period, independently of the reduction in the 
increases obtained by analogues: changes in the operation of the criteria 
were the cause. First, the access of groups to pay determination 
mechanisms employing formal criteria was curtailed. Second, the modus
421
Third,operandi of the criteria became more stringent in some respects.
the method of implementing the results of the pay determination process
sometimes reduced the inflationary effects.
Regarding the availability of the formal criteria, the public service
groups which might have referred their cases to the Standing Commission on
Pay Comparability (SCPC), together with the non-industrial civil service,
saw their access to comparability mechanisms removed after CL1. The Civil
Service Pay Research Unit (CSPRU) was suspended in October 1980 and its
121
reports were suppressed. The SCPC had been given notice of its demise
122
in August and completed its inquiries by the end of the year.
No formal criteria replaced the comparability mechanisms. The Megaw 
Inquiry reported in July 1982 and recommended a modified form of 
comparability for the civil service: increases were to be within the 
interquartile range of increases seen in the private sector, the exact
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Group Pay round
CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4
AFRB 14.5-20.0 10.3 4.0-8.9 3.9-9.9
Police service 13.5 21.3 13.2 10.3
Fire service 20.0 18.8 10.1 7.5
Civil service 18.75 n. a. n. a. n.a.
SCPC various n. a. n. a. n.a.
Central Govt. 17.0 9.1 6.9 4.4
(excl. SCPC)
Local Auths. 15.9 8.5 7.7 5.9
(excl. police 
and fire)
Table 7.1: Percentage settlement rates in groups with formal pay criteria
and in central and local government 1979-83.
Sources: Specific group data from settlements.
Sectoral data from Chapter 5, Table 5.3.
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point to be determined by supplementary collective bargaining arguments.
However, no new system was introduced during the period of interest, the
Government not agreeing until December 1982 to enter into negotiations on
124
the basis of the report.
Instead of formal criteria, negotiations were based on the
conventional range of arguments. As will be explored in more detail in
Chapter 8, the comparability argument of the unions came to be dominated by
management concerns regarding the ability to pay and recruitment and
retention. In abolishing the formal criteria the Government clearly
intended that pay increases would be lower. The Lord President of the
Council told the civil servants' unions that 'cash limits would be the
125
major determinant' of pay , at the same time that the Prime Minister was 
saying that, after the SCPC,
pay needs to negotiated with full regard to the country's 
economic circumstances, to the need to improve the efficiency of 
the public services and to what the taxpayer and ratepayer can be 
expected to afford.126
Union bargaining arguments and pay surveys demonstrated that, indeed, pay
127
over CL2 to CL4 failed to keep pace with that of comparators.
The other groups with formal criteria retained them. For the police
service and the armed forces this reflected the Government's election
promise. In addition, the Armed Forces Review Body (AFRB) justified the
maintenance of comparabi1ity as essential in order to be fair to servicemen
and women and to the taxpayer, and to be able to recruit and retain
128
personnel of adequate quality. The fire service retained its link
although, as noted earlier, the employers attempted to eliminate it.
Initially, they disregarded it in negotiations in CL2, but were pressured by
129
the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) into honouring it. In February 1981, the
123
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employers then gave notice of withdrawal from the link, but it was
130
reinstated after the May elections. Although it cannot be proven, it
seems highly likely that the increases in pay obtained by these groups were
higher than under conventional bargaining. Certainly, the employers in the
fire and police services believed so, complaining that the formulae took no
131
account of the ability to pay, productivity, and supply and demand.
While the trends in the incidence of formal criteria indicated a
likely reduction in wage inflation, certain commentators suggested that
formal criteria were increasing in significance once more by the end of the
period. Reference was made to the establishment of a Review Body for
nurses and professions allied to medicine with effect from April 1984, and
Burnham Committee working parties which had been formed to produce agreed
comparability data to be used in the April 1984 negotiations over teachers' 
132
pay. However, it seems clear that these developments did not imply
formal comparability criteria were to be revived. There was no intention
on the Government's part that the Review Body should become a vehicle for
unabridged comparability. It clearly stated in the Body's terms of
reference that it would 'submit evidence on economic and financial
considerations, and on such factors as recruitment, retention and 
133
motivation.' The teaching working parties were merely collecting data 
to inform negotiations and to help them reach agreement.
The manner in which the comparability criteria were operated can be 
divided into two stages: the selection of the analogues, including both 
the method of comparison and the choice of external fields; and the account 
taken of other factors in determining appropriate increases. The former 
stage did not appear to accelerate the decline in wage increases. In some 
respects, the selection of analogues continued to have a probable
inflationary bias. Throughout the period the police and fire services used
the method of index-linking, generally regarded as one of the more
expensive forms of comparability: witness the Government's delight and the
134
unions' dismay when it was rejected by the SCPC. The AFR8 used factor
comparisons, as did the SCPC on occasions, which were less lucrative for
workers, while the CSPRU and the SCPC (generally) employed job-for-job
comparisons, usually the least productive comparisons. For instance, the
SCPC was hard-pushed to award pay increases for some local authority manual
135
workers because their direct analogues were so poorly paid.
Likewise, the choice of external fields for comparison purposes was
most suspect from a counter-inflationary standpoint in respect of the
police and fire services, two of the three groups with a formal
criterion for the whole period. Police pay was linked to the change in
average earnings for all workers, while firemen's pay was linked to the
upper quartile male manual earnings level in the April New Earnings Survey
(NES), updated by the average earnings index. In both cases the employer
sides felt that the points of comparison gave increases that were too high.
The official side of the Police Negotiating Board (PNB) said that it was
'fully aware of the extent and depth of outside concern over the levels of
police pay'. It asked for an examination of the appropriateness of the 1983
pay levels, and the idea of a link with the pay of the armed forces was 
136
floated. The Employers' Side in the fire service was concerned at the
extent to which the point of comparison, which was originally supposed to
represent skilled workers, produced increases far in excess of the cash
limit pay factor. It wanted to see a wider database used to make
comparisons more valid, but no changes were introduced in the 1979-83 
137
period.
426
Elsewhere, external fields were criticised, but whether they were
truly biased was open to question. The civil service analogues were
concentrated in large firms, with many in finance and the public sector:
two-thirds were in firms with more than 5000 employees, a tenth were in
138
finance industries, and a quarter in the public sector. The Government
was suspicious that these were not representative, and at the end of CL1,
before suspending pay research, stated its intention of increasing the
proportion of outside survey officers and appointing an outside Director of
the PRU, having already increased the number of businessmen on the CSPRU 
139
Board. However, this view may have been largely unwarranted. The CSPRU
Board could not find a relationship between firm size and pay. It also
believed it necessary to use financial and public sector analogues in order
to find adequate numbers of jobs entailing broadly comparable work in the
relevant industrial orders. Further, it found the survey methods and
practice to be thorough and impartial, and capable of satisfying the 
140
severest critic. Independent assessments of civil service pay
relativities carried out for the Megaw Inquiry also found that over a
quarter of a century of pay research, civil service pay had not deviated
141
significantly from private sector pay.
The SCPC attempted to obtain a representative view of the economy as a
whole, including the public sector. Concerns were voiced that the samples
were not balanced because, for job-for-job comparisons, PRU data were used.
The Government was also worried about unduly high increases from the use of
public sector comparisons, which were 'not sufficiently subject to market
forces', and groups which had their pay fixed with reference to 
142
comparability. Against this, the PRU told the SCPC of shortcomings in 
the data, and the SCPC asserted that these were borne in mind when making
recommendations. Also, supplementary surveys were used where necessary,
and consultants' databanks were drawn on when using the factor comparison
method, widening the field of comparators. Furthermore, the SCPC could
find no systematic relationship between the pay increases of analogues and
143
their public-private sector composition.
The selection of analogues may not have helped the downward trend in 
pay rises, but adjustments to the survey and index data in taking account 
of other factors appeared influential. First, pension contributions were 
raised. As explained in Chapter 3, there had been disquiet at the 
relatively low deductions from pay for index-linked pensions. The Scott 
inquiry reinforced this. While not recommending the abandonment of index­
linking, it found that the calculation of deductions took insufficient note
of public-private differences because the analogues in fact included other
144
public sector workers with index-linked pensions. However, in CL1, the
145
civil service deductions rose from 2.6 to 3.8 per cent. In CL4, the
contributions of policemen were raised by the Home Office from 7 to 11 per
cent, and for policewomen from 5 to 8 per cent. The armed forces and fire
146
personnel also increased their contributions. These changes reduced the
value of the increases implied by the formal criteria.
Second, deductions were also raised in respect of food and
accommodation charges in the armed forces. In CL3, while pay rose between
147
4 and 9 per cent, food and accommodation charges rose 25 per cent. By
the end of the period, the official side of the PNB was contemplating
148
substantial increases to compensate for rent allowances.
Third, there was hard bargaining over the appropriate deductions for 
non-monetary advantages in the civil service in CL1. The CSD simply 
ignored certain fringe benefits received by outside comparators, such as
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cheap mortgages. In comparing hours and leave, they asserted, without
evidence, that comparators outside London worked one hour longer than civil
servants, and they included public and privilege holidays in leave
calculations. The SCPS's annual comparison of actual negotiated rates and
what was expected from an objective analysis of PRU evidence regarding true
money rates, superannuation, hours and leave, and fringe benefits, showed
that the rates at grade maxima rose between 18 and 19.1 per cent against
149
'objective' increases of 20.1 to 24.4 per cent. Some IPCS workers at
150
higher levels received little or no increases until arbitration.
Fourth, it was clear that, informally, other, non-comparability,
criteria crept into negotiations. In the fire service, for instance, in
CL2 the two sides massaged the data so as to produce increases they could
both live with: essentially, this meant recognising the ability to pay was 
151
limited. Improvements in efficiency were requested by the SCPC in its
152
awards to manual workers in local authorities and the NHS. At the same
time, relative job security did not surface, in spite of the Government's
wish that it should if comparisons were to be valid. Both the SCPC and the
Scott Inquiry were unable to measure relative job security and the SCPC
also doubted there was a relationship between security and pay, save in a 
153
few extreme cases.
The final feature of the formal criteria mechanisms to influence the 
scale of pay increases was the manner in which the comparability increases 
were implemented. All the increases were accepted by the relevant 
employers, but certain of them were staged, mainly for financial reasons. 
This kept down the immediate effects on pay rates and deterred competitive 
claims. For example, most of the SCPC increases were very large, and if 
they had been paid in a single instalment they could have significantly
boosted other workers' expectations. The staging of the fire settlement in 
CL2 also helped prevent difficulties with other local authority 
settlements.
Overall, it appears that the formal criteria used in pay determination 
aided the de-escalation of public sector wage inflation in several ways in 
spite of providing increases that were large relative to most settlements. 
Of key importance were, first, the reduced access of groups to procedures 
involving formal criteria, and, second, the tougher manner in which the 
criteria were administered.
3.2 Third-party involvement
Apart from the AFRB, SCPC and PRU, other third parties having a hand 
in public sector pay determination were the Doctors' and Dentists' Review 
Body (DDRB), the Top Salaries Review Body (TSRB), arbitral bodies, and pay 
inquiries. As Chapter 3 made clear, these bodies were capable of 
frustrating pay restraint policies. In fact, as operated in the 1979-83 
period, they appeared to be only slightly more inflationary than collective 
bargaining in general; and changes in their incidence and operation as the 
period progressed actually accentuated the decline in public sector pay 
increases. Thus the cash limits pay policy was largely facilitated and 
augmented by the state of third-party involvement.
3.2.1 Review Bodies
Ignoring previously-abated increases including the catch-up increases 
promised to compensate for the effects of the Labour Government's incomes 
policy, the recommendations of the DDRB and TSRB were generally quite close 
to the average settlement rate in central government. Part 1 of Table 7.2 
illustrates. Over the period as a whole, the recommended increases were
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only a few percentage points higher for the Review Body groups.
This does not square with the normal perception of Review Bodies as
more inflationary institutions because the recommended increases most
visible to observers included not only the above recommendations, but also
the increases that the Government had failed to implement in the past.
Abated increases were a significant part of the total, especially for TSRB
groups, as the second part of the table makes clear.
The reasons for the unexceptional underlying increases during the cash
limits policy are to be found in the Review Bodies' criteria and modus
operandi. These factors did not only allow the policy to operate largely
unimpeded, but also, changing as they did during the period, added to the
de-escalation independently of pay factors.
Initially, comparability was the influential criterion. The Phase 3
reviews had established appropriate levels, but because they were not fully
implemented, the Review Bodies updated the figures for the next two years,
relying mainly on comparative movements in pay. But thereafter
comparability took on a more subordinate role. As the DDRB said, once the
1978 recommendations were fully implemented,
detailed comparisons with earnings movements will have a less 
direct role to play in our deliberations.154
Instead, comparisons were to be used as a longer-term check on
relativities. As it turned out, even as long-term checks, comparisons were
not of great relevance. The DORB's CL4 recommendations established pay
levels that had fallen behind the NES comparison point by 14.7 per cent 
155
since 1980. The TSRB, meanwhile, in CL2 did not even bother to update
156
their recommendations of the previous year after they had been abated.
In CL3 it was emphasised that comparability was not being used 
mechanistically. Indeed, the recommendations of 16.6 per cent on the 1980
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Year CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4
Group
1. Increased on recommended 
scales
Central Government 17.0 9.1 6.9 4.4
DDRB 18.7 9 5.5 5
TSRB 14 0 16.6 6.9
2. Recommended restoration 
of abated increases
DDRB 12.7 0 3 0
TSRB 10 12 5.3 5
Table 7.2: Percentage pay increases on recommended scales, and recommended
rises to restore previously-abated increases for DDRB and 
TSRB groups, 1979-83
Notes: The total increases recommended were the sum of (1) the newly- 
recommended increases and (2) the previously-abated increases. 
Sources: Reports of Review Bodies and Chapter 5, Table 5.3.
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recommended scales compared poorly with increases of 24 per cent for
individuals covered by a renumeration survey and a 30 per cent increase in
157
the average earnings index. These changes were accompanied by a lesser
emphasis on social criteria such as the cost of living, and the level of
158
taxation. Instead, the state of the economy played a greater part.
Although less note was taken of budgetary constraints than in most of the
rest of central government, it was a significant change from the preceding
era when the Review Bodies did not see economic constraints (apart from
incomes policy) as relevant to their deliberations. In addition, other
market criteria were used. While recruitment and retention had always been
159
considered, job security emerged as an explicit argument. Also, from
CL3, it was borne in mind that unemployment among the less-skilled might be
artifically boosting the upper-quartile point on the NES non-manual 
160
distribution.
The way the Review Bodies operated added to the effects of the change
in dominant criteria. Most importantly, the client relationship of the
Bodies to their charges was less evident after CL1. It is true that the
reports regularly restated the independence of the Bodies from Government,
insisting on the Bodies' right or duty to recommend appropriate
remuneration levels and to be free of prior limits on increases outside
161
conventional incomes policy. However, the reports showed a much greater
concern for the so-called 'national interest' than previously when
sectional interests were promoted. The change of attitude was made
explicit in the giving of oral evidence in CL2, when the DDRB made it clear
to the professions that the Review Bodies operated in a wider economic and
political context, and necessarily had to take account of general economic 
162
circumstances.
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Problems still remained with the process of pay comparisons, possibly
causing incorrect assessments of appropriate increases. Although a new job
evaluation exercise was carried out for the TSRB review in CL3, there was
163
still no job evaluation of doctors and dentists. External comparators
were hardly scientific, with the DDRB continuing to look at the NES upper
quartile, che TSRB surveys of top armed forces and civil service jobs
having a small sample size, and the survey of barristers' receipts being
164
confined to recent appointees in most years. However, this was not of 
great significance after 1980, given the overshadowing of comparability by 
the ability to pay and other market concerns.
Finally, it is conceivable that the manner in which the 
recommendations of the Review Bodies were implemented may have helped bring 
wage increases down. First, in some years the Government was slow to 
decide whether to override the recommendations, allowing other groups to 
settle before expectations could be boosted by the increases for Review 
Body groups. Second, as noted earlier, the recommendations were regularly 
abated, directly and indirectly affecting settlement levels. Against this, 
the consequently higher recommendations in subsequent years and the larger 
implemented increases may have had an offsetting effect. As the TSRB 
remarked:
The main reason, in our view, why successive Governments have 
been prone to hold down top salaries is to set an example, or at 
least to avoid repercussions which they might fear. It seems to 
us that the exemplary force of such measures is greatly 
exaggerated and that sooner or later the problem is likely to 
become all the more difficult through pressure for large 
'catching-up' increases.165
3.2.2 Arbitration and dispute inquiries
Other forms of third-party intervention in pay determination, 
arbitration and dispute inquiries, likewise, probably caused settlements to
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be marginally above what otherwise might have been negotiated. This stemmed
from their problem-solving role and the associated need to make an award that
was acceptable to the union side. Sometimes that award could not have been
attained through strike action, given the distribution of bargaining power
at the time, but was given all the same to prevent disruption. However,
the extent of access of groups to third-party hearings and the criteria
employed by the third-parties minimised the effect on wage increases.
Access to arbitration and inquiries was not always easy in the 1979-83
period and in fact became increasingly difficult, especially after CL1.
The Government's attitude was that
the main defect in many current arrangements is that they provide 
unilateral access to arbitration; ... this right should be re­
negotiated or if necessary withdrawn.166
The concern was that the ability to pay was not sufficiently recognised,
forcing employers to go beyond their final offer. Some authorities duly
made references joint rather than unilateral. Pay determination was
affected. For example, the PO began to oppose arbitration even on minor 
167
matters. In the case of the teachers, the Government consistently
168
opposed recourse to arbitration in CL3. Quite apart from instances
where the rules concerning references were changed, the Government and
other employers were reluctant to agree to arbitration. The Government
refused access in the civil service and NHS disputes, and in the academic
169
teachers' negotiations. In the NHS case, a Minister explicitly
justified the action by saying it was solely the Government's
responsibility to decide the ability to pay and to stick to it; arbitrators
were not publicly accountable and tended to split the difference between
170
the last offer and claim. Other employers often opposed arbitration,
171
such as in municipal transport. In some cases, such as the BBC, they
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were helped by the demise of Schedule 11 of the Employment Protection Act,
which previously had enabled groups to go to the Central Arbitration
172
Committee (CAC) to have their pay brought up to industry levels.
Where arbitration or inquiries took place, the criteria used to
determine appropriate increases were not usually significant threats to the
effectiveness of the pay restraint policy, even though, typically, small
amounts were added to the employer's final offer. First of all, third
parties did not generally ignore the ability to pay. Where the reasoning
was given in the award, serious account was taken of financial pressures.
For example, in the CL1 arbitration over the pay of local authority white-
collar workers, the arbitrators wrote:
The Committee is not well-versed in the intricacies of local 
government finance but it is persuaded that there is considerable 
substance in the Employers' Side's argument... The Committee, 
therefore, has kept the question of the ability to pay very 
firmly in its mind throughout its deliberations.173
Only a two per cent increase in the offer was made, and that was delayed.
In the same year, the teachers' arbitration body report said that although
the ability to pay was complicated and uncertain, the panel was convinced
that stringent restraints existed. The employers' original offer had been
13 per cent (before subtracting the Clegg overpayment), and the body
awarded 12 per cent with a later payment of between 2-1/2 and 4 per 
174
cent.
Where the reasoning of the third-parties was not detailed,
circumstantial evidence points to a similar recognition of budgetary
limitations. For example, in the CL3 arbitration at London Transport, in
which a 7 per cent award was suggested to the parties, management had
offered 5 per cent, but had been willing to go to 7 per cent if agreement
175
was forthcoming on productivity. The civil service arbitration of that
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year awarded 6 per cent. Although the final offer had been 3.5 per
cent, experience had shown that there was some slack in the cash limits.
Even where strikes had to be resolved, the inquiries tended to pay
attention to the ability to pay. In the CL1 steel strike, the Lever
inquiry came down nearer management's final position. Management had
offered 10 per cent on basic rates and 4 per cent as a minimum bonus; the
unions had demanded 14 and 5 per cent respectively; the award was 11 and 4-
177
1/2 per cent respectively. In the water dispute, the Johnston inquiry 
report contained a recurrent theme of improved productivity: a payment was
made for flexible working; another was consolidated as a 'continuing
178
incentive'; and a working party was set up to discuss productivity.
This was to help finance the award as well as to justify it.
Of course, there were instances where one or both of the parties felt
that there had been too little attention paid to the ability to pay. For
example, this was most obvious in BR where the Railway Staffs National
Tribunal (RSNT) awarded 8 per cent plus a delayed 3 per cent in CL2, and
management was not prepared to pay the second stage until productivity
179
increases had been negotiated. Nevertheless, the generalisations remain 
valid.
The second observation to be made concerning the criteria used by
arbitral bodies and inquiries is that comparability was considered, being
the main union argument, but that it only played a role in a narrowly-
defined manner. Other than where important links had been broken (such as
between management and NJIC formen in the electricity industry, and between 
180
LT and BR personnel), no arbitrations or inquiries accepted that past 
relativities should be maintained in the economic climate of 1979-83. The 
local authority white-collar arbitration recognised the union argument that
176
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there had been a loss of relativity since tne in-house comparability study
the previous year, but would only award a total of 15 per cent against the 
181
claim of 20 per cent. The CL1 teachers' arbitration report also noted 
that the SCPC report had stated that the maintenance of relativities was 
only reasonable for a limited period, and tnat it was unreasonable to
believe that settlements would be achieved solely by the comparative method
182
at that time. In the civil service arbitration in CL3, the award of 6
per cent made no attempt to remove the shortfall in relative pay, estimated
183
at 15 to 20 per cent by the unions.
Rather than maintain historical relativities or seek to achieve pay
level parity, third parties appeared to be concerned with awarding
increases that were close to the going rate of increase in the public
sector at the time. This minimalist version of comparability was one
184
consideration cited in the CL1 arbitration report on teachers' pay. In
CL3, the teachers were awarded 6 per cent, which was identical to the
Scottish teachers arbitrated settlement, and 0.2 per cent above the further
185
education pay increase. The civil servants' 6 per cent increase can be 
interpreted in a similar manner.
3.2.3 Summary
Overall, as this section and the last have shown, third parties 
probably added to wage inflation owing to their independence and problem­
solving role. That said, the intended effects of pay restraint through 
financial controls were not frustrated to as great an extent as might have 
been expected. Under the SCPC and PRU, where comparability was the sole 
criterion, the procedures were generally as non-inflationary as possible, 
and both bodies were abolished after CL1. The Review Bodies, apart from
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the AFRB, de-emphasised comparability and acted less as the groups' agents. 
Finally, arbitrations and inquiries also played down comparability, and 
groups found their access to arbitration limited. Since the availability 
and operation of most third parties were tightened up during the period, it 
seems likely that the institutions themselves had an independent effect on 
the diminution of pay increases.
3.3 Structure of the pay round
It is difficult to discern more than a minor inflationary impetus from 
the length of intervals between settlements and the order of the pay round. 
Further, to the extent that it was pertinent, it was greater in the first 
half of the period than in the second, thereby contributing to the de- 
escalation of wage increases.
The settlement intervals continued to be twelve months in the great
majority of settlements. Table 7.3 lists the major exceptions. Where they
were other than a year, it was only for a pay round or two: a twelve-month
pattern was soon regained. The divergences usually arose because there
were short-term difficulties that could only be resolved by larger
increases over a longer period, such as happened in CL2 in the case of
186
university teachers and technical workers, for example. Other
rationales included the wish to change the settlement date for various
reasons; and, in cases of delayed settlements, the desire to avoid further
negotiations a few months later, as occurred in CL3 in the NHS after the
strike, and in BA where the January settlement that year had to be delayed
187
to October for economic reasons.
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Group Old date New date Agreement length 
(months)
Central Government
CL2
Universities: manuals Nov. 80 Apr. 82 17
technicians Oct. 80 Apr. 82 18
teachers Oct. 80 Apr. 82 18
NHS: ambulancemen Jan. 81 Apr. 82 15
ancillaries Dec. 80 Apr. 82 15-1/2
Pubi ic Corporations
Phase 4
PO: operational grades Jan. 79 Apr. 80 15
telecomms, op. grades Apr. 79 July 80 15
clerical & exec, grades Apr. 79 July 80 15
NFC: manuals Nov. 78 Jan. 80 13-1/2
BGC: staff July 79 June 80 11
CL1
BGC: senior management July 80 June 81 11
BS: all grades Jan. 80 Apr. 81 15
BWB: staff Sep. 79 July 80 10
NTS: senior management Apr. 80 July 81 15
PTE: staff Sep. 79 Apr. 81 19
NCB: all grades Mar. 80 Jan. 81 10
CL2
NCB: all grades Jan. 81 Nov. 81 10
PTE: manuals (Glasgow) Oct. 80 Apr. 81 5-1/2
tabi e 7.3: Major changes in setti ement dates taking effect 1979-83
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Agreements longer than twelve months usually implied higher increases 
than otherwise might have been expected. For example, in CL2, NHS 
ancillary workers and ambulancemen negotiated 15-month agreements that were 
proportionately more lucrative than for other NHS groups: they gave 7.5 
rises as opposed to 6 per cent. This tendency was less pronounced in the 
later years, with the result that the pay restraint policy was not impeded 
as much.
However, it is important not to overstate the inflationary effects of 
the different intervals. First, not all parties negotiating longer 
agreements received higher increases. The New Towns senior management in 
CL1 were one example. Second, the indirect effect on other groups was 
sometimes minimised by staging the increases so that the first instalment 
was close to the general settlement level elsewhere. This characterised 
the 19-month PTE staff increases in CL1, and the university manual, 
technical and academic 17-18-month settlements in CL2, for instance.
Third, where agreements were shorter, increases were not above what would 
have been likely for twelve months: the only effect was that increases 
occurred sooner. While there were cost implications, the wage inflation 
level in the pay round was no higher. Finally, as the table indicates, the 
number of instances of longer and shorter agreements was comparatively 
small.
The order in which groups settled in the pay round in the cash limits 
era changed compared to Phase 4 as a result of negotiations in Phase 4 and 
after. As a result, as the table shows, the cash limits pay policy 
operated in a context where central government negotiations were more 
concentrated in April than hitherto, and where many public corporations 
settled later than before, usually between April and July, with the
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exception of the NCB, which brought its date forward to November.
Where the change of settlement dates was not simply a by-product of
the short-term industrial relations and economic difficulties cited
earlier, but was a purposive action, employers tended to want to move so as
to align agreement lives with budgetary periods in order to make both
financial and pay decison-making easier. Thus negotiations could be
conducted in the light of a more detailed knowledge of the ability to 
188
pay. For unions, the changes of date were sometimes to make the wage 
leadership process work more effectively: for example, certain weaker 
groups, such as the university manual workers, removed themselves from the
vanguard, preferring to follow stronger groups than attempt to spearhead an
189
attack on pay restraint. Others moved in order to increase collective 
or individual union power. This was partly behind the NHS changes in CL2, 
whereby, in accordance with the TUC Health Services Committee plan 
discussed earlier, NHS groups forged a common settlement date. The 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), meantime, negotiated an earlier date
so any action would take place in the winter (rather than the spring) when
190
they were more powerful.
In practice, the effect of the order on pay settlements appeared
marginally positive at most. First, the wage leadership process did not
produce significant wage inflation. In the public services, the local
authority manual workers were still the first major group to settle. Since
they were not particularly powerful or militant, the precedents set were
191
not unduly inflationary. The TUC PSC saw the CL2 settlement as poor.
The following year, although the settlement was close to 7 per cent, given 
a 4 per cent pay factor, the employers argued that there special
192
circumstances existed, and later settlements were accordingly lower. In
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CL4 the manual settlement, as in CL2, was not much above the pay factor.
In the public corporations, although the miners moved to the front of the
line and set relatively high increases, groups outside tne energy and
utilities sector showed little inclination to match them.
Second, collective union power may have been increased by the greater
concentratien of settlements in April, but in very few cases did it seem to
affect settlement rates. As noted in the context of inter-union
coordination, the TUC believed that the NHS strike could not have achieved
193
what it did without a common settlement date. That may well be true,
but the pay rises eventually negotiated were little above the initial pay
factor or the pre-strike offer. A further point to note is that in spite
of the trend towards an April settlement date, there remained a great
amount of diversity, dampening union power. In local government, for
example, the fire service and manual workers settled in November, education
staff in April, and other white-collar staff in July. Public corporation
settlement dates were even more variegated, and defy simple summarisation.
Third, there is little evidence that, individually, unions
successfully raised pay settlements through the use (or threat of use) of
power that was primarily dependent on the timing of negotiations. Even in
the miners' case, there is no obvious sign that the earlier date had any
effect in the period: their power was respected whatever the date of
settlement. In fact, some of the changes of date actually reduced
individual union power. For example, the university groups which moved to
April gave up their ability to disrupt the academic year, apart from maybe 
194
at its tail-end. In general, the greater number of spring settlements 
made usually more-damaging winter action less probable.
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No. of agreements End of Phase 4 End of CL4
Central Government 9 85.5 85.6
Local Authorities 13 86.2 87.5
Public Corporations 23 77.4 78.8
Table 7.4: Basic pay and allowances as a percentage of average gross
weekly earnings for adult males in 1979 and 1983
Note: Where the CL4 data were not available, CL3 figures were used
instead.
Source: Adjusted NES data. (For method see Chapter 5).
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3.4 Payment systems
While other pay determination procedures were adding to wage
increases, albeit mainly in a mild and decreasing manner, payment systems
were on the whole working to reduce pay increases, as the statistical
analysis in Chapter 5 indicated. Several reasons are apparent.
First, whatever the efficacy of the pay systems, there was relatively
little opportunity to raise pay outside negotiations through changes in the
level of overtime, bonus or shift pay, owing to the continuing high
proportion of basic pay in total earnings. In fact, during the era of cash
limits pay restraint under study, the percentage actually increased by a
small amount in each of the three major subsectors of the public sector.
Table 7.4 reports the arithmetic averages for agreements reported in the
NES both at the end of Phase 4 and at the end of CL4. Disaggregating, 15
of the 45 agreements exhibited increases of over 3 percentage points, and
in 11 of the 15 cases, the basic pay element rose. Typically, non-manual
groups continued to receive over 90 per cent of their earnings in basic
pay, manual workers approximately 70 per cent.
Second, independent of demand conditions, pay systems were operated
more cost-effectively as time passed. Overtime became particularly subject
to control due to its pre-eminence as an addition to basic pay. The NHS,
AEA and BRB each reported an attempt to control overtime in order to meet
195
budgetary constraints. The NWC took steps to reduce overtime and
196
replace it with stand-by duty payments. The P0 and BSC introduced
197
productivity schemes partly in order to lower the incidence of overtime.
At the behest of the SCPC, a similar ploy was used to reduce manufactured
overtime by local authority manual workers and, especially,
198
ambulancemen. The significance of these reforms is seen in the fact
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that each of these groups was among those cited in Chapter 5 as
experiencing sizeable reductions in overtime hours and employee coverage.
Incentive schemes were also tightened up in some sectors. Local
authorities were the most notable example. Employers' sides requested that
199
local authorities carry out thorough reviews of all schemes. To give an
incentive, the bonus calculator on existing, unreviewed, schemes was not
allowed to increase, while reviewed schemes were geared to a higher 
200
calculator. This policy was stimulated by a number of reports that
pointed to problems and also by internal and Government criticism. The
Chief Inspector of Audit, like the SCPC, noted that as basic rates
approximated those of the private sector, bonuses should only be paid for
performance reasons. In practice, the level of bonus payments had implied
that exceptional work was widespread, or, more likely, the principles of
the code were not being respected. It was advised that the schemes be 
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reviewed and pruned. The Advisory Committee on Local Government Audit
202
reiterated specific problems of control. Internally, employers were
aware, too, that in building-craft areas, as much as 48 per cent of the
calculator was being earned on average, whereas a third was standard 
203
performance. A Ministerial letter to the local authority associations
204
urged a review of schemes in the light of the various reports. The
direct labour legislation embodied in the Local Government Planning and
Land Act 1980 reinforced the pressure. Outside local government, BGC wound
205
down three of its regional schemes for non-manual workers. In the
industrial civil service, greater attention was paid to ensuring that
206
schemes were self-financing. These management strategies account for 
the observation in Chapter 5 that local authority building and civil 
engineering workers and BGC non-manual workers were two of the three groups
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with the largest losses in pay emanating from incentive schemes.
Management control was also evident in many schemes even where there
had been no reforms. Therefore, the bonus increases earned by other groups
- 0.5 per cent an average according to Chapter 5 - should not be regarded
as necessarily inflationary. For instance, the payments in BS, where they
207
occurred, were self-financing. It has to be admitted, however,
that deficiencies were evident in, for example, certain NCB schemes and
208
some universities, and remained in some local authorities.
A final reason for the constraining effect of pay systems on earnings 
was that demand conditions were poor. Independently of any increase in 
management control, there was less need for extra hours or extra 
productivity. For example, the big losses in overtime pay in municipal 
road transport and by NCOI employees reflected the large reductions in 
transport mileage in the recession. Also, where bonuses were related to
209
corporate results, output and profit indicators were sometimes sluggish.
4. Reasons for Institutional Restraint
The argument of the chapter has been fourfold. First, the operation 
of the cash limits pay restraint policy was facilitated by the 
institutional environment generally transmitting financial pressures to the 
bargaining area relatively unimpaired. This was especially true of the 
organisational characteristics of management which enabled the Government 
to exercise vertical control and financial interests a degree of horizontal 
control. Bargaining structure played a part too, particularly because of 
centralised bargaining levels and high unit concentration, but also because 
of the precise form of agreements and the inclusion of productivity 
improvements within the scope of bargaining.
Second, at the same time, there were isolated, yet sometimes
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significant exceptions, which frustrated the effects of policy. These 
arose mainly due to pay determination procedures, especially the formal 
criteria used in pay links and by the SCPC and PRU, but also third parties 
such as Review Bodies and arbitrations and inquiries. Union organisation 
and the structure of the pay round were generally less influential.
Third, not only did the institutional environment facilitate the pay 
restraint policy, it also had an independent depressing effect on pay rises 
as time proceeded. This was caused by reforms to the organisation of 
management, which resulted in closer control of negotiators, and by changes 
to pay determination procedures, particularly the abolition of the SCPC and 
PRU, the greater cognisance taken by other third parties of the ability to 
pay, and the tightening up of payment systems.
Fourth, inter-sectoral differences in pay increases can be explained 
in part by the facilitating and independently causal role played by the 
institutions surrounding pay determination. Central government 
negotiators were subject to the greatest organisational constraints, 
public corporations the least. Bargaining structures enabled these 
constraints to be experienced by negotiators. Pay determination procedures 
in fact reduced control in the public services the most, but that sector 
saw the most significant reforms, so that it was barely better off than the 
public corporations sector.
In sum, the institutional environment played a key role. It appears 
that the institutional context was more important than under conventional 
incomes policy. Unprecedented efforts were made to ensure the complex of 
structures and processes were appropriate to the successful control of pay 
determination. To be sure, changes had occurred in previous eras: 
witness, for example, the upsurge of productivity agreements in the second
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half of the 1960s, the supercession of PBR schemes by MOW, job evaluation
and plant-wide productivity schemes in the late 1960s and 1970s, the
increased specialisation of personnel management, and the periodic
210
alteration or suspension of institutionalised criteria. However, the 
motivation was not always pay control and attention was often directed at 
only a part of the institutional environment. This contrasts with the 
1979-83 experience when the whole environment was scrutinised to ensure it 
was compatible with the control of pay increases.
Two questions therefore require answers. First, why was the 
institutional environment used to restrain pay? Second, why did the cash 
limits pay restraint policy see more institutional restraint than previous 
forms of policy?
At a superficial level, it is clear that the economic-political 
environment provided inducements or directives to establish a suitable 
institutional context for pay control. In the first place, as Chapter 6 
showed, it produced stringent financial constraints for most authorities, 
which created a general incentive to restrain pay. One option was to use 
the institutional context.
Secondly, the political market surrounding pay bargaining favoured 
institutional restraint. The distribution of power benefitted the 
Government due to its formal role in authorities, or the dependency of 
organisations on it. Through formal and informal mechanisms it was able to 
exercise vertical control over negotiations to varying extents. It 
influentially suggested the reform of arbitration access, and put pressure 
on the Review Bodies. Directly, it abandoned comparability through the 
abolition of the SCPC and the PRU. Also, within their own organisation, 
where they were all-powerful, managements were free to decide on optimal
structures and processes. Finally, tne political market allowed the free
expression of suggestions for reform by independent parties such as the
SCPC and tne Chief Inspector of Audit.
But such an explanation is too facile. While it shows that
authorities had a general incentive to control pay, it does not explain why
the institutional context was used, rather than simply hard bargaining in
the light of financial exigencies. Also, it does not explain why the
Government would want to encourage this approach.
The explanation therefore requires refinement. This can be achieved
by taking into account additional characteristics of the economic-political
environment, other than its harshness. First, the potential for loss of
control must be considered. Organisational behaviour researchers have
shown that environmental complexity, change and uncertainty prejudice
control. Complexity increases the amount of information required to make
decisions; processing that information becomes more difficult, and the risk 
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of error increases. Change requires the updating of information on
212
which decisions are made. Tardiness can cause problems. Uncertainty
increases the amount of information required to make a competent decision;
213
without it, control is not assured. To prevent a loss of control, 
suitable organisational characteristics are needed.
In the context of cash limits pay restraint, the complexity, change 
and uncertainty of the economic-political environment appear to have been 
pertinent to the choices of institutional frameworks preferred by employers 
and Government. Public sector authorities certainly faced a complex 
environment, with a range of different political and economic pressures, 
and with even more financial exigencies. Complexity was most pronounced in 
the nationalised industries, where attention had to be paid to EFLs, and
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other governmental restrictions, prices, and the likely development of 
demand. But even in the public services a plurality of factors, notably 
cash limits, non-pay expenditure, and employment levels, was germane. 
Moreover, many of these factors were prone to vary, especially demand, but 
also public spending levels. Uncertainty was evident in that expenditure 
provisions for the following financial year were generally unclear and 
demand was always likely to vary. As a result of these environmental 
characteristics, the appropriate level of pay increase was far from clear. 
Mistakes could easily be made.
Given this situation, it is not surprising that institutional 
restraint occurred. By controlling negotiators more within the management 
structure, the danger of overgenerous pay offers was reduced. Centralised, 
concentrated and formal bargaining structures reduced the chance of errors 
by decentralised management. The reform of pay determination procedures 
lessened the likelihood of problems caused by independent bodies which were 
out of touch with financial details and by formal criteria which 
disregarded them completely.
The explanation is further improved by the recognition that 
environmental characteristics apart from stringency affect the urgency and 
intensity with which institutional restraint is pursued. Of importance are 
the specificity of the constraints, and their flexibility and permanence. 
Institutional restraint is needed more where the environment does not 
control pay increases specifically, yet imposes more general constraints 
that must be respected. It is also more likely where environmental 
exigencies are inflexible, so that errors in pay decision-making have 
definite repercussions on other expenditures. Permanent, or semi­
permanent, environmental constraints are also likely to foster
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institutional restraint because other, unstructured, means of control 
probably have a shorter longevity.
Under the cash limits pay restraint policy, there was no specific 
control of wage increases by the Government; rather, there were more 
general budgetary constraints. Hence it fell to the individual authority 
to control pay increases. Its own internal structures and processes had to 
be involved to a greater extent, even if hard bargaining was a major tactic 
to keep within the cash limits. Further, since the policy was viewed as 
inflexible by most authorities, and non-pay expenditure reductions were 
disliked, where there were inflationary pay determination procedures and 
bargaining structures the combination of budgetary control and hard 
bargaining was potentially inadequate. Control demanded that procedures 
not be costly. The apparent permanency of the stringent and inflexible 
financial constraints also led managements to ensure that bargaining 
structures and pay determination procedures were suited to the long-term 
restraint of pay growth.
Having analysed the reasons for the restraint exercised by the 
institutional context, it is plain to see why it was more extensive than 
under conventional incomes policy. While the capacity of the economic- 
political environment to pay increases was certainly limited under incomes 
policies, many other environmental characteristics differed.
First, in the political market, governments were primarily concerned
with administering the pay limits rather than establishing an appropriate
institutional context. Only isolated instances of institutional change
were seen, as noted earlier. Independent bodies had little to say on
appropriate structures, apart from the NBPI in the 1960s and the Commission
214
on Industrial Relations (CIR) in the early 1970s. Furthermore, Labour
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and Conservative governments were generally willing to listen and respond 
to union views. The position of the unions was also stronger at Government 
and authority level because the whole point of incomes policy was to reduce 
inflation without raising unemployment. Reform to contain unit labour 
costs was therefore made less likely.
Second, the financial constraints produced by the economic-political 
environment were different from under cash limits pay restraint. Pay 
limits were far from complex, changeable and uncertain. Consequently, 
there was less need to organise management so as to provide more input to 
pay decisions. Loss of control was unlikely, even with an autonomous 
industrial relations function.
Third, the environmental constraints were of a kind that did not 
demand institutional restraint. Since external control of pay increases 
existed, there was no need to reform internal control systems. In 
addition, while the pay limits were seen as inflexible, incomes policies 
were always seen as relatively short-term rather than permanent. Hence 
there was no perceived role for institutional change to produce less 
inflationary procedures; temporary suspensions of the PRU and abatements of 
Review Body recommendations, together with hard bargaining backed by 
incomes policy, sufficed.
Of course, the emphasis on restraint through the institutional context 
is not to suggest that hard bargaining was unimportant. Indeed, it played 
a major role within the economic-political and institutional environments: 
hence the next chapter is devoted to the analysis of the bargaining 
strategies of management and unions.
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Acting within the financial and institutional environments, public 
sector negotiators pursued strategies which led to the de-escalation of pay 
increases. Although the environments were frequently confining, negotiators 
had an important independent influence on pay settlements through the 
precise choice and weighting of pay determination criteria, the exercise of 
bargaining power, and the politics surrounding wage decisions.
The first three sections of this chapter assess the role of these three 
factors in situations where negotiators had a part to play - in other 
words, where pay was not set by a third-party or with reference to a formal 
criterion. The fourth section summarises the thrust of the argument.
1. Pay Determination Criteria
In mid-1979, the dominant themes in pay bargaining had been 
comparability and the cost of living, with public sector groups seeking to 
make up some of the lost relative and real income that had been suffered 
due to the Labour Government's 1975-79 incomes policy. In contrast, in the 
cash limit pay restraint policy era the ability to pay assumed a primary 
role in the determination of pay increases. Comparability and the cost of 
living were generally very much subordinate criteria, save in the remaining 
catch-up settlements of CL1. Lower pay rises were thereby induced.
Partly, the switch was made imperative by the financial climate, but partly 
it reflected the negotiators' strategic choice.
1.1 The abi1ity to pay
The ability to pay was the chief consideration in most negotiations.
The correlation noted in Chapter 6 between the financial constraints and 
pay increases was definitely a causal relationship and not a statistical 
artefact. It is true that the financial constraints did not rigorously
define the ability to pay: there was room for discretion. Apart from 
attempting to increase governmental or internal finance insofar as the 
constraints would allow, it was possible to increase the pay budget of a 
particular bargaining unit by reallocating finance between pay and non-pay 
expenditure budgets, (subject to the labour cost— total cost ratioj, or 
between bargaining units; by staging or deferring agreements; or by trading 
off employment for pay. Nevertheless, negotiators chose not to "stretch" 
the ability to pay too much as is illustrated by the relatively close 
adherence to the pay factor.
In central government, settlements generally only exceeded the pay
factors by a fraction, as Chapter 5 showed. Thus the financial constaints
were largely respected. The flexibility came from reductions in non-pay
expenditure and employment. For example, the non-industrial civil service
CL1 pay settlement explicitly recognised that staffing levels would be cut
by 2-3/4 percent, and that additional finance would therefore be available
to help fund the 18.75 per cent increases under the 14 per cent cash 
1
limit. Where agreements did not explicitly say how the finance would be
raised, job and non-pay spending cuts were the usual means of raising
money. For instance, after the NHS dispute, the Health Authorities were
obliged to make savings to cover the cost of the settlements over the pay 
2
factor. Apart from these sources of finance, however, negotiators usually 
lived well within the constraints. Supplementary finance was not generally 
available. Cash limits on government finance were not overspent. The 
staging and deferral of agreements occurred to some extent in CL1, such as 
in the civil service, but was less common thereafter, being limited to 
groups such as the universities in CL2 and selected units in the NHS in CL2 
and 3. Nor was any group made to accept increases below the pay factor in
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order to finance the increases of another, although there was a small
degree of differentiation between groups.
Local authorities, similarly, did not experience pay rises far in
excess of the pay factor. Up to a point, negotiators were prepared to see
rates increase due to settlements, (as might be inferred from the financial
analysis in Chapter 6.) They were also willing to reach settlements that
implied some employment and service cuts. For example, in the CL3 manual
worker settlement, the excess of the 6.9 per cent increases over the 4 per
cent pay factor was supposed to be financed by the savings from employment
reductions over the previous year: they were not to be put back into
3
higher employment or more services. However, it is worth underlining the
fact that negotiators were stretching the ability to pay at the margin
rather than ignoring it. Indeed, they rarely opted to stage agreements, or
to benefit one group at the expense of another.
Public corporations, it will be recalled, on the whole received higher
settlements than the public services. This was not primarily due to a
greater disregard for the ability to pay: it was caused by the financial
constraints themselves being looser in general. However, as in the public
services, negotiators were prepared to stretch the ability to pay somewhat.
For example, relatively high pay increases were negotiated even in
industries where prices were already uncompetitive, such as in BSC in CL1,
and where loud complaints were heard about inadequate investment funds,
4
such as in the ESI, BGC, BT, PO and BR. At the same time, staging and 
virement between budgets were seen only infrequently. Also, pay-employment 
trade-offs were not as evident as in the public services.
While the ability to pay was obviously taken seriously, it should be 
said that it was not generally debated in negotiations in depth.
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Management usually stated in broad terms that its ability to pay was
limited and made a few general references to the constraints it faced. The
5
NCB produced profit and loss accounts, but that was unusual. The typical
union response was to say that it was management's job to find the 
6
finance. There was a marked reluctance to argue in detail that the claim
could be afforded. The local authority and NWC manual workers did offer
analyses of the financial position, but in this they were distinguishable
7
from others who envisaged problems with this approach. First, it was
believed to be difficult to argue that the ability to pay could meet the
union's claim. As one BA union officer put it, there was no point in a
8
financial analysis when BA was making a loss. Commonly, union officials
knew they could not deny employer counterarguments spelling out the impact
9
of government spending cuts and inadequate inflation provisions. Second,
unions realised that they would get out of their depth very quickly in
discussing financial issues with which management was professionally 
10
involved. Third, some unions feared that to even argue about the ability
to pay would validate the criterion and allow management to feel even more
11
justified in using it on other occasions. Finally, certain unions wanted
to ensure that their members did not see them agreeing that the financial
12
situation was grave and that low increases were in order. As a result, 
unions tended to argue their claim on other grounds, although, through 
concessions, they implicitly acknowledged the importance of the ability to 
pay.
In order to understand why the financial constraints were interpreted 
relatively closely, albeit implicitly, it is necessary to explore the 
attitudes of negotiators towards each of the different influences on the 
ability to pay. Essentially, apart from where negotiators were coerced by
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the economic and political markets or by force of circumstance, respect for 
the constraints was rooted in normative or calculative considerations.
The ceilings on government finance did not allow negotiators any room 
for interpretation. As seen in the discussion of the political market 
environment, the government enjoyed a powerful position in the planning and 
control of expenditure, and was able to impose limits on finance it 
directly or indirectly provided.
For the most part, the attitude of management and unions was one of
resignation due to the distribution of political power. Both parties
thought that increases in government finance were out of the question.
Hence, little thought was given to attempts to secure additional funds. One
manager commented that more time was spent trying to increase the provision
13
for the following year, since it was still at the planning stage.
In other words, coercion was the reason for compliance by negotiators:
there was no consent in most cases. In negotiations management did not
seek to justify the cash limit constraints. Most would have preferred to
have more financial freedom, although some believed that it was their duty
14
to support the Government's policy. On the union side, the predominant
15
view was that cash limits should accommodate pay increases, although
16
certain unions argued for their complete abolition. If there was any
acceptance, it was due to the knowledge that similar pay factors applied 
17
across major sectors.
The financial constraints on other sources of finance were not 
exploited to any severe extent for a combination of reasons. First, in 
central government, negotiators were coerced into accepting that they could 
not rely on significant amounts of additional finance, if any at all. Key 
was the power of the Government to enforce the public expenditure rule that
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most receipts were to be remitted to the Consolidated Fund. Even where
authorities had limited revenue-raising powers, circumstances placed
practical limitations on the proceeds. For instance, in the NHS voluntary
contributions and lotteries could not be counted on to provide more than a
19
very small fraction of the budget ; while where sales were made, such as
in the BBC or through contracts held by manufacturing operations in the
20
industrial civil service, demand was largely exogenous. Further,
uncertainty regarding the future amounts of internally-generated funds
21
caused negotiators to adopt a prudent approach. It should also be
mentioned that the union side, in particular, had a strong principled
22
objection to raising private finance to fund public services. In the
NHS, for example, unions were vociferously opposed to higher prescription 
23
charges and pay beds. In addition, it was believed inappropriate to
raise fees which might choke off demand for a public service. For
instance, unions were unhappy with the prospect of increases in overseas
24
student fees in universities.
In local authorities and public corporations, where the financial
constraints on rate and price increases did not coerce negotiators into
accepting an inflexible amount of internal finance, calculative motives in
conjunction with the financial constraints, caused restraint in bargaining:
both sides realised it was in their interests to refrain from making
settlements that would have required excessive increases in prices or
rates. Local authority negotiators bore in mind both political and
economic incentives. Politically, negotiators, especially on management
sides, were sensitive to the implications of pay deals for rates. Concerns
25
to be mentioned included the fear that industry would move, and that 
there would be an electoral backlash, especially in small districts where
18
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Economically, management calculatedratepayers were strongly organised.
that it was worthwhile avoiding pay settlements that might prejudice the
achievement of nominal expenditure targets and lead to grant penalties.
Public corporation negotiators were wary of agreeing pay increases
that would have boosted prices and threatened services and jobs. For
instance, London Transport negotiators were anxious to avoid increases that
might have substantially raised fares and reduced ridership because bus and
27
rail travel was seen as a public service. In BAe, BA and the bus
transport sector it was realised that greater product market competition
and falling demand prevented significant rises without substantial job
consequences. One union negotiator said, with resignation, that the bus
28
industry was 'a dead duck1.
The leeway afforded by the labour cost-total cost ratio to reallocate 
funds between pay and non-pay budgets was not substantially exploited to 
avoid the pressure of the financial constraints on the overall amount of 
finance for a variety of reasons. First, there were other coercive 
influences which made it unrealistic for most negotiators to assume that 
significant virement could take place after a high settlement. Much non­
pay expenditure was commonly necessary. For the authorities to operate, 
they required factor inputs other than labor. For example, negotiators in 
the Primary and Secondary Burnham Committee realised that education
budgets had to devote large sums to the purchase of new textbooks and 
29
school maintenance. Expenditure was frequently committed in advance,
too. For example, in the NWC, where investment spending was large relative
to pay budgets, virement was limited because approximately 85 per cent of
30
investment spending was committed a year ahead. Furthermore, as time 
progressed, authorities found less and less scope to make economies because
26
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progressive cuts in budgets had eliminated most of the 'fat' that had 
31
existed. For instance, 3A felt the pressures of competition more
intensely because it had already sold off its terminal in London, closed
32
offices, and dispensed with company cars.
A normative commitment to maintaining non-pay expenditure was also
widely evident among negotiators. Both management and union negotiators
wanted to keep services at least at their existing levels. Sometimes it
was for social reasons: for example, NHS unions were anxious to increase
patient services, and so did not want to force health authorities to have
33
to draw on the growth money allotted by the Government. For some others,
it was encouraged by a professional ethic, as in teaching; or by a
dedication to the authority, as in the BBC where a high esprit de corps
34
brought with it a desire for quality programming.
Calculative motives were also behind the reluctance to reduce non-pay
spending. Unions, in particular, were concerned lest the effect of cutting
35
equipment or services would be reduced employment levels.
The remarkable dearth of instances of reallocations of funds from one
pay budget to another was mainly the result of the normative stance of
unions and the calculative attitudes of management, although it is true
that the size of some groups' budgets relative to others, in the
authority, such as nurses' pay in the NHS, coercively prevented any serious 
36
thought of virement.
There were four normative justifications proffered by unions. First,
it was believed unfair to do anything other than give equal percentage
increases across groups in the same authority, especially as the ability to
37
pay was limited, and other groups were not always well-paid. For 
example, the relatively higher increases awarded to doctors and dentists by
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their Review Body particularly irked the other NHS unions because pay
38
factors were conservative and doctors and dentists were highly paid.
Second, it was deemed ethically reprehensible to adopt a policy of 'dog eat
39
dog'; mutual union survival was the dominant goal. Third, unions were
concerned at the general level of unemployment, and felt it was socially
inappropriate to reach agreements that might increase unemployment in other 
40
bargaining units. Fourth, as will be discussed in more detail in a later
subsection, strong intra-authority pay comparisons promoted similar pay 
41
increases. These four normative views were pressed particularly hard in
negotiations because of two features of pay determination. Inter-union
rivalry caused different unions or, in the case of the NHS, different
42
Whitley Councils, to strive for the same increase. Cooperation between
unions, or connections between negotiation bodies, such as where the same
national officer sat on different bodies, also encouraged similar pay 
43
objectives.
Managements' calculative rationales for equal increases related to 
industrial relations and labour market objectives. First, in order to 
avoid labour relations problems it was felt judicious to recognise that
unions were competitive and had equity concerns, and hence to negotiate
44
similar settlements. Second, certain employers feared that different pay
increases might cause unions to reopen agreements and commence a
45
leapfrogging spiral. Third, since each negotiating panel within an
authority generally wanted the largest percentage increase possible, in
order to resolve problems with pay structures and pay systems, as well as
46
give a general increase, equal increases resulted.
Staging was not often used to circumvent the financial constraints 
after CL1 mainly due to Government coercion and management calculation.
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After criticism of the delayed CL1 civil service pay settlement by the
Treasury and Civil Service Committee, the Chancellor stated:
The Government thinks it desirable for the future to avoid the 
delay or staging of awards, and will avoid it where it is itself 
the employer.47
Tnus where the Government was represented in negotiations, staging was
refused. Elsewhere, the threat that the Government would not finance
higher expenditure bases due to staged pay increases was sufficient to
deter most managements from staging. They were daunted by the cuts in
48
employment and services that would be implied. Some did not believe they
49
could make the necessary economies to keep within budgets. Union views
were pragmatic too, but, with different interests, on occasions they were
prepared to countenance staging to a greater degree where the importance
they attached to other objectives outweighed the employment and service 
50
costs. To a lesser extent, there was normative opposition to staging.
Some managements thought staging was dishonest and cheated the taxpayer out 
51
of value-for-money. Several unions reported that their members wanted
straightforward settlements on the due date, whatever the cost in lower
52
increases or cuts in jobs and services.
Finally, negotiators were generally loathe to boost pay increases far
above pay factors if it meant that employment would be reduced. Dominant
were normative motives. First, there was a concern with creating more
umemployment in an economy which was already underemployed. Unions felt
that they could not afford to be seen to be party to agreements that
53
reduced employment opportunities further. Management also voiced
54
concern, albeit to a lesser extent. Second, employers were more worried
about the effects of employment-pay trade-offs for their ability to provide
55
services and meet contractual obligations. Third, some managements did
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not think that it was appropriate to have unions effectively share in the
determination of employment levels; it was felt to be a management 
56
prerogative.
Calculative motives were apparent in addition. Unions noted that
unemployment was generally high and that alternative jobs were not easy to
find. For instance, the NHS pnarmacists were acutley aware of the growing
57
unemployment of the so-called High Street pharmacists. In the industrial
civil service, as in other skilled manual groups, unemployment was
particularly feared due to the difficulty of searching for a job in a
58
narrowly-defined craft. From the viewpoint of the union as an
institution, negotiators were also conscious of the effect of trade-offs on
59
union membership and income. Management realised that its interests lay
in maintaining employment and therefore services, not just because it could
thereby meet its objectives to a greater degree, but also because it
implied larger units to manage, with the consequent income and status 
60
implications.
Where trade-offs were seriously considered, there were usually
coercive constraints preventing significant increases. As in the context
of pay - non-pay substitution it was difficult to make cuts where
authorities had been under financial pressure for some time; or where large
61
cuts were needed to achieve the desired pay levels. Both conditions
applied, for example, in CL1 in the industrial civil service, where the PRU
results revealed that increases far in excess of the pay factor would be
necessary to achieve pay parity. The negotiators agreed that the increases
could not be paid because the savings could not be made due to their size
62
and the lack of significant organisational slack. It was similarly hard 
to envisage employment cuts being possible where relatively fixed ratios of
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employment to service levels existed, sucn as in personal health care and
teaching, where there was, respectively, a one-on-one doctor-patient
63
relationship and specified teacher-pupil ratios.
To the extent that trade-offs occurred, they tended to be in
situations where the normative and calculative imperatives were weakened by
circumstances. First, where employment cuts were going to happen in any
case, or had happened, unions were content to reap some of the financial
gains, while management were clearly not as concerned about service levels.
This was explicit in the CL1 non-industrial civil service pay deal, for
64
example, and also the CL3 local authority manual worker settlement.
Second, where it was not certain that unemployment would result, unions
were sometimes prepared to negotiate higher increases, arguing that
65
management could make economies in other ways, if necessary.
In total, there were coercive, normative and calculative forces 
promoting acquiescence in the financial constraints, and allowing them to 
influence the decline and pattern of settlements over the 1979-83 period.
The extent to which they were stretched by negotiators reflected the power 
of those forces in conjunction with the other criteria of pay determination tc 
which attention now turns.
1.2 Comparabi1ity
The comparability criterion did not play such a significant role in 
negotiations under cash limits as in catch-up increases at the end of the 
Labour Government's incomes policy. Nevertheless, it was still a pertinent 
influence on pay increases. Essentially, the kinds of comparisons made 
changed in the face of the financial constraints on the ability to pay, 
breeding lower increases than would have been attained under former 
versions of comparability, and aiding the counter-inf 1ationary effort of the
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Government. In Ross's terms, the ability to pay was a centrifugal force in 
the process of comparisons, overriding some of the centripetal forces, and 
reducing the orbits of comparisons. As Ross noted in a more general 
context:
Comparisons exert a centripetal force, pulling separate wage 
bargains together into a system. Ability to pay is often 
centrifugal, since no two employers are situated exactly alike 
from the standpoint of financial capacity. . . .Even within a 
customary orbit, (comparisons) are sometimes superseded by more 
compelling considerations, especially differences in ability to 
pay.66
1.2.1 Public services
Table 8.1 records the orbits of comparisons in the public services and 
corporations as revealed by interviews and bargaining records. They are 
categorised into, first, economy-wide or private sector comparisons; 
second, external relativities within the public sector, (that is, orbits 
linking different authorities); and third, internal relativities, (that is, 
comparisons with other bargaining units in the same authority). The points 
of comparison appearing in brackets had previously been important in pay 
determination, but, when proposed under cash limits, were rejected in one or 
more, but usually all, rounds.
As Table 8.1 shows, economy-wide or private sector comparisons were 
brought up in negotiations, particularly by the union side, but in most 
cases they were rejected. Employers were not prepared to maintain 
relativities set by the SCPC or any other standing body, nor to keep pace 
with the average earnings index.
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Bargaining Units Orbits of comparison
Economy-wide/ Public Sector Internal
Private Sector External Relativities Relativities
Central Government 
Non-industrial (PRU sample)
civil service (NICS)
Industrial civil 
service (ICS) 
NHS electricians 
other craftsmen 
ancillaries 
admin/clerical 
nurses/midwives
(PRU sample) 
local comparators 
(elec, contracting
(SCPC relativities)
ind. )
LA manuals 
(NICS)
(NICS, doctors 
and dentists)
NICS
NHS electricians
other NHS 
other NHS
PT (A)
PT(B): technicians 
MLSOs
work staff 
pharmacists 
Universities:
technical priv. sec. tech.
clerical
manual
AEA: manual engineering, chem.
nurses and 
midwives
(NICS scientists)
(NICS scientists)
(NICS prof, and tech.)
(NICS scientists)
(ICS, NHS, academics)
(NICS, LA clericals)
(NHS, LA manuals) 
nationalised inds.
non-manual NICS
Bargaining Units Orbits of compari son
Economy-wide/ Public Sector Internal
Private Sector Ex terno1 Re Ta tl v i t i e s Relativities
Local Authorities
Manual workers (SCPC relativities) NHS ancillaries
Craftsmen (private sector) similar LA jobs
White-collar (av. earnings index) (NICS, other other LA groups
workers 
Teachers:
prin. and sec. (Houghton, SCPC 
relativities)
further educ. (Houghton
relativities)
Pub!ic Corporations 
Energy and utilities:
NCB miners 
other
BGC manuals
non-manuals
management 
ESI manuals
non-manuals av. earnings index
NWC manuals
non-manuals
NALGO)
(NICS) other LA groups
(NICS) prim, and sec.
teachers
More than others
NCB miners
NCB miners
other energy 
groups
BGC manuals
NICS BGC non-manuals
NCB miners, 
BGC manuals
ESI manuals
NCB miners, BGC, 
ESI manuals
LA manuals NWC manuals
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Bargaining Units Orbits of comparison
Economy-wide/ Public Sector Internal
Private Sector Externa 1 Re lat i v i t i es Re 1 at i v i t i e s
Communications:
PO UCW
CMA
BT POEU 
BBC
Transport:
BA
BAA
BRB
LTE buses 
ra i 1
PTE manuals
non-manuals
BWB
Manufacturing:
BAe
BSC
engineers
(IBA)
(Oct. Earnings 
Survey)
(1974 relativities)
(road haulage) 
(SCPC)
local firms, EEF
BR, NBC, NCB 
manuals
BT
eng i neers
NICS
general
general
NCB miners, BT 
engineers, 
dockworkers
BRB
BRB, LA manuals
LA groups
LA white-collar 
workers
general and 
civil service
(general)
Other PO groups 
Other BBC unions
LTE rail
other divisions 
other BSC unions
Table 8.1: Orbits of comparison in public sector pay negotiations 
under the cash 1imits pay restraint policy 1979-83 
Notes: ( ) denotes comparison repudiated during all or part of period
Sources: Interviews and records of negotiations.
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Some other specific private sector comparisons were also abandoned. It 
should be pointed out, however, that in spite of the relative lack of 
public-private comparisons, the public sector did not appear to lose 
substantial ground, at least on the average. Table 8.2 illustrates. It 
shows the gains and losses in pay in public subsectors relative to the 
private sector over the 1979-83 period. Although each sector has a 
different proportion of settlements negotiated under the policy current in 
April, and staged payments of comparability awards are included in the 1980 
and 1981 figures, it is clear that the loss of relativity since the peak 
relative position was not substantial, in the sense that the gain due to 
catch-up awards was far from wiped out. Central government suffered most, 
but lost only 6.1 points of the 10.5 gain, while local authorities lost 3 
points against a 9.3 point recovery. Of course, while this was true of 
workers on average, certain groups did suffer more significant losses of 
relativity vis-a-vis their private sector counterparts. Non-manual workers 
fared worse, it appears, especially in central government.
At the same time, the orbit of external relativities was less 
influential. In particular, comparisons with the non-industrial civil 
service were repudiated. Notably, the informal link between administrative 
and clerical workers in the NHS and in the civil service was broken after 
twenty years. Also, the informal links between professional and technical 
staffs in the NHS and the civil service were broken.
As a result, where pay comparability was a relevant consideration in the 
public services, it related to pay within authorities. The going rate 
within the NHS and within local authorities took on extraordinary 
importance. After the first settlement in each, groups were mainly 
concerned with achieving similar deals. Comparisons with
4 8 2
Sector Percentage point changes in public sector pay 
relative to private sector pay
Gain in relativity: 
T979 to peak
Loss in relativity:
Manual and non-manual men
Central Government 10.5 6.1
Local Authorities 9.3 3.0
Public Corporations 4.5 0.7
Manual men
Central Government 10.4 1.4
Local Authorities 7.4 0.5
Public Corporations 8.0 0.5
Non-manual men
Central Government 8.4 9.6
Local Authorities 9.2 5.1
Public Corporations 6.7 1.6
Table 8.2: Percentage point changes in pub!ic sector relative to
private sector adult male average gross weekly earnings 
under the cash 1imits pay restraint policy 1979-83■ 
Notes: Figures are based on April data and include staged catch-up
increases at the date of payment.
Source: Derived from New Earnings Survey, DE, various issues.
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rises in the same round and under the same financial circumstances relieved
much inflationary pressure. Looking farther afield to authorities where
the capacity to pay was greater, and back to increases gained by
comparators in previous rounds would have been much more inflationary.
The reasons for the narrower orbits of comparison were plainly related
to financial pressures. Under the range of controls associated with the
cash limits authorities could not always afford the increases paid in other
public or private sector organisations. Private sector pay negotiators
operated under the confines of monetary policy rather than the cash limits
policy, while, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, the cash limits policy itself
had a varying effect across the public sector, with the result that the
capacity of authorities to fund pay increases was not identical. Thus in
CL1, the NHS Administrative and Clerical Whitley Council Management Side
said that it could see no basis on which it could fund increases that
67
maintained the civil service link. The same reasoning also explains the
68
other fractured links between the two services.
Financial constraints also prevented the restoration of relativities
vis-a-vis points of comparison to have received increases under previous
pay policies: there was generally only sufficient money to match the current
going rate. For example, the industrial civil service PRU exercise in CL1
in 1980 showed that increases elsewhere over the previous year, which
included some of the large catch-up increases of Phase 4, had been around
25 per cent. There was no attempt to match the comparators due to the 14 
69
per cent pay factor. In a similar fashion there was no way authorities 
could maintain relativities established by standing bodies or move to re­
establish historically preferred relative positions.
Internal relativities did not simply come to dominate comparabi1ity
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discussions due to financial imperatives, but also due to
normative forces. There was a strong sentiment tnat some degree of
comparability was appropriate, even if it was limited to intra-authority 
70
orbits. This was reinforced by a belief that there should be 'equality
of sacrifice1: if pay was being restrained by the authority's financial
71
position, all units should share the burden. For example, in CL1 the NHS
ancillaries settled for 13 per cent before it became clear that a 14 per
cent pay factor was to be introduced; the unions negotiating the nurses' and
midwives' increases, some of which were the same as settled the ancillary
negotiations, did not want to press for more than 14 per cent for fear of
72
upsetting the ancillaries. In a similar way, the teachers were angry
when management said their final offer was only 4 per cent when other
73
groups had settled for 7-1/2 per cent in CL2.
While the trend towards more limited orbits of comparison was 
indisputable, it is clear that some groups retained wider orbits. This 
occurred for a variety of reasons. Partly this was due to some 
authorities, like the AEA, acting within a more liberal economic-political 
market context. For the others, it reflected labour market forces and 
bargaining power, about which more will be said in due course.
1.2.2 Public corporations
The orbits of comparison favoured by public corporation groups did not 
change significantly during the period. As Table 8.1 shows, there were few 
comparisons that were prevented from affecting pay negotiations: those 
were a small number of historical, index-based, or private sector 
comparisons disavowed for financial reasons. As a result, there was not 
the same degree of contribution to lower wage inflation from this source as
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in the public services.
Notwithstanding tnis, the comparability criterion facilitated the
counter-inflationary impact of the financial pay restraint policy by
largely mirroring, and thereby legitimising, the financial constraints.
First, it is striking that most comparisons were made within the same broad
sector of the public corporations or closely related sectors. The first to
settle in an industry, usually the manual workers, commonly looked to other
manual groups in the sector. Other bargaining units in the industry were
heavily influenced by the manual increases. Of course, there were
exceptions where more general comparisons were made, but the emphasis on
subsectoral and authority relativities matched the subsectors in which
financial constraints were similar.
Second, the sectoral ranking based on financial constraints was much
the same as the sectoral ranking based on normative ideas of fair pay. The
NCB and the NUM wanted to be 'top of the league1, as they put it, due to
74
the nature of mineworking. Meantime, 8GC aimed to be in the top 10 per 
75
cent. The ESI and NWC workers thought they should be comparable to BGC 
76
employees. Large increases were believed to be in order. These
authorities also had the most flexible ability to pay, so the financial pay
policy implications were reaffirmed. Again, matching the stricter
financial conditions, other sectors tended to shun comparisons with the
energy and utilities sector. As one negotiator remarked, 'The miners are a
77
different kettle of fish*. The communications sector focused on points 
of comparison that did not tend to imply increases as great as in the 
energy and utilities sector, although some comparators were from outside 
the subsector. The same applied to the transport sector groups, some of 
which also included local authority comparisons, which lowered the likely
sectoral average increase relative to communications workers, commensurate
with the lower ability to pay. Finally, the manufacturing sector showed
both wide and narrow orbits of comparison, correlating financial
circumstances. For example, in BSC external comparisons were totally
78
rejected in view of the overriding corporate goal of survival.
The reinforcing role of comparability originated independently of the
financial constraints to a large extent, although granted, certain orbits
were reduced in the name of economy. The norms regarding appropriate
comparisons were of long standing in many cases. Apart from feelings of
fairness, such as due to historical relationships or the so-called 'spirit
79
of the industry1 in BR, they were partly influenced by relative power,
rooted both in strategic and economic conditions. For example, energy and
utility groups were accorded the highest place in the normative hierarchy
in part due to a recognition of their superior power. Other determinants
included labour market considerations, such as the need to give equal rises
within authorities in order to maintain adequate incentives for foremen and 
80
supervisors.
Of course, an alternative interpretation of this role of comparability 
might be that the financial constraints were drawn up so as to accommodate 
the forces of comparisons. While there may be some truth in this in a few 
cases of the fixing of the EFL assumptions, it seems clear that financial 
circumstances outside the Government's control, such as demand trends and 
labour-total cost ratios, also gave flexibility to high-paying industries. 
In addition, comparisons were overridden in a few cases. As a result, it 
seems unlikely that comparability was actually a significantly inflationary 
factor.
1.3 Cost of living
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The de-escalation of wage increases was further encouraged by the
relatively restricted role given the cost-of-living criterion. First, it
was not emphasised in the public services. This reflected the fact that,
even in more normal times, the public services groups were generally more
concerned with comparability. The only groups to attach primary importance
to it were university manual and clerical workers and local authority
manual and building and civil engineering workers. Other groups, such as
NHS nurses, professional and technical staff, optical staff and
ancillaries; AEA employees; and local authority white-collar workers, used
81
the real wage argument, but only in a subsidiary manner.
Second, where the cost-of-living criterion was pressed by the union
side, as in most public corporations, especially by the first group in the
authority to settle, and in the public services cited above, it was not
always accorded respect in negotiation outcomes. The financial arguments
tended to dominate. Unless the financial constraints were sufficiently
loose, real wages declined. As might be expected, bargainers, especially
in the public services and manufacturing and transport, reported their 
82
arguments rebuffed. Negotiators accepted this, even if they disagreed
83
with it, and turned their attention to 'equalising the misery'.
The record of settlement rates in real terms corroborates these 
findings. Table 8.3 indicates that, indeed, the public services 
(excluding the police and fire services) and manufacturing failed to keep 
pace with the cost of living, although the aggregate figure for transport 
did not reveal a decline in real pay. The energy and utilities and 
communications sectors generally kept up with inflation. The cost of 
living was apparently neglected most in the first three phases of the 
financial pay restraint policy.
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Policy CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4 CL1-4
Year
Sector
1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1979-83
Compounded
Central Government -3.9 -2.6 -2.4 +0.4 -8.3
Civi1 Service -0.5 -2.9 -0.4 N. A. -3.7
NHS -6.7 -2.4 -2.6 +0.3 -11.1
Uni versities N . A. N . A. -5.8 +0.6 N. A.
Local Authorities -4.7 -1.7 -0.9 +2.7 -4.7
Police and Fire +0.3 +2.8 +0.5 +3.3 +7.0
Other -4.8 -3.1 -1.6 +1.8 -7.6
Public Corporations +0.3 +1.4 +0.3 +1.9 +3.9
Energy and Utilities +2.3 + 1.3 -0.1 + 1.0 +4.7
Communications +2.2 -0.5 -0.6 +1.8 +3.1
Passenger Transport + 1.2 +0.7 +0.7 +4.2 +6.4
Manufacturing -1.1 +2.6 -5.7 -2.7 -6.9
Public Sector: Total -2.0 -0.3 -0.6 +1.8 -1.1
Annual increase in
RPI: April 21.8 12.0 9.4 4.0
Table 8.3: Percentage real settlement rates in the UK public sector 1979-
83
Note: Settlement rates are deflated 
at the usual settlement
by the 
date
annual rate of price increase
Source: Derived from Table 5.3 and RPI data .
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In view of the evidence, it is clear that the rate of pay increase was
lower than if compensation for price increases had been permitted.
Furthermore, where the cost of living was acknowledged, it should be said
that the downward trend in the index after May 1980, induced a comparable
movement in settlement rates. Table 8.3 indicates the falling rates of
price inflation in April each year.
The Government attempted to accelerate this effect by introducing a
Tax and Price Index (TPI) in August 1979, which took account of changes in
retail prices as well as income taxes and national insurance 
84
contributions. It was hoped that negotiators would look at trends in 
post-tax real income and realise that the Government's tax cuts implied 
that lower increases were necessary to regain former levels of real 
disposable income than were implicit in conventional real wage 
calculations based on the RPI. In practice, the tax cuts made little 
difference and negotiators almost universally failed to use the TPI in 
bargaining.
1.4 Recruitment and retention
Recruitment and retention needs had little significant effect as a pay
increase criterion during the 1979-83 period. Primarily, this was because
it was rarely brought up. Labour supply and demand had not been prominent
considerations in the era prior to the cash limits pay restraint policy,
and there was no reason to expect them to grow in importance during the 
85
policy. Negotiators were generally preoccupied with the ability to pay 
and its consequences for relative and real pay. Further, some bargainers, 
particularly where multiemployer bargaining took place, remarked that they
490
were uncertain of the recruitment and retention situation. As a result, 
they were not in a position to take account of labour market factors, even 
if they had wished to do so.
Where recruitment and retention was an issue, the criterion was not 
particularly influential in the determination of the final settlement 
level. Probably the most devout protagonist of the criterion was the 
Government in civil service pay negotiations. Its view was baldly stated 
in the CL3 pay offer:
. . . the Government's objective . . was to pay those wages 
necessary to recruit, retain and motivate the staff required in 
both numbers and quality to enable public business to be 
conducted in an efficient and cost effective manner.87
Yet, it offered pay increases of 3.5 per cent in a period of high
unemployment. As it admitted,
had (recruitment and retention of staff) been the only criteria, 
it could be argued that no increase in pay was needed at all in 
the circumstances of 1982.88
The eventual settlement, determined by arbitration, was even higher. This
indicates that other factors were more important.
This case was not atypical: the use of the labour market criterion
did not appear to reduce the general level of pay increases within an
authority. To the extent that it had an effect, it was to affect the
distribution of the increases, either between bargaining units in the
authority or within a particular unit. For example, UCNS did not seem to
want to use the labour market criterion to squeeze pay budgets - that was
largely a function of financial constraints and the role of the FGPC in
setting parameters - but it did vary the increases according to market
conditions. In view of the losses of technical support staff to private
industry, for example, technicians tended to receive slightly greater
89
increases than manual or clerical workers. Elsewhere, BT was conscious
36
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of the need to attract and retain engineers in a market characterised by 
90
excess demand. The BSC also weighted its increases towards certain
91
groups for which the London market was tight, such as secretaries.
1.5 Productivity
Productivity arguments or deals as a means of obtaining higner
settlements, (as distinct from pay increases from ongoing incentive payment
systems that were not part of settlements, which were discussed in the last
chapter), were not common. In part, this reflected the difficulties of
measuring productivity, especially in non-manual occupations, and also the
fact that greater productivity was not always appropriate in the public
services if a decline in the quality of service would have resulted.
Even where productivity was a potentially viable criterion, unions and
management were frequently hesitant to use it. Foremost in the minds of
unions was a fear of creating additional unemployment. For instance, BAe
workers would only agree to a productivity deal if there was no reduction in 
92
employment. BGC non-manual workers simply refused, saying that they
93
wanted employment stability. Unions were also concerned at the
implications for the organisation of work and working conditions. For
example, although it eventually agreed, ASLEF was reluctant to commit
itself to flexible rostering due to the ill-effects it foresaw. In
particular, it did not want to see the end of the eight-hour guaranteed
day. It was also worried about the effect on health and safety, personal
94
needs breaks, and shift 'swapping1 arrangements. Finally, as 
institutions, unions were concerned for membership, income and power. For 
example, the ISTC was aware that local bonus schemes would weaken the 
central organisation and dampen enthusiasm for national campaigns such as
492
95
against job cuts.
Managements, too, were often opposed to productivity deals.
Principled objections included the view, held by the BBC for example, that
96
it was wrong to pay unions for the remedy of past inefficiencies. Some
authorities were also opposed to paying for management-inspired
97
reorganisations and economies. From a practical point of view,
managements were wary of entering into productivity deals without specific
98
commitments that would ensure self-financing or labour cost savings.
The instances where productivity gains were rewarded by higher
settlements were limited to the public corporations sector. The
productivity criterion was operated in different ways. One variant was the
added-value or profit-sharing approach. This was seen in BSC plants in the
tubes division, for example, where business results schemes were negotiated
99
on one or other basis. Meanwhile, BT paid higher increases according to
100
the annual increase in profit due to greater output. A second type of
formula used was based more directly on labour productivity. BSC plants in
the strip products group negotiated schemes based on manhours per tonne
101
(and production costs), for example. The P0 also introduced local
102
schemes involving targets in parcel- and letter-handling per man-hour.
A third kind of productivity deal was simply a higher settlement for
promises of greater productivity. For example, LT gained a commitment in
CL1 to duties and rosters for single manning of tube trains, inter alia, in
103
return for the 20 per cent pay deal. BR unions eventually agreed to a
number of productivity measures in return for a shorter working week in 
104
1982.
The effect of productivity deals on settlement increases did not 
appear to threaten the de-escalation of pay increases. To be sure, where
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productivity was rewarded, pay generally appeared to be higher than it 
would otherwise have been. For instance, the increases in the pay of BR 
and LT workers in CL1 and 2 were among the highest in the round, in spite 
of the energy and utility sector having a more prosperous financial 
outlook. Also, BSC management argued that pay increases could not be 
afforded other than through productivity agreements. On the other hand, 
the percentage of public sector workers affected was relatively small. Not 
only did few authorities negotiate productivity-related settlements, but 
also where schemes were left to local parties to determine, they did not
always do so, as in the PO, with the result that the potential pay
105
increases did not occur. In addition, on occasions, payments were not
large, as was the case in BSC during periods when demand was especially 
106
sluggish. In BT, the productivity payments amounted to only 1 to 3 per
cent a year, and management argued that the net addition to pay increases
was even less because without the productivity payments, higher basic rate
107
increases would have been negotiated. BS also regained some of its
108
outlay in the form of firm limits on overtime pay.
It should be remembered, of course, that while productivity deals may 
not have lowered settlement rates, they were not necessarily inflationary in 
terms of unit labour costs. It was striking that managements strove to tie 
pay and productivity together by means of formulae, as in BT, the PO, 
and BSC, or by attempts to make pay rises conditional upon general progress 
or productivity, such as in BS and BR. Certainly, BSC achieved massive 
cuts in employment and significant restructuring. BS reduced its size, too. 
LT achieved single manning. BR managed to make progress on a number of 
issues, which may not have added up to great savings, but opened the way 
for future changes in working practices by demonstrating management's
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determination to manage.
1.6 Summary
It is clear that for most authorities the ability-to-pay criterion was 
the most influential under the cash limits pay restaint policy: through 
this argument in pay determination the financial constraints imposed by the 
policy had their intended effect. Negotiators desired, for normative and 
calculative reasons, or were forced, to respect the constraints, stretching 
them only at the margin. The downward path of settlements was also induced 
by narrower orbits of comparison in tne public services, and was 
facilitated in the corporations sector by orbits of comparison tending to 
be confined to authorities with similar financial positions. The cost of 
living also played a role subordinate to the ability to pay: it was 
largely ignored or rebuffed in the public services and manufacturing. 
Elsewhere, the decline in price inflation spilled over into pay claims.
The recruitment and retention and productivity criteria were of limited 
relevance in the 1979-83 period. Labour market arguments appeared to 
affect the distribution, but not the average level of pay increases. 
Productivity payments were not always large, and financial and productivity 
offsets were generally made.
2. Bargaining Power
The choice and weighting of the pay determination criteria, together 
with the aggression with which they were pursued in bargaining was partly 
due to bargaining power. In the 1979-33 financial pay restraint policy 
era, the balance of power lay with the Government and management.
2.1 Economic bargaining power
At the end of Phase 4, economic bargaining power favoured the unions
109
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over management. Unions could press their claims due to the relatively low 
costs of negotiation, industrial action, and settlement outcomes. 
Management, on the other hand, faced high negotiation and action costs, not 
to mention considerable disaffection with outcomes, if it was to pursue 
smaller increases.
By the closing of months of CL1, the tables ware turned: generally 
speaking, relative economic bargaining power rested with management. The 
main reason was unemployment. It greatly increased the cost to the union 
side of pursuing settlements based on preferred criteria, such as 
comparability and the cost of living. In a situation where the ability to 
pay was closely circumscribed, not only would workers be displaced by high 
pay increases, but also they would find it more difficult to find other 
employment. This was disconcerting for the normative and calculative 
reasons outlined earlier.
As Table 8.4 shows, in CL1 the rate of unemployment in April, a common
settlement date, was only 5.8 per cent. However, during CL2-4,
unemployment was close to, or in, double digits. Negotiators reported
that, indeed, they noticed the effects of unemployment on power after 
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CL1. Not only were the rates of unemployment important, but also its
trend, or rate of change. As the table indicates, the trend was upward
throughout, but was particularly pronounced in CL2. Workers realised that
future job losses would probably be set against a background of even
greater unemployment. Thus it was not surprising that, for example, the
ISTC believed it was futile to strive for larger settlements given
budgetary constraints, rising imports and a declining market, while BAe
workers were concerned lest contracts be lost to Boeing, and NBC employees
111
feared employment cuts in the more competitive bus sector. A common
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Pay Round
TRprTT]~
% rate
Unemployment
X rate of change
CL1 5.8 13.7
CL2 9.9 70.7
CL 3 11.9 20.2
CL4 13.1 12.9
Table 8.4: Unemployment rates and rates of change in Great Britain April
1980-83.
Source: Department of Employment Gazette, various issues.
sentiment was that of PT(3) workers who 'felt they were lucky to have a
112
job.1
At the same time, the costs to management of insisting on low 
settlement rates were much less. Discontent was usually latent given the 
attitude of resignation towards the financial constraints, and the 
recognition that restraint was general. The low costs to management of 
pressing its case, and the high costs to unions of resistance, gave 
management a considerable degree of economic bargaining power.
While, in general, power rested with management, there were sectoral 
variations. Management's power was most pronounced in manufacturing and 
certain transport industries where unemployment was relatively high and 
union negotiators were resigned to the inflexibility of the financial 
situation. At the other extreme, management was weakest in the utilities 
and communications sectors because unemployment was relatively low; at the 
same time, the less stringent financial position induced unions to pursue 
their claims, causing management to incur high costs if it resisted. Other 
authorities were between these two extremes, with relative power favouring 
management.
The relative costs of industrial action also changed in favour of
management, particularly in the earlier years of the period, making it
easier to resist union claims. Union and individual resources for
financing strikes were more restricted than in 1979, effectively increasing
the cost of action in terms of the institutional and personal economies that
were necessary. First, some unions had severely depleted their funds when
taking action in Phase 4. NALGO, for example, found the social workers'
strike particularly expensive, its general fund revenue account showing a
113
deficit in 1980 of £0.4m. It should be said that even after a few
years, during which time resources were rebuilt somewhat, unions were far
from indifferent to the cost of action. The conclusion of the civil
service dispute, although based on selective action in the main, was said
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to be hastened by the deficiency of funds. In the NHS dispute it was
realised that NUP£'s£16m. of funds would have disappeared in six weeks had
115
all NHS members struck and had been paid strike pay of £12.50 per week.
COHSE, with £3.7m. in reserves and assets and £ 3 weekly strike pay would
116
have quickly run out of finance too. The TUC Health Services Committee
was also cost-conscious, refraining from placing advertisements in
117
newspapers due to the cost.
Second, individual resources were limited. They had been run down in 
some cases during the Phase 4 strikes. Under the cash limits policy, the 
cuts in real income hindered the restoration of savings levels.
Furthermore, supplementary benefit payments to strikers' dependents were 
reduced from 1980: not only were deductions made for other earned income, 
but also for notional amounts of strike pay, whether actually paid or not.
For management, the costs of worker action fell in certain respects. 
First, as will be shown shortly, the strategic power of unions in certain 
authorities was reduced, lowering the cost of action to the employer. 
Second, even where industrial action had the usual implications for output 
or services, the political costs were less than in Phase 4. Part of the 
reason appeared to be that the public was more prepared to countenance 
strikes caused by management resistance to inflationary claims that were 
out of line with other settlements. Linked with the change of mood, the 
Government believed that it had a mandate to reduce inflation and combat 
the power of trade unions, and was therefore prepared to withstand strikes. 
In any case, apart from in 1983, the cash limits policy was administered in
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years when there were no national elections at which public opposition
118
could have political repercussions.
Finally, negotiation costs also gave management economic power over 
unions in most cases. Outside the less-constrained public corporations, 
unions faced costly negotiations if tney were to strive for the increases 
they demanded, due to the difficulty of raising the ability to pay: there 
would have been costs in terms of negotiators' time and effort , not to 
mention administrative costs associated with organising lobbies, for 
example. The costs to management of seeking low settlements were somewhat 
smaller because management's position was bolstered by the exogenous 
financial constraints. The exogenous character of the constraints also 
meant that attempts to raise offers were directed more at politicians than 
management, reducing negotiation costs for management.
2.2 Poli tical bargaining power
A further reason for the dominance of the ability to pay was the 
distribution of power in the political market that was oriented around pay 
determination (as distinct from the public expenditure political market). 
Structurally, the market included management and unions, government 
departments, the Cabinet, M.P.s, the media and the public. Before the 
Conservatives took office, the unions were powerful. They had access to 
Government, meeting Ministers regularly, lobbying Parliament, and working 
through sponsored M.P.s. Importantly, in 1979, the Labour Government was 
prepared to acknowledge the views of the unions, partly due to ties with 
the labour movement, and partly because of its industrial might.
However, the change of government brought with it a change in the 
political market. While the unions had much the same access to government,
500
the attitudes of the new administration were fundamentally different, as in
the public expenditure political market. Reflecting the absence of ties
with the unions and the lack of union power from other sources, and in
conjunction with its macro-economic stance, the Government was
uncompromising when approached with demands for more flexibility in pay
determination, as noted in the context of the ability-to-pay 
119
constraints. For instance, in the industrial civil service, the CSO
offered to arrange a meeting for the union side with the Minister to
discuss a pay offer, but warned that it would be of no use: a union
120
negotiator remarked that it was 'a dialogue of the deaf'. More
generally, unions recognised that the Treasury view dominated and that no
121
"end run' bargaining would be successful. They believed that, once set,
the pay provisions were immovable: more than one negotiator compared
attempting to obtain more funding to 'banging your head against a brick 
122
wall1.
Some reacted by withdrawing from political channels or by limiting
participation in the market to non-financial matters. Others continued to
send deputations and lobby Parliament, usually with resignation to the
likely outcome. One rationale was that it was necessary 'to go through the
hoop’ and try any means possible to increase pay, while another was that it
123
was done to satisfy the membership.
The unions most affected were those in the public services and 
manufacturing and transport where Government constraints bit deeply and 
could only be altered through political channels. For others, political 
bargaining power was largely irrelevant, at least in the context of pay 
determination.
When managements were prepared to approach the Government, they
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usually fared no better. As one CSD negotiator said, 'Ministers are not
124
sympathetic to hard-luck stories.1 The local authority associations
came to realise that the Environment Secretary really did mean that there
125
would be no more funding for negotiators to rely on.
As a result of tne changed distribution of power, tough management
stances were bolstered. Instead of positions being undermined by
Government-union negotiations, management was supported by the Government.
Not only were financial constraints reinforced by the Government's
unwillingness to bend in the face of industrial relations pressure, but
also the Government was prepared to agree to stringent pay factors, such as
in BSC in CL1, and back tough positions in negotiations, such as in BR over
126
productivity in return for a shorter workweek.
Union power was also usually dampened by public opinion and the media.
Autonomously, and with help from the media, public opinion reacted against
the unions in the Phase 4 'Winter of Discontent1. For example, general
anti-union sentiments were said to have caused some NHS unions to be
127
acquiescent in the early part of the period. The public was also
128
hostile to particular groups, such as the rail unions over productivity.
That said, some groups did not fare badly: the FBU and the NHS unions
reported public support when, respectively, attempts were made to remove
129
the fire link and the NHS was on strike.
2.3 Strategic bargaining power
Strategically, unions were slightly less well-placed to impose their 
demands in the cash limits pay restaint policy due to changes in the 
organisational, technical and legal sources of power.
The organisational bases of union strategic power remained largely 
intact. Although the roll-back of the public sector reduced union
5 0 2
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membership levels, there is no evidence that the density decreased. The
closed shop continued to have much the same coverage, promoting
organisational membership and thereby union strength. One exception was in
8R, where management told the workforce that if they lost their union
membership through refusing to take strike action, they would not lose 
131
their jobs. However, overall, it appeared that unions were still able 
to call on the support of a substantial proportion of the workforce in most 
sectors.
During the period, the distribution of members between unions and
professional associations shifted a little. In particular, the RCN grew
approximately 40 per cent, while COHSE declined after 1982. In teaching
the NUT declined by 15 per cent or so, while the NAS/UWT maintained a
132
reasonably steady level of membership. However, it is wise not to make
too much of this. Union power was probably not significantly affected.
The RCN demonstrated in the NHS dispute that it could be militant like the
other unions. The NAS/UWT was as aggressive in pay bargaining as the NUT,
133
being prepared to ask its members to suspend voluntary school duties.
In point of fact, it should be noted that union organisation-based 
strategic power may have increased due to the inter-union coordination seen 
at TUC and other levels. However, for reasons outlined in the context of 
the organisation of the parties in the last chapter, the practical import 
of this should not be exaggerated, either.
The technological sources of union power were more restricted, in 
contrast to organisational sources. The main reason was that, in some 
sectors, alternative sources of supply sprang up, preventing workers from 
controlling output or services to the same extent, and hence easing the 
pressure on the authority from the public. There was also a greater risk of
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permanently losing business and tnerefore jobs in the trading sector. For
example, in local authorities the growth of privatisation and the decline of
direct labour organisations facilitated the circumvention of local
134
authority worker strikes. Elsewhere, the deregulation of transport made
135
alternative means of transportation even more readily available. The PO
workers found their power curbed by the threat of the derogation of the 
136
postal monopoly. These fears were real: steelworkers saw part of their
market share disappear as a result of the strike in 1980.
In addition, certain groups discovered that their ability to disrupt
the economy was less than they had professed. For example, the
steelworkers were unable to stem the flow of imports of steel in their CL1 
137
dispute, and the water workers' strike in CL4 was not as catastrophic as
the unions had threatened, due to automatic pumping mechanisms and the
ability of picket-crossing management to substitute for striking workers.
Of course, this is not to deny that many groups were still powerful
due to their place in the production process. In particular, gas and
electricity workers and the miners appeared to be well-placed, with no
other significant competition, although coal stocks were high. According
to negotiators, this at least partly explained their relatively large
increases. Electricians were also powerful: the NHS electricians were
able to use their might to maintain pay parity with the electrical
138
contracting industry in CL1. Computer operators in the public sector
generally gave their unions significant power, too, such as in the civil 
139
service dispute.
The legal bases of union power were reformed by the Conservative 
Government because, as Sir Geoffrey Howe said in 1978,
every piece of industrial relations legislation passed by the
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Government in the past 4 1/2 years has served only to diminish 
the authority of the moderate and responsible trade unionists and 
strengthen the hand of the militants.140
First, the power to organise was limited. The recognition procedures were
repealed by the 1980 Employment Act. No longer could unions appeal to ACAS
for a ruling when management refused recognition. Moreover, coercive trade
union recruitment through industrial action was no longer protected where
the action was on other premises. Injunctions or damages could be given if
a contract was broken. The Act also placed more limitations on the closed
shop. From 1980 anyone with a deeply-held personal conviction could be 
141
excused. The 1982 Employment Act prohibited action in pursuit of a
closed shop, and required ballots every five years to approve the closed
shop, approval being defined as an 85 per cent majority of the voters, and
142
80 per cent of those entitled to vote, in favour.
Second, the power of unions to take industrial action was concurrently
affected by legislative changes. Fewer actions remained immune. Secondary
action was precluded by the 1980 Act, except where a contract was in force
with the primary employer and the action was likely to prevent or disrupt
the supply of goods or services between the primary and secondary 
143
employers. In addition, the 1982 Act required that issues over which
action was taken had to be related mainly to a trade dispute, not merely
connected with them. Unions were made liable for damages to compensate for
144
economic losses where strikes were not immune under the law. Secondary
145
picketing was also barred by the 1980 Act.
While there is no question that the legal bases of union power 
underwent considerable change, it is unlikely that they amounted to much in 
practice in the context of pay determination between 1979 and 1983. 
Certainly, negotiators did not mention them as important. First of all.
the limits on the power to organise were of little relevance because the
public sector was already heavily organised. The closed shop remained 
largely unaffected, as argued earlier. Second, most action in pursuit of a 
pay claim was still protected. Only those groups which might have engaged 
in secondary action were constrained. Action over government policies, 
such as cash limits or deregulation which could impact on pay, was, 
however, likely to be precluded due to the requirement that the issue 
relate mainly to a trade dispute.
2.4 Summary
In general, bargaining power rested with management, in contrast to 
mid-1979. It was relatively costly for unions to pursue their claims due 
to the threat of unemployment, limited resources, and the prospective costs 
of long negotiations. Management was prepared to press its case since the 
costs of low settlements were not significant in terms of discontent; the 
economic and political costs of action were less than previously; and the 
costs of negotiation for management were likely to be low. Politically, 
the unions were relatively powerless, while management's negotiating 
position was reinforced. Some unions remained strategically powerful, but 
power was lost to management, mainly because of the growth of alternative 
sources of supply, but also because secondary action was curbed by legal 
reforms. The increase in organisational power due to inter-union 
coordination was relatively minor. As a result of these factors, 
managements' main pay criterion, the ability to pay, was recognised, and 
the de-escalation of settlements went ahead.
Unions were relatively powerful in a few authorities where 
unemployment was low; where the financial constraints did not impose large 
negotiation costs and removed the need for political action; and where the
J
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unions possessed organisational and technological strategic power. 
Primarily, this meant the utility industries and the communications sector. 
Consequently, there was more pressure for the implementation of union 
criteria, and hence for higher pay rises, in these corporations.
3. Politics of Wage Decisions
The final factor influencing bargaining strategies, in conjunction 
with pay criteria and bargaining power, was the politics of wage decisions 
within and between unions and management. The balance of attitudes within 
and between the parties was important because it affected the responses 
made to the implications of the preferred criteria and the intensity with 
which bargaining power was used.
3.1 Intra-union politics
Of major relevance to the outcome of negotiations was the attitude of 
the unions towards rectifying perceived injustices. Rarely were the unions 
prepared to use their power to challenge the ability-to-pay argument in 
order to achieve their pay objectives. This is illustrated by the 
relatively small number of stoppages in pursuit of improved pay offers 
under the cash limits policy. Table 8.5 lists the public sector stoppages 
defined as prominent by the DE. It can be seen that there were only eleven 
prominent stoppages over four years, and only the steel, civil service,
NHS, and water strikes were significant in terms of working days lost.
Also, only the steel, water and docks strikes entailed more than five 
working days lost per worker involved.
The main reason why the public sector was relatively docile, and was 
prepared to see normative and calculative advantages in respect for the 
ability to pay, was that the shortfall relative to the pay levels warranted
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by comparability and cost-of-living criteria was not large on the whole, as
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 showed. Although links were broken, relativities within
the public sector did not fall much out of line. Negotiators reported that
146
workers would only fight over a shortfall if it was large. Certainly, 
action was not to be expected, at least given recent historical experience. 
The shortfalls were much larger under the Labour Government's policy in tne 
late 1970s before widespread action occurred. Table 8.6 illustrates this
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Pay Group Dates Workers Involved Working Days
Round Directly Indirectly Lost
CL1 BSC: production workers 2.1.80-7.4.80 138,495 12,505 8,800,000
BTDB : London dockers 15.1.80-22.2.80 4,195 810 41,900
BA: Maintenance eng. 10.1.80-11.1.80 8,500 - 8,500
LA: Scottish teachers 17.4.80-12.6.80 32,100 500 103,000
CL 2 Non- ind. civil servants 24.11.80-1.12.80 50,000 - 15,000
9.3.81-21.8.81 294,000 24,000 867,000
NWC: Manual workers 19.2.81-12.3.81 1,410 - 7,500
BA: Engineering maintenance
and ground staff 23.1.81-23.1.81 15,000 - 15,000
NHS : ambulancemen 10.6.81-16.7.81 13,000 - 25,000
CL3 NHS 14.4.82-15.12.82 180,000 - 781,000
BR: conciliation grades 28.6.82-29.6.82 56,300 - 108,300
CL4 NWC: manual workers 18.10.82-18.10.82 30,000 - 30,000
24.1.83-23.2.83 35,000 “ 766,200
Table 8.5: Prominent public sector stoppages under the cash 1imits pay 
restraint strategy 1979-83 
Source: Employment Gazette, DE, various issues.
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by contrasting tne maximum relative and real losses in pay during each 
strategy since the previous peak levels of relative and real pay. The 
relative pay losses under cash limits pay restraint were less than half the 
magnitude of the losses during Phases 1 to 4 (with just one exception). In 
particular, manual workers saw much less loss, as did public corporation 
non-manual workers, while central government white-collar workers saw 
relatively less improvement. Public sector real pay declined by less than 
half of the Phase 1 to 4 fall, with only two exceptions. Public 
corporation workers and non-manual local authority workers fared relatively 
wel 1.
Moreover, there appeared to be misperceptions of the magnitude of the
losses that were being generated by current settlements. Delayed or staged
payments during the life of an agreement tended to obscure the implications
of the following settlement. It was repeatedly asserted, for example, that
the SCPC awards, which were in most cases staged, made workers less willing
147
to press their demands in the next set of negotiations.
Interacting with the degree of shortfall were a number of other
factors which encouraged worker recognition of the ability to pay and
defused militancy. First, a large number of negotiators believed that
Government exhortation combined with the constant media discussion of the
economy's problems conditioned workers to accept lower pay increases,
148
despite their own self-interest. This was reinforced by the general
mood of the rest of the workforce: it was felt that it was untimely to
149
expect significant increases.
Secondly, there was a reluctance to engage in industrial action while
150
the memories of the "Winter of Discontent' were still fresh. Partly 
this was due to the effects on workers as individuals. For instance, UCATT
traumatic. Partly also, some unions were concerned for their image
which had been tarnished in Phase 4, particularly following media
152
criticism of the conduct and effects of the strikes . The memories of
the UCW were even longer: the spectre of the 1971 strike continued to
153
dampen any thoughts of national action.
Thirdly, in some authorities unitary perspectives of the union-
employer relationship persisted. For example, the industrial civil service
workers were pro-establishment due to their defence work; consequently
154
they were generally unwilling to strike. BWB workers, meanwhile, felt
155
close personal ties to management. NHS professionals would do no more 
than send messages of support to strikers in the NHS dispute. The extent of 
this should not be exaggerated, however, since most groups had a pluralist 
perspective.
Fourthly, some unions did not campaign hard against management pay
proposals because they were more concerned with other issues, particularly
employment. For instance, there was more opposition to privatisation
157
proposals in BGC and BT than to pay offers. UCATT was also too
preoccupied with internal organisational problems to concern itself too
158
deeply with challenging the pay restraint policy.
These factors tended to outweigh the influence of forces working in
the opposite direction, such as an increasingly militant union leadership
and growing unionateness, at least in the public sector as a whole. For
example, the NUR leadership became more militant, not just due to a change
of General Secretary, but also due to a shift in the balance of power on
159
the Executive Committee. NUPE's new General Secretary was more left- 
wing than his predecessor. The IPCS and FDA became more politically-
workers in local authorities were said to nave found the experience
151
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conscious, as was evident in conference motions. The FDA also supported
160
the civil service strike. In the NHS, the administrative and clerical
161
staff side was more militant due to personalities and union policies.
The RCN was also surprisingly aggressive in the health service dispute. As
the chairperson of the RCN's Representative Body said.
The RCN has a reputation as the most conservative, the most 
moderate, the most docile trade union anywhere in the public 
sector. Never before has it so publicly thrown down the 
gauntlet!162
While these changes were sometimes locally significant, they did not lead
to greater public sector militancy overall.
The strikes and militant posturing that were seen were due to
deviations from the general pattern of union politics. First, some
industrial action arose due to unusually large shortfalls in relative pay.
The evidence in Table 8.6 that non-manual workers in central government
were particularly badly hit suggests one reason why the civil service and
NHS strikes occurred. Also, the low offers to steelworkers (2 per cent)
and waterworkers (4 per cent), when the going rates were approximately 20
and 7 per cent respectively, held out the prospect of increased shortfalls.
Other unions felt similarly. One negotiator said that the going rate was 
163
'a test of virility’.
A second cause of militancy was the defence of a deeply-held principle 
that had been abrogated. For example, the civil servants wanted to retain 
the PRU system of pay comparability. The FBU voted to strike if their pay 
link was not reinstated in CL2. The water workers were motivated by the 
principle of pay parity with the electricity and gas workers. To be sure, 
other groups saw pay links broken, but few had the same moral authority.
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Sector Maximum 
Relative 
Phases 1-
Percentage Losses 
pay Real pay 
4 CL1-4 Phases 1-4 CL1-4
All men
Central Government 13.9 6.1 8.9 3.4
Local Authorities 16.0 3.0 11.1 1.6
Public Corporations 6.0 0.7 9.8 1.6 gain
Manual men
Central Government 7.0 1.4 7.2 4.0
Local Authorities 7.3 0.5 12.1 7.2
Public Corporations 7.2 0.5 10.3 0.2
Non-manual men
Central Government 13.4 9.6 9.8 4.3
Local Authorities 15.0 5.1 10.8 1.7
Public Corporations 8.1 1.6 7.9 1.5 gain
Table 8.6: Maximum percentage losses in relative and real pay of public
sector groups under Phases 1 to 4 and under the cash limits pay restraint
policy 1975-83
Notes: 1. Figures are based on April data which include staged catch-up 
increases at the date of payment.
2. Data relate to adult male average gross weekly earnings.
3. Relative pay is calculated with reference to the private sector 
as a whole.
Source: Derived from New Earnings Survey, DE, various issues, and Retail 
Price Index.
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3.2 Inter-union politics
The balance of attitudes between unions in the same authority or on
joint negotiating bodies, (given the organisational structure, including
membership composition and the distribution of power), appeared to be of
only marginal relevance to pay settlements. In some circumstances the
counter-inflationary effort was aided by disunity which prevented a strong
opposition to the ability-to-pay arguments of management. For example, in
the NHS, relations between unions and professional associations were
especially acrimonious. The absence of a common front allowed management
to push through the agreement of its choice on the PT(A) and PT(B) Whitley
Councils, while on the Nurses' and Midwives' Council, the usually less
militant RCN was generally picked off first, making it difficult for the
164
unions to do anything but agree to the same increase. In local
government, the poor relations between the TGWU and UCATT were exploited by 
165
the employers. In public corporations, BR used the rivalry between the
NUR and ASLEF to its advantage, settling with the NUR first, and then
166
seeking to obtain the same settlement with ASLEF, as in CL3. In BSC,
management tended to reach agreement with the more militant ISTC after 
167
other unions. NBC management looked to exploit the differences between
168
the TGWU and the NUR, meanwhile. Although inter-union politics 
prevented unions from using their full strength to enforce their claims, it 
is difficult to see this as having had a great effect on pay increases.
The relatively weak bargaining power of the unions would have limited the 
consequences of a more united approach.
Supporting this, where inter-union politics produced a more 
cooperative approach, sometimes institutionalised in an umbrella
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organisation or a joint committee, the impact on pay settlements appeared
minimal. In the context of the civil service and NHS, the greater
cooperation seen during the strikes added little to offers, as tne
discussion of CCSU and TUC committees showed in the last chapter. The main
teaching unions put their squabbling behind them and agreed on industrial
action in CL3, but the increased offer appeared to be more the result of
169
political pressure, independent of the degree of union cooperation.
Elsewhere in local government, NAFO supported the F8U in tne demand that
the pay link be restored, but it is likely that action by the FBU alone
170
would have been sufficient to achieve the objective.
In sum, it is unlikely that, in the final analysis, the politics of 
inter-union relationships had much effect on the outcomes of negotiations. 
They were more relevant to the style of the process through which 
settlements emerged.
3.3 Management pol itics
Given environmental factors and the organisation of management for
collective bargaining, especially the vertical and horizontal distribution
of power, the attitudes of the holders of key positions influenced
settlement rates. The balance of attitudes in management was markedly less
receptive to union claims than in 1979. In particular, the notion of
public sector employers having to be 'good employers' received less
attention. For example, as has been discussed already, the Government no
longer believed that the pay of non-industrial civil servants should be
related to good outside employers. Local authorities did not attempt to be
in the "first flight of good employers'. In the public corporations sector
unions believed that, for instance, the NWC 'wanted to take the union on1,
171
while BA was 'increasingly hard-nosed’ in negotiations.
However, it would be incorrect to put the whole of the change in
attitude down to management politics. While the stances were generated by
the internal political process, they were not totally independent of otner
factors. In particular, they reflected financial constraints and
and bargaining power. Therefore, some firm stands taken by management
obscured an underlying preference for being a 'good employer1. A common
sentiment expressed by management negotiators was that they wanted to be
good employers because they had to coexist with the staff; indeed, the
172
Burnham employers regarded the staff as their colleagues. Employers in
local authorities, BR and NBC would have liked to have paid more attention
173
to the plight of the low-paid. Most managements in universities, the
NHS and local authorities wanted to reach fair settlements rather than 
174
restrict increases. For instance, the fire employers were genuinely
175
reluctant to attempt to abolish the pay link. The NHS Administrative
and Clerical Council Management Side were disturbed that the link with the
civil service had to be broken, and promised to restore it when 
175
possible.
All the same, part of managements1 attitudes was definitely
independent of environmental factors. First, personalities were important
in some industries. For example, Mr. Ian McGregor was hired as Chairman of
BSC to take harsh financial decisions which obviously affected the
atmosphere of pay negotiations. At BA the Chairman was regarded as 'a
hatchet-man1 by the unions: as they put it, 'if we strike, we will be on 
177
strike forever1. Secondly, some management personnel adopted tough
178
attitudes on the grounds that it was 'the age of the employer1. Sir
Michael Edwardes* adherence to a firm position was admired and seen as an
179
example to be followed. Third, where the Government was concerned,
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pay appeared related to the antagonism felt by members of the Government 
180
towards bureaucracy. More generally, the Government showed a strong
political will to bring settlements down, even where financial constraints
would have allowed higher increases: witness the intervention facilitated
by vertical channels of communication and control mechanisms identified in
the last chapter. The Government's intention was aptly summarised by Sir
John Hoskyns, former policy adviser to the Prime Minister:
Every battle - British Steel, the Civil Sevice, British Rail - 
had to be fought and, if possible, won.181
In these ways, management politics helped damp down the inflationary trend
in public sector settlements.
At the same time, party politics among management side members in
local authorities influenced pay increases, but it was only at the margin
and worked in both directions. In the first two years of the period, the
Labour Party was weakly represented in the local authority associations and
on negotiating bodies. It was believed that pay offers were slightly lower 
182
as a result. After the 1981 elections, the AMA turned Labour, and the
ACC included more Labour members. The increased role of Labour members led
183
to marginally higher increases, it appeared. For example, the CL3 offer
to manual workers of 6.9 per cent by a Labour-dominated Employers' side was
approximately 1 per cent more than the Conservative members had thought was
184
realistically attainable. It was commonly held by some that the AMA
attempted, through negotiations, to unsettle the Conservative 
185
Government.
political attitudes were germane. For example, the attack on civil service
3.4 Politics of negotiations
Settlements levels were further affected at the margin in some cases by
the general disposition of the two sides towards each other and the manner
in which strategic differences were resolved.
High-trust relations continued to characterise the style of most
negotiations, with the result that the outcomes tended to reflect the
environment of pay determination and other strategic factors: there was
little attempt to deceive the other party so as to gain an additional
advantage, for example. Commonly, the practice in public service
negotiations was for management to either offer the maximum amount possible
at the outset, or to engage in two-step bargaining with the initial offer 
186
being revised. It was extremely rare for an offer to be below the pay
factor. In these ways, management was honest and direct about the
realities of the financial position.
However, in certain instances, particularly where the Government was
involved, the degree of trust was less. Behavioural norms were broken, for
instance, in the non-industrial civil service where the Government reneged
on the pay agreement regarding the use of comparability and came to largely
disregard comparisons in spite of the Lord President of the Council having
187
promised that there would still be room for them. In the industrial
civil service, the PRU results were simply overridden in CL1. Deception
was apparent in the CL4 NWC negotiations where the initial offer of only 4
per cent was clearly well below the ability to pay, despite employer
assertions to the contrary; the low offer was in fact made to satisfy a DoE 
188
Minister. There were also instances of the bargaining arena being 
ignored altogether. For instance, BSC and BA both imposed interim freezes 
before negotiating delayed agreements in CL2. Industrial relations were 
soured in each case.
The impact of low-trust bargaining on settlements varied. For
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and water workers to oppose the employers more militantly. The civil
service strike duly resulted in a minor increase in pay and the water
strike was believed to have raised pay increases from a likely 6 per cent
189
without the initial inflammatory offer to over 10 per cent. In other
examples, on the other hand, it might have been more difficult to contain
pay increases had there been more trust in bargaining.
Apart from the general style of negotiators, the tactics used to
resolve differences between the two sides probably had a minor restraining
influence on settlements in a few cases. First, BSC and BR surveyed their
workforces and undermined the credibility of the union negotiators'
position. For example, BSC polled its employees in CL2 over a delayed
seven per cent offer linked to achievement of the Corporate Plan. A 65 per
cent response rate showed a 78 per cent majority in favour, discrediting
the ISTC's opposition, (based in part on a narrower sample survey which
showed a small majority against the offer). The unions were thereby
190
induced to reach a 7 per cent settlement and not hold out for more. BR 
ballotted a sample of its workers about their attitudes towards a strike in 
CL3. A majority were opposed: 66 per cent of NUR members and 53 per cent 
of ASLEF members. BR was therefore confident in its stance in
191
negotiations, and, although the NUR struck, it quickly crumbled.
Second, BR adopted the British Leyland tactic of sending letters to
workers' homes from the Chairman. The letters sent in CL3 asked workers to
defy their unions and not strike, stressing the threat to their own jobs
if union instructions were followed. Notably, emphasis was laid on "family" 
192
and "job".
Third, a growing trend at the end of the period under study was for
example, it appeared to invigorate the non-industrial civil service
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or recommended for acceptance, by union negotiators. While the membership
might still have failed to ratify the deal, it made acceptance more likely
and higher settlements less probable. For example, in CL3 the electricity
manual workers reached agreement only after a strike vote and an improved
offer, so in CL4 the employers made their offer of 5.3 per cent contingent
on acceptance by the negotiators. Similarly, in CL4, the non-industrial
civil service was allowed an increase in the offer from 3.5 per cent to
4.86 per cent only on condition that the General Secretaries undertook to
recommend acceptance to their respective executives. Against the
background of a NALGO delegate conference mandating plans for industrial
action, local authority white-collar workers were given an improvement in
the offer from 4.25 per cent to 4.9 per cent, again on condition of
193
recommendation for acceptance.
4. Summary
While the economic-political and institutional environments constrained 
pay negotiations, their precise effect was mediated by the strategies of 
negotiators. As it turned out, for a range of coercive, normative, and 
calculative reasons, the pay criterion most influential in pay determination 
was the ability to pay. Thus the intention of the financial pay restraint 
policy, in conjunction with other financial constraints, was relatively 
unthwarted. The more restrictive notions of comparability that were used 
also facilitated the de-escalation of settlements, as did the reduced 
emphasis placed on real wage objectives. Bargaining power reinforced the 
implications of the policy. Unions lost economic, political and strategic 
power relative to employers, fortunately especially where the financial
managements to make a final offer only on condition that is was accepted,
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power relative to employers, fortunately especially where the financial
managements to make a final offer only on condition that is was accepted,
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constraints were most stringent. At the same time, the politics of unions, 
management and negotiations tended to dampen pay settlements further.
Union members did not press their demands militantly in most cases because 
real and relative pay shortfalls were not perceived as significant, 
particularly given recent increases during agreements. Workers were also 
influenced by government exhortation and memories of previous strikes. 
Management was generally more aggressive. While partly due to the 
financial background, it reflected a different management ethos too. 
Finally, in a few cases the style and tactics of negotiators had a marginal 
impact on settlements.
In sum, the qualitative evidence presented in Chapters 6 to 8 
indicates that the de-escalation in public sector pay increases was largely 
due to the financial pay restraint policy, but that its effect was highly 
dependent on other, situational factors of an economic-political, 
institutional, and strategic nature. Before considering the theoretical 
and practical implications in Chapter 10, the next chapter contains a 
parallel, econometric, analysis of the causes of the diminution of pay 
inflation across the public sector.
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The econometric analysis of the causes of tne de-escalation in pay 
increases in the public sector under the cash limits pay restraint policy 
has two purposes. First, it is intended to independently cross-check the 
results of the predominantly qualitative analysis presented in the last 
three chapters. Second, it seeks to ascertain the statistical significance 
of the forces at work in a more rigorous manner than the qualitative 
investigation, which necessarily involved more impressionistic assessments 
of significance.
The first section specifies the model and describes the data used.
The results appear in the second section. The chapter concludes with a 
comparison of the econometric results with those of the qualitative 
analysis, to judge the validity of the explanations put forward in this 
thesis.
1. Model Specification and Data
The objective of the analysis is to explain changes in, and
differences in, settlement rates under the cash limits pay restraint
policy, reflecting the fact that the primary focus of the policy was
settlement rates, the element in total increases most likely to add to
costs without accompanying changes in output. The theoretical basis for
the model was as in the theoretical framework of Chapter 2. Variables were
included that varied over both time and space in order to explain both the
diminution of increases and differences in rises between authorities. As a
result, the wage equations were more developed and better specified than in
any previous studies of pay increases. For example, in one relatively
recent study, wage increases were simply made a function of the rate of
1
unemployment and incomes policy dummies. Admittedly, this was a time-
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series study which made it reasonable to drop structural and procedural 
variables which did not vary tremendously over time. However, a more 
sophisticated specification of financial variables and compensation 
criteria would have been advisable to explain the magnitude of increases 
adequately.
The data were painstakingly collected from published sources as well 
as from public sector authorities themselves. In the analysis, attention 
was confined to the first three years of the policy because the official 
data for one potentially important variable, industry unemployment, were 
discontinued after May 1982. There were 91 public service observations and 
96 observations for the public corporations. The data were pooled within 
each of the two sectors in order, first, to capture both the changes over 
time and the differences between authorities, and, second, to create data 
sets large enough to enable the full set of hypotheses to be tested 
satisfactorily. A division was maintained between the services and 
corporations in view of likely differences in the explanation of pay 
increases.
The specification and the data are explained in more detail in the 
following subsections.
1.1 The dependent variable
In order to pick up the impact of settlements, the dependent variable 
was defined as the hourly wage increase for normal hours. It thus included 
hours reductions, but excluded changes in supplementary elements of pay, 
such as in overtime working and productivity. Although supplements changed 
in value due to changes in rates of payment, these were generally directly 
related to basic rate changes; hence the hourly pay measure was a good 
proxy for settlement rates over all pay elements. The variable was put in
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log terms (so that a five per cent increase became the log of 1.05) to cope 
with potential non-linearities in the model caused by large variations in 
the dependent variable. The data were obtained from Incomes Data Reports 
and bargaining units themselves.
1.2 The independent variables
Following the theoretical framework, the independent variables fell 
into three categories: financial, institutional and strategic. They are 
summarised in Table 9.1.
The financial variables for the public services were the pay factor, a 
dummy representing the ability of local authorities to raise rate finance, 
and the ratio of labour to total costs. Financial growth figures were not 
used because, as published, they applied to financial years rather than 
bargaining rounds. In this way, the roles of government financial 
constraints, supplementary finance, and virement between expenditure 
subheads were assessed. The pay factors were known from Government policy 
announcements. The labour-total cost ratios were calculated for current 
expenditure as a whole where virement was easy, but within cash blocks 
where current expenditure was rigidly divided up by cash limits. The data 
were drawn from government expenditure plans in central government, local 
authority financial surveys, and reports from other bodies. It was 
expected that pay settlements varied positively with the pay factor and 
access to rate finance, but negatively with the labour cost-total cost 
ratio, other things being equal.
For the public corporations, government constraints were proxied by 
two measures. One, representing EFLs, was predicated on the reasoning that 
EFLs were designed to affect pay through indirectly stretching internal
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resources, given non-pay expenditures. All other things being equal, the 
more internal investment finance was necessary, the less there was 
available for pay. Hence one proxy adopted for the constraints imposed by 
EFLs was the amount of internal investment finance that was supposed to be 
found, normalised by total operating costs to counteract the effects of 
corporation size. Some figures were negative, such as for British Rail, 
because of unprofitable operations. The second variable attempted to 
capture some of the political pressures on authorities. The square of the 
first variable was used to allow for the possibility that authorities were 
increasingly scrutinised when they used progressively more external finance 
to pay for current expenditure, (that is, when internal investment finance 
was negative), due to greater Government concern with value-for-money and 
economy; and when their investment plans called for progressively more 
internal finance from higher prices, (that is, when internal investment 
finance requirements were large relative to costs). A positive sign was 
therefore expected. The politically-determined constraints themselves 
defied individual and precise quantification. The data for the two 
variables used were from Government expenditure plans and annual reports of 
corporations.
Constraints on internally-generated finance were proxied by market
shares; market trend data were incomplete, and hence were not used. It was
expected that greater market shares facilitated higher pay increases. Some
market share data came from a 1976 National Economic Development Office 
2
report; others were estimated from information in Government expenditure 
documents and annual reports of corporations. It should be said that where 
independent estimates were made, the definition and size of the total 
product market were sometimes open to question, especially in cases of
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Independent variable Proxy Expected sign
Financial constraints
1) Pub!ic services 
Overall budget
Division of budget
2) Public corporations 
Effect of EFLs
Political and 
administrative 
pressures 
Internal finance 
Division of budget 
Institutional environment 
SCPC
Pay link 
Review Body
Arbitration or inquiry 
Longer, shorter or 
staged agreement 
Negotiation strategies
Pay determination criter 
Ability to pay:
general
Pay factor
Local authority rates dummy 
Labour costs as % of total costs
Internal investment finance/
operating costs
(Internal investment finance/
2
operating costs)
Market share
Labour costs as 1 of total costs
Dummy variable 
Dummy variable 
Dummy variable 
Dummy variable
Dummy variable
ia:
Above financial and staged 
agreement proxies
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various
s
Change in industry or occupationpay-employment 
trade-offs 
Comparability
Cost of living
Recruitment & retention
Economic bargaining 
power
Strategic bargaining 
power
Politics:
Willingness to use power
unemployment +
Public sector comparators'
settlement rates in round +
Private sector median settlement
rate in round +
% change in Average Earnings
Index over previous year +
% change in Retail Price Index
over previous year +
% National unemployment rate 
% Industry or occupation 
unemployment rate 
% change in industry or
occupation employment +
Above recruitment and retention
and market share proxies various
% change of national unemployment - 
% change of industry or occupation 
unemployment
Market share +
Value of increases since previous 
settlement date
Table 9.1: Independent variables, the proxies used in the econometric 
equations, and the expected signs
W
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international competition. Also, changes from year to year were unknown. 
Nevertheless, the figures used were approximately correct, and served to 
differentiate between authorities, if not pay rounds.
The possibilities of substitution between expenditure categories were 
represented by the ratio of labour to total costs in each authority. It 
was calculated including capital costs since wider budgetary virement was 
technically possible under the EFL policy and accounting conventions than 
in the public services. Corporation accounts provided the necessary 
information. Once more, as in the public services, the sign on the 
coefficient was expected to be negative.
The institutional context was operationalised as much as possible, but 
organisational and bargaining structure factors had to be omitted due to 
the difficulties of quantification. Dummy variables might have captured 
bargaining levels but were left out because, even where bargaining was 
decentralised, there was still central control. Unit fragmentation could 
have been measured by the number of units in an authority, but that did not 
seem appropriate because the potential for leapfrogging was not simply a 
function of unit numbers. However, most pay determination procedures could 
be included in the wage equations. Dummy variables were specified for the 
occasions when formal comparability criteria were applied, including the 
SCPC settlements and awards based on pay links. Other third-party awards 
by Review Bodies, arbitrations, and inquiries were dealt with similarly. 
Also, where pay intervals deviated from the 12-month norm, dummies were 
employed. In each case, it was expected that, if anything, there would be 
a positive effect on settlement rates.
The strategic variables were inserted in the equation to ascertain the 
importance of negotiation criteria, bargaining power, and union politics in
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the fixing of pay increases.
Of the pay criteria, the ability to pay was assumed to be captured in 
part by the financial constraint variables. They were complemented by two 
otner variables. One was a dummy variable representing instances where 
agreements were staged to increase settlement rates out of a given budget. 
This variable was amalgamated with the pay interval dummy since some of the 
shorter or longer agreements also had the objective of increasing the 
ability to pay: they were not always simply negotiated for the sake of it, 
or to change settlement dates. The other additional variable was a proxy 
for employment-pay trade-offs: the change in the ratio of unemployment in 
the relevant industry or occupation, as revealed by Government figures or 
Joint Manpower Watch data. For both variables, positive coefficients were 
expected.
Three comparability measures were included to assess the role of 
various orbits of comparisons at the due settlement dates. The narrowest 
definition of comparabi1ity was the going rate among public sector 
comparators who had already settled in the round. The field of comparators 
was the group of customary reference points in pay negotiations. The first 
to settle were assumed to look to the private sector going rate. The wider 
orbits of comparisons that were tested were the private sector going rate 
itself, summarised by the median settlement in the pay round at that time; 
and the change in the average earnings index over the previous twelve 
months. The data were obtained from Incomes Data reports, public sector 
authorities and Government publications. Public sector settlements were 
expected to be positively related to pay increases gained by the points of 
comparison.
Other pay criteria were specified too. Real income objectives were
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assumed to be to keep pace with the Retail Price Index between settlements. 
A positive relationship was expected. Recruitment and retention objectives 
were hypothesized to put upward pressure on settlements when the rate of 
unemployment in the economy and in the occupation or industry was low at 
the time of settlement; and when the employment level was increasing, as 
indicated by the change over the previous year. Published Government and 
Joint Manpower Watch data were again used. Productivity arguments could 
not be included due to the lack of data.
Economic bargaining power was encapsulated, first, by the change in 
employment, included already as a pay determination criterion. It was 
assumed that a declining authority would yield less power for the union, 
because the employer could afford a stoppage to a greater extent. Second, 
the national and industrial rates of unemployment, and their rates of 
change, were included on the assumption that high and rising unemployment 
would also increase management resistance, and because the workers may have 
been less prepared to take action in pursuit of their claims. Hence a 
negative relationship with settlement rates was expected. The rate of 
change of industry unemployment, it is true, picked up any employment-pay 
trade-off as well, so its sign showed the net effect of the two 
contradictory influences. Again, official data were used.
Strategic power was indicated by the market share variable. A larger 
market share was assumed to imply fewer alternative sources of supply and 
consequently smaller unemployment effects, upon given increases in pay.
One aspect of union politics was included. The willingness of the workforce 
to use its power (of any kind) was represented by a variable which measured 
the magnitude of pay increases since the previous settlement. It was 
believed that rises would be lower when interim increases were paid.
540
Omitted variables, such as public corporation market trends, 
management and union organisation, bargaining structure, productivity 
changes, and political bargaining power, were implicit in the year dummies 
inserted in the equation. Unfortunately, there were insufficient degrees 
of freedom to include authority dummies to capture cross-section effects of 
these variables.
2. Results
2.1 Pub! ic services
First of all, the full equation, with every variable, was computed.
It appears as Equation 1 in Table 9.2. The significance of certain 
variables, in conjunction with what is known about their trends between 
1979 and 1982, indicates the reasons for the decline in pay settlements and 
for their differentiation across the public services sector.
The financial pay restraint policy appeared to impose significant 
constraints on pay bargaining. Local authorities' ability to raise rate 
revenue did not appear to significantly offset this. High ratios of labour 
to total costs restrained pay settlements, but not to a significant extent.
Institutions in the pay determination process worked against these 
constraints, significantly adding to settlements where pay links, the SCPC 
and Review Bodies were to be found. The same effect resulted from changes 
in the length of agreements. Arbitrations and inquiries were not 
significant inflationary forces, however, in fact apparently having a 
slight depressing effect on increases. In spite of these results, it 
should be remembered that the abolition of the SCPC reduced the 
contribution of the institutional context to public sector pay increases.
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Dependent variable: log (l + (% increase/100))
independent varfabTes: Equation 1 Equation 2
Constant - .352* -.161
(2.078) (1.140)
Pay factor .017* .016
(1.677) (1.587)
L.A. rates .007 .004
(1.111) (.660)
Labour costs/total costs -.043 -.034
(1.325) (1.127)
Pay link .025* .025
(2.959) (2.853)
SCPC .022* .028*
(2.373) (3.148)
Review Body .021* .019*
(2.303) (2.045)
Arbitration/i nquiry -.004 -.003
(.492) (.389)
Shorter/longer/staged agreements .035* .032*
(5.223) (4.894)
Change in ind./occ. .001 .001
unemployment rate
(1.552) (1.541)
Public sector comparability .003* .004*
(3.838) (4.406)
Private sector going rate .011*
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(1.751)
Annual change in Av. Earnings -.0002 -.001
(.137) (.571)
Annual change in RPI .001 .001
(.393)
National unemployment rate .007
(.353)
(1.079)
Ind./occ. unemp. rate -.0003 -.0001
(.227) (.094)
Change in employment of industry .0004 .0003
(.443) (.330)
Change in nat. unemp. rate -.0003 -.0004
(.795) (1.345)
Interim rises -.001* -.001
(1.874) (1.573)
Pay round 1980/81 .141* .105
(1.715) (1.325)
Pay round 1981-82 .175 .133
(1.610) (1.349)
2
R .86 .85
1?2 .82 .81
N 91 91
Table 9.2: Public services wage equations 1979-82 
Note: critical t-value (1-tailed test. 5% level) = 1.67; 
* denotes significant
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Negotiators' ability-to-pay arguments did not purely reflect the 
overall financial constraints. They were circumvented to some extent by 
staging. Where agreements to stage settlements were negotiated, there were 
strongly significantly higher increases (independent of the institutional 
setting). However, given the diminution of staging after CL1, the overall 
addition to wage increases consequently fell as time passed. In addition, 
the fact that the coefficient on the change in industry or occupation 
unemployment was positive and close to significance indicates that there 
was some evidence of a pay-employment trade-off, whereby increases above the 
pay factor were negotiated. The trends in the variable indicate that this 
occurred mainly in CL2 and CL3, reducing pay restraint.
Comparisons, meantime, appeared to favour pay de-escalation. The most 
significant comparisons were limited to the public sector going rate in 
relevant authorities. By definition, there was no attempt to catch up lost 
ground from previous rounds, and the comparators were rarely from a more 
lucrative financial environment. Private sector comparisons also turned 
out to be significant, although much less so. Once more, the concern was 
merely the going rate. The widest orbit of comparison, the authorities 
comprising the average earnings index, was not a significant factor. These 
findings also underline the fact that successful attempts were not made to 
recover lost ground since previous settlements. Not only were comparisons 
limited, but also the reference groups experienced successively lower pay 
increases year by year, reinforcing the de-escalation in public sector pay 
increases.
Other criteria did not appear significant. Real income losses between 
settlements had no significant bearing on settlements. Recruitment and 
retention, likewise, were not relevant, the unemployment rates at national
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and industry level, togetner with employment growth, being insignificant.
Economic bargaining power was not a significant factor in pay 
determination either, in that all the unemployment variables were 
insignificant and the changes in industry unemployment in fact indicated a 
positive relationship, that is, a pay-employment trade-off. Power may not 
have been relevant due to the absence of any willingness to use it: the 
results show that pay rises between settlements significantly reduced the 
rate of pay increase, other things being equal.
Finally, the CL2 and CL3 year dummies were significant or close to 
significance, and positive, indicating that the combined effect of all 
omitted variables was to raise pay settlements. Conceivably, this could 
reflect the other politics of wage determination, political power, bargaining 
structure, or management and union organisation: it is not possible to 
tell.
It should be said that in Equation 1 some of the regression 
coefficients were unreliable due to multicollinearity. The private sector 
going rate was highly correlated with the pay factor, the price index, and 
the aggregate unemployment rate, while the latter was highly correlated 
with the pay factor and the private sector going rate. This made the 
interpretation of the coefficients difficult: a coefficient could not be 
assumed to show the effect of a change in the variable on pay rises because 
other things did not remain the same. Since there were no more available 
observations to draw on, the solution had to be to drop the private sector 
going rate and the aggregate unemployment rate, even at the cost of 
misspecifying the equation. In fact, as Equation 2 shows, little happened 
to the thrust of the results: the pay factor and interim rises became 
insignificant, but only to a marginal extent, while the CL2 year dummy
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became slightly more insignificant. 
2.2 Pub!ic corporations
The full equation. Equation 1 in Table 9.3, was computed first. 
Significant financial constraints appeared to stem from the degree of 
monopoly power in the product market. Lower pay settlements were seen 
where market shares of authorities were smaller, and presumably internal 
finance was more limited. Since intertemporal changes in market shares 
were not known due to a lack of data, it is not possible to say with 
certainty whether the growth of product market competition spurred on the 
de-escalation of pay rises over time. However, the cross-section results 
suggest it was likely. Otherwise, there was little evidence of the cash 
limits pay restraint strategy inducing lower increases, perhaps partly due 
to the problems of operationalising relevant factors. Both the proxies for 
EFLs and political and administrative pressure were insignificant. In 
addition, the scope of substitution between pay and other expenditure was 
not significant.
The only part of the institutional setting of pay determination that 
was significant was the length of the intervals between settlements: when 
shorter or longer than twelve months, pay settlements were higher. Since 
this became less common as time went on, the implication was that pay 
increases were significantly lower as a result. Throughout the period, the 
corporation sector saw less pay inflation from other pay determination 
procedures than did the service sector because the SCPC, pay links, and 
Review Bodies were not relevant to corporation settlements (apart from 
nationalised industry heads' salaries for a short period), and arbitrations 
and inquiries did not have a significant effect on pay outcomes.
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Dependent variable: log (l + (% increase/100))
Independent variables: Equation 1 Equation 2
Constant .083 .046*
(.439) (1.809)
Internal finance/Operating costs -.0002 -.0001
(.625) (.545)
2
(Internal finance/Operating costs) .000001 .0000004
(.810) (.735)
Market share .018* .018*
(2.685) (3.035)
Labour costs/total costs .011 .005
(.694) (.446)
Shorter/longer/staged .010* .010*
agreements
(1.945) (2.534)
Arbitrat ion/inquiries -.004 .006
(.572) (1.103)
Change in ind./occ. unemp. rate -.0002* -.0002*
(1.678) (3.560)
Public sector comparability .002* .002*
(2.093) (2.312)
Private sector going rate -.004
(.299)
Annual change in Av. Earnings Index .001
(.344)
Annual change in RPI .004* .004*
(1.875) (3.504)
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National unemployment rate .001
(.075)
Ind./occ. unemp. rate -.001
(.729)
Change in employment of industry -.0003
(.326)
Change in nat. unemp. rate -.0003
(.727)
Interim rises -.001* -.001*
(1.677) (1.984)
Pay round 1980/81 -.032 -.027*
(.441) 2.313)
Pay round 1981-82 -.060 -.038*
(.604) (2.490)
2
R .91 .91
2
R .89 .90
N 96 96
Table 9.3: Public corporation wage equations 1979-82
Note: critical t-value (1-tailed test. 5% level) = 1.67
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Negotiators recognised tne ability to pay to some degree, but it was
not as influential as in the public services. As noted above, internal 
financial constraints were a significant influence. Staged agreements 
effectively increased the ability to pay to a significant degree until 
their demise accentuated the restraint in pay settlements. There was no 
apparent employment-pay trade-off, however, the sign on the industrial 
unemployment rate indicating the dominance of normal labour market 
pressures.
Comparability, too, contributed to pay control. Short-range 
comparisons of pay increases, made between groups in similar financial 
situations in the public corporation sector, were the only significant 
type. This reinforced the decline in settlements seen elsewhere. Wider, 
potentially more inflationary, comparisons with private sector firms in 
different markets and with average earnings index movements over the 
previous year were not made to a significant extent.
Recruitment and retention were insignificant considerations again, 
neither the unemployment rates nor the industrial employment growth 
rates being significant in the wage equation, the two least significant 
variables also having incorrect signs. However, in contrast to the public 
services, the cost of living played a significant role. As it fell, so did 
settlement rates.
The results also show that in this sector economic bargaining power 
was significant. Although unemployment rates and changes in the rate of 
national unemployment were insignificant, the change in unemployment at a 
disaggregated level was significantly negative, indicating that rising 
industrial unemployment dampened pay rises. Judging from the trends 
in the variable, this was most pronounced in CL2 and CL3. The significance
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of the market share variable also underlines the importance of strategic 
bargaining power. Furthermore, since interim rises were significant once 
more, it seems likely that the willingness of workers to press claims 
vigorously was reduced as interim rises became less common.
As in the earlier analysis, problems of multicollinearity may have 
been present. The private sector going rate was highly correlated with 
public sector comparability, the price index, and the change in the average 
earnings index, while the latter was highly related to the RPI. Hence the 
private sector going rate and the earnings index, two very poor 
explanatory factors, were dropped in Equation 2, along with the 
insignificant (and in some cases incorrectly-signed) labour market 
variables. The basic picture of public corporation pay determination under 
the cash limits pay restraint policy was unchanged, although real income 
arguments became appreciably more significant, and the year dummies became 
significantly negative, indicating that changes in the omitted variables 
helped bring pay settlements down.
Finally, it should be said that the results presented for both the 
public services and public corporations stood up to various 
respecifications of the wage equations using different combinations of 
variables consistent with the theoretical framework, and different proxies 
for the variables.
3. A Comparison of the Qua!itative and Econometric Results
Reassuringly, there is a large measure of agreement between the 
results presented in the last section and those based on written source 
material and interviews. Broadly speaking, the two separate analyses 
concur regarding the qualitative effects of the financial, institutional
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and strategic factors (where measurable). Tney only differ in their 
assessments of significance.
The financial environment was found to influence pay determination in 
both investigations, but the qualitative evidence found that it played a 
more significant part than indicated by statistical criteria. While both 
agreed the public services pay factor was influential, the econometric 
exercise found that local authority rates were faintly insignificant and 
did not find the public corporation EFL or political and administrative 
pressures significant. This may have been due, however, to the lack of 
appropriate proxies for these variables; hence, the role of these variables 
should not be discounted. The ratio of labour to total costs was not 
statistically significant in either sector, but perhaps while not of 
independent importance, it may have facilitated the operation of the pay 
policy. For instance, in the public services it did not differ much over 
time and space, unlike settlements, yet qualitative evidence indicates that 
the high ratio reinforced the implications of the pay factors, preventing 
significant virement. Econometric techniques would not pick this up.
The analyses were more similar in their assessments of the 
institutional and strategic factors. Both agreed that pay rises were 
higher where the SCPC, pay links and Review Bodies operated, and were 
significantly reduced after the SCPC was abolished. The qualitative 
evidence was also able to identify a tightening up of their operation. Pay 
intervals were also agreed to be relevant. The only difference was that 
the qualitative study suspected arbitrations led to more significant 
increases than the econometric results implied.
Apart from the aforementioned differences in the perception of the 
role of the ability to pay, there was substantial agreement over the
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strategic approach of negotiators. Both agreed that staging worked against 
pay restraint as long as it lasted, and noted an employment-pay trade-off 
in the public services enabled higher increases to be negotiated. The 
narrow definition of comparabi1ity in each sector and the trend in the 
cost of living in the corporations sector were noted by botn as aiding de- 
escalation, while recruitment and retention was insignificant. Finally, 
each approach believed interim rises defused militancy, and that 
unemployment affected power in the public corporations, although the 
qualitative analysis concluded that unemployment levels and increases were 
also relevant in the public services.
In view of the general similarity of the findings of the qualitative 
and econometric approaches, it would seem that the argument of the thesis 
is basically sound. It is therefore possible to draw out the conclusions 
and implications with confidence. This is the task of the final chapter.
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PART V
ISSUE 4:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
FINANCIAL PAY RESTRAINT POLICY EXPERIENCE
Chapter 10
Theoretical and Practical Implications
»
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Tne analysis of tne performance of the financial pay restraint 
strategy during the 1979-83 period of office of the Conservative Government 
contains insights of theoretical and practical value. This cnapter draws 
them out. First, the theoretical implications are extracted. A tentative 
model of the impact on pay increases of financial pay restraint strategies 
is built in the light of the experience of the period studied. The 
practical implications are then derived. Light is shed on the efficacy of 
different approaches to pay control. Initially, in the second section, the 
relative effectiveness of the financial form of pay restraint policy and 
previous, more conventional, forms is explained on the basis of the 
research findings. Sections 3 and 4 take a more forward look, examining 
the probable consequences for pay control of different styles of financial 
pay restraint strategy that have been suggested, and also of alternative 
forms of strategy. A final conclusion follows in which the outlook for the 
cash limits pay restraint approach is assessed.
1. A Tentative Theory of t^ he Impact of Financial Pay Restraint Policies 
The objective is to develop a series of general propositions 
concerning the impact of financial pay restraint policies in the UK public 
sector which can be used to help interpret other phases of policy, and also 
to facilitate the assessment of policy options. In view of the broadness 
of these purposes, the model necessarily cannot focus too closely on the 
circumstances of particular authorities or the specifics of particular pay 
rounds, but must remain relatively general. Chapter 2 suggested a broad 
theoretical framework: the empirical findings of the study allow it to be 
refined, permitting the isolation of the major explanatory variables.
Since the factors of relevance are so many and variable it is impossible to 
produce a theory which categorically states how negotiators will behave
under a cash limits pay restraint policy. Instead, a contingency theory is 
appropriate in which relationships are developed between pay increases on 
the one hand, and, major influences on the other.
The essence of the theoretical model should be fundamentally clear by 
now. It is that the impact of a financial pay restraint policy depends on 
the economic-political and institutional contexts in which it operates and 
on how it is interpreted by negotiators in formulating their strategies.
The first proposition is that the financial constraints felt by 
negotiators depend not only on the pay restraint policy pay factor, but 
also on the wider financial setting. The stringency of other government 
constraints on the finance it provides to authorities is relevant, 
particularly the implicit real growth of finance, assuming the pay factor 
is respected. Total budgets are also affected by access to other sources 
of finance, especially rate income and product revenue which depend on rate 
limitation and market liberalisation; and by the ability to spend it free of 
expenditure controls. Flexibility within the budget is restricted by the 
ratio of labour to total costs. Pay is more likely to be controlled when 
governmental and other finance are both subject to firm limits, and the 
proportion of labour costs in total costs is high.
The second element in the theory is that the overall constraints on 
finance are more stringent when the pay restraint strategy is implemented 
in an economic-political environment where: first, the government 
dominates the political market and is disposed towards pay and expenditure 
control, overriding the self-interest of the other actors, such as 
authorities and unions; second, where the government uses its political 
power to force local political submarkets in local authorities and public 
corporations to control finance; and, third, where the economic markets of
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public corporations show downward demand trends.
A third theoretical component is tnat the institutional environment 
influences pay control through the organisation of management and unions, 
bargaining structure and pay determination procedures. Restraint is 
furthered especially by the control of management negotiators by 
government representatives on bargaining bodies, or by other management 
groups, such as the finance function. For union organisation to threaten 
pay restraint there has to be a historically significant degree of inter­
union cooperation. Bargaining structure usually facilitates control when 
bargaining is centralised, bargaining units are consolidated, agreements 
formally control local additions to pay, and the scope of agreements covers 
working practices, enabling unit labour costs to fall. However, management 
control systems can make other structures equally conducive to pay 
restraint. Pay determination procedures are less inflationary when they do 
not establish formal comparability criteria; when third parties recognise 
the ability to pay as a relevant pay determination criterion; when the pay 
round has a weak leader or key bargaining group; and when payment systems 
restrict or control local flexibility.
The fourth and final proposition is that bargaining strategies 
independently influence pay increases. Negotiators' interpretations of the 
financial constraints are extremely important since the constraints are 
rarely binding. For control, the normative and calculative reasons for not 
stretching the constraints too much - particularly the employment and 
service effects - must outweigh the benefits of achieving comparability, 
real wage and other objectives. The government's objectives are also 
likely to be attained to a greater degree if unions are relatively weak, 
especially if the level of, and increase in, unemployment is high; if
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competitive goods and services markets provide alternative sources of 
supply; and if political access to appeal to government is denied or 
fruitless. Finally, union resistance is curbed if the pay of comparators 
is kept roughly in line with that of the public sector and price inflation 
is low; and if government and media exhort the general population regarding 
the seriousness of the economic situation.
It should be emphasised that the highlighting of these conditions for 
pay restraint is not to deny the relevance of other factors, such as the 
type of worker organisation, management politics and bargaining tactics, 
nor to reject other ways in which featured factors might influence pay 
increases, such as the detailed modus operandi of Review Bodies or pay 
links; the objective is simply to draw out the more significant universal 
and enduring characteristics of public sector pay determination that are 
likely to impinge on the performance of a cash limits pay restraint 
strategy.
2. The Relative Effectiveness of Financial and Conventional Pay Restraint
Strategies
The statistical analysis of the performance of the financial pay
restraint strategy in Chapter 5 showed that the counter-inflationary impact
was similar to the best conventional incomes policies of the 1960s and
1970s. However, those comparisons were between periods when the policies
were 'on', that is, when they were operated as desired. To gain a true
impression of the policy effects, a longer perspective is required. When
this is adopted, it transpires that conventional incomes policies tended to
be relaxed or ignored, and 'catch-up' phases ensued, which offset the
1
initial effect to a greater or lesser extent. However, in the period
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studied, the cash limits policy showed no signs of weakening. This was a 
significant difference, particularly as the policy had been in force so 
long, (even excluding CL1 when catch-up awards were still being made to 
correct the anomalies caused by the previous strategy).
This section seeks to explain the overall performance of the two types 
of approach to pay restraint in the public sector. It is helpful to 
analyse the policies within the framework of the policy characteristics 
isolated in Chapter 4: policy design, (the type of general pay rule and 
exceptions), and policy support, (the agreement and enforcement provisions, 
and the use of auxiliary policies). The essence of the explanation is that 
incomes policies tended to fail in the longer term because their design and 
support took insufficient note of pay determination realities relating to 
the state of the economic-political environment, the institutional context, 
and negotiators' strategies. In contrast, the cash limits pay restraint 
policy did not conflict with realities.
2.1 Pol icy design
First of all, there was often a substantial conflict in incomes policy 
between the policy design and negotiators' strategies. Even at their 
latter stages, policies were aimed at individual or group average pay 
increases. As a result, there was little flexibility in the general pay 
rule to allow bargaining objectives to be met within the policy. 
Furthermore, the exemptions to the policy were generally defined in detail, 
while special cases required government approval, where allowed. It was 
not always the case that the groups with the largest claims met the 
criteria in the policy design or were in a position to obtain government 
approval.
The cash limits policy in contrast, was more flexible, being addressed
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to the budgets of authorities. As well as by using rate and revenue 
exceptions to the policy, pay increases above the pay factor could be 
given, since employment and services could be reduced at least to some 
extent. The conflict between the policy and bargaining arguments was thus 
smaller, other things equal.
Consequently, the potential for policy-breaking settlements was 
greater under incomes policy. Once the rules were broken, general respect 
for the policy diminished, and the policy then had to be dropped or 
relaxed, resulting in a catch-up phase.
Compounding this, the general pay rules of incomes policies usually 
revealed a desire to be equitable; to the extent that exceptions were 
allowed, they tended to be relatively small. Problematically for pay 
control, equitable treatment was at odds with the unequal distribution of 
bargaining power. Strong groups were most restrained by the policy, other 
things equal, and were in the best position to rectify the situation. A 
policy breakdown was always possible.
On the other hand, the cash limits approach imposed varying degrees of 
restraint across the public sector which correlated with variations in 
bargaining power. For example, the unions with the greatest economic and 
strategic power were in the energy and utilities sector, where the 
financial constraints yielded the greater freedom of manoeuvre. The 
relatively weak economic, political and strategic bargaining power of the 
unions in the public services, meanwhile, was matched by tight financial 
constraints. As a result, the policy accommodated, rather than was 
threatened by, the distribution of power.
2.2 Pol icy support: enforcement and agreement
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The provisions in incomes policies regarding enforcement, and the 
basis of agreement between government and the parties, tended to conflict 
with the realities of the political environment. The implication was that 
support for the policy was liable to erode. The financial approach was 
better supported by the political context.
First, the government's position in the political market under cash 
limits was powerful. Tne policy could therefore be enforced without undue 
difficulty. Enforcement was sometimes more problematic under incomes 
policies where the government was more prepared to consult the parties, and 
was obliged to change its position, such as under Phase 4 in 1978-79 when 
the policy was modified after union deputations to the Prime Minister.
Second, the government's incomes policy rules regarding notification 
were not always matched by an effective enforcement mechanism in the 
political market. Arrangements for notification were frequently ad hoc and 
required the cooperation of authorities, especially in the public 
corporations sector. Policy circumvention was more likely than under cash 
limits, where the FIS system operated by the Treasury ensured that cash 
limits were respected, in line with government wishes.
Third, where agreement to incomes policies was secured, the political 
market could not guarantee continued support. In terms of the political 
market structure, the TUC had no right to intervene in member unions' 
negotiations, although it could certainly bring pressure to bear. In turn, 
national unions could not easily control the rank and file. In terms of 
attitudes, unions had fundamentally different attitudes compared to 
government: any agreement to pay restraint could only be temporary. Thus 
the preference for enforcement of cash limits, rather than agreement, aided 
the policy's long-term prospects.
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Fourth, the enforcement rules in incomes policy were not always 
reinforced by similar political market attitudes over the long haul. For 
example, electoral considerations sometimes led governments to relax 
policies in the face of opposition. In the case of cash limits, the 
government had the political will to pursue the policy even as the 1983 
election approached.
2.3 Pol icy support: auxi1iary policies
Under incomes policies, the patchwork of auxiliary policies often 
failed to counteract inflationary forces in pay determination. The 
policies operated in conjunction with cash limits were more sensitive to 
this.
First, economic policies operating alongside incomes policies 
frequently allowed unemployment to be relatively low, giving workers more 
power to oppose the pay limitations. This reflected a fundamental 
conflict: one of the central objectives of incomes policy was to reduce 
inflation without creating unemployment, yet low unemployment threatened 
incomes policy. During the cash limits policy, on the other hand, 
persistently high unemployment dampened the economic bargaining power of 
workers.
Second, private sector incomes policy often failed to take adequate
account of the importance public sector negotiators attached to comparisons
with the private sector. Although incomes policies were usually formally
the same for each sector, they tended to have a differential effect due to
the relative inability of public sector workers to take advantage of
productivity exemptions; their smaller opportunity for increases in non-
basic elements in pay due to the make-up of pay; and different degrees of 
2
enforcement. For example, the private sector received relatively greater
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increases under Phase 3 in 1977-/8, fuelling the crisis for incomes policy 
in the following year. Although cash limits pertained only to the public 
sector, monetary policy operating in the private sector, potential problems 
were avoided by the policies being run to produce overall similar 
constraints on pay determination.
Thirdly, as Chapter 7 showed in detail, the cash limits policy induced 
institutional changes in formal criteria, third-party intervention, and 
payment systems that reduced the chances of policy-breaking. Under incomes 
policies this did not tend to happen: the institutions were merely 
suspended. Over time, there emerged a difference between actual pay 
increases and what was implied by the criteria or what would have been 
awarded by third parties. Discontent consequently grew, and threatened the 
policies.
In sum, this analysis points to a number of contradictions between the 
design and support of incomes policy on the one hand, and the realities of 
public sector pay bargaining on the other, that tend to arise in the later 
years of the policy's lifetime. These conflicts did not arise, at least to 
the same extent, during the 1979-83 period of cash limits pay restraint 
policy.
3. The Potential Impact of Variations in the Style of Financial Pay
Restraint Strategies
During the 1979-83 era of cash limits pay restraint, a number of 
suggestions were made by various parties regarding possible changes to the 
modus operandi of the strategy, but were not taken up. This section spells 
out the major ideas and assesses their implications for the counter- 
inflationary effort on the basis of the theoretical model developed in the
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first section. For pedagogical purposes, the proposals are grouped 
according to whether they affect the policy design or the policy support.
3.1 Pol icy design proposals
The suggestions that were made had the objective of making the policy
more flexible. First, it was proposed that the general pay rule - in the
form of the pay factor - should be allowed to vary rather than be fixed.
For example, the TUC wanted cash limits to expand to fund pay increases,
which, it believed, the Government would accept only if determined by 
3
comparability. The Megaw Commission produced similar recommendations:
the Government should as far as possible build realistic 
assumptions into its cash limits based on what is happening in 
the private sector.4
These proposals had their general public expenditure counterpart in the
fecommendations of the Armstrong Committee which urged that general
inflation above the expected inflation rate be reimbursed, but not the
relative price effect, (that is, cost increases peculiar to the public 
5
sector).
The implications for pay control of the introduction of a flexible
general pay rule would probably be to slightly increase wage inflation in
the short run, given that private sector pay showed a tendency to lead the
public sector when stable pay factors operated. Much would depend on the
efficacy of pay restraint in the private sector. A difference of opinion
exists regarding the long run. The argument of protagonists was that there
would be no inflationary breakdown of policy because comparability had been 
6
respected. Against this, the evidence in this study indicates that there 
need not necessarily be an explosion under cash limits if the totality of 
conditions are favourable.
A second plan was to allow more exceptions to the policy. It was
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proposed that more special cases could be financed out of a larger 
7
contingency reserve. Again, there would be increases in pay inflation in 
the short-term, other things being equal. Not only would there be a direct 
contribution, but also the diversity of increases might produce 
counterclaims, particularly as the comparability criterion would likely be 
important within the public sector. In the long run, tnere might be less 
chance of a policy breakdown, but, as before, it might not occur anyway.
3.2 Policy support proposal s
Along with the policy design proposals was often a proposal that
parties other than the Government should agree the pay factor. For
example, the TUC wanted to agree the comparability links with the
8
Government, and hence the pay factor. The National Association of Health 
Authorities, meanwhile, wanted to see Ministers advised by health 
authorities as to the pay factor. Such changes would weaken the power of 
the Government in the political market and, given the interests of the 
parties, would reduce control over pay.
Changes in auxiliary policies were widely suggested. Economic policy 
proposals centered on reflation. While the rationale was not usually 
related to pay determination, the state of demand would obviously influence 
pay by increasing the economic bargaining power of unions. Pay restraint 
would be less successful as a result.
One other economic policy, put forward by the Institute of Directors, 
was the breaking up of public corporations into smaller units. The
10
objective behind the scheme was to 'break the bargaining monopolies.' 
Certainly, the experience of the 1979-83 period indicates that greater 
competition would decrease union economic bargaining power (by increasing
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the elasticity of demand for labour), and would weaken union strategic power 
due to the growth of alternative sources of supply. Lower inflation could 
be expected.
Institutional changes to be discussed included reform of the
organisation of NHS management for bargaining. The National Association of
Health Authorities proposed a policy council, of district and regional
chairmen and the Management Side Whitley Council chairmen, which would
increase coordination in pay negotiations, give evidence to Review Bodies,
11
and advise Ministers on cash limits and service priorities. The 
implication of this would be to improve grass-roots control, but it would 
be unclear whether pay restraint would be hindered or helped since the 
Association favoured comparability, but disapproved of Review Bodies, 
leading to contradictory implications for pay increases.
Decentralised bargaining in the NHS and local authorities was a
12
further aspect of the Institute of Directors' plan for public sector pay.
One rationale was to make groups identify with local market realities, but 
this would be likely to inflate as much as deflate pay increases, according 
to local conditions. The other rationale, to keep disputes small, might 
have been prompted by a desire for weaker unions, but even local groups 
have monopoly power. The impact on inflation would therefore be uncertain.
In any case, as this investigation has stressed, management control mechanisms 
largely determine the efficacy of a bargaining level.
Three main suggestions were made concerning pay determination 
procedures. One was the greater use of Review Bodies. The Government had 
said throughout the period that it wanted to provide long-term pay 
arrangements for nurses given their reluctance to strike in 1979, but did 
not decide to set up a Review Body (for both nurses and PT(A) staff) until
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the end of CL4. The prospective impact on pay was rather small in view 
of the new willingness of Review Bodies to take account of factors other 
than comparability.
Tne second development was the Megaw Commission's proposal for
'informed collective bargaining' in the non-industrial civil service. To
recall, it would be modified form of comparability, with negotiations to
take place within the interquartile range of private sector pay 
14
increases. The effects on pay increases of a system such as that
suggested would probably be to raise them above what they would be under
'free' collective bargaining; but they would be unlikely to exceed the
rises that would be generated by a PRU-type exercise. The planned system
would give the Government a more powerful position than under pay research
it would be able to appoint the Pay Information Board from outside the
civil service to determine comparisons. In addition, consultants would
collect the data, which, it is alleged, might bias the results in the 
15
Government's favour. The unions would not be able to participate in the 
16
analysis of the data. However, the degree of restraint would depend 
largely on the effectiveness of private sector restraint and hard 
bargaining by the Treasury.
Third, several parties suggested the establishment of an independent
17
body to assess comparability for public sector groups. However, this 
would not of itself affect inflation unless negotiators were otherwise 
misestimating the pay of comparators. The only concern from tne point of 
view of pay control would be that comparability would rise in the public 
consciousness making it more difficult to reach settlements based on the 
ability to pay.
Overall, therefore, there have been several reforms put forward. In
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most cases it 
introduction, 
model emphasi 
be judged in 
it is likely 
while a more 
and informed 
situation exi
is difficult to be precise about the likely effect of their 
apart from in a ceteris paribus world. As the theoretical 
ses, the impact of the financial pay restraint policy can onl 
conjunction with the context in which it operates. However, 
that the fragmentation of corporations would aid control, 
flexible policy design, economic reflation, new Review Bodies 
collective bargaining, might frustrate it, compared to the 
sting at the conclusion of CL4.
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4. Imp!ications for Alternative Forms of Pay Restraint Strategy
Three major alternative pay restraint strategies received publicity 
in the 1979-83 period: conventional incomes policy; a national economic 
forum; and a tax-based incomes policy. None of these were directed solely 
at the public sector, but each carried implications for it. This section 
analyses whether they would be likely to be successful instruments of pay 
restraint.
First, incomes policy was suggested by certain observers and
18
politicians, such as the Labour Party's Joel Barnett. However, as
discussed with reference to past policies, incomes policies tend to have
only a short-term effect. This was acknowledged by some: for example, the
twelve unions, which recommended an approach similar to the NBPI policy soon
after Phase 4 broke down, admitted it was a case of 'try, flop, learn a bit, 
19
try again'.
The notion of an economic forum was suggested both by the
Conservatives prior to the 1979 election and by the TUC and Labour Party in 
20
1983. Although the broader role of the forum differed markedly in the 
plans, its immediate role was more similar: the prospects for the economy 
were to be discussed and the implications for pay determined. There are a
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number of reasons why such an approach may not guarantee pay control.
First, the political market structure would leave the government in a 
vulnerable position if there was any negotiation of the economy's ability 
to pay. Second, there would be no assurance that individual unions would 
agree to the terms reached by the TUC because of their independent status 
in the political market and potentially different views. Third, there may 
be a conflict between the features of the institutional context and of 
bargaining strategies on the one hand, and the decision of the forum on the 
other.
The tax-based incomes policy suggestion took many forms. One variant,
put forward by Layard and Jackman, established a norm for pay increases
above which employers paid tax penalties, except in the public services
where awards were made on the basis of the norm plus any catch-up required
21
due to the private sector exceeding the norm the year before. Another 
plan, suggested by the leader of the Social Democratic Party, visualised 
the private sector controlled by an inflation tax, while public sector 
workers received increases equal to those of the private sector the
21
previous year, plus or minus an amount representing changes in efficiency.
In both conceptions the catch-up increases, although a year late, would be 
likely to add to wage inflation in the public services compared to a cash 
limits-based policy where comparability was denied. Against this, however, 
the Layard policy would control the public corporations assuming the taxes 
could not be totally passed on to the consumer. More indirectly, the use 
of a norm would be a more assured means of controlling private sector pay 
than monetary policy, and hence of reducing the potential for relativities 
claims and the escalation of pay. At the same time, just like cash limits, 
exceeding the norm would not constitute breaking the policy: the respect
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of other groups for the policy would be maintained. The net effect of 
these implications is uncertain.
It appears, therefore, that the incomes policy and economic forum 
ideas would not be viable options for public sector pay restraint, while 
tax-based incomes policies would not clearly improve on the cash limits 
approach.
5. The Outlook for Financial Pay Restraint Policies
In conclusion, having determined that cash limits pay restraint 
policies lowered public sector pay inflation, two questions that spring to 
mind are, first, will the policy effects be maintained even longer?; and, 
second, should the policy be retained?
With respect to the first issue, at the end of CL4 the conditions were 
ripe for the continued containment of inflation. Over the longer term, 
counter-inflationary success might be weakened by economic policy changes 
or an export-led economic upturn which reduces unemployment and gives 
unions more power. Also, if monetary policy ceases to have relatively 
similar effects as cash limits, upset private-public relativities might 
generate higher claims. Finally, of course, a change of government could 
change the design of, or support for, the policy, and hence pay increases.
The normative question of whether the cash limits pay restraint policy 
should continue cannot be answered strictly on the basis of the evidence: 
value judgments would have to enter. Suffice it to say, whatever the 
verdict, it is important to analyse not only the benefits of reduced 
inflation, but also the costs, such as in terms of unemployment or reduced 
services caused by the policy, and the need to undermine the economic 
bargaining power of the workers. Financial pay restraint may work; but so 
does hanging.
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